Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 2 (2 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
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IFR-COMMENT:Old crisis, new crisis and newer crisis lead to ECB
Reuters - 31/10/2011 15:10:01
By Divyang Shay
LONDON, Oct 31 (Reuters) -
Ahead of the EU summit the hope had been that another rescue plan would help to buy more time either 1-3 months (Soros) or 1-2 years (BoE's King). Instead what we have had is 1-2 days at best with European sovereign debt markets, Italy in particular, trading like the EU summit didn't happen at all.
The problem is that we are still dealing with reminiscences of the old crisis (Greece/Ireland/Portugal) as well as the new crisis (Italy) with a touch of a newer crisis (France). The use of the ECB's balance sheet to back the EFSF would have been the real bazooka. Expect the crisis to get worse before the Eurozone finally sees the option of using the ECB's balance sheet as a viable and palatable option.
The Old Crisis: Early on in the crisis the pattern was for Ireland and the Portugal to follow the script laid out by Greece in losing access to market funding. The debate on Greece has diverged as discussions over default/haircuts have dominated but the trio have the potential to converge again as we remind ourselves that both Portugal and Ireland still lack market access. Now that haircuts are no longer taboo words for European policy makers the risk is that either Portugal and/or Ireland are walking down the same road as Greece.
An added worry for investors is that when restructuring/haircuts are on the table then this may not be the final word given that Greek haircuts went from 21% to 50%. Ireland might have seen its 10-year yield fall from double digits to around 8% currently but this, as well as Portugal 10-year yields of 13%, remain unsustainable. The second Greek bailout happened due to a realization that market access was not forthcoming and the risk is that any second bailout for Portugal or Ireland will go straight to a large haircut.
The New Crisis: The risk that Italy (and Spain) were close to a point at which they will lose market access has been enough for the EU to consider a firewall around the two sovereigns. On paper either the monoline (insurer) or CDO (SPIV) route is a positive but this is only for new debt -- what happens to the excluded old debt? While the EU/EFSF looks to iron out the leverage aspect to a leveraged EFSF by convincing investors the ECB has continued its unsuccessful intervention. Attention is now on Italy to deliver on growth inspiring reforms with a firm timetable but despite the crisis being at the doorsteps of Italy there remain deep political divisions. It is not surprising that markets remain skeptical that the political pieces in Italy will fall into place with worries that elections are just around the corner in early 2012.
The Newer Crisis: Leveraging the EFSF is not a free lunch and comes with higher risks compared to just a guarantee based support structure. Creditworthiness of the core will be diluted and the largest impact will be felt by those that are considered as being at most risk of losing their AAA rating. France is at the top of the list here in the Eurozone and if it's not the non-contingent liabilities related to the EFSF then it's the risks that come from the potential for a Eurozone recession/double-dip. Keep in mind the recent warning by S&P that a Eurozone double-dip could see France downgraded from AAA to AA+. The October flash PMI readings not only showed the double-dip risks for the Eurozone but also a divergence between the performance of France and Germany. We continue to consider France as the weak link in the EFSF chain.
ECB the only real bazooka: The debate has moved on beyond worrying about a Greek default. In fact one can argue that a Greek default would not be catastrophic as the markets have had long enough to prepare for this and can no longer be classed as a shock. The worry continues to be that the EU has done little to incentivize portfolio managers and investors to increase or even maintain their exposure to peripheral debt. Continuing with the risk transference now poses a risk to the creditworthiness of the core and we have reached a stage now where a more active discussion needs to be had about coordinating fiscal reforms from the peripheral countries in exchange for more active involvement by the ECB to support peripheral debt.
This is no time to worry about debt monetization concerns but for more active and formal cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities. We have had an informal arrangement via the SMP but this has been both variable and add hock in its delivery. Take the UK as a prime example of cooperation where monetary policy is being used to effectively allow the UK government to continue with its fiscal strategy that there is no Plan-B to fiscal austerity. An ECB that is involved with its still untainted balance sheet and access to the printing press is where the real bazooka lies as opposed to tinkering around with the EFSF's size via questionable leverage.
Making unpalatable options more palatable: Remember how the ECB used to say that they did not set collateral rules for individual countries (Greece collateral rules relaxed), or were not interested in buying sovereign debt (SMP started), or the informal rule that they would only buy debt of those countries with EU support programmes (Italy and Spain debt buying under SMP). The crisis has tended to move in the direction of making unpalatable options more palatable. Resistance from Germany and ECB highlights that the crisis will have to get worse in order to make the ECB bazooka route more palatable.
In the meantime socializing credit risk via leverage poses a threat to the creditworthiness of France and we look for the 10-year France/Germany spread to widen out to its recent highs above 120bps and still look for a move to at least 140bps.
LONDON, Oct 31 (Reuters) -
Ahead of the EU summit the hope had been that another rescue plan would help to buy more time either 1-3 months (Soros) or 1-2 years (BoE's King). Instead what we have had is 1-2 days at best with European sovereign debt markets, Italy in particular, trading like the EU summit didn't happen at all.
The problem is that we are still dealing with reminiscences of the old crisis (Greece/Ireland/Portugal) as well as the new crisis (Italy) with a touch of a newer crisis (France). The use of the ECB's balance sheet to back the EFSF would have been the real bazooka. Expect the crisis to get worse before the Eurozone finally sees the option of using the ECB's balance sheet as a viable and palatable option.
The Old Crisis: Early on in the crisis the pattern was for Ireland and the Portugal to follow the script laid out by Greece in losing access to market funding. The debate on Greece has diverged as discussions over default/haircuts have dominated but the trio have the potential to converge again as we remind ourselves that both Portugal and Ireland still lack market access. Now that haircuts are no longer taboo words for European policy makers the risk is that either Portugal and/or Ireland are walking down the same road as Greece.
An added worry for investors is that when restructuring/haircuts are on the table then this may not be the final word given that Greek haircuts went from 21% to 50%. Ireland might have seen its 10-year yield fall from double digits to around 8% currently but this, as well as Portugal 10-year yields of 13%, remain unsustainable. The second Greek bailout happened due to a realization that market access was not forthcoming and the risk is that any second bailout for Portugal or Ireland will go straight to a large haircut.
The New Crisis: The risk that Italy (and Spain) were close to a point at which they will lose market access has been enough for the EU to consider a firewall around the two sovereigns. On paper either the monoline (insurer) or CDO (SPIV) route is a positive but this is only for new debt -- what happens to the excluded old debt? While the EU/EFSF looks to iron out the leverage aspect to a leveraged EFSF by convincing investors the ECB has continued its unsuccessful intervention. Attention is now on Italy to deliver on growth inspiring reforms with a firm timetable but despite the crisis being at the doorsteps of Italy there remain deep political divisions. It is not surprising that markets remain skeptical that the political pieces in Italy will fall into place with worries that elections are just around the corner in early 2012.
The Newer Crisis: Leveraging the EFSF is not a free lunch and comes with higher risks compared to just a guarantee based support structure. Creditworthiness of the core will be diluted and the largest impact will be felt by those that are considered as being at most risk of losing their AAA rating. France is at the top of the list here in the Eurozone and if it's not the non-contingent liabilities related to the EFSF then it's the risks that come from the potential for a Eurozone recession/double-dip. Keep in mind the recent warning by S&P that a Eurozone double-dip could see France downgraded from AAA to AA+. The October flash PMI readings not only showed the double-dip risks for the Eurozone but also a divergence between the performance of France and Germany. We continue to consider France as the weak link in the EFSF chain.
ECB the only real bazooka: The debate has moved on beyond worrying about a Greek default. In fact one can argue that a Greek default would not be catastrophic as the markets have had long enough to prepare for this and can no longer be classed as a shock. The worry continues to be that the EU has done little to incentivize portfolio managers and investors to increase or even maintain their exposure to peripheral debt. Continuing with the risk transference now poses a risk to the creditworthiness of the core and we have reached a stage now where a more active discussion needs to be had about coordinating fiscal reforms from the peripheral countries in exchange for more active involvement by the ECB to support peripheral debt.
This is no time to worry about debt monetization concerns but for more active and formal cooperation between the monetary and fiscal authorities. We have had an informal arrangement via the SMP but this has been both variable and add hock in its delivery. Take the UK as a prime example of cooperation where monetary policy is being used to effectively allow the UK government to continue with its fiscal strategy that there is no Plan-B to fiscal austerity. An ECB that is involved with its still untainted balance sheet and access to the printing press is where the real bazooka lies as opposed to tinkering around with the EFSF's size via questionable leverage.
Making unpalatable options more palatable: Remember how the ECB used to say that they did not set collateral rules for individual countries (Greece collateral rules relaxed), or were not interested in buying sovereign debt (SMP started), or the informal rule that they would only buy debt of those countries with EU support programmes (Italy and Spain debt buying under SMP). The crisis has tended to move in the direction of making unpalatable options more palatable. Resistance from Germany and ECB highlights that the crisis will have to get worse in order to make the ECB bazooka route more palatable.
In the meantime socializing credit risk via leverage poses a threat to the creditworthiness of France and we look for the 10-year France/Germany spread to widen out to its recent highs above 120bps and still look for a move to at least 140bps.
Gaudente
Forumer storico
Tutta colpa dei naked CDS , senza dubbio
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
Tutta colpa dei naked CDS , senza dubbio
O forse la MF Global ha dovuto vendere un po' di BTP... anche loro sono piuttosto naked al momento
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/10/31/us-mfglobal-idUSTRE79R4YY20111031
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tommy271
Forumer storico
Efsf dà mandato a banche per bond 10 anni da 3 mld per Irlanda
lunedì 31 ottobre 2011 15:25
BRUXELLES, 31 ottobre (Reuters) - L'Efsf, European Financial Stability Facility, ha dato mandato a un gruppo di banche per l'emissioone di un bond con scadenza sopra i 10 anni e per l'ammontare di 3 miliardi di euro.
Le banche scelte sono Barclays, Credit Agricole e JP Morgan.
Il bond, che verrà offerto a breve in base alle condizioni di mercato, servirà per finanziare l'Irlanda all'interno del programma di salvataggio.
L'emissione ha rating Tripla A da tutte e tre le agenzie.
lunedì 31 ottobre 2011 15:25
BRUXELLES, 31 ottobre (Reuters) - L'Efsf, European Financial Stability Facility, ha dato mandato a un gruppo di banche per l'emissioone di un bond con scadenza sopra i 10 anni e per l'ammontare di 3 miliardi di euro.
Le banche scelte sono Barclays, Credit Agricole e JP Morgan.
Il bond, che verrà offerto a breve in base alle condizioni di mercato, servirà per finanziare l'Irlanda all'interno del programma di salvataggio.
L'emissione ha rating Tripla A da tutte e tre le agenzie.
tommy271
Forumer storico
pier87
GBP uber alles
Tutta colpa dei naked CDS , senza dubbio
tornato a 402...
tommy271
Forumer storico
Crisi: Hu Jintao fiducioso su Europa
Presidente cinese, Europa ha competenze per affrontare crisi
(ANSA-AFP) - VIENNA, 31 OTT - Il presidente cinese Hu Jintao e' ''fiducioso'' che l'Europa riuscira' a ''superare'' la crisi del debito. Lo ha detto Hu in visita di Stato a Vienna. La Cina ''e' fiduciosa che l'Europa ha le competenze per superare le difficolta' in corso'' ha dichiarato Hu incontrando il presidente austriaco Heinz Fischer.
Presidente cinese, Europa ha competenze per affrontare crisi
(ANSA-AFP) - VIENNA, 31 OTT - Il presidente cinese Hu Jintao e' ''fiducioso'' che l'Europa riuscira' a ''superare'' la crisi del debito. Lo ha detto Hu in visita di Stato a Vienna. La Cina ''e' fiduciosa che l'Europa ha le competenze per superare le difficolta' in corso'' ha dichiarato Hu incontrando il presidente austriaco Heinz Fischer.
ficodindia
Forumer storico
Tagliando ci si salva: parola di Schauble.
Adesso anche il governo tedesco, dopo il taglio draconiano, crede nella sostenibilità del debito greco. Ironia della sorte: ora che la Grecia è salva la situazione dell'Italia si aggrava? A proposito, il martellamento di Schauble su l'Italia mira forse allo stesso obiettivo greco: la ristrutturazione del suo debito? Non credo, il default dell'Italia sarebbe un cataclisma tale da far precipitare tutto (non solo l'euro). ekathimerini.com | Schauble optimistic Greece can get back on its feet
TMNews - Crisi/ Schauble: Italia risolva da sé suoi problemi,tagli debito
Adesso anche il governo tedesco, dopo il taglio draconiano, crede nella sostenibilità del debito greco. Ironia della sorte: ora che la Grecia è salva la situazione dell'Italia si aggrava? A proposito, il martellamento di Schauble su l'Italia mira forse allo stesso obiettivo greco: la ristrutturazione del suo debito? Non credo, il default dell'Italia sarebbe un cataclisma tale da far precipitare tutto (non solo l'euro). ekathimerini.com | Schauble optimistic Greece can get back on its feet
TMNews - Crisi/ Schauble: Italia risolva da sé suoi problemi,tagli debito
frmaoro
il Fankazzista
stessi discorsi fatti circa un anno fa da tutte le istituzioni poi è andata a finire esattamente con un haircut al 50%
dipenderà tutto dai politici italiani certo che la grecia ha tracciato una bella strada
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