Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato / 2
(soprattutto).m.m.f
Forumer storico
Da notare che la questioni migranti è passata di moda,fine i migranti sono tutti spariti.
Bzt
Forumer storico
La questione del "waiver" in agenda per il 2/06, già scontata anche quella, o può fare da ulteriore traino nei prossimi gg?
ferdo
Utente Senior
Oggi ho venduto un quarantottesimo dell'esposizione
street_hassle
Forumer attivo
con o senza anestesia?
Vespasianus
Princeps thermarum
Dall'analisi del Fmi.
Growth: Staff believes that the continued absence of political support for a strong and broad
acceleration of structural reforms suggests that it is no longer tenable to base the DSA on the
assumption that Greece can quickly move from having one of the lowest to having the highest
productivity growth rates in the eurozone. Two concerns stand out in this regard, as detailed in
Boxes 2 and 3:
(i) As to the financial sector, the bank recapitalization completed in 2015 was not
accompanied by an upfront governance overhaul to overcome longstanding problems,
including susceptibility to political interference in bank management. Moreover, staff believes
that, in the absence of more forceful actions by regulators, and in view of the exceptionally
large level of NPLs and high share of Deferred Tax Assets in bank capital, banks will be
burdened by very weak balance sheets for years to come, suggesting that they will be unable
to provide credit to the economy on a scale needed to support very ambitious growth
targets.
(ii) As to broader structural reforms, the further postponement of reforms to the collective
dismissals and industrial action frameworks to the fall of 2016—overdue since 2014—and the
still extremely gradual pace at which Greece envisages to tackle its pervasive restrictions in
product and service markets are also not consistent with the very ambitious growth
assumptions used hitherto.
Against this background, staff has lowered its long-term growth assumption to 1.25 percent, even
as over the medium-term growth is expected to rebound more strongly as the output gap closes.
Here as well the revised assumption remains ambitious in as much as it assumes steadfastness in
implementing reforms that exceeds the experience to date, such that Greece would converge to
the average productivity growth in the euro-zone over the long-term.
Growth: Staff believes that the continued absence of political support for a strong and broad
acceleration of structural reforms suggests that it is no longer tenable to base the DSA on the
assumption that Greece can quickly move from having one of the lowest to having the highest
productivity growth rates in the eurozone. Two concerns stand out in this regard, as detailed in
Boxes 2 and 3:
(i) As to the financial sector, the bank recapitalization completed in 2015 was not
accompanied by an upfront governance overhaul to overcome longstanding problems,
including susceptibility to political interference in bank management. Moreover, staff believes
that, in the absence of more forceful actions by regulators, and in view of the exceptionally
large level of NPLs and high share of Deferred Tax Assets in bank capital, banks will be
burdened by very weak balance sheets for years to come, suggesting that they will be unable
to provide credit to the economy on a scale needed to support very ambitious growth
targets.
(ii) As to broader structural reforms, the further postponement of reforms to the collective
dismissals and industrial action frameworks to the fall of 2016—overdue since 2014—and the
still extremely gradual pace at which Greece envisages to tackle its pervasive restrictions in
product and service markets are also not consistent with the very ambitious growth
assumptions used hitherto.
Against this background, staff has lowered its long-term growth assumption to 1.25 percent, even
as over the medium-term growth is expected to rebound more strongly as the output gap closes.
Here as well the revised assumption remains ambitious in as much as it assumes steadfastness in
implementing reforms that exceeds the experience to date, such that Greece would converge to
the average productivity growth in the euro-zone over the long-term.
Vespasianus
Princeps thermarum
Why does Greece require further adjustment? Without further measures, Greece will fall back into primary deficit over
the medium run (of around 1 percent of GDP), with attendant consequences for debt. This is due to several factors:
First, revenue is expected to decline relative to GDP, as: (i) the recovery is expected to rely on investment and exports,
which are not tax rich; (ii) almost half of social contributions (e.g. self employed) are not linked to income, and
property taxes are not linked to market prices; and (iii) one-off revenues from bank liquidity support will taper off.
Second, spending pressures are likely to re-emerge, reflecting the fact that past
spending cuts have not been supported by reforms. Spending on goods and
services fell to 16 percent of primary spending (lower than its pre-crisis level
of 19 percent and the euro-area average of 22 percent). Health spending has
been severely compressed to 41⁄2 percent of GDP, which is below euro area
average of 7 percent of GDP, despite the fact that Greece faces one of the
highest old-age dependency ratios.
The pension system is unaffordable and unsustainable. Greece’s current
spending on the pension system is by far the highest in the euro-area
(171⁄2 percent of GDP), with annual transfers to the system of around 10 percent
(21⁄2 in the euro-area). This reflects very generous pensions to existing retirees
(as noted below, the recent reform aims to address this problem over the long
run by reducing benefits of future retirees).
The tax system offers a large implicit tax-free threshold which exempts more than half of wage and pension earners
from income tax (compared to 9 percent euro-area average). This leads to a highly skewed income tax distribution,
with the top decile contributing 60 percent of the tax revenue. Consequently, collection rates have been declining
steadily despite efforts to strengthen tax administration, and tax debt has reached 50 percent of GDP, the largest in
the euro-area.
the medium run (of around 1 percent of GDP), with attendant consequences for debt. This is due to several factors:
First, revenue is expected to decline relative to GDP, as: (i) the recovery is expected to rely on investment and exports,
which are not tax rich; (ii) almost half of social contributions (e.g. self employed) are not linked to income, and
property taxes are not linked to market prices; and (iii) one-off revenues from bank liquidity support will taper off.
Second, spending pressures are likely to re-emerge, reflecting the fact that past
spending cuts have not been supported by reforms. Spending on goods and
services fell to 16 percent of primary spending (lower than its pre-crisis level
of 19 percent and the euro-area average of 22 percent). Health spending has
been severely compressed to 41⁄2 percent of GDP, which is below euro area
average of 7 percent of GDP, despite the fact that Greece faces one of the
highest old-age dependency ratios.
The pension system is unaffordable and unsustainable. Greece’s current
spending on the pension system is by far the highest in the euro-area
(171⁄2 percent of GDP), with annual transfers to the system of around 10 percent
(21⁄2 in the euro-area). This reflects very generous pensions to existing retirees
(as noted below, the recent reform aims to address this problem over the long
run by reducing benefits of future retirees).
The tax system offers a large implicit tax-free threshold which exempts more than half of wage and pension earners
from income tax (compared to 9 percent euro-area average). This leads to a highly skewed income tax distribution,
with the top decile contributing 60 percent of the tax revenue. Consequently, collection rates have been declining
steadily despite efforts to strengthen tax administration, and tax debt has reached 50 percent of GDP, the largest in
the euro-area.
Vespasianus
Princeps thermarum
Ibidem
Greece is assumed to access markets by end-program at an initial rate of 6 percent, reflecting a prolonged absence from markets, weak track record on delivering fiscal surpluses, and a substantial debt overhang. The rate is lower than the average yield during January-May 2016 by around 300 basis points, and is in line with the rates obtained by the country in 2014 when it was able to temporarily issue on the markets. It is consistent with a risk-free rate of 1-1.5 percent in 2018 and a risk premium of 450-500 basis points (broadly consistent with an increase in the premium of four basis points for each 1 percent of GDP in debt above the Maastricht limit).
Regression analysis suggests that staff’s assumption is at the low (optimistic) end of estimates. A variety of empirical specifications regressing sovereign yields on key macroeconomic fundamentals (debt-to-GDP, debt-to-GDP squared, growth, primary balance, inflation, as well as country and time fixed effects) suggests a range of estimates between 6 and 13 percent (Table 1).
As to its evolution over time, the rate is expected to fall/rise by four basis points for every one percentage point decline/increase in debt-to-GDP ratio, in line with the literature (Laubach, 2009, Ardagna, Casseli, Lane, 2004, Engen and Hubbard, 2004), up to a floor of 4.5 percent (consistent with a small long-run risk free premium of 75 basis points).
Greece is assumed to access markets by end-program at an initial rate of 6 percent, reflecting a prolonged absence from markets, weak track record on delivering fiscal surpluses, and a substantial debt overhang. The rate is lower than the average yield during January-May 2016 by around 300 basis points, and is in line with the rates obtained by the country in 2014 when it was able to temporarily issue on the markets. It is consistent with a risk-free rate of 1-1.5 percent in 2018 and a risk premium of 450-500 basis points (broadly consistent with an increase in the premium of four basis points for each 1 percent of GDP in debt above the Maastricht limit).
Regression analysis suggests that staff’s assumption is at the low (optimistic) end of estimates. A variety of empirical specifications regressing sovereign yields on key macroeconomic fundamentals (debt-to-GDP, debt-to-GDP squared, growth, primary balance, inflation, as well as country and time fixed effects) suggests a range of estimates between 6 and 13 percent (Table 1).
As to its evolution over time, the rate is expected to fall/rise by four basis points for every one percentage point decline/increase in debt-to-GDP ratio, in line with the literature (Laubach, 2009, Ardagna, Casseli, Lane, 2004, Engen and Hubbard, 2004), up to a floor of 4.5 percent (consistent with a small long-run risk free premium of 75 basis points).
Similar threads
