Obbligazioni societarie GM, Ford, Chrysler: il 3D dell'automotive USA (1 Viewer)

paologorgo

Chapter 11
Milano, 30 apr. - (Adnkronos) - Fiat non potra' superare la quota di partecipazione del 49% fino a quando l'intero debito verso il dipartimento del Tesoro Usa non sara' rimborsato. Lo si legge nel comunicato della Fiat sull'accordo con Chrysler.

OK

qualcuno sa dire a quanto ammonta questo "prestito"?:-?

non mi è ben chiaro in alcuni articoli pare sia di 1,5 miliardi in altri trovo cifre di 4 miliardi

bohhhhhhhhhhhhh

p.s. a marchiò ma dove li becchi 4 miliardi ma anche 1 ma anche mezzo!

quindi in sintesi fiat potrebbe non arrivare mai al 51%

la società ristrutturata dovrà produrre una qualche specie di cash flow, si spera... fiat non ci mette una lira... ;)

When the transaction is completed, the Voluntary Employee Beneficiary Association (VEBA) will own 55 percent of the new company and the U.S. and Canadian governments will own proportionate shares of a 10 percent stake. Fiat will initially hold a 20 percent ownership stake in Chrysler. Fiat will have the right to increase its ownership stake an additional 15 percent in three increments as it meets the following criteria: 5 percent for bringing a 40 mpg vehicle platform to Chrysler to be produced in the U.S.; 5 percent for providing a fuel-efficient engine family to be produced in the U.S. for use in Chrysler vehicles; and 5 percent for providing Chrysler access to its vast global distribution network to facilitate the export of Chrysler vehicles. Fiat cannot become a majority owner until after all U.S. government loans have been completely repaid.
 

paologorgo

Chapter 11
lo sai che apprezzo gli avvertimenti ...
mi da fastidio nel caso in questione il trattamento che gli yankees riservano agli strangers ... non proprio identico a quello riservato agli indigeni

e poi lo sai che sono sempre propenso ai fallimenti in casi irrecuperabili ... come tutta la finanza USA ad esempio ;)

mi è sembrato di capire che sia uguale, ma non è molto importante...

il problema è quello di quanti fallimenti saranno saranno "consentiti" e se il settore in cui verranno evitati maturerà la convinzione che può continuare a truccare i conti... :rolleyes:
 

stockuccio

Guest
senza stare a far calcoli per la conversione del debito in azioni ... più o meno i bh pagano l'azione 10 volte quello che la pagano UAW e lo stato ... i secondi sono yankees, i primi insomma ... poi tutto il credito bh e la metà degli altri, si poteva fare due terzi per tutti ...
l'impressione che in generale si ricava da tutto quello che succede in USA è che vogliano far 'partecipare' un pò troppo gli stranieri ai loro casini ... comunque credo che questa 'soluzione' proposta per il caso GM si ritorcerà contro gli USA
 

paologorgo

Chapter 11
senza stare a far calcoli per la conversione del debito in azioni ... più o meno i bh pagano l'azione 10 volte quello che la pagano UAW e lo stato ... i secondi sono yankees, i primi insomma ... poi tutto il credito bh e la metà degli altri, si poteva fare due terzi per tutti ...
l'impressione che in generale si ricava da tutto quello che succede in USA è che vogliano far 'partecipare' un pò troppo gli stranieri ai loro casini ... comunque credo che questa 'soluzione' proposta per il caso GM si ritorcerà contro gli USA

io avevo capito che ti riferivi alla call, ed al fatto se esisteva solo se le emissioni in € e £, o per tutte.

la tua tesi è quella dei BH, che chiedono: "perchè a noi più taglio del debito?" fin dall'inzio. la risposta degli altri è "perchè i nostri crediti hanno priorità". quello dello stato è secured, non dimentichiamolo... o non valgono più queste distinzioni? ;)

in caso di fallimento della mia ditta, io dipendente (locale) vanto una priorità (stipendio) rispetto al credito di uno straniero. non necessariamente questo può invocare la discriminazione perchè non è italiano... non dico abbiano ragione, ma più o meno sostengono questa tesi per giustificare la differenza di trattamento tra UAW e BH. in ch 11 si potrà vedere se regge...
 

stockuccio

Guest
lo stato era già intervenuto per GM, i posti di lavoro in pericolo sono soprattutto in USA ... insomma secondo me era una buona occasione per fare una bella figura ... l'hanno persa ...
 

paologorgo

Chapter 11
alcuni aspetti dei primi docket sono interessanti, se si vuole cercare di capire come si potrebbe muovere l'amministrazione anche nel caso sia necessario ricorrere alla procedura per GM.

ad esempio, ecco confermato che i fornitori la fanno franca:

The Debtors, therefore, seek authority to pay the prepetition claims of the
Essential Suppliers, in their sole discretion,
to the extent such payment is permitted by, and
consistent with the terms of the Debtors' proposed postpetition financing facility (the "DIP
Financing Facility").8 Given the scope of the Debtors' operations, and the importance of
preserving the supplier body to consummate a Sale Transaction on a going concern basis, the
Debtors submit that the exercise of such authority would be a reasonable and appropriate
expenditure of estate funds.

The Debtors purchased nearly $25.9 billion in production parts from their
domestic Direct Production Part Suppliers in 2008. The Debtors estimate that, as of the Petition
Date, the aggregate amount of prepetition claims held by Direct Production Part Suppliers is
approximately $1.71 billion.

34. Indirect Suppliers. A substantial number of suppliers (collectively,
the "Indirect Suppliers") provide the Debtors with services and goods that, while not directly
incorporated into the Debtors' vehicles, are nevertheless indispensable to the production of such
vehicles (e.g., perishable tools, maintenance materials such as lubricants and gasoline required to
power, utilize and maintain the Debtors' equipment and machinery, maintenance and repair
services, services related to the Debtors' engineering and research and development efforts). The
constant need to repair the Debtors' machinery and equipment and the non-"catalogue" nature of
many of the perishable items used by the Debtors while operating, among other things, will
require renewed access to the goods and services provided by the Indirect Suppliers upon the
recommencement of the Debtors' operations.
35. The Debtors estimate that they paid approximately $3.3 billion to Indirect
Suppliers in 2008. The Debtors estimate that, as of the Petition Date, the aggregate amount of
prepetition claims held by Indirect Suppliers was approximately $600 million.

ricordo che tutti questi pagamenti riducono, nella pratica, il recovery dei creditori... :eek:

interessante come pensano di agire:

As the culmination of these efforts, Chrysler, Fiat and New Chrysler (as
defined below) have reached an agreement in principle and are expected to entered into a Master
Transaction Agreement (collectively with other ancillary and supporting documents,
the "Purchase Agreement") in short order. Pursuant to the Purchase Agreement, among other
things: (a) Chrysler will transfer the majority of its operating assets to New CarCo Acquisition
LLC ("New Chrysler"), a newly established Delaware limited liability company that currently is
an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of Fiat; and (b) in exchange for those assets, New Chrysler
will assume certain liabilities of Chrysler and pay to Chrysler $2 billion in cash (collectively
with the other transactions contemplated by the Purchase Agreement, the "Fiat Transaction").

13. With the support of the U.S. government, Fiat, the UAW, dealers,
suppliers and other stakeholders, the Debtors commenced these cases to implement an
expeditious sale process to implement the Fiat Transaction, or a similar transaction with a
competing bidder, designed to maximize the value of the Debtors' operations and businesses for
the benefit of their stakeholders. Pending the proposed sale, the Debtors will idle most
operations as they conserve their resources
, while at the same time ensuring that (a) the facilities
are prepared to resume normal production schedules quickly upon the completion of a sale and
(b) consumers are not impacted by the filing.

la vendita avrà un "ricavo" di 2 bilioni... cifra interessante e forse maliziosa.... ;)

per mettere un po' di pepe sotto il rispettabile fondoschiena del giudice, una bella serrata, che renderà indispensabile fare la vendita "alla Lehman", in fretta e furia o si apre un grosso problema sociale di scomparsa di posti di lavoro.... ;) :eek:
 

Researcher

Stop Loss? No, Thanks!!!
Ford's Sales Sank in April

Ford Motor Co. reported a 32% drop in U.S. vehicle sales for April, but the healthiest of Detroit's auto makers said it continued to make market-share gains.
Also Friday, Nissan Motor Co. said its U.S. sales fell 38% to 47,190 vehicles, while Daimler AG's sales fell 31% to 15,910. Other auto makers will release their monthly results later in the day.
Industrywide auto sales have tumbled since September as the U.S. recession took hold. The Commerce Department reported Thursday that consumers cut their spending in March as incomes declined, although a drop in new jobless claims offered some hope that the labor market is stabilizing.
"We continue to operate in a very challenging economic and competitive environment," said Ken Czubay, Ford vice president of sales and marketing.
Ford said in April it sold 133,979 light vehicles in the U.S., down from 195,665 a year earlier.
Ford, Lincoln and Mercury car sales dropped 31% despite record sales of its Fusion sedan. Sport-utility vehicles continued to tumble, falling 61% in April. Sales of pickups and vans dropped 36%.
Auto manufacturers have cut capacity, costs and inventory in the wake of the global slowdown in demand caused by weak economies and tight credit.
Last week, car-shopping Web site Edmunds.com said it expected new-vehicle sales in the U.S. for April to fall 31% from a year earlier, but edge up 0.5% from March as stabilization appears to continue.
 

Imark

Forumer storico
Un capitolo interessante: default Chrysler e conseguenze sulle ABS... la sensazione è che in parte inciderà la durata del Ch 11... dovesse essere della rapidità che ci si aspetta, l'effetto potrebbe essere contenuto a quanto già fatto fino ad oggi o poco più.

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's comments on ABS following Chrysler bankruptcy[/FONT]
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[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]$25.62 billion of related Asset-Backed Securities. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]New York, April 30, 2009 -- Today, Chrysler LLC ("Chrysler") announced that it has filed a petition under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. This event has varying implications for the performance and ratings of vehicle-related Asset-Backed Securities ("ABS"). [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]The following provides a commentary on the ABS asset classes affected by Chrysler's bankruptcy in the U.S. and Canada. None of the transactions rated by Moody's in Europe and Asia is directly exposed to the bankruptcy of the manufacturer. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Auto loans and leases [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's has taken several actions on auto loan and lease securitizations sponsored by Chrysler Financial Services Americas LLC ("Chrysler Financial") over the past six months. The actions on these securitizations were driven by the performance of the underlying pools, as well as by the heightened risk of a bankruptcy of the manufacturer and the impact that a bankruptcy would likely have on used vehicle prices. The most recent rating actions have taken into consideration a high likelihood of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing by Chrysler. Therefore, no further rating actions are being taken on the above transactions today, although several ratings (a total of eight tranches issued from six separate transactions) remain under review for possible downgrade. The ratings may come under pressure if the decline in vehicle prices throughout the duration of the bankruptcy is greater than our expectation or if the reorganization is unsuccessful and is followed by liquidation. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]We believe that new and used vehicle prices are likely to decline as a consequence of Chrysler's bankruptcy. The manufacturer may be motivated to heavily discount new vehicles to encourage sales; the discounted new vehicles would negatively impact used car resale values. A bankruptcy may also raise concerns over the continuation of existing models. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]The risk that collateral value, as reflected by used vehicle prices, will decline is a key driver that will magnify losses in both retail auto loan and lease ABS to varying degrees. In auto loan ABS, generally a limited percentage of the collateral pool is subject to repossession and resale and therefore exposed to market value risk, since only a fraction of the loan pool will default. However, with respect to auto lease ABS, 80% to 90% of the manufacturer's leased vehicles are turned in at lease termination. Turn-in rates are also likely to increase further when car prices decline, as the lessee's purchase option becomes more expensive than prevailing market prices. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]In response to the heightened risk of a manufacturer bankruptcy, as well as the higher than expected residual value losses experienced to date, Chrysler Financial's auto lease securitizations (Chrysler CA Lease Receivables Trust II, CALN2 Notes and Chrysler CA Lease Receivables Trust II, CALW2 Notes) were downgraded on November 25, 2008, on January 14, 2009, and again on April 29, 2009. The ratings (currently Baa3 and Ba3 for the CALN2 and CALW2 transactions, respectively) remain under review for possible further downgrade. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]The actions on the ratings of auto loan transactions have been relatively less severe than those on the lease deals. Auto loan ABS account for the majority of Moody's-rated outstanding securitizations sponsored by Chrysler Financial. Out of 29 outstanding tranches issued in six term retail auto loan transactions rated from 2005 through 2008, we have downgraded the ratings of nine tranches in three transactions issued in 2007 and 2008. The rating review that concluded on February 18, 2009 with the downgrade actions was driven by worse than expected performance of the loan pool, and particularly the higher than expected borrower default rate. Lower recoveries compared to historical rates have contributed to boosting overall losses. The deterioration in these transactions has outpaced that of other recent vintage prime auto loan pools and is also not reflective of the general performance of prime auto loan transactions from other U.S. or foreign automakers. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Mezzanine and subordinate notes in the same three transactions were placed under review for possible downgrade on April 29, 2009. In addition, the public rating on one auto loan warehouse transaction (Chrysler Retail Trust II) rated in 2008 was also placed under review for downgrade. These ratings are relatively more sensitive than those of other Chrysler auto loan ABS to a significant decrease in recovery rates on repossessed vehicles, as the projected defaults are higher for those deals. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]We expect that the administration will take steps to contain the disruption that might be caused by the bankruptcy, including providing government-funded debtor in possession financing during the bankruptcy process. These government actions may contain the extent of future vehicle price declines to some degree. In addition, we expect that Chrysler Financial will continue servicing its existing loan and lease portfolio throughout the bankruptcy process to preserve the value of its residual interest in the transactions. As a consequence, servicing disruption is likely to be immaterial for both loan and lease ABS transactions at this stage. Avoiding servicer disruption is central to lease ABS performance as a higher percentage of vehicles needs to be auctioned. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Floorplans [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Moody's most recently took rating actions on floorplan transactions sponsored by Chrysler Financial in the US and Canada in April 2009. Specifically, in the US, Class A notes of Master Chrysler Financial Owner Trust Series 2006-A and Series 2008-B were downgraded to B2 and Baa3 from Baa3 and A1, respectively, and remain under review for further possible downgrade. In Canada, the ratings of senior notes issued under Canadian Revolving Auto Floorplan Trust Series 2007-D1, D2, and D3 were all downgraded to Ba1 from Aa3 and remain under review for further possible downgrade. The most recent rating actions took into consideration a high likelihood of a Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing by Chrysler. Therefore, no further rating actions are being taken on those transactions as of today. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Ratings for the floorplan notes remain on review for further possible downgrade due to the significant uncertainty surrounding the floorplan transactions in the near term. A Chrysler bankruptcy filing could lead to high dealer default rates, depressed collateral recovery values, and could severely constrain the servicer's ability to monitor dealers and secure collateral if numerous dealers default in a short period of time. Moody's will continue to monitor developments and will further assess the potential impact on Chrysler Financial's outstanding floorplan transactions as necessary. The uncertainty related to potential developments, particularly the potential for a subsequent Chapter 7 filing by Chrysler at a later time, underlies the continued review process for the transactions. [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Rental cars [/FONT]

[FONT=verdana,arial,helvetica]Rental car ABS have varying amounts of exposure to Chrysler due to the presence of Chrysler-manufactured vehicles in the rental car fleets that serve as collateral for the securities. The residual values of those vehicles may suffer following a Chrysler bankruptcy filing. Any such lowering of collateral value exposes rental car ABS holders to greater possible loss in the event of a default by the sponsoring rental car company. In addition, such a decline in vehicle values may itself increase the risk of default of the sponsoring rental car company. All but one of the rental car ABS issuers are well-diversified among manufacturers and have only modest exposure to Chrysler. The exception is Rental Car Finance Corp. (RCFC), sponsored by Dollar Thrifty, where Chrysler vehicles represent approximately three-quarters of the fleet collateral. The underlying ratings of the RCFC rental car ABS were downgraded on January 27, 2009 to the Caa category, and already factor in a high likelihood of a Chrysler bankruptcy filing. As such, downward ratings movement as a result of the actual filing is anticipated to be minimal to none. No other rating actions related to rental car ABS solely as a result of this filing are expected[/FONT]
 

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