Macroeconomia la situazione (2 lettori)

[Blue59]

Ciao Gipa.......

Ti allego un articolo piuttosto interessante tratto dal New York Times.....

Sharp rise in prices in China = looming inflation around the world
China's ability to set prices in many industries gives it a growing influence on the world economy

GUANGZHOU - China's newest export could just be inflation.

As managers of businesses across China opened booths here at the nation's biggest trade fair, the common refrain was that prices of everything were rising sharply, and that prices of exports to the United States, Europe and elsewhere would have to follow.

The prices for orders placed now will not show up in most US indices until months later, when goods are actually shipped. But as prices begin to rise in the US, concerns are growing that China will become an exporter of inflation.

Even though its goods account for a small percentage of total US purchases, China has played an oversize role in worldwide prices, with low labour costs that allow it to set prices in many industries.

A socket wrench maker said his high-quality models had risen in price by 10 per cent in the last six months and his lesser-quality models by as much as 50 per cent.

The prices of steel and other materials are major culprits. Another is energy costs. A motorcycle manufacturer in China said he has had to close a factory for three days each week because of electricity blackouts, forcing a 4-per-cent increase in prices.

Food and other necessities are putting pressure on wages. A maker of key-cutting machines in central China said it was paying workers 10 per cent to 20 per cent more to help cover sharp increases in rice prices, and had raised export prices for the machines by 25 to 30 per cent.

Price increases in raw materials and other business costs in China, a government spokesman said, will probably spill over soon to consumer prices, in China and abroad.

'There is a time lag, but it can't be too long, and there is pressure for price rises,' said Mr Zheng Jingping of the National Bureau of Statistics at a news conference in Beijing on Thursday.

'If this goes on for a long time, it will cause problems.'

China's efforts to keep the economy from overheating and igniting inflation have been unsuccessful so far.

The economy grew at a rapid 9.7 per cent in the first quarter, faster than expected, while consumer prices were exactly 3 per cent higher in March than a year earlier.

But the true increase in consumer prices could be 7 or 8 per cent, according to Morgan Stanley's China economist Andy Xie.

In the US, the Labour Department reported on Wednesday that prices climbed 0.5 per cent in March, with gasoline and clothing leading the way, for an annualised rate of 6 per cent if sustained.

Though prices of housing and health care have been rising for some time, increases in other areas stoked concerns that inflation could rear its head in coming months.

Within China, ferocious competition has kept prices from rising for big-ticket items like cars, household appliances and mobile phones. Giant companies like Wal-Mart, moreover, have some ability to force suppliers to hold down price increases.

But managers from two companies in Wuhan said that factories there had lifted wages by at least 10 per cent to help workers cope with rising food prices.

Buyers at the trade fair talked about marking up prices in coming months.

Mr Paul Bartels, who buys products in bulk for American mail-order companies, said that he had taken price increases of a few percentage points out of his own profit margins, but had passed on larger increases.

'With every customer I have, I've gone back and revised prices, and none has gone down,' he said.

Whether the trend will be sustained depends on many variables. Chinese leaders have taken steps to slow the economy and brake inflation.

By next year, the many steel mills under construction could start easing the acute shortages that are driving up prices. New power plants should curb blackouts if coal mines can increase output fast enough to supply them.

At the trade fair, a marketing company's export director, Mr Ke Sheng Feng, rattled off price increases for work boots, up 10 per cent; machetes, up 20 per cent; and folding steel ladders, up 50 per cent.

'If the conditions continue like this, business will be difficult,' he said. -- New York Times

 

[gipa69]

Ciao Blue
In una logica di scenario macro occorre monitorare con grande attenzione i numeri che riguardano l'inflazione proveniente dall'Asia in quanto questi numeri possono influenzare i cambi di quei paesi. Infatti un forte recupero dell'inflazione potrebbe essere lo strumento per far scomparire la sottovalutazione di queste valute mantenute o attraverso il cambio fisso o attraverso acquisti massicci di valuta US.
E la scomparsa di questa sottovalutazione potrebbe eliminare almeno in parte la protezione dall'inflazione di cui hanno usufruito gli US negli ultimi anni, un pò come successe nel 1972 quando il marco e altre valute europee si rivalutarono.
Attualmente con prezzi al consumo saliti del 3% a/a a marzo rispetto al 2,1% di Febbraio si nota anche una crescita del reddito rurale del 13,2% nell'ultimo quarto e del 12,1% in quello urbano con le vendite cresciute del 10,7% sempre nel primo quarto.
Il differenziale eccessivo tra tassi e crescita a cui il legame con il dollaro sta costringendo l'economia Cinese sta surriscaldando l'economia e le misure attualmente adottate dalla Banca Centrale Cinese non sembrano sufficenti.
Nel contempo l'inflazione US ha ricominciato a crescere....
I dati inflattivi dell'asia dei prossimi mesi avranno la loro importanza.....

 

[gipa69]

Ritengo possibile che però nel breve la reazione dei bond US sia stata eccessiva e un certo rimbalzo (in realtà già iniziato..) si possa concretizzarte anche perchè vi sono molte posizioni short sui bund da parte degli small e vanno un pò riassorbiti...
E poi c'è la FED che sta tranquillizando:

Richmond Fed president says if positive signs continue, bank will have to act, but there's room.
April 16, 2004: 1:46 PM EDT



CAMBRIDGE, Md. (Reuters) - Richmond Federal Reserve Bank President Alfred Broaddus said Friday that the risk of a downward move in the U.S. inflation rate appeared to have eased, but conditions were not yet ripe for an interest-rate hike.

"Obviously, as we look at incoming data, if the expansion continues...and if we see not only a bottoming of the inflation rate but an upcreep in that rate, it is going to be essential that the Fed react," Broaddus said in answer to a question at an event sponsored by Salisbury University.

"We're still some distance from that in my view."

Broaddus later told reporters the central bank would need to see signs that confirmed a firmer economic tone evident in data for March before deciding.


"I think at this stage of the game, speaking strictly for myself, we need more confirmation," he said. "We must wait a little longer before we make judgments on whether or not the reports of the March economic data will persist or not."

 

[Blue59]

Ti allego un grafico........

 

[Blue59]

Ed un'altro articolo sull'argomento preso da www.morganstanley.com.....

Global: Pitfalls of Asian Central Banking

Stephen Roach (New York)
April 16, 2004

I have been critical of America’s Federal Reserve for failing to normalize monetary policy in this post-bubble climate. But the Fed is not alone in deserving blame for nurturing the persistent imbalances that continue to plague a lopsided, US-centric global economy. Other central banks have played an equally important role in condoning this unstable and increasingly risky arrangement. Nowhere is that more evident in Asia, where monetary policy is now moving into the danger zone.

The financial crisis of 1997-98 was Asia’s wake-up call. Never again would the region’s monetary authorities be caught with inadequate foreign exchange reserves — unable to defend themselves (i.e., their currencies) in tough market conditions. They have succeeded beyond their wildest dreams. On a pan-Asian basis (i.e., including Japan), the region has now amassed a reservoir of about US$2.1 trillion in official currency reserves (as of March 2004); that’s more than 80% of the world’s total reserves and is almost triple Asia’s holdings of $766 billion existing at the end of 1998, at the worst point of the Asian financial crisis. Collectively, Japan (US$827 billion) and China ($440 billion) account for 59% of Asia’s total FX reserves; however, adding in Taiwan ($226 billion) and Hong Kong ($124 billion), Greater China’s reserves amount to $790 billion, only fractionally below those of Japan. For Japan and China, the accumulation of reserves has been particularly explosive in recent years; since early 2002, the holdings of both countries have basically doubled. (Note: The official data on foreign exchange reserves, maintained by the Bank of International Settlements [BIS], is only available through year-end 2002; our updates through early 2004 are taken from national sources).

The plot thickens when the mix of official reserves is considered. As of 2002, BIS data reveal that dollar-denominated assets made up fully 73% of the world’s total official holdings of foreign exchange reserves — more than double America’s 30% share of world GDP. There can be little doubt as to who has led the charge. With Asia accounting for the bulk of the world’s expansion in foreign exchange reserves, there is every reason to believe that the region has also led the way in driving the play into dollar-denominated assets. Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan has come to the same conclusion. Since the start of 2002, he notes that Asian authorities purchased almost $240 billion in dollar-based assets (see “Current Account,” Greenspan’s remarks before the Economic Club of New York, March 2, 2004).

This has serious consequences for the financial underpinnings of an unbalanced global economy. With private sector inflows into dollar-based assets on the wane in recent years, Asia’s monetary authorities have picked up the slack. According to Rakesh Mohan, the Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, “The central banks of Asia are financing roughly 3-3.5% of the current account deficit of the US and most of its fiscal deficit” (see “Challenges to Monetary Policy in a Globalising Context,” published in the January 2004 issue of the Reserve Bank of India Bulletin). Asia’s monetary authorities have become the primary financiers of the largest imbalances the world has ever seen.

This is no accident, in my view. It is a conscious by-product of Asia’s unflinching reliance on external demand as its primary source of economic growth and development. For years, I have been hearing tales of the emergence of autonomous sources of domestic demand in Asia. The record, however, falls well short of the rhetoric — especially insofar as support from private consumption is concerned. Asia’s domestic demand success stories have been few and far between, largely concentrated in the smaller ASEAN economies such as Thailand and Indonesia. For the big Asian economies — namely, Japan, China, and Korea — domestic demand has largely taken the form of unsustainable investment bubbles; the Asian consumer remains all but missing in action.

Lacking in a sustainable foundation of domestic demand, Asian authorities have concluded that they have no choice other than to embrace external-demand-focused growth strategies. This requires vigilance on the currency front in order to maintain export competitiveness. Asia’s enormous overweight of dollar-denominated official foreign exchange reserves is central to this strategy. For a consumption-short region, it prevents sharp currency appreciation that might impair export-led growth. Yet by doing that, Asia has little incentive to develop autonomous support from domestic demand. That perpetuates what I believe is one of Asia’s most unfortunate vicious circles.

The Asian-style growth recipe also provides great support to the income-short, saving-deficient, and overly indebted American consumer. By funding the bulk of America’s record twin deficits, the Asian bid for dollars prevents what would otherwise have been a sharp back-up in US interest rates. For what it’s worth, my guess is that intermediate to longer-term yields in the US would be at least 100 bp higher today were it not for the Asian bid for dollar-denominated assets. The Asian subsidy to US interest rates not only keeps the magic alive in America’s asset markets — bonds and property, alike — but it also provides the means by which purchasing power can be extracted from such holdings through the ever-efficient financial technology of asset-based refinancing vehicles.

Is this any way to run the world? My answer is “absolutely not.” Central banks — both in the United States and Asia — have created a monster that they may no longer be able to control. Income-short American consumers have turned to tax cuts, asset-driven income extraction, and debt as the means to sustain current consumption. The Federal Reserve has encouraged this recklessness by offering the steroids of essentially free money at the short end of the yield curve (a 1% nominal federal funds rate in a climate of 1.7% headline CPI inflation).

Asian central banks are playing the mirror image of the same game — buying dollars to keep their currencies from rising and thereby subsidizing Asia’s ability to sell exports to overly indulgent American consumers. Yet by running ever-widening current account surpluses and having to purchase massive amounts of dollar assets in order to maintain currency targets, Asian central banks are flirting with the growing risk of abdicating control over their domestic financial systems. Japan’s massive and unprecedented currency intervention in 2003 and early 2004 is the most glaring and extreme example of the Asian gambit; while it may make sense for an economy in deflation, it is not sustainable for a post-deflationary Japanese economy. At the same time, China’s aggressive purchases of dollar-based assets are already complicating the efforts of its central bank to rein in the liquidity-driven excesses of an overheated economy.

Like all periods of financial market excess, this one is likely to end in tears. But, in my opinion, there is nothing fundamentally sound about this increasingly precarious arrangement. In recent years, it has become fashionable in policy and investor circles to argue that imbalances in the classic sense — current account and budget deficits, saving shortfalls, and rising private sector indebtedness — have lost their meaning in this increasingly interdependent era of globalization. It’s all about “capital flows,” goes the logic of the latest New Paradigm. And America’s IT-enabled productivity-led prowess of the past eight years is widely considered to make the US deserving of the special breaks it is getting in world financial markets. The dollar’s role as the world’s major reserve currency is the icing on the cake of this logic.

In my view, the capital-flow thesis is nothing more than another “greater fool” theory — precisely the type of logic that was in favor as Nasdaq was cresting toward 5,000 about four years ago. I couldn’t agree more with India’s Deputy Governor Mohan, who also notes in the above-cited paper, “Global capital flows impact the contact of monetary policy on a daily basis. The problem, however, is that capital flows typically follow a boom-bust pattern.” As soon as you hear the word “flows” to describe the new way the world works, the endgame is no longer in doubt. It’s just a question of when — and under what conditions. I fear we are now entering the most seductive phase of this liquidity boom.

Central banks did a masterful job in fighting the ravages of high inflation. But in my opinion, they are doing a terrible job in coping with the challenges of an inflationless world. It is the height of absurdity for America’s Federal Reserve to hold its policy rate at 1% when growth in the US economy is now running at a 5-6% clip. It is equally reckless for Asian central banks to operate under the delusion that massive reserve accumulation and open-ended buying of dollar-denominated assets are a recipe for prosperity. These are dangerous and unsustainable policy strategies that can only exacerbate the ever-mounting imbalances of a lopsided global economy.

Such profound disequilibria should be a wake-up call for misguided central banks and complacent world financial markets. Instead, the authorities are asleep at the switch and investors have been lulled into a false sense of complacency. America’s Federal Reserve has led the charge in pushing monetary policy into the danger zone. But the US authorities couldn’t have done it alone. The complicity of Asian central banks is an equally worrisome development for the global economy and world financial markets.

 

[gipa69]

E' appunto la manipolazione da parte della FED della parte a breve della curva dei tassi e delle banche centrali asiatiche della parte a breve e lunga dei tassi americani e del loro cambio che ha sostenuto questa situazione fino ad adesso.
Il problema è quali conseguenze si avranno se questo comportamento cambierà o sarà forzato a cambiare (vedi appunto inflazione...).
In realtà la FED negli ultimi due anno ha già cambiato atteggiamento sul mercato più volte da quando esiste.
Comunque i dati sui consumi interni stanno dimostrando che nella fase attuale il surriscaldamento dell'economia Cinese avviene anche a livello di economia interna e non solo a livello di prodotti esportati.
Per quanto riguarda i tassi effettivamente la parte a breve della curva sarà quella che potrebbe subire i maggiori danni se la FED alzerà i tassi
ma anche la parte a lunga sicuramente ha ancora spazio per crescere.
Come dicevo sul breve dovrebbe rimbalzare ma i target di crescita senza negare l'andamento dei tassi calanti in essere dal 1981 è intorno al 5% nella fase attuale sul decennale.
Se si va oltre lo scenario potrebbe cambiare decisamente....
In fondo negli ultimi 20 mesi l'inflazione in Cina é cresciuta dal -1,6% al 3% e l'impatto della sua crescita sul mercato US è stata sentita solo negli ultimi mesi anche a causa dell'eccessivo costo di trasporto delle materie prime e delle merci.

 

[gipa69]

Il vulcano dei borrower

La risalita dei tassi e la forza del dollaro mette sotto pressione i mercati azionari anticipandone e dettandone i comportamenti.
Attenzione soprattutto al dollaro in quanto ulteriori cedimenti potrebbero scatenare una fuga di borrower di notevoli proporzioni portando ad un nuovo sell-off sui bond probabilmente molto più dannoso al mercato di quello precedente.
Il mercato US in termini di euro ha raggiunto comunque nuovi massimi relativi giusto in queste sedute mostrando non tanto una nuova forza come pensavo ma bensì una certa debolezza dell'euro dovuta ad una crescente sfiducia nelle potenzialità dei mercati Eu sia in termini economici sia in termini politici. Certo conta anche il differenziale sui tassi ma l'euro in questa fase potrebbe diventare una delle valute più deboli....
Per quanto riguarda gli internals del mercato non si può fare a meno di notare che la postura più difensiva del mercato viene rimarcata dal ratio SOX/NDX che mostra una fase correttiva duratura.
Si può notare come il ratio abbia spesso anticipato i movimenti dei mercati maggiori......
Gli indicatori di breve si stanno deteriorando e pur nella confusione dei segnali la chiusura assegna una postura negativa al mercato che solo un pronto recupero potrebbe invalidare...
Situazione alquanto complicata.....

 

[gipa69]

Il comportamento di ieri del mercato sembrava avvisare che oggi avrebbe potuto essere una giornata positiva e poi una news sull'occupazione meno brillante del previsto a dato fiato al dollaro, ai bond e quindi al mercato.
Certo con una complessità maggiore e con un certo numero di segnali negativi il mercato potrebbe ancora andare a fare quei nuovi massimi relativi di cui parlo da alcune settimane e nel caso con divergenze (almeno per il momento) ancora più preoccupanti.
Certo che è interessante notare come il mercato abbia deciso di consolidare alcuni movimenti e per farlo ha deciso di interpretare le parole di Greenspan in maniera accomodante e dimenticato quanto pronunciato in questi giorni dagli altri governatori.
Il concetto è il seguente:
noi vi abbiamo avvertito, sapete cosa dovete fare.....
Per quanto riguarda i mercati azionari vi è uno studio di SSB che confronta l'andamento dei singoli settori 6 mesi prima del rialzo dei tassi US nelle 6 ultime occasioni dal 1980 ad oggi:
i Vincenti:
Energy (con eccezione del 1994), Materials (il sottosettore dei Gold molto volatile e Technology (con l'eccezione del 1984)
i perdenti:
Telecom e Utility con qualche periodo in controtendenza.
Il settore più forte in assoluto con tutte letture positive nei sei precedenti casi è l'elettronica.

 

[gipa69]

L'unico fatto che resta è che in queste ultime due settimane questi repentini cambiamenti di trend mi hanno fatto perdere diversi soldi a partire dai Gold e arrivando ai continui movimenti dello SPY.
L'atteggiamento che normalmente uso è multiday e probabilmente nella fase attuale è stato penalizzante e sarebbe stato più opportuna una stategia intraday.
Chiassa....

 

[christiano]

Ciao gipa e complimenti per le analisi.
In un mercato dove la capacità di credito (e quella di stampa) è virtualmente infinita, la possibilità di manipolazione si estende apparentemente fino all'inverosimile generando movimenti irrazionali. Ciò che prima seguiva le leggi della natura, (e per un pò ha continuato a seguirla quasi per inerzia) ora viaggia a briglia sciolta verso il declino dell'economia come noi la pensiamo ora.
Quando ci si renderà conto che la creazione di moneta fiduciaria ha di gran lunga ecceduto i livelli sostenibili si innesterà una paurosa crisi inflattiva che non potrà non terminare con il ritorno a forme di scambio ancorate a qualcosa con valore intrinseco. Io credo che il momento sia molto vicino: i grandi demiurghi con fiumi di moneta finora sono riusciti a rimettere le cose a posto ma lo hanno fatto al prezzo di 6 dollari di debito per ogni dollaro di GDP prodotto. La strana connection fra US e Asia ha permesso tutto questo. Ma credo che siano mature le condizioni per un'inversione di tendenza. La tendenza alle politiche protezionistiche US e l'innegabile crescita dei mercati "reali" asiatici farà si chenel momento in cui in oriente smetteranno di ccumulare debito americano ci sarà un violento riallineamento delle forze in campo, con una massiccia perdita di valore di tutti gli asset denominati in dollari. L'accumulo di metallo giallo a mio avviso non deve essere visto come una forma di trading, ma come una sorta di fondo pensione per garantirsi il futuro.