Obbligazioni societarie GM, Ford, Chrysler: il 3D dell'automotive USA (2 lettori)

Yunus80

Del PIG non si butta nulla
L'argomento esposto non è affatto campato per aria... vero che il parco bovi ha la memoria molto corta, ma veramente si troverà ancora gente disposta a prestare per scadenze 30ennali sapendo che può bastare un semplice colpo di spugna per ripartire da zero?

Beh, a dirla tutta, temo di sapere la risposta... :rolleyes:
 

troppidebiti

Forumer storico
tutti parlano della cina come fosse il nuovo eldorado

Toyota recalls 688,314 cars


:rolleyes::rolleyes::rolleyes:

Toyota will recall 688,314 sedans made by its two Chinese joint ventures because of a flaw in their electric window controllers. This is the largest auto recall in China since 2004, the Beijing Times reported today. The recall includes 384,736 Camry models and 22,767 Yaris models made by Guangzhou Toyota between May 15 and Dec 31 of 2008, the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine said in an announcement on its website posted on Aug 23.
 

paologorgo

Chapter 11
Edmunds.com Forecasts August Auto Sales: Predicts Year’s Highest SAAR, Notes Unprecedented Sales Volatility


SANTA MONICA, Calif.--(BUSINESS WIRE)--This month's new vehicle sales (including fleet sales) are expected to be around 1.17 million units, nearly a six percent decrease from August 2008 but up nearly 18 percent from July 2009, according to Edmunds.com, the premier online resource for automotive information.
Edmunds.com analysts predict that August’s Seasonally Adjusted Annualized Rate (SAAR) could be just over 13 million, this year’s highest by far. However, a week-by-week analysis reveals that this summer has been the industry’s most volatile period in history, due to the government’s Car Allowance Rebate System (CARS), also known as Cash for Clunkers.
“Cash for Clunkers sent the sales rate on a wild roller coaster ride,” said Edmunds.com Senior Analyst Jessica Caldwell. “The SAAR surpassed 19 million in late July, bounced around in the 15 million range early in August and has fallen to around eight million currently. Ending August on such a low note does not bode well for September.”
Edmunds.com analysts note that the unusual inventory shortage faced by many dealerships could mean that deals are stuck in the pipeline and, when accounted for, will move the numbers significantly.
August 2009 had 26 selling days, one less than last August 2008. (The chart below sets forth other unadjusted and adjusted comparisons.)

vedi allegato

“Hyundai and Ford were the biggest winners in the Cash for Clunkers contest, experiencing significant growth in August sales compared with a year ago,” said Edmunds.com Senior Analyst Michelle Krebs, whose analysis of Edmunds.com’s August sales forecast can be found on AutoObserver.com. “This is likely to be a record month for Hyundai, beating their prior sales record by a mile – maybe as much as 40 percent.”
“In contrast, some automakers couldn’t really make Cash for Clunkers work for them, and their August sales suffered as a result,” Krebs noted, “Chrysler and GM – both hurt by extended factory shutdowns during their Chapter 11 proceedings – had limited inventory to feed Cash for Clunkers, while high-end automakers didn’t have the right products for these buyers.”
The combined monthly U.S. market share for Chrysler, Ford and GM domestic nameplates is estimated to be 42.2 percent in August 2009, down from 45.7 percent in August 2008 and down from 44.2 percent in July 2009.
Edmunds.com predicts Chrysler will sell 86,000 units in August 2009, down 22 percent compared to August 2008 and down 3 percent from July 2009. This would result in a new car market share of 7.4 percent for Chrysler in August 2009, down from 8.8 percent in August 2008 and down from 8.9 percent in July 2009.
Edmunds.com predicts Ford will sell 185,000 units in August 2009, up 22 percent compared to August 2008 and up 13 percent from July 2009. This would result in a new car market share of 15.9 percent of new car sales in August 2009 for Ford, up from 12.2 percent in August 2008 but down from 16.4 percent in July 2009.
Edmunds.com predicts GM will sell 222,000 units in August 2009, down 28 percent compared to August 2008 but up 18 percent from July 2009. GM's market share is expected to be 19.0 percent of new vehicle sales in August 2009, down from 24.7 percent in August 2008 and down from 18.9 percent in July 2009.
Edmunds.com predicts Honda will sell 137,000 units in August 2009, down 7 percent from August 2008 but up 19 percent from July 2009. Honda’s market share is expected to be 11.8 percent in August 2009, flat compared to 11.8 percent in August 2008 and up from 11.5 percent in July 2009.
Edmunds.com predicts Hyundai will sell 108,000 units in August 2009, up 63 percent from August 2008 and up 44 percent from July 2009. Hyundai’s market share is expected to be 9.3 percent in August 2009, up from 5.3 percent in August 2008 and up from 7.5 percent in July 2009.
Edmunds.com predicts Nissan will sell 89,000 units in August 2009, down 18 percent from August 2008 but up 25 percent from July 2009. Nissan's market share is expected to be 7.7 percent in August 2009, down from 8.7 percent in August 2008 and up from 7.2 percent in July 2009.
Edmunds.com predicts Toyota will sell 209,000 units in August 2009, down 1 percent from August 2008 and up 20 percent from July 2009. Toyota's market share is expected to be 18.0 percent in August 2009, up from 17.0 percent in August 2008 and up from 17.6 percent in July 2009.

http://www.businesswire.com/portal/...d=news_view&newsId=20090827005824&newsLang=en
 

Allegati

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Imark

Forumer storico
Le incognite sono ancora tantissime, sebbene Fitch disegni un percorso di possibile uscita dal tunnel. In realtà, letti fra le righe i dettagli della situazione contingente continuano a mostrare una situazione in linea con un rating estremamente basso.

Fitch Revises Ford/Ford Credit Outlook to Stable http://www.fitchratings.com/creditdesk/ratings/issuer_content.cfm?pr_id=505231

26 Aug 2009 3:12 PM (EDT)

Fitch Ratings-Chicago-26 August 2009: Fitch Ratings has revised the Rating Outlook on Ford Motor Company (Ford) and Ford Motor Credit Company to Stable from Negative. In addition, the Issuer Default Rating of Ford is affirmed at 'CCC'. The change in the Outlook is based on the solid execution of Ford's restructuring program, a competitive product lineup with a healthy level of new and refreshed product introductions over the next several years, realignment of the company's manufacturing footprint, and diminished liquidity concerns.

A return to positive cash flow is not expected over the next 12 months, but is probable upon the industry reaching more normalized sales levels above 12 million light vehicles.

Although Fitch projects a slow rebound in industry sales (consistent with a weak economic recovery), signs of stabilization in the economy, coupled with replacement demand, indicate that industry sales should reach this level of annualized demand in late 2010 or 2011.

Improvement in the company's Outlook and rating will be driven by the pace and mix of the rebound in industry sales, steady execution of the company's product introductions, continued discipline in the company's production/inventory strategy, further margin improvement and competitive access to capital at Ford Credit.

These trends are largely pointing in the right direction, but have been overwhelmed by general economic and industry conditions. The behavior of competitors in production and pricing could also influence the timing of any improvement in the outlook or rating. Ford's product lineup continues to perform well, and the company is positioned to maintain or increase retail share over the next several years with new products and an aggressive refreshening program.

Ford has achieved relatively broad competitiveness across market segments, including smaller product segments where industry sales have been trending. Ford's Focus and Escape were two of the top eight vehicles in the Cash for Clunkers program, while the refreshed Fusion continues to perform well in the competitive mid-size sedan market.

Two new product introductions should lead to incremental share gains: the Fiesta in the sub-compact market where Ford has not recently had a U.S. product, and the new Taurus in the large sedan category, where Ford has not been competitive for some time. Ford's quality improvement has been well-documented and together with Ford's ability to avoid taking government aid, may benefit Ford's near-term retail share.

Although Fitch is not projecting a rapid rebound in industry sales in 2010 (particularly with the pull-forward from the Cash for Clunkers program), a stronger-than-expected rebound in industry sales to above the 12 million light-vehicle sales level and improvement in housing construction could lead Ford to operate at a cash- flow breakeven point in the second half of 2010.

Weak employment, high foreclosure rates, higher savings, shaky consumer confidence and the impact of the Cash for Clunkers program, however, all point to a modest recovery in industry sales over the near term.

A Fitch upgrade of Ford would be driven by a combination of the following:

--Industry sales rebound to an annual 12 million sales level more quickly than currently forecast;
--Ford's products continue to hold or gain share;
--Inventory management at Ford and the industry allows Ford to hold or improve product prices;
--A clear path to positive free cash flow is projected;
--Liabilities continue to be managed or addressed, including the maturity of the company's bank agreement;
--Independent access to capital by Ford Credit improves.

A downgrade could result from some combination of the following factors:

--U.S. industry sales revert to further declines in the event of a double-dip recession;
--A market disruption in oil prices which sends gas prices sharply higher and drives consumers away from vehicle purchases;
--A breakdown in the supply chain resulting from further supplier bankruptcies and lack of access to capital, or from dislocations caused by the dissolution of a major competitor;
--Inability of Ford Credit to obtain financing on competitive terms.

Ford has made significant reductions in its fixed cost structure, although step-changes to its headcount, wages and benefits have largely been completed. Realization of recent actions should continue through year-end, with a full run-rate of savings expected in 2010.

Future cost savings will be achieved largely through more standard (but challenging) efficiency and productivity gains, including materials savings.

Upon completion of the conversion of several truck plants, Ford's manufacturing footprint will be well-aligned with near-term product plans, supporting an expected improvement in efficiency and capacity utilization.

New product introductions and higher volumes through existing assembly plants, plus increased platform sharing, should provide material improvement in operating margins, also aided by the ability to add lower-tier hourly wage earners.

Ford's ability to navigate recent events - the plummet in industry sales, consumer migration to smaller vehicles, multiple plant closures, a dramatic reduction in its workforce, the bankruptcy of Chrysler and GM, diminished retail financing capacity and distress in the supply base - while still introducing competitive, improved-quality products and accelerating its product cadence, has been impressive.

A primary driver of operating performance over the near term will be the high-margin large pickup segment, which constituted 10.4% of U.S. light-vehicle unit sales through August 2009, and 24% of Ford's non-Volvo unit deliveries.

This market has suffered a decline of more than 50% in production from 2006 levels, and sales volumes remain mired below replacement demand.

Demand is expected to recover slowly due to lingering weakness in the housing market, but the potential trough of the housing market should signal improved demand and consolidated margin performance as a result.

From a competitive standpoint, Ford and GM could be poised to gain pickup share from Nissan (weak market presence) and Chrysler (the impact of its bankruptcy on sales and capital investment capacity).

Over the longer term, it remains to be seen what Toyota's plans in the full-size pickup segment will be. Although a withdrawal from the pickup truck market is not expected, Ford and GM's comparative strengths in brand and pickup truck quality, the lack of global platform scale, and the vast market share advantage of the Detroit 3 call into question Toyota's ability to earn an adequate return on the capital investment in this platform over the long term.

Ford's plant consolidation, cost reductions, product introductions and operating strategy have aided a disciplined production/inventory balance in 2009, and allowed Ford to achieve pricing gains that have benefited operating results.

This discipline will lead to production boosts in the third and fourth quarter of 2009 from levels that were below demand for much of the year, although it remains to be seen whether the industry's history of over-production and price discounting will allow Ford to consistently adhere to this strategy.

Ford has also committed substantial resources to the support of its supply chain, a cost that is unlikely to abate in 2010.

Access to capital remains limited or non-existent for a large part of the supply base, and further bankruptcies will be a certainty. It has been noteworthy that through the bankruptcy of numerous Tier 1 and lower-tiered suppliers, as well as the bankruptcy of Chrysler and General Motors, the production process has been surprisingly well-managed with very few disruptions (although aided by the substantial injection of funds by the Federal government).

As the supplier industry consolidates and business migrates to financially viable suppliers, the reduction in support costs for Ford could be material in the outer years. However, the industry has been supported by multiple layers of Federal government support, including direct capital injections into General Motors and Chrysler (as well as their finance arms), supplier aid, the TALF program and more. The reduction or termination of these actions will place additional burdens on the industry, as self-sufficiency remains uncertain.

Liquidity remains sufficient to finance reduced operating losses over the near term, even if a slow recovery pushes out the timing of the company's cash-flow breakeven point.

As of June 30, 2009, Ford had cash of approximately $21 billion, with a reduced rate of outflow projected for the second half due to increased production and working capital inflows.

Fitch estimates that if U.S. industry sales rebound only to 11 million light vehicles in 2010, that Ford's cash drain from operations would be $5 billion or less, depending on mix.

Primary risks to this forecast include a U.S. relapse in economic conditions, a sharp escalation in gas prices, the collapse of the supply base, or a lack of retail financing capacity. In addition to cash on hand, sources include future funding from the government for energy programs, modest asset sales, potential securities issuance, and dividends from Ford Credit. These sources are deemed sufficient to fund cash drains from operations even if a recovery in industry sales is deferred.

Shrinking U.S. production has also modestly lowered the cash level needed to operate the business to below $10 billion. Liquidity in 2009 and into 2010 is expected to benefit from working capital inflows associated with higher production volumes, and modest asset sales. In addition, liquidity will benefit from an expected $5.9 billion in federal government loans under an energy-efficiency program.

Ford's maturity schedule is centered on the December 2011 maturity of its $10.7 billion bank agreement. Given current market conditions in the leveraged finance market, the company's recent performance and the state of Ford's collateral, it is probable that the company could "amend and extend" this facility in the existing amount (although at higher pricing).

This would mitigate refinancing risk and address the liquidity risks associated with a double-dip recession and the resulting step-down in industry sales. Ford executed a voluntary debt exchange in 2009, removing $9.9 billion in debt ($7.7 billion in unsecured debt and $2.2 billion in secured debt) and $500 million in interest costs.

This debt reduction, however, was effectively replaced by the drawdown of its revolving credit facility.

Over the past several years, Ford has also completed several equity-for-debt swaps and a straight equity issuance, thereby managing the growth in its liabilities and somewhat moderating the damage caused by severe cash drains.

Ford's willingness to use equity is likely to continue. The interests of equity and bondholders have recently been very much aligned, as both sides have benefited from the issuance of equity and the boost in liquidity, although it remains to be seen how long this will last.

Fitch expects that Ford will continue to issue equity over the next 12 months as market conditions permit, and will likely issue equity to finance its VEBA obligations to the full $6.5 billion permitted. However, even with periodic equity issuances, any balance sheet improvement over the near term is expected to be modest.

Although General Motors and Chrysler have realized substantial access to capital from various government actions, Fitch does not believe that this represents a competitive disadvantage to Ford from a balance sheet perspective.

To the contrary, Fitch views Ford and Ford Credit's periodic access to equity and the debt markets as a distinct competitive advantage. Over the longer term, balance sheet strength or deterioration will be driven by operating results, and Fitch views Ford as better-positioned in this respect than its Detroit-based competitors. The retention of Ford Credit remains a positive.

Ford's underfunded U.S. pension plan will require incremental contributions over the next several years, although there are no contributions required in 2010. Deferral of these contributions, however, will result in larger funding gaps in outer years, and will remain a material claim on cash flows. The VEBA agreement with the UAW, changes to wage and benefit levels, and reduced employment levels have materially reduced the long-term risks and costs associated with legacy obligations.

Ford has shown steady improvement in market share in Europe, but operating results will remain challenging through 2010 due to weak economic conditions and a sharp 2010 payback resulting from various aggressive 2009 Cash for Clunkers programs throughout Europe. Results from Latin America and Asia are not expected to be material users or generators of free cash flow over the next several years.

Over the longer term, tighter regulations around the globe addressing fuel-efficiency, emission standards, other environmental, safety and urban planning are all likely to pressure profitability by limiting or skewing demand, as well as escalating capital investment requirements.

These factors, along with changing lifestyles indicate that global overcapacity is likely to be a fundamental characteristic of the industry over the long term, pressuring margins and leading to regular failures among competitors. As technologies and regulatory requirements multiply, Ford may continue to be capital constrained versus a number of transplant competitors.

The ability of Ford Credit to finance itself and its customers, independent of government sponsored programs and at economically competitive rates will be a factor in future upgrades. Fitch has revised Ford Credit's senior debt ratings following changes in Fitch's rating definitions published in March 2009, which suggests a baseline rating of 'B' for a 'CCC' IDR with an 'RR2' Recovery Rating (RR). Fitch continues to believe potential recoveries are at the lower end of the 71%-90% recovery range.

In the event of a bankruptcy, unsecured bond recoveries at Ford are expected to be negligible. The senior secured loans are currently rated 'RR1' (90%-100% recovery), based on a restructured, going-concern North American enterprise value plus certain international operations and joint ventures (particularly those in Latin America and China).

According to Fitch methodology, an RR of 'RR1' would typically translate to a rating of 'B+'. However, in the event of a stress scenario, recent industry events suggest that the corresponding plunge in asset values would result in less than full recovery, even though Ford's secured borrowings are subject to a borrowing base.
 
scusate

Le incognite sono ancora tantissime, sebbene Fitch disegni un percorso di possibile uscita dal tunnel. In realtà, letti fra le righe i dettagli della situazione contingente continuano a mostrare una situazione in linea con un rating estremamente basso.


Scusate se mi intrometto nella discussione (che però a quanto pare langue, da un po' di tempo). Ho letto le 140 pagine del tread (ebbene sì, sorvolando su parecchi articoli in inglese però) e ho visto che siete molto informati in merito all'argomento. Mi permetto di chiedere qualche chiarimento, riguardo alle novità sui bond GM. SEmbra che entro il 9/11 si debba presentare la famosa "proof of claim", almeno a quanto si dice sul sito http://www.motorsliquidationcreditorscommittee.com/

Ora, io ho un po' di obbligazioni GM in euro, scadenza 2033. cosa dovrei fare? La mia banca a domanda non ha ancora risposto. Potreste aiutarmi voi e indirizzarmi nel modo adeguato? Mi spiace, ma non ho mai avuto esperienze di fallimenti manco in italiano, figuriamoci in inglese.
Scusate ancora il disturbo.
 
Ultima modifica di un moderatore:

paologorgo

Chapter 11
Scusate se mi intrometto nella discussione (che però a quanto pare langue, da un po' di tempo). Ho letto le 140 pagine del tread (ebbene sì, sorvolando su parecchi articoli in inglese però) e ho visto che siete molto informati in merito all'argomento. Mi permetto di chiedere qualche chiarimento, riguardo alle novità sui bond GM. SEmbra che entro il 9/11 si debba presentare la famosa "proof of claim", almeno a quanto si dice sul sito http://www.motorsliquidationcreditorscommittee.com/

Ora, io ho un po' di obbligazioni GM in euro, scadenza 2033. cosa dovrei fare? La mia banca a domanda non ha ancora risposto. Potreste aiutarmi voi e indirizzarmi nel modo adeguato? Mi spiace, ma non ho mai avuto esperienze di fallimenti manco in italiano, figuriamoci in inglese.
Scusate ancora il disturbo.

ciao damya, benvenuto sul forum.

sopravvivere a 140 pagine non deve essere stato facile... ;) - la discussione un po' langue perchè non trovo veri argomenti che aiutino nella valutazione della nuova GM (Ford è sempre, ingiustamente, stato argomento marginale nel 3d...), visto che per il momento di financials non ne vengono resi disponibili, ed in corte succede (relativamente) poco...

veniamo alla tua domanda. è facile rispondere a quella che non fai. I detentori di bond in US$ non dovranno fare nulla. Il proof of claim e gli interessi della categoria verranno curati dall'indenture Trustee.

The following persons or entities are not required to file a Proof of Claim
on or before the applicable Bar Date, with respect to the claims described
below:

any person or entity whose claim is limited exclusively to the
repayment of principal, interest and other fees and expenses on or
under any agreements (a “Debt Claim”) governing any debt
security issued by any of the Debtors pursuant to an indenture
(together, the “Debt Instruments”) if the indenture trustee or
similar fiduciary under the applicable indenture or fiscal and
paying agency agreement files a Proof of Claim against the
applicable Debtor, on or before the Bar Date, on account of all
Debt Claims against such Debtor under the applicable Debt
Instruments

Wilmington Trust Company farà tutto, come ha scritto sul suo sito (in cui puoi anche controllare l'elenco dei bond).

Q: Do I need to file a proof of claim? A: As a bondholder you will be represented by Wilmington Trust Company as Indenture Trustee. This will include the filing of necessary documents in the courts, including proofs of claim.

https://www.wilmingtontrust.com/gmbondholders/faqs.html

vedi per brevità l'allegato con l'elenco dei bond a questo link.

Bond in Euro. io non avevo mai guardato il prospetto informativo, se devo essere sincero. Il fatto che, al momento del filing, Wilmington e Deutsche fossero indicati come primo e terzo maggior creditore mi avevano fatto pensare che Deutsche svolgesse la stessa funzione. Mi pare però che sia unicamente Fiscal Agent, ed infatti, vedi allegato, solo Wilmington viene espressamente chiamato Indenture anche nel primo filing di fallimento.

>>When bonds are issued under fiscal agency agreements, there is no trustee to represent holders’ interests. This means that thousands of bondholders around the world need to file proofs of claim. Many small bondholders, especially those outside the United States will not know how to do this (or even that they need to do this) and will not file claims at all.

questo è tratto da un filing fatto per il fallimento Lehman, situazione diversa per certi versi (complicata dal fatto che la holding USA in Chapter 11 è solo garante del debito eventualmente non rimborsato dalla filiale europea, facente parte di una procedura fallimentare distinta, per riassumere in maniera grossolana...), ma simile per altri. Le banche e le associazioni (tipo ABI) avevano presentato opposizioni per evitare il problema che ogni singolo obbligazionista dovesse presentare il proof of claim.

Quindi la mancanza dell'Indenture Trustee significa che non esiste un rappresentante dei bondholders, ai fini dell'insinuazione al passivo.

Il 14 Settembre, in corte, viene discussa la richiesta di GM di stabilire le regole per il proof of claim. Eventuali obiezioni debbono essere presentate entro domani. Ad adesso non ne ho viste relative a questo argomento. Va comunque ricordato che l'avvocato di GM è lo stesso che, nel caso Lehman, ha visto il giudice decidere di autorizzare degli "enti" (banche, etc.) ad effettuare l'insinuazione in nome e per conto dei clienti di cui detengono i titoli, se lo desiderano.

a hearing will be held before the
Honorable Robert E. Gerber, United States Bankruptcy Judge, in Room 621 of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”), One
Bowling Green, New York, New York 10004, on September 14, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. (Eastern
Time),

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that any responses or objections to the
Motion must be in writing ... so as
to be received no later than September 9, 2009, at 4:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) (the “Objection
Deadline”).


/s/ Stephen Karotkin
Harvey R. Miller
Stephen Karotkin
Joseph H. Smolinsky
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153
Telephone: (212) 310-8000
Facsimile: (212) 310-8007
Attorneys for Debtors
and Debtors in Possession

Aspettiamo la discussione in corte (dopo alcuni giorni sono disponibili i transcripts...) e vediamo cosa viene deciso, prima di pensare al peggio (dovere fare l'insinuazione come singolo obbligazionista).

Una ultima nota: mentre i bond in $, grazie all'insinuazione dell'Indenture, resteranno disponibili per vendita/acquisto, la procedura "singola" o delle banche potrebbe (condizionale...) rendere i bond indisponibili fino al conguaglio (assegnazione azioni/warrant).

09/02/2009 3940 Motion to Approve/DEBTORS' MOTION FOR ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 502(b)(9) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND BANKRUPTCY RULE 3003(c)(3) ESTABLISHING THE DEADLINE FOR FILING PROOFS OF CLAIM (INCLUDING CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 503(B)(9) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE) AND PROCEDURES RELATING THERETO AND APPROVING THE FORM AND MANNER OF NOTICE THEREOF (Objection Deadline: 09/09/2009 at 4:00 p.m.) filed by Stephen Karotkin on behalf of Motors Liquidation Company with hearing to be held on 9/14/2009 at 09:00 AM at Courtroom 621 (REG) Responses due by 9/9/2009 (Karotkin, Stephen) (Entered: 09/02/2009)
 

Allegati

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frankiemachine

Mr. Tentenna
ciao damya, benvenuto sul forum.

sopravvivere a 140 pagine non deve essere stato facile... ;) - la discussione un po' langue perchè non trovo veri argomenti che aiutino nella valutazione della nuova GM (Ford è sempre, ingiustamente, stato argomento marginale nel 3d...), visto che per il momento di financials non ne vengono resi disponibili, ed in corte succede (relativamente) poco...

veniamo alla tua domanda. è facile rispondere a quella che non fai. I detentori di bond in US$ non dovranno fare nulla. Il proof of claim e gli interessi della categoria verranno curati dall'indenture Trustee.

The following persons or entities are not required to file a Proof of Claim
on or before the applicable Bar Date, with respect to the claims described
below:

any person or entity whose claim is limited exclusively to the
repayment of principal, interest and other fees and expenses on or
under any agreements (a “Debt Claim”) governing any debt
security issued by any of the Debtors pursuant to an indenture
(together, the “Debt Instruments”) if the indenture trustee or
similar fiduciary under the applicable indenture or fiscal and
paying agency agreement files a Proof of Claim against the
applicable Debtor, on or before the Bar Date, on account of all
Debt Claims against such Debtor under the applicable Debt
Instruments

Wilmington Trust Company farà tutto, come ha scritto sul suo sito (in cui puoi anche controllare l'elenco dei bond).

Q: Do I need to file a proof of claim? A: As a bondholder you will be represented by Wilmington Trust Company as Indenture Trustee. This will include the filing of necessary documents in the courts, including proofs of claim.

https://www.wilmingtontrust.com/gmbondholders/faqs.html

vedi per brevità l'allegato con l'elenco dei bond a questo link.

Bond in Euro. io non avevo mai guardato il prospetto informativo, se devo essere sincero. Il fatto che, al momento del filing, Wilmington e Deutsche fossero indicati come primo e terzo maggior creditore mi avevano fatto pensare che Deutsche svolgesse la stessa funzione. Mi pare però che sia unicamente Fiscal Agent, ed infatti, vedi allegato, solo Wilmington viene espressamente chiamato Indenture anche nel primo filing di fallimento.

>>When bonds are issued under fiscal agency agreements, there is no trustee to represent holders’ interests. This means that thousands of bondholders around the world need to file proofs of claim. Many small bondholders, especially those outside the United States will not know how to do this (or even that they need to do this) and will not file claims at all.

questo è tratto da un filing fatto per il fallimento Lehman, situazione diversa per certi versi (complicata dal fatto che la holding USA in Chapter 11 è solo garante del debito eventualmente non rimborsato dalla filiale europea, facente parte di una procedura fallimentare distinta, per riassumere in maniera grossolana...), ma simile per altri. Le banche e le associazioni (tipo ABI) avevano presentato opposizioni per evitare il problema che ogni singolo obbligazionista dovesse presentare il proof of claim.

Quindi la mancanza dell'Indenture Trustee significa che non esiste un rappresentante dei bondholders, ai fini dell'insinuazione al passivo.

Il 14 Settembre, in corte, viene discussa la richiesta di GM di stabilire le regole per il proof of claim. Eventuali obiezioni debbono essere presentate entro domani. Ad adesso non ne ho viste relative a questo argomento. Va comunque ricordato che l'avvocato di GM è lo stesso che, nel caso Lehman, ha visto il giudice decidere di autorizzare degli "enti" (banche, etc.) ad effettuare l'insinuazione in nome e per conto dei clienti di cui detengono i titoli, se lo desiderano.

a hearing will be held before the
Honorable Robert E. Gerber, United States Bankruptcy Judge, in Room 621 of the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York (the “Bankruptcy Court”), One
Bowling Green, New York, New York 10004, on September 14, 2009 at 9:00 a.m. (Eastern
Time),

PLEASE TAKE FURTHER NOTICE that any responses or objections to the
Motion must be in writing ... so as
to be received no later than September 9, 2009, at 4:00 p.m. (Eastern Time) (the “Objection
Deadline”).


/s/ Stephen Karotkin
Harvey R. Miller
Stephen Karotkin
Joseph H. Smolinsky
WEIL, GOTSHAL & MANGES LLP
767 Fifth Avenue
New York, New York 10153
Telephone: (212) 310-8000
Facsimile: (212) 310-8007
Attorneys for Debtors
and Debtors in Possession

Aspettiamo la discussione in corte (dopo alcuni giorni sono disponibili i transcripts...) e vediamo cosa viene deciso, prima di pensare al peggio (dovere fare l'insinuazione come singolo obbligazionista).

Una ultima nota: mentre i bond in $, grazie all'insinuazione dell'Indenture, resteranno disponibili per vendita/acquisto, la procedura "singola" o delle banche potrebbe (condizionale...) rendere i bond indisponibili fino al conguaglio (assegnazione azioni/warrant).

09/02/2009 3940 Motion to Approve/DEBTORS' MOTION FOR ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 502(b)(9) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE AND BANKRUPTCY RULE 3003(c)(3) ESTABLISHING THE DEADLINE FOR FILING PROOFS OF CLAIM (INCLUDING CLAIMS UNDER SECTION 503(B)(9) OF THE BANKRUPTCY CODE) AND PROCEDURES RELATING THERETO AND APPROVING THE FORM AND MANNER OF NOTICE THEREOF (Objection Deadline: 09/09/2009 at 4:00 p.m.) filed by Stephen Karotkin on behalf of Motors Liquidation Company with hearing to be held on 9/14/2009 at 09:00 AM at Courtroom 621 (REG) Responses due by 9/9/2009 (Karotkin, Stephen) (Entered: 09/02/2009)

che dire?
era un po' che non mi facevo vivo (e so che non vi sono mancato) ma un grazie mi sento di dovertelo :ops:
 

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