Ieri ho fatto casino con i nick....
Oggi il mercato ha salutato con un certo ottimismo il calo del deficit commerciale USA come un segnale del riequilibrio degli squilibri senza rendersi conto che in realtà gli squilibri sono talmente strutturati nel sistema economico basato sullo standard del dollaro che in realtà il calo del deficit commerciale USA è in realtà l'evidenza della contrazione della crescita economica globale e come mostratovi tempo fa solitamente un calo del deficit commerciale porta ad una crisi di un qualche tipo in quanto conduce a delle crisi di liquidità nei punti più deboli del sistema economico.
Maggiori dollari in circolazione=maggiori scambi commerciali e viceversa.
Soprattutto sui mercati dove sono presenti eccessi di investimenti speculativi una contrazione dei dollari in circolazione potrebbe portare a movimenti repentini che tanto spaventano la FED in quanto possono disequilibrare un sistema economico profondamente correlato.
Giusto nel post di qualche giorno fa parlavo di come non sono i flussi sui fondi o le variazioni di asset a favore dell'azionario ciò che sostiene le quotazioni degli asset finanziari quanto invece sono denari speculativi proveniente principalmente dai carry trade messi in atto sulle principali curve dei tassi globali a seconda della convenienza del momento.
Giusto ieri ho letto report della Gavekal che sostiene più o meno gli stessi concetti:
Out With the Old, in with the New Carry Trade
Every now and then, central banks fall asleep on the job and allow their currencies to achieve very overvalued levels. In turn, this slows down the underlying economy, a fact which then forces the central bank into cutting rates aggressively to counter-balance the tightening done by the FX markets. When such a turn of event occurs, financial market participants jump on it with both feet; all of a sudden, financiers are given an opportunity to borrow in a currency which a) goes down and b) whose borrowing costs keep falling. What we are describing above is not theoretical. In fact, it has happened twice in the past decade. And it is about to happen again. A fact with important investment consequences.
Between 1995 and 1998, a number of investors participated in the great "Yen carry trade". For three years, it was fantastic: whatever one bought with one's borrowed Yens, one made money. Until one did not; and then the unwinding of the Yen carry trade was both violent, and painful for those involved in it (Tiger, Sumitomo...).
From 2001 to 2004, we experienced the great US$ carry trade. As we tried to show in a number of reports in the past couple of years a large number of people borrowed US$ on the premise that a) the US$ could only go down and b) borrowing US$ was nearly free (1% interest rates) and likely to stay that way for a very long time.
Needless to say, the US$ carry trade is no longer working. For a start, the US$ is no longer falling, and borrowing US$ is no longer free (the Fed just raised rates again). In turn, this raises an important question: will the unwinding of the US$ carry trade prove as painful as the unwinding of the Yen carry-trade?
As our readers know, we have argued in recent months that the unwinding of the US$ carry-trade could lead to some short-term dislocations in the financial markets. However, so far this year, the US$ on a trade-weighted basis has risen +11% in a straight line, and the impact on financial markets has been mild. So have our fears on the effects of the unwinding of the US$ carry-trade been excessive?
One explanation for the good tenure of markets in the face of the US$ rally is that most investors short the US$ (save the ones who got in the game late) are still positive on their short US$ trade. Meanwhile bearishness on the US$ remains prevalent (i.e.: the belief in the "unstainability of the US current account deficit), and so panic has not yet hit the market.
This could of course change as central banks all over the world, except in the US, start to loosen monetary policy. Sweden and Poland have already cut interest rates by 50bp; and we believe that the UK, EMU & Australia should soon follow. As Charles put it in a meeting recently, this is the first cycle in his memory where the Fed is likely to be the last central bank to stop raising rates; and the last central bank to cut rates (if and when it does). The widening interest rate differentials alone should trigger an impressive US$ bull market.
As this reality of the US$ bull market sets in, we will of course witness a change of behaviour in financial market participants. Will this change be a panic? Or will the change be a hunt for new opportunities? We use to believe it would be the former. We now believe it could be the latter. Indeed, all around the world, it is becoming increasingly obvious to investors that there is one currency which remains grotesquely overvalued, and whose interest rates can only go down: the Euro (though the AU$ also qualifies). So borrowing Euros to buy whatever else now makes a lot of sense. The US$ carry trade is in the process of being replaced by the Euro carry trade. This means, of course that we should expect the Euro to fall like a stone.
Al di là della previsione sull'euro e della sostenibilità di questa strategia una possibile contrazione della liquidità potrebbe mettere in difficoltà questi trade e costringere ad improvvise ricoperture molti trade correlati.
Nel frattempo però questa strategia permette il sostegno agli asset finanziari giustificati da condizioni economiche che le opinioni mainstream giudicano positivamente e da buoni risultati aziendali.
