Macroeconomia la situazione (3 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione gipa69
- Data di Inizio
gipa69
collegio dei patafisici
Mercati USA
I grafici di ieri segnalano la situazione sullo SPX di lungo periodo e mostrano come gli indici siano nei pressi di resistenze cruciali (1255/1260) che se perforate porteranno la situazione ciclica in netto miglioramento ma è per questo che effettuare acquisti strategici su questi livelli comporta livelli di rischio significativi.
Allo stesso modo la situazione di breve presenta l'indice su livelli di supporto/resistenza importanti senza fornire al momento nessun segnale direzionale rilevante seppure consolidando su livelli elevati che solitamente è segnale di accumulo. Il fatto che comunque queste resistenze di breve siano vicine alle resistenze di lungo fa si che le operazioni da considerare su questi livelli siano necessariamente di corto respiro.
Siccome molta della linfa ai mercati è stata portata dalle vendite manifestatesi sui mercati obbligazionari e delle commodity la fase di recupero di breve di quei mercati potrebbe prolungare il consolidamento prima di un nuovo movimento direzionale.
Resta il fatto che la situazione è di estrema incertezza e le operazioni devono essere di corto respiro e legate ai mercati più forti che la rotazione settoriale sfrenata di queste ultime sedute rende di difficile individuazione escluso il settore tech che ha mostrato una buona overperformance.
I grafici di ieri segnalano la situazione sullo SPX di lungo periodo e mostrano come gli indici siano nei pressi di resistenze cruciali (1255/1260) che se perforate porteranno la situazione ciclica in netto miglioramento ma è per questo che effettuare acquisti strategici su questi livelli comporta livelli di rischio significativi.
Allo stesso modo la situazione di breve presenta l'indice su livelli di supporto/resistenza importanti senza fornire al momento nessun segnale direzionale rilevante seppure consolidando su livelli elevati che solitamente è segnale di accumulo. Il fatto che comunque queste resistenze di breve siano vicine alle resistenze di lungo fa si che le operazioni da considerare su questi livelli siano necessariamente di corto respiro.
Siccome molta della linfa ai mercati è stata portata dalle vendite manifestatesi sui mercati obbligazionari e delle commodity la fase di recupero di breve di quei mercati potrebbe prolungare il consolidamento prima di un nuovo movimento direzionale.
Resta il fatto che la situazione è di estrema incertezza e le operazioni devono essere di corto respiro e legate ai mercati più forti che la rotazione settoriale sfrenata di queste ultime sedute rende di difficile individuazione escluso il settore tech che ha mostrato una buona overperformance.
gipa69
collegio dei patafisici
Articolo molto interessante da parte di Morgan Stanley:
Global: Is Global Excess Liquidity Drying Up?
Joachim Fels (London)
Introduction and summary
Will the liquidity glut of the last several years give way to a drought, thus spelling trouble for financial markets? With the US Fed funds rate now at 4% and likely to head higher still, the ECB inching closer to a first rate hike, and the Bank of Japan signalling that the quantitative easing policy will come to an end in the foreseeable future, fears abound that the global super-liquidity cycle is turning. Some even argue that the drought has already started, pointing to a contraction in the ratio of the money stock to GDP (the ‘Marshallian K’) in the US.
However, our freshly updated indicators of global excess liquidity tell a different story: the super-liquidity cycle is still alive and kicking because other central banks, most notably the ECB, have taken over from the Fed as the dominant supplier of additional liquidity. More importantly, after many years of easy monetary policies, the level of excess liquidity has become so large that any plausibly conceivable leakage in response to monetary tightening would still leave the pond very full.
While there are good fundamental reasons to be bearish on bonds (higher inflation) and risky assets (slower economic growth), excess liquidity is likely to remain plentiful, which should cushion any sell-off in some asset classes and could even pump up new bubbles in others (equities?). And, turning to monetary policy, central banks need to find new approaches to deal with the liquidity monster. An old-fashioned concept like inflation targeting is certainly not the answer, in my view — in fact, it may be part of the problem.
Excess liquidity or savings glut?
Why worry about excess liquidity? As I see it, the enormous amounts of excess liquidity created by the major central banks are the ultimate explanation for Alan Greenspan’s conundrum of low bond yields, and for the broader conundrum of simultaneous rallies in virtually all asset classes over the past couple of years. The main competing explanation for the current Fed Chairman’s conundrum is the future Fed Chairman’s savings-glut hypothesis. According to Ben Bernanke, low bond yields have been the result of an excess of (ex-ante) savings over (ex-ante) investment in the world, driven mainly by the developing countries in Asia, which have a special appetite for US bonds due to their dollar pegs.
My main difficulty with the savings-glut explanation is that, while it helps to explain developments in the late 1990s and in the early part of this decade, it does not gel well with the strong recovery in global GDP growth and capital spending during 2004 and 2005, which is when the conundrum became fully apparent. A savings glut would normally be associated with a weaker economy and weak investment. In my view, the liquidity-glut hypothesis fits the stylized facts of 2004/2005 better: it would naturally go along with stronger economic growth, rising capital spending and generalized asset price inflation. And if excess liquidity is the explanation, then a drying up of liquidity would spell trouble for inflated asset markets and the global economy.
Defining excess liquidity
While the concept of excess liquidity sounds intuitive, its measurement is fraught with difficulties. What exactly is liquidity, and how do we determine whether it is excessive or not? I usually define excess liquidity as the ratio of a monetary aggregate to nominal GDP, a.k.a. the ‘Marshallian K’, which is equivalent to the inverse of the ‘velocity of money’.
I use both a narrow monetary aggregate (cash and checking deposits, a.k.a. M1) and a broad aggregate (which in addition to cash and sight deposits also includes money market funds, certain time deposits, savings deposits and CDs, and is equivalent or similar to M3). As an additional but related indicator, I use the sum of outstanding credit to the private sector. These money and credit aggregates are created through the interplay between borrowers (companies and private households), lenders (banks) and the central bank. While the central bank cannot control these monetary aggregates in the short term, it will indirectly influence their evolution over the medium and longer term via setting short-term interest rates that in turn affect money demand through several channels. Put simply, lower interest rates will spur money growth and higher interest rates will dampen it.
To determine whether money (liquidity) is excessive, I compare it to nominal GDP, which in turn is a (crude) proxy for all the transactions that are related to the production of, and the demand for, goods and services in the economy. So if money grows by more than GDP, excess liquidity accumulates. Simply speaking, excess liquidity is liquidity that is not needed to finance transactions in the ‘real’ economy. It is available (or needed) for transactions in the ‘financial’ sphere, such as the acquisition of bonds or equities. It is a common misunderstanding to assume that excess liquidity disappears in this process. It doesn’t: If John buys a bond or a stock from Paul, Paul will receive a bank transfer from John and monetary aggregates (the sum of cash and bank deposits) won’t change. Paul might then use the deposit to buy a stock portfolio from Mary, and so on. Thus, the desire of John, Paul and Mary to get rid of the excess liquidity drives asset prices higher. (In reality, Mary of course doesn’t buy from Paul but goes via a broker or her bank, but that doesn’t change the story unless the bank decides to permanently increase or decrease its holdings of securities in the process.) And, by the way, John might be a hedge fund manager who borrows money from his prime broker to finance his purchases, while Mary might be a portfolio manager at a large pension fund. All said, the process only stops when bond yields and equity returns have been driven so low that the excess liquidity is willingly held.
As the above example illustrates, the level of excess liquidity matters at least as much as its growth rate. And, as markets and economies are increasingly integrated, or globalised, the relevant measure of excess liquidity should be global, rather than regional or national. As a proxy for the global economy, we use aggregated data for the G5 countries/regions — United States, Euroland, Japan, UK and Canada — plus China, which is more or less part of the US dollar zone and has become an important contributor to global liquidity in recent years.Global excess liquidity still expanding
We have updated our three global excess liquidity measures — narrow money/nominal GDP, narrow/nominal GDP and private sector credit/nominal GDP — for 2005 by annualising year-to-date developments in money and credit since the end of 2004 and using Morgan Stanley forecasts for 2005 real GDP and inflation in the respective countries.
According to our calculations, global excess liquidity has been on a steep upward trend since about 1995. Between 1995 and 2005, the credit-to-GDP ratio has risen by 25%, broad money-to-GDP by 32%, and narrow money to GDP by no less than 55%. The steep rise especially in narrow money reflects the fact that this aggregate is particularly sensitive to short-term interest rates, which were reduced sharply following the bursting of the equity bubble in 2000. Thus, monetary easing has produced an unprecedented amount of liquidity not needed to finance transactions in the real economy and available to chase bond, equity and other asset prices higher.
Moreover, despite the Fed’s rate hikes since June 2004, which have led to a slight decline in excess liquidity in the US and China this year (on the narrow money-to-GDP measure) global excess liquidity has become even more abundant this year. Global narrow money growth outpaced global nominal GDP growth by 1.4 percentage points (pp), broad money growth outpaced GDP by 2.7 pp, and credit growth outpaced GDP by 3.6 pp. The main reason was a significant increase in excess liquidity in the euro area on all three measures. Thus, it is fair to say that the ECB has become the main financier of global asset price inflation this year. This outcome is exactly what I had in mind when I wrote my piece Liquidity Springs Eternal earlier this year (January 17, 2005).
How can excess liquidity disappear?
Whenever I talk to investors about excess liquidity, they ask how it will disappear. My response: it probably won’t. Probably, because none of the three events that could make it disappear looks particularly likely to happen in the foreseeable future.
Very restrictive monetary policies. The first possibility of how excess liquidity could disappear is through aggressive rate hikes. But, just as it took several years of unnaturally low short-term global interest rates to pump up liquidity, it would take a long period of very restrictive global monetary policies to mop up liquidity again. However, it looks unlikely to me that central banks will be willing to risk recession and financial turmoil just to undo the cumulative effect of their past expansionary policies.
Much higher consumer price inflation. Another possibility of how excess liquidity could be absorbed is via a significant acceleration of global inflation. In this case, the denominator in our definitions of excess liquidity, nominal GDP, would be pumped up as prices rise, and excess liquidity would be absorbed as more transaction balances would be needed to finance higher nominal transactions in the real economy. This is the good old monetarist concept: Excess liquidity will eventually lead to higher inflation. Having monetarist roots, I’m sympathetic to this argument. But being a financial market economist, I would argue that our bloated financial system requires a permanently higher level of money per unit of nominal output to facilitate financial transaction. Also, as long as globalisation keeps traded goods prices low and wages under control, it is difficult to see an inflationary burst of 1970s proportions, with prices rising at a double-digit pace. Yet, that’s exactly what would be required to make a meaningful dent in our measure of excess liquidity. Don’t get me wrong: I do expect global inflation to surprise on the upside. But it will by far not be enough to absorb the liquidity glut out there.
Bank failures and debt deflation. The third way how excess liquidity could disappear is through major balance sheet destruction in the financial sector and amongst companies and private households. This could happen if asset bubbles first get pumped up, say in the real estate market, and then burst with a bang either on their own because prices got out of whack, or through a recession or an aggressive monetary tightening. In this case, banks exposed to the asset class in question would get in trouble and would severely restrict lending. Money and credit would shrink relative to nominal GDP as the banking system would become dysfunctional. But such a 1930s-type or 1990s-in-Japan-type outcome is not particularly likely, in my view, simply because central banks would try to pre-empt it by easing monetary policy swiftly. Following twelve measured rate hikes, the Fed has built up enough ammunition to cut rates aggressively, if needed. And don’t forget that not too long ago (in 2003) Dr. Bernanke spelled out the whole arsenal of deflation-fighting weapons available to the Fed if ever the zero-bound for nominal interest rates became binding.
Inflation targeting is an outdated concept
The massive amount of excess liquidity accumulated over the last decade is a formidable challenge not only for financial markets, but also for central banks. In my view, excess liquidity could only build up over the years because of many central banks’ excessive focus on the real economy and consumer price inflation. The perceived wisdom used to be that by ensuring macroeconomic stability in the form of smoother business cycles and low inflation, financial stability would result quasi automatically. However, with consumer price inflation kept low by globalisation and deregulation (and, of course, more credible monetary policies), central banks felt encouraged to keep interest rates very low for a very long time, thus encouraging excessive risk taking in financial markets and sparking the ‘yearn for yield’. Allowing asset prices to inflate, possibly far beyond their fundamental values, creates risks of its own not only for investors but, more importantly, also for the stability of the real economy, as the Japanese learned the hard way in the 1990s.
Against this backdrop, it strikes me that the concept of ‘inflation-targeting’, as it is commonly understood, is wholly inadequate to deal with the excess liquidity issue. Many central banks who have applied the concept directly or indirectly in the past are becoming increasingly aware of the limits of this approach. It is a great concept if you want to acquire credibility and want to bring about disinflation. But, once inflation is low and stable, credibility may become a curse as it encourages excessively low interest rates and excessively high risk-taking.
There are two possible ways out. The first is to stick to inflation targeting in principle but extend the time horizon for the inflation forecast exercise to 3 to 5 years out, and to explicitly incorporate risks to longer-term price stability emanating from asset price developments into the forecast exercise and into the monetary policy stance derived from the process. This could imply tolerating, say, an undershoot of consumer price inflation below target for some time and pursue a less expansionary policy so as to prevent a build-up of financial sector imbalances that could give rise either to higher inflation or, if bubbles burst, to deflation over the medium to longer term. The second avenue would be an approach similar to the ECB’s two-pillar strategy, which explicitly incorporates a detailed analysis of the monetary and credit sphere and thus the potential build-up of excess liquidity. Alas, as recent developments show, this is no guarantee for preventing such a build-up: as discussed above, the ECB has become the main provider of global excess liquidity in the last two years despite its two-pillar monetary policy strategy.
Bottom line: The big mitigator
Global excess liquidity is alive and kicking, read: still expanding. Aggressive central bank rate hikes to mop up excessive liquidity — and that’s what would be needed to make a meaningful difference to the high levels accumulated — are unlikely, in my view. Yes, the ECB looks likely to raise rates soon, but aggressive action is unlikely. Yes, the Band of Japan is likely to end quantitative easing in the foreseeable future, but the zero-interest rate policy is likely to remain in place and, if anything, money and credit growth look likely to accelerate as the banking system becomes functional again. And yes, the Fed isn’t done tightening yet. But there is more to global liquidity than the Fed, and even the Fed is unlikely to be very aggressive from here, in my view. So, excess liquidity will likely stay around, cushioning the bear market in government bonds, credit and high yield that I think has started or is about to start. And as the liquidity has to go somewhere, my guess is that the next bubble could well occur in equities, the least overvalued of all major asset classes, in my view.
Global: Is Global Excess Liquidity Drying Up?
Joachim Fels (London)
Introduction and summary
Will the liquidity glut of the last several years give way to a drought, thus spelling trouble for financial markets? With the US Fed funds rate now at 4% and likely to head higher still, the ECB inching closer to a first rate hike, and the Bank of Japan signalling that the quantitative easing policy will come to an end in the foreseeable future, fears abound that the global super-liquidity cycle is turning. Some even argue that the drought has already started, pointing to a contraction in the ratio of the money stock to GDP (the ‘Marshallian K’) in the US.
However, our freshly updated indicators of global excess liquidity tell a different story: the super-liquidity cycle is still alive and kicking because other central banks, most notably the ECB, have taken over from the Fed as the dominant supplier of additional liquidity. More importantly, after many years of easy monetary policies, the level of excess liquidity has become so large that any plausibly conceivable leakage in response to monetary tightening would still leave the pond very full.
While there are good fundamental reasons to be bearish on bonds (higher inflation) and risky assets (slower economic growth), excess liquidity is likely to remain plentiful, which should cushion any sell-off in some asset classes and could even pump up new bubbles in others (equities?). And, turning to monetary policy, central banks need to find new approaches to deal with the liquidity monster. An old-fashioned concept like inflation targeting is certainly not the answer, in my view — in fact, it may be part of the problem.
Excess liquidity or savings glut?
Why worry about excess liquidity? As I see it, the enormous amounts of excess liquidity created by the major central banks are the ultimate explanation for Alan Greenspan’s conundrum of low bond yields, and for the broader conundrum of simultaneous rallies in virtually all asset classes over the past couple of years. The main competing explanation for the current Fed Chairman’s conundrum is the future Fed Chairman’s savings-glut hypothesis. According to Ben Bernanke, low bond yields have been the result of an excess of (ex-ante) savings over (ex-ante) investment in the world, driven mainly by the developing countries in Asia, which have a special appetite for US bonds due to their dollar pegs.
My main difficulty with the savings-glut explanation is that, while it helps to explain developments in the late 1990s and in the early part of this decade, it does not gel well with the strong recovery in global GDP growth and capital spending during 2004 and 2005, which is when the conundrum became fully apparent. A savings glut would normally be associated with a weaker economy and weak investment. In my view, the liquidity-glut hypothesis fits the stylized facts of 2004/2005 better: it would naturally go along with stronger economic growth, rising capital spending and generalized asset price inflation. And if excess liquidity is the explanation, then a drying up of liquidity would spell trouble for inflated asset markets and the global economy.
Defining excess liquidity
While the concept of excess liquidity sounds intuitive, its measurement is fraught with difficulties. What exactly is liquidity, and how do we determine whether it is excessive or not? I usually define excess liquidity as the ratio of a monetary aggregate to nominal GDP, a.k.a. the ‘Marshallian K’, which is equivalent to the inverse of the ‘velocity of money’.
I use both a narrow monetary aggregate (cash and checking deposits, a.k.a. M1) and a broad aggregate (which in addition to cash and sight deposits also includes money market funds, certain time deposits, savings deposits and CDs, and is equivalent or similar to M3). As an additional but related indicator, I use the sum of outstanding credit to the private sector. These money and credit aggregates are created through the interplay between borrowers (companies and private households), lenders (banks) and the central bank. While the central bank cannot control these monetary aggregates in the short term, it will indirectly influence their evolution over the medium and longer term via setting short-term interest rates that in turn affect money demand through several channels. Put simply, lower interest rates will spur money growth and higher interest rates will dampen it.
To determine whether money (liquidity) is excessive, I compare it to nominal GDP, which in turn is a (crude) proxy for all the transactions that are related to the production of, and the demand for, goods and services in the economy. So if money grows by more than GDP, excess liquidity accumulates. Simply speaking, excess liquidity is liquidity that is not needed to finance transactions in the ‘real’ economy. It is available (or needed) for transactions in the ‘financial’ sphere, such as the acquisition of bonds or equities. It is a common misunderstanding to assume that excess liquidity disappears in this process. It doesn’t: If John buys a bond or a stock from Paul, Paul will receive a bank transfer from John and monetary aggregates (the sum of cash and bank deposits) won’t change. Paul might then use the deposit to buy a stock portfolio from Mary, and so on. Thus, the desire of John, Paul and Mary to get rid of the excess liquidity drives asset prices higher. (In reality, Mary of course doesn’t buy from Paul but goes via a broker or her bank, but that doesn’t change the story unless the bank decides to permanently increase or decrease its holdings of securities in the process.) And, by the way, John might be a hedge fund manager who borrows money from his prime broker to finance his purchases, while Mary might be a portfolio manager at a large pension fund. All said, the process only stops when bond yields and equity returns have been driven so low that the excess liquidity is willingly held.
As the above example illustrates, the level of excess liquidity matters at least as much as its growth rate. And, as markets and economies are increasingly integrated, or globalised, the relevant measure of excess liquidity should be global, rather than regional or national. As a proxy for the global economy, we use aggregated data for the G5 countries/regions — United States, Euroland, Japan, UK and Canada — plus China, which is more or less part of the US dollar zone and has become an important contributor to global liquidity in recent years.Global excess liquidity still expanding
We have updated our three global excess liquidity measures — narrow money/nominal GDP, narrow/nominal GDP and private sector credit/nominal GDP — for 2005 by annualising year-to-date developments in money and credit since the end of 2004 and using Morgan Stanley forecasts for 2005 real GDP and inflation in the respective countries.
According to our calculations, global excess liquidity has been on a steep upward trend since about 1995. Between 1995 and 2005, the credit-to-GDP ratio has risen by 25%, broad money-to-GDP by 32%, and narrow money to GDP by no less than 55%. The steep rise especially in narrow money reflects the fact that this aggregate is particularly sensitive to short-term interest rates, which were reduced sharply following the bursting of the equity bubble in 2000. Thus, monetary easing has produced an unprecedented amount of liquidity not needed to finance transactions in the real economy and available to chase bond, equity and other asset prices higher.
Moreover, despite the Fed’s rate hikes since June 2004, which have led to a slight decline in excess liquidity in the US and China this year (on the narrow money-to-GDP measure) global excess liquidity has become even more abundant this year. Global narrow money growth outpaced global nominal GDP growth by 1.4 percentage points (pp), broad money growth outpaced GDP by 2.7 pp, and credit growth outpaced GDP by 3.6 pp. The main reason was a significant increase in excess liquidity in the euro area on all three measures. Thus, it is fair to say that the ECB has become the main financier of global asset price inflation this year. This outcome is exactly what I had in mind when I wrote my piece Liquidity Springs Eternal earlier this year (January 17, 2005).
How can excess liquidity disappear?
Whenever I talk to investors about excess liquidity, they ask how it will disappear. My response: it probably won’t. Probably, because none of the three events that could make it disappear looks particularly likely to happen in the foreseeable future.
Very restrictive monetary policies. The first possibility of how excess liquidity could disappear is through aggressive rate hikes. But, just as it took several years of unnaturally low short-term global interest rates to pump up liquidity, it would take a long period of very restrictive global monetary policies to mop up liquidity again. However, it looks unlikely to me that central banks will be willing to risk recession and financial turmoil just to undo the cumulative effect of their past expansionary policies.
Much higher consumer price inflation. Another possibility of how excess liquidity could be absorbed is via a significant acceleration of global inflation. In this case, the denominator in our definitions of excess liquidity, nominal GDP, would be pumped up as prices rise, and excess liquidity would be absorbed as more transaction balances would be needed to finance higher nominal transactions in the real economy. This is the good old monetarist concept: Excess liquidity will eventually lead to higher inflation. Having monetarist roots, I’m sympathetic to this argument. But being a financial market economist, I would argue that our bloated financial system requires a permanently higher level of money per unit of nominal output to facilitate financial transaction. Also, as long as globalisation keeps traded goods prices low and wages under control, it is difficult to see an inflationary burst of 1970s proportions, with prices rising at a double-digit pace. Yet, that’s exactly what would be required to make a meaningful dent in our measure of excess liquidity. Don’t get me wrong: I do expect global inflation to surprise on the upside. But it will by far not be enough to absorb the liquidity glut out there.
Bank failures and debt deflation. The third way how excess liquidity could disappear is through major balance sheet destruction in the financial sector and amongst companies and private households. This could happen if asset bubbles first get pumped up, say in the real estate market, and then burst with a bang either on their own because prices got out of whack, or through a recession or an aggressive monetary tightening. In this case, banks exposed to the asset class in question would get in trouble and would severely restrict lending. Money and credit would shrink relative to nominal GDP as the banking system would become dysfunctional. But such a 1930s-type or 1990s-in-Japan-type outcome is not particularly likely, in my view, simply because central banks would try to pre-empt it by easing monetary policy swiftly. Following twelve measured rate hikes, the Fed has built up enough ammunition to cut rates aggressively, if needed. And don’t forget that not too long ago (in 2003) Dr. Bernanke spelled out the whole arsenal of deflation-fighting weapons available to the Fed if ever the zero-bound for nominal interest rates became binding.
Inflation targeting is an outdated concept
The massive amount of excess liquidity accumulated over the last decade is a formidable challenge not only for financial markets, but also for central banks. In my view, excess liquidity could only build up over the years because of many central banks’ excessive focus on the real economy and consumer price inflation. The perceived wisdom used to be that by ensuring macroeconomic stability in the form of smoother business cycles and low inflation, financial stability would result quasi automatically. However, with consumer price inflation kept low by globalisation and deregulation (and, of course, more credible monetary policies), central banks felt encouraged to keep interest rates very low for a very long time, thus encouraging excessive risk taking in financial markets and sparking the ‘yearn for yield’. Allowing asset prices to inflate, possibly far beyond their fundamental values, creates risks of its own not only for investors but, more importantly, also for the stability of the real economy, as the Japanese learned the hard way in the 1990s.
Against this backdrop, it strikes me that the concept of ‘inflation-targeting’, as it is commonly understood, is wholly inadequate to deal with the excess liquidity issue. Many central banks who have applied the concept directly or indirectly in the past are becoming increasingly aware of the limits of this approach. It is a great concept if you want to acquire credibility and want to bring about disinflation. But, once inflation is low and stable, credibility may become a curse as it encourages excessively low interest rates and excessively high risk-taking.
There are two possible ways out. The first is to stick to inflation targeting in principle but extend the time horizon for the inflation forecast exercise to 3 to 5 years out, and to explicitly incorporate risks to longer-term price stability emanating from asset price developments into the forecast exercise and into the monetary policy stance derived from the process. This could imply tolerating, say, an undershoot of consumer price inflation below target for some time and pursue a less expansionary policy so as to prevent a build-up of financial sector imbalances that could give rise either to higher inflation or, if bubbles burst, to deflation over the medium to longer term. The second avenue would be an approach similar to the ECB’s two-pillar strategy, which explicitly incorporates a detailed analysis of the monetary and credit sphere and thus the potential build-up of excess liquidity. Alas, as recent developments show, this is no guarantee for preventing such a build-up: as discussed above, the ECB has become the main provider of global excess liquidity in the last two years despite its two-pillar monetary policy strategy.
Bottom line: The big mitigator
Global excess liquidity is alive and kicking, read: still expanding. Aggressive central bank rate hikes to mop up excessive liquidity — and that’s what would be needed to make a meaningful difference to the high levels accumulated — are unlikely, in my view. Yes, the ECB looks likely to raise rates soon, but aggressive action is unlikely. Yes, the Band of Japan is likely to end quantitative easing in the foreseeable future, but the zero-interest rate policy is likely to remain in place and, if anything, money and credit growth look likely to accelerate as the banking system becomes functional again. And yes, the Fed isn’t done tightening yet. But there is more to global liquidity than the Fed, and even the Fed is unlikely to be very aggressive from here, in my view. So, excess liquidity will likely stay around, cushioning the bear market in government bonds, credit and high yield that I think has started or is about to start. And as the liquidity has to go somewhere, my guess is that the next bubble could well occur in equities, the least overvalued of all major asset classes, in my view.
gipa69
collegio dei patafisici
L'eccesso di liquidità
Riportando in sintesi il senso dell'articolo postato all'interno del thread:
L'eccesso di liquidità cioè la liquidità finanziaria che eccede il sistema produttivo misurata attraverso il rapporto tra aggregati monetari e il PIL nominale e che segnala la liquidità disponibile per il sistema finanziario mostra una straordinaria forza pur in presenza di un significativo rialzo da parte della FED, in quanto altre aree monetarie dei principali paesi economici (in particolare l'area euro) hanno sostenuto le disponibilità finanziarie globali.
Questa liquidità è ormai in crescita da molti anni e mostra un andamento molto sostenuto anche nel corso di quest'anno permettendo di avere relativi timori in caso di consolidamento del ciclo economico.
I pericoli che potrebbero contrarre la liquidità finanziaria sistemica secondo l'autore sono:
1)Politiche monetarie molto restrittive (improbabile allo stato attuale anche se una leggera restrizione in caso di eccessi potrebbe avvenire)
2)Prezzi al consumo molto sostenuti (al momento possibile solo con uno shock sulle materie prime industriali)
3)Fallimento delle banche e deflazione da debito (possibile con un crollo degli immobili e simile all'andamento degli USA post anni 30 e del Giappone negli anni 90 ma improbabile viste le nuove cartucce a disposizione della FED dopo i molti rialzi dei tassi).
L'autore ritiene improbabile uno di questi avvenimenti nel prossimo futuro e ritiene che l'eccesso di liquidità servirà da ammortizzatore all'eventuale possibile bear market sulle obbligazioni sia governative che corporate e contemporaneamente è possibile che si sposterà su qualche altro asset magari quello meno sopravvalutato allo stato attuale che per l'autore è l'azionario creando una nuova bolla speculativa.
Queste considerazioni che dal mio punto di vista sono corrette portano ad una conclusione che dal punto di vista intellettuale è condivisibile.
In effetti è possibile che una nuova bolla si sviluppi e sicuramente uno dei settori più liquidi è proprio l'azionario e quindi lo scenario è potenzialmente realizzabile.
Tenuto però conto delle considerazioni tecniche di lungo che ho postato negli ultimi giorni e delle considerazioni delle ultime settimane sui valori fondamentali e sul rischio inversione degli utili aziendali (per la prima volta da diversi trimestri le aziende USA seppur di poco non rispetteranno le aspettative) questo scenario si potrà considerare realizzato probabilmente quando gli indici USA andranno a perforare i massimi degli ultimi due anni su tutti i principali indici e quando lo SPX perforerà la famosa area 1255/1260.
In quel caso lo scenario di bolla potrebbe farsi concreto e seppure non entusiasta dovrò adeguare la mia operatività.
Il caso contrario si potra verificare oltre che per le cause indicate sopra dall'autore anche per eventuali contrazioni interne al mercato che possano portare ad un imbuto di liquidità improvviso non facilmente colmabile dalle politiche monetarie e da un corrispondente peggioramento del sentiment degli investitori (in parte già attivo) o da situazioni economiche in deciso peggioramento.
Riportando in sintesi il senso dell'articolo postato all'interno del thread:
L'eccesso di liquidità cioè la liquidità finanziaria che eccede il sistema produttivo misurata attraverso il rapporto tra aggregati monetari e il PIL nominale e che segnala la liquidità disponibile per il sistema finanziario mostra una straordinaria forza pur in presenza di un significativo rialzo da parte della FED, in quanto altre aree monetarie dei principali paesi economici (in particolare l'area euro) hanno sostenuto le disponibilità finanziarie globali.
Questa liquidità è ormai in crescita da molti anni e mostra un andamento molto sostenuto anche nel corso di quest'anno permettendo di avere relativi timori in caso di consolidamento del ciclo economico.
I pericoli che potrebbero contrarre la liquidità finanziaria sistemica secondo l'autore sono:
1)Politiche monetarie molto restrittive (improbabile allo stato attuale anche se una leggera restrizione in caso di eccessi potrebbe avvenire)
2)Prezzi al consumo molto sostenuti (al momento possibile solo con uno shock sulle materie prime industriali)
3)Fallimento delle banche e deflazione da debito (possibile con un crollo degli immobili e simile all'andamento degli USA post anni 30 e del Giappone negli anni 90 ma improbabile viste le nuove cartucce a disposizione della FED dopo i molti rialzi dei tassi).
L'autore ritiene improbabile uno di questi avvenimenti nel prossimo futuro e ritiene che l'eccesso di liquidità servirà da ammortizzatore all'eventuale possibile bear market sulle obbligazioni sia governative che corporate e contemporaneamente è possibile che si sposterà su qualche altro asset magari quello meno sopravvalutato allo stato attuale che per l'autore è l'azionario creando una nuova bolla speculativa.
Queste considerazioni che dal mio punto di vista sono corrette portano ad una conclusione che dal punto di vista intellettuale è condivisibile.
In effetti è possibile che una nuova bolla si sviluppi e sicuramente uno dei settori più liquidi è proprio l'azionario e quindi lo scenario è potenzialmente realizzabile.
Tenuto però conto delle considerazioni tecniche di lungo che ho postato negli ultimi giorni e delle considerazioni delle ultime settimane sui valori fondamentali e sul rischio inversione degli utili aziendali (per la prima volta da diversi trimestri le aziende USA seppur di poco non rispetteranno le aspettative) questo scenario si potrà considerare realizzato probabilmente quando gli indici USA andranno a perforare i massimi degli ultimi due anni su tutti i principali indici e quando lo SPX perforerà la famosa area 1255/1260.
In quel caso lo scenario di bolla potrebbe farsi concreto e seppure non entusiasta dovrò adeguare la mia operatività.
Il caso contrario si potra verificare oltre che per le cause indicate sopra dall'autore anche per eventuali contrazioni interne al mercato che possano portare ad un imbuto di liquidità improvviso non facilmente colmabile dalle politiche monetarie e da un corrispondente peggioramento del sentiment degli investitori (in parte già attivo) o da situazioni economiche in deciso peggioramento.
