Obbligazioni valute high yield TURCHIA bond in usd e lira turca

[m.m.f]

Per entrare nella UE serve l'unanimità.
Le probabilità sono meno di zero per almeno un decennio.(prima devono aver risolto la questione di Cipro e una decina di altri dossier che nè Erdogan, nè l'opposizione sono, attualmente, dell'idea di affrontare in pieno)


La crisi Argentina delle ultime ore conforta Erdogan nel fatto che l'atteggiamento di chinare il capo all'IMF e di alzare i tassi non serve a tenere a bada la moneta.

La crisi Argentina delle ultime ore conforta Erdogan nel fatto che l'atteggiamento di chinare il capo all'IMF e di alzare i tassi non serve a tenere a bada la moneta.

Sono d'accordo. Soprattutto chiedere aiuto al FMI quando è oramai troppo tardi o molto lì vicino difficile possa essere utile e ,soprattutto sè hai le casse vuote .Sù tutti gli editoriali come in ogni trasmissione dedicata ,viene sottolineato che sè da un lato l'Argenmtina stà facendo le cose giuste anche vero con circa due anni di ritardo.

Al tempo stesso ancora una settimana fà riguardo la Turchia invece sottolineavano che potrebbe ancora tirarsi fuori .

Abbiamo quindi un paese che anche sè in ritardo ha presa piena consapevolezza della situazione e cerca in tutti i modi di uscirne,dall'altra parte invece abbiamo un paese che cerca in tutti i modi di saltare per aria. Un bel quadro.

 

[waltermasoni]

Fitch Ratings: Lira Depreciation Heightens Risks to Turkish Banks
30 AUG 2018 06:01 AM ET


Fitch Ratings-London-30 August 2018: The sharp fall in the Turkish lira this month heightens risks for Turkey's banks, and a marked reduction in banks' ability to refinance, protracted large deposit outflows or significantly deteriorating asset quality could lead to further negative rating actions, Fitch Ratings says.

State-owned banks could face negative rating pressure if stress on Turkey's external finances weakens the government's ability to provide foreign-currency support and support-driven ratings of foreign-owned banks are sensitive to further sovereign downgrades or a reduction in their parents' propensity to provide support.

 

[m.m.f]

Fitch Ratings: Lira Depreciation Heightens Risks to Turkish Banks
30 AUG 2018 06:01 AM ET


Fitch Ratings-London-30 August 2018: The sharp fall in the Turkish lira this month heightens risks for Turkey's banks, and a marked reduction in banks' ability to refinance, protracted large deposit outflows or significantly deteriorating asset quality could lead to further negative rating actions, Fitch Ratings says.

State-owned banks could face negative rating pressure if stress on Turkey's external finances weakens the government's ability to provide foreign-currency support and support-driven ratings of foreign-owned banks are sensitive to further sovereign downgrades or a reduction in their parents' propensity to provide support.

...vorrei tanto capire nel vero senso della parola cosa hanno in mente di fare e se hanno in mente di fare qualcosa...

 

[Ventodivino]

Non mi sembra che l'unico problema che ha la Turchia sia se liberano o meno il pastore o se Trump dia dello scureggione a Erdogan e questi gli dica che non vuol più vedere "la battaglia di Alamo."

• Turkey’s monthly external debt profile suggests that payments are likely to increase in September, October and December driven by maturities in the banking sector
• Gross external financing needs (GEFN) are large with external debt of $179 billion and a large but shrinking current account deficit
• Our projected CA deficit is $38 billion over July 2018 – June 2019. This results in a total of $217 billion (or 28.1% of 2018 GDP) of GEFN with estimated interest payments (included in the CA deficit) at about $14 billion
• Data suggest that the corporate sector on aggregate has sufficient external FX assets to cover external FX liabilities over the next 12 months; also, even though the gross liabilities are large at about $65 billion, the majority is represented by trade credits ($47 billion) that have low roll-over risk
• There are other parts of the upcoming debt service that are perhaps less risky, namely deposits held by overseas branches of local banks ($14 billion), loans from corporate subsidiaries abroad and government’s obligations
• These total roughly $71 billion, leaving roughly $108 billion with higher roll-over risk. In a sudden stop of capital flows, roll-over risks will mount and financing of the CA deficit will be difficult
• Although not our base case, GDP may need to contract by around 5% in order to achieve the required import compression to offset the financing gap
• The external financing performance of the private sector (especially the banks) in the next three months will be a litmus test of Turkey’s access to external funds
• The policy reaction of the government (particularly the medium-term program to be announced in the next few weeks) and of the CBRT will be key to re-establishing credibility and market confidence
• Note that we had laid out the contours of Turkey’s debt burden and FX mismatches in Turkey: Mapping the Next Stage, and, in this note, we go a step further to parse Turkey’s external debt servicing requirements over July 2018 – June 2019

As we highlighted in Turkey: The time to act is now, August 14, 2018, the deterioration of the situation in Turkey is a combination of worsening fundamentals, erosion of policy credibility, and geopolitical developments. We have also argued that measures adopted so far have only bought time and that effective monetary, fiscal and regulatory action is required to address the situation. In this regard, the three-year medium-term program to be announced over the next couple of weeks will indicate how determined the authorities are in dealing with the fundamental weaknesses.

We think that a coordinated policy action by the policymakers could put Turkey on a soft landing path where rebalancing is achieved with manageable collateral damage (see Turkey: lower growth, higher inflation, narrower CAD, August 23, 2018). GDP growth would be lower but still positive at 1.1% in 2018, while the CAD would decline from an expected US$51 billion in 2018 to US$26 billion in 2019. The easing of political tensions would also support this process. There is, however, the risk that the policy response is not strong enough and Turkey faces serious headwinds in covering its external financing requirements, a process that leads to a hard landing. In this case, GDP contraction could reach 5% next year.

While worsening macroeconomic imbalances are the fundamental drivers of Turkey’s stress, the immediate concern is the looming large FX debt service of the economy (also see Turkey: Mapping the Next Stage, Goulden et al, August 15, 2018). With headline external debt maturing over July 2018 – June 2019 at $179bn (23% of 2018 GDP), roll-over needs are substantial over the coming months. Without quickly rebuilding credibility, the risk is that the external funding pressure will effectively determine the economic outlook and decide whether the economy gravitates to a soft landing or a hard landing scenario.

To get an idea about near-term pressure, in this piece we build a schedule of principal and interest payments due over the coming months. In particular, external debt service projections point to large principal payments coming due in September, October, and December (Table 1 and Figure 1A). However, our figures should be seen as rough estimates for the payments for those months because the payment schedule for significant parts of the external debt is not available ($45.7 billion of bank debt and $47.1 billion of trade credits – Table 1). Importantly, while trade credits are a relatively stable source of funding, it is possible the $45.7 billion bank debt with unspecified maturities may include some more risky sources of funding. Figure 1B and Table 1 put together principal maturities ($179.1 billion) and interest payments ($14.4 billion).
Repayment schedule over July 18 – June 19

The total debt payments in the table above include the principal payments over the next 12 months and estimated interest payments, without including the entire CA deficit in the analysis. The CBRT publishes data for private sector maturities and the Treasury for the public sector. However, both data sets do not include part of bank debt: about $30 billion in the case of the private sector and about $16 billion in the case of the public sector. The Treasury data covers May-December 2018 and the full 2019 year for both short-term and long-term debt (short-term debt is also available over January-April 2019). As a result, we had to approximate monthly maturities for about $12 billion of public-sector bank debt, but had no information on about $16 billion. Lastly, we include our estimates on interest payments based on previous monthly payments and implied rates.

Even though there is no maturity information for about $46 billion of bank debt expected to be paid over July 2018-June 2019, we think it is reasonable to assume that the monthly profile in the table above would not change significantly. It is unlikely that bank debt is heavily concentrated in a specific month but there is a risk that some of that debt may have to be repaid sooner. As for trade credits, those are mostly due to imports ($42.7 billion) and the rest represents advanced export payments ($4.4 billion); trade credits are considered low-risk in terms of roll-over and thus lack of maturity profile is not necessarily an issue. Also, as imports compress, trade credits will naturally compress as well.

Easy market access needs to be regained
Turkey is facing a debt stock problem as external debt is large and a significant part of it is represented by short-term debt. At the same time, it is facing a flow problem as financing needs over the next 12 months are large and access to markets has become problematic. Last year, the stock of external debt as % of GDP was already close to the record-high level recorded over 1999-2000 putting more pressure on the balance sheets of banks and corporates. The result of rising overall stock of debt coupled with still large portions of short-term debt led to an increase in debt payments coming due in less than one year (Figure 2). Yet, as discussed above, the flow issue is mainly impacting the banking sector.


The estimated cost of funding for Turkey’s banks and corporates has been relatively low for a long period, but this has, in part, been due to reliance on short-term debt which accounts for about 40% of total external debt (Table 3). After improving between 2010 and 2015, external debt payments as a proportion of exports of goods and services (G&S) have been rising in the last three years. We estimate total external debt service including principal and interest payments has risen to about 40% of exports of goods and services ($194 billion on a 12-month rolling basis) in June 2018, up from 23% at the end of 2014 (Figure 4). However, the ratio remains close to the long-term average of 35% of exports of G&S and is lower in case of Turkey than regional averages (Figure 4). The explanation for this is partly in Tables 2 and 3: as Turkey borrowed more in nominal terms, a significant portion of the additional borrowing remained on a short-term basis. As pressure on their balance sheets was mounting, the country’s banks and companies kept their funding cheap by increasing liquidity risks. In fact, banks and corporates borrowed cheaper than the government. Also, since the majority of external debt is in foreign currency, Turkey also accumulated FX risk.

If we assume that a portion of export proceeds have to be used for energy finance, the debt service profile becomes weaker, but not significantly so (Figure 5). If debt service is calculated as share of usable reserves (obtained by removing reserve requirements and gold), the picture is one indicating that Turkey needs to maintain market access as official reserves are insufficient to accommodate the large debt service. This would not change if FX reserves excluding only gold are used instead (Figure 6).
In this context, as international banks are likely to at least partially reduce their exposure to Turkey, roll-over of principal could be challenging for some entities (banks or corporates). In addition, while interest payment obligations compare favourably to pre-2008 due to record low global funding costs, they have been rising as well since 2014 and are currently close to the pre- GFC crisis level (Figure 7).

Nonetheless, there are some factors which mitigate to some extent concerns over external debt service. We believe that at least part of the private sector funding is relatively sticky, including certain deposits (about $14bn) collected by bank branches outside of Turkey and trade credits of about $47 billion which are normally considered having low roll-over risk. In the less vulnerable category, we would also include government debt and debt received from subsidiaries of Turkish companies abroad. In total, we estimate that slightly more than $71 billion of debt maturing over next 12 months is less vulnerable (Table 4).
The fact that banks are FX hedged on their balance sheet may not help with an FX liquidity shortfall. The banking system has a flat net FX position and so does not face large direct FX losses. However, this does not provide a buffer against an FX liquidity shortfall. Additionally, banks are likely to face capital shortfalls (see our estimates here).

As for the corporates, the real issue seems to be a balance sheet problem rather than a roll-over problem over the next 12 months. According to CBRT data, as of May, the corporate sector has a short FX position of US$217 billion (Table 5). As this table fails to capture at least part of the natural and financial hedges, the real short position must be lower. But, even after such an adjustment, the position is wide enough to have a significant negative impact on corporate balance sheets and hence on the asset quality of the banking system. However, the external debt roll-over risks of the corporate sector look quite manageable at least in the short run. Their total FX deposits in banks abroad amounts to US$15.2 billion and this fully covers the short-term external debt payments (excluding import payables) of US$14.2 billion. A caveat would be the likely asymmetric distribution of these FX assets: some corporates with external FX liabilities might not have external FX assets and others might have more than their FX liabilities.
In this context, it is important to point out that FX deposits held by corporates in the local banking system do not necessarily constitute a source of FX liquidity to repay external FX debt. In order to make external FX debt repayments, banks would need to have external FX assets. These FX deposits of corporates can only limit balance sheet problems at Turkish companies (reducing NPL ratios), although we still believe that NPL ratios in the corporate sector would rise.

Under a simplified calculation, a GDP contraction of about 5% is needed in order to compress imports sufficiently to cover external financing needs in case roll-over ratios on external debt drop substantially. We make a number of simplifying assumptions to arrive at this figure. Turkish banks and corporates have to finance, at minimum, the vulnerable portion of maturing debt over July 2018-June 2019 (about $108 billion) as well as the projected CA deficit ($38 billion). In a sudden-stop scenario, most of this amount needs to be obtained from existing internal FX liquidity and from compression of imports. The CBRT recently lowered RR and ROM mechanism to inject about $10 billion in FX liquidity, but another $60 billion is left as part of CBRT FX reserves. To maintain financial stability and to alleviate external financing needs, policymakers could free all FX liquidity in the form of RR and ROM (implicitly this means 0% roll-over for the $60 billion). This would force companies and banks to cover about $86 billion. If one assumes that roll-over ratio would not fall below 50% and that Turkish banks/corporates have no free FX assets, then the implicit conclusion is that imports need to compress by about $43 billion to close the gap. Using simple models, we calculate that such import compression can be achieved by a large contraction of investment and consumption (25% and 5%, respectively) that would bring a severe recession - about 5% contraction in real GDP. Such a development would be in line with previous experience as GDP contracted by 4.7% in 2009 and by 6% in 2001. This is a simplistic calculation of course – the FX needs and sources of the economy are more complex (see Exhibits 25 and 26 here). Under a more complete sudden-stop scenario, we believe FX funding needs will be larger and FX funding sources more constrained. However, the resulting GDP contraction may still resemble the simple calculation as FX depreciation would likely contribute substantially to the required import compression.

With increased uncertainty about the prospects for the economy and tighter global liquidity, external credit is likely to be more constrained and expensive. The sharp depreciation of the lira has already led to increased uncertainty about the prospects for the economy and has led to a sharp rise in yields. Against the background of ongoing policy uncertainty and rising global interest rates, funding costs for borrowers are likely to continue rising and thus put more pressure on Turkish corporates and banks. There is need for quick action from authorities to indicate that required measures are taken to restore confidence and credibility.

 

[m.m.f]

There is need for quick action from authorities to indicate that required measures are taken to restore confidence and credibility.

...eh,ma il turco non vuole sentirne parlare.

I 15 bln saranno gia in un conto in svizzera assieme a tutto il resto

 

[m.m.f]

Vado parzialmente fuori tema ,usd/ars tra ieri e oggi il pesos perde il 40 circa.Tassi portati al 60 personalmente mai visto.
Quanti mesi di vita se non settimane?

 

[Fabrib]

The central bank and the banking watchdog have taken a series of measures to underpin the currency since its recent slide began. The Official Gazette said on Friday that Turkey had lowered the level of withholding tax on lira bank deposits, while raising the tax level on foreign currency deposits of up to one year.

 

[Gian-ale]

Vado parzialmente fuori tema ,usd/ars tra ieri e oggi il pesos perde il 40 circa.Tassi portati al 60 personalmente mai visto.
Quanti mesi di vita se non settimane?

Non capisco la domanda......settimane per cosa? per fare default sulle obbligazioni in valuta estera?

 

[m.m.f]

Non capisco la domanda......settimane per cosa? per fare default sulle obbligazioni in valuta estera?

....beh,subito no non fraintendere,ma o riescono a mettere in piedi velocemente una strategia costi quello che costi che possa incanalare il paese su un percorso credibile di ripresa o in questa situazione non reggono e non possono in alcun modo reggere a lungo.

 

[Gian-ale]

....beh,subito no non fraintendere,ma o riescono a mettere in piedi velocemente una strategia costi quello che costi che possa incanalare il paese su un percorso credibile di ripresa o in questa situazione non reggono e non possono in alcun modo reggere a lungo.

su questo sono d' accordo. dalla parte argentina c'e' il fmi e gli stati uniti. entrambi sono interessati a non fare sprofondare il paese.....in piu' il problema e' di fiducia e non di solvibilita' allo stato attuale.