Mi sembra un'analisi
alquanto realistica anche se scomoda, e da troppi columnist taciuta:
By Jim Saft Jan 17 (Reuters) - (James Saft is a Reuters columnist. The opinions expressed are his own)
As Greece slouches ever closer to a disorderly default and euro exit we see how the more one thinks the unthinkable the more thinkable it becomes.
Athens on Monday sent representatives on an emergency trip to Washington for talks with the International Monetary Fund after talks with its creditors broke down.
Facing 14.5 billion euro of loans coming due in March,
Greece must agree a bond swap with its creditors before it can begin planned negotiations later this week with the ECB, IMF and EU for a second 130 billion euro bailout.
The problem, in short, is that a continuing deterioration in its economy means Greece cannot live with the terms of the deal it struck last year to write down half of its debts with private creditors.
Someone needs to pony up more money and none of the obvious candidates feel able or willing to cooperate.
That deal, tortuously structured so as not to be a default and not to impair the ECB and euro zone national central banks' massive holdings of Greek debt,
left Greece too little wriggle room and few tools short of a default to improve its situation.
Avoiding a default means credit default swap contracts don't trigger payment, something that would instantly and unpredictably hurt those banks and insurers, many in the U.S.,
which wrote the protection.
As for the ECB and its member central banks,
they are sitting on so much exposure to rickety Greek bonds that forcing them to recognize that impairment very likely would leave them without sufficient capital.
Thus Greece, and some of the hedge funds who own its debt,
have both the motivation and means to use and quite possibly employ default,
either as a negotiating technique or a means to a perversely better outcome.
At the time the 50 percent debt swap was negotiated, banks and other private sector creditors expected that the new debt they would receive would carry an interest rate of about 4.0 percent.
That is no longer seen as sustainable for Greece, and now a coupon closer to
2.0 percent is on offer.
That will punish both banks,
most of whom have already written down their exposure,
and hedge funds who bought in at lower prices, usually using borrowed money.
While the banks may prove susceptible to official pressure,
some hedge funds may be less biddable.
CENTRAL BANK RECAPITALIZATION
The obvious solution, but not perhaps not the likely one, is for the EU, IMF and ECB to cut Greece yet another break,
giving it leeway to give the banks a better deal, avoiding the hornet's nest of a default and a CDS payout.
It is unclear how far, exactly, down the road of debt forgiveness we can go without central bank's recognizing that their holdings have lost value and will not be repaid in full.
As well better terms for Greece will immediately be
met by calls for better terms from Dublin, Lisbon, Madrid and even Rome.
If things go the other way and Greece defaults, things will be worse still, likely for Greece , but
most definitely for the ECB.
The ECB is holding something on the order of 50 billion euros of Greek debt.
Far more still has been pledged as collateral by banks.
Should Greece leave the euro, Greek banks will likely instantly and en masse default, an event that means the vast majority of the 100 billion or so euros the Greek central bank owes other euro zone central banks will not be recovered.
That may well leave the ECB and some of its peers needing an injection of capital,
something that would be all the more crucial because a Greek euro exit and the effective vaporization of the Greek banking system would leave some European banks in need of support from those same central banks. Remember too that all of the debate about Greek write downs is part of a plan which has as its goal getting Greece's rati....
Finanza.com – 15 minuti fa
