Camajan
Forumer storico
io qualkosina sul mais
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 2 (3 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione caligola2005
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
io qualkosina sul mais
Coche
Forumer storico
frankiemachine
Mr. Tentenna
Eh si, perché ne avranno in abbondanza visto che saranno sempre meno quelli che le possono comprare
mavalà
Forumer storico
pensiero festivo........
facciamo una volta tanto un'altra considerazione:
e' da tempo che tutti quanti giudichiamo sbagliate le manovre attuate per risolvere la crisi, ed e' effettivamente incredibile notare che tutto quello che e' stato detto e fatto sinora ha ottenuto l'effetto contrario di quello che diceva di prefiggersi.
ma siamo nel giusto ad cosi sicuri che tutto quanto sia 'solo' frutto di un macro errore strategico ?
o speculazione (ormai se ne parla come del lupo nelle fiabe) ?
oppure coglioneria a livelli atomici ?
mahh:
perche non consideriamo che la dissoluzione dell europa non potrebbe invece essere la reale volonta' e obbiettivo di una qualche parte ?
capt.harlock
MENA IL CAMMELLO FAN CLUB
la merkel continua a crescere ed e'sopra al 60% nei sondaggi
questo significa che va tutto bene
bosmeld
Forumer storico
MOLTO IMPORTANTE capacità residua banche ita acquisto btp
non voglio sembrare l'uccello del mal augurio, ma mi sa che se non interviene la bce, a agosto, voleranno paduli a più non posso.
io nel dubbio mi sono comprato mutande di ghisa....
posto questi 2 passaggi che fanno capire che le nostre banchette non ci potranno proteggere ancora per molto comprando btp senza nuovo ltro....
e a quel punto lo spread andrà dove gli pare
Residual capacity for sovereign purchases
Based on the most recent data, Italian and Spanish banks’ sovereign purchases have
respectively reached €93bn (Italy) and €54bn (Spain). The sovereign purchases represent
respectively 41% of Italian government 2012 maturities and 57% of Spanish government 2012
maturities. We have estimated the residual capacity of sovereign purchases at €69bn for the
Italian banks and €46bn for the Spanish banks. The remaining capacity of the Spanish banks
looks narrower. However, key issue is that the Spanish banks can cover 115% of their 2012
sovereign refinancing needs but the Italian banks only 52%, i.e. leaving €65bn uncovered.
talian banks cannot absorb the remaining sovereign placements
In 2012 Italy has to refinance €227bn of sovereign debt. Placements have been put under
pressure by the debt crisis, with most of the purchases made by domestic banks and with
foreign institutional investors and banks having sharply reduced their exposure to peripheral
sovereign debt. The share of Italian government debt in the hands of foreign investors fell from
50% in summer 2011 to 38% in Q1 12. Domestic banks have played a primary role in
sovereign purchases, along with domestic households, for which the Italian Treasury has
arranged dedicated placements. However, the domestic banks face two constraints to making
sovereign purchases: (i) funding; and (ii) relative exposure. The funding constraint is defined by
the remaining purchases (after the use of the LTRO for the core funding needs of the banks).
We qualify as core funding needs mainly wholesale maturities, as the debt market is currently
closed for most of the peripheral banks. Relative exposure to sovereigns is the weight of
sovereign bonds as a percentage of tangible equity: note that negative mark-to-market may
impact tangible equity via AFS negative adjustments.
As Italian households also bought sovereigns we may assume that the remaining €134bn of
sovereign purchases to be refinanced in 2012 (€227bn-€93bn) could be smaller by, say,
€20bn, giving a final estimated figure for sovereign placements of €114bn for the rest of the
year. While smaller, this number does not change the picture: with €69bn of sovereign
purchases capacity left, the Italian banks are unable to cover upcoming sovereign
placements. In terms of exposure to Italian sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity, the
average ratio was 167.4% in Q1 12 (vs 159.9% in Q4 11). For Q2 12, the small increase of
marginal purchases combined with the increasing negative impact of the AFS reserve due to
negative mark-to-market (for spread widening), should drive up the weight of Italian
sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity (in the region of at least 170%).
In the absence of marginal buyers of the sovereign and following the Moody’s downgrade, the
spread is likely to suffer any further widen going forward, unless (i) the Italian government asks
for a bailout (which could trigger SMP/PMP by the ESM); or (ii) eurozone countries by next
autumn agree on a more flexible use of the EFSF/ESM for countries already compliant in
terms of fundamental requirements but out of line in terms of spread.
se non iniziano a comprare investitori esteri o la Ue in qualche maniera, c'è poco da stare allegri, si rischia di non comprire le aste se non a tassi insostenibili.
devono sbrigarsi a far tornare la fiducia...
e ora come ora vi garantisco che gli istituzionali esteri stanno allegerendo piuttosto che comprando, una delle poche eccezioni è Allianz
Conclusion
Even though our calculations show potential room for additional sovereign purchases capacity
by the domestic banks, we cannot rule out that capacity being absorbed by larger-than-
expected deposits outflows. In our calculations we work on the assumption of ‘deposits being
equal’ and we also assume no deleveraging measures. Bearing in mind that deleveraging can
take time while deposit outflows can occur overnight, the theoretical residual sovereign
purchases could be used to cover potentially sharper-than-expected deposit outflows. In the
absence of data on the most recent deposits trends (June and July), we cannot rule out the
possibility that Italian and Spanish banks may have run out of ammunition. This leads us to the
question asked by investors: ‘Who will buy Spanish and Italian bonds?’
mi sa che in spagna si trovano già nella cac.... perchè probabilmente gli outflow di depositi di giugno e luglio sono stati forti, su ita, penso (spero) che i depositi bancari siano stati più stabili
ora ho capito perchè MOnti ha spinto così tanto per scudo anti spread c'è il rischio che se non fanno nulla, qualche asta tra qualche mese vada non comperta (purtroppo non scherzo)
non voglio sembrare l'uccello del mal augurio, ma mi sa che se non interviene la bce, a agosto, voleranno paduli a più non posso.
io nel dubbio mi sono comprato mutande di ghisa....
posto questi 2 passaggi che fanno capire che le nostre banchette non ci potranno proteggere ancora per molto comprando btp senza nuovo ltro....
e a quel punto lo spread andrà dove gli pare
Residual capacity for sovereign purchases
Based on the most recent data, Italian and Spanish banks’ sovereign purchases have
respectively reached €93bn (Italy) and €54bn (Spain). The sovereign purchases represent
respectively 41% of Italian government 2012 maturities and 57% of Spanish government 2012
maturities. We have estimated the residual capacity of sovereign purchases at €69bn for the
Italian banks and €46bn for the Spanish banks. The remaining capacity of the Spanish banks
looks narrower. However, key issue is that the Spanish banks can cover 115% of their 2012
sovereign refinancing needs but the Italian banks only 52%, i.e. leaving €65bn uncovered.
talian banks cannot absorb the remaining sovereign placements
In 2012 Italy has to refinance €227bn of sovereign debt. Placements have been put under
pressure by the debt crisis, with most of the purchases made by domestic banks and with
foreign institutional investors and banks having sharply reduced their exposure to peripheral
sovereign debt. The share of Italian government debt in the hands of foreign investors fell from
50% in summer 2011 to 38% in Q1 12. Domestic banks have played a primary role in
sovereign purchases, along with domestic households, for which the Italian Treasury has
arranged dedicated placements. However, the domestic banks face two constraints to making
sovereign purchases: (i) funding; and (ii) relative exposure. The funding constraint is defined by
the remaining purchases (after the use of the LTRO for the core funding needs of the banks).
We qualify as core funding needs mainly wholesale maturities, as the debt market is currently
closed for most of the peripheral banks. Relative exposure to sovereigns is the weight of
sovereign bonds as a percentage of tangible equity: note that negative mark-to-market may
impact tangible equity via AFS negative adjustments.
As Italian households also bought sovereigns we may assume that the remaining €134bn of
sovereign purchases to be refinanced in 2012 (€227bn-€93bn) could be smaller by, say,
€20bn, giving a final estimated figure for sovereign placements of €114bn for the rest of the
year. While smaller, this number does not change the picture: with €69bn of sovereign
purchases capacity left, the Italian banks are unable to cover upcoming sovereign
placements. In terms of exposure to Italian sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity, the
average ratio was 167.4% in Q1 12 (vs 159.9% in Q4 11). For Q2 12, the small increase of
marginal purchases combined with the increasing negative impact of the AFS reserve due to
negative mark-to-market (for spread widening), should drive up the weight of Italian
sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity (in the region of at least 170%).
In the absence of marginal buyers of the sovereign and following the Moody’s downgrade, the
spread is likely to suffer any further widen going forward, unless (i) the Italian government asks
for a bailout (which could trigger SMP/PMP by the ESM); or (ii) eurozone countries by next
autumn agree on a more flexible use of the EFSF/ESM for countries already compliant in
terms of fundamental requirements but out of line in terms of spread.
se non iniziano a comprare investitori esteri o la Ue in qualche maniera, c'è poco da stare allegri, si rischia di non comprire le aste se non a tassi insostenibili.
devono sbrigarsi a far tornare la fiducia...
e ora come ora vi garantisco che gli istituzionali esteri stanno allegerendo piuttosto che comprando, una delle poche eccezioni è Allianz
Conclusion
Even though our calculations show potential room for additional sovereign purchases capacity
by the domestic banks, we cannot rule out that capacity being absorbed by larger-than-
expected deposits outflows. In our calculations we work on the assumption of ‘deposits being
equal’ and we also assume no deleveraging measures. Bearing in mind that deleveraging can
take time while deposit outflows can occur overnight, the theoretical residual sovereign
purchases could be used to cover potentially sharper-than-expected deposit outflows. In the
absence of data on the most recent deposits trends (June and July), we cannot rule out the
possibility that Italian and Spanish banks may have run out of ammunition. This leads us to the
question asked by investors: ‘Who will buy Spanish and Italian bonds?’
mi sa che in spagna si trovano già nella cac.... perchè probabilmente gli outflow di depositi di giugno e luglio sono stati forti, su ita, penso (spero) che i depositi bancari siano stati più stabili
ora ho capito perchè MOnti ha spinto così tanto per scudo anti spread c'è il rischio che se non fanno nulla, qualche asta tra qualche mese vada non comperta
(purtroppo non scherzo)
Ultima modifica:
wagenbach
Forumer attivo
non voglio sembrare l'uccello del mal augurio, ma mi sa che se non interviene la bce, a agosto, voleranno paduli a più non posso.
io nel dubbio mi sono comprato mutande di ghisa....
posto questi 2 passaggi che fanno capire che le nostre banchette non ci potranno proteggere ancora per molto comprando btp senza nuovo ltro....
e a quel punto lo spread andrà dove gli pare
Residual capacity for sovereign purchases
Based on the most recent data, Italian and Spanish banks’ sovereign purchases have
respectively reached €93bn (Italy) and €54bn (Spain). The sovereign purchases represent
respectively 41% of Italian government 2012 maturities and 57% of Spanish government 2012
maturities. We have estimated the residual capacity of sovereign purchases at €69bn for the
Italian banks and €46bn for the Spanish banks. The remaining capacity of the Spanish banks
looks narrower. However, key issue is that the Spanish banks can cover 115% of their 2012
sovereign refinancing needs but the Italian banks only 52%, i.e. leaving €65bn uncovered.
talian banks cannot absorb the remaining sovereign placements
In 2012 Italy has to refinance €227bn of sovereign debt. Placements have been put under
pressure by the debt crisis, with most of the purchases made by domestic banks and with
foreign institutional investors and banks having sharply reduced their exposure to peripheral
sovereign debt. The share of Italian government debt in the hands of foreign investors fell from
50% in summer 2011 to 38% in Q1 12. Domestic banks have played a primary role in
sovereign purchases, along with domestic households, for which the Italian Treasury has
arranged dedicated placements. However, the domestic banks face two constraints to making
sovereign purchases: (i) funding; and (ii) relative exposure. The funding constraint is defined by
the remaining purchases (after the use of the LTRO for the core funding needs of the banks).
We qualify as core funding needs mainly wholesale maturities, as the debt market is currently
closed for most of the peripheral banks. Relative exposure to sovereigns is the weight of
sovereign bonds as a percentage of tangible equity: note that negative mark-to-market may
impact tangible equity via AFS negative adjustments.
As Italian households also bought sovereigns we may assume that the remaining €134bn of
sovereign purchases to be refinanced in 2012 (€227bn-€93bn) could be smaller by, say,
€20bn, giving a final estimated figure for sovereign placements of €114bn for the rest of the
year. While smaller, this number does not change the picture: with €69bn of sovereign
purchases capacity left, the Italian banks are unable to cover upcoming sovereign
placements. In terms of exposure to Italian sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity, the
average ratio was 167.4% in Q1 12 (vs 159.9% in Q4 11). For Q2 12, the small increase of
marginal purchases combined with the increasing negative impact of the AFS reserve due to
negative mark-to-market (for spread widening), should drive up the weight of Italian
sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity (in the region of at least 170%).
In the absence of marginal buyers of the sovereign and following the Moody’s downgrade, the
spread is likely to suffer any further widen going forward, unless (i) the Italian government asks
for a bailout (which could trigger SMP/PMP by the ESM); or (ii) eurozone countries by next
autumn agree on a more flexible use of the EFSF/ESM for countries already compliant in
terms of fundamental requirements but out of line in terms of spread.
se non iniziano a comprare investitori esteri o la Ue in qualche maniera, c'è poco da stare allegri, si rischia di non comprire le aste se non a tassi insostenibili.
devono sbrigarsi a far tornare la fiducia...
e ora come ora vi garantisco che gli istituzionali esteri stanno allegerendo piuttosto che comprando, una delle poche eccezioni è Allianz
Conclusion
Even though our calculations show potential room for additional sovereign purchases capacity
by the domestic banks, we cannot rule out that capacity being absorbed by larger-than-
expected deposits outflows. In our calculations we work on the assumption of ‘deposits being
equal’ and we also assume no deleveraging measures. Bearing in mind that deleveraging can
take time while deposit outflows can occur overnight, the theoretical residual sovereign
purchases could be used to cover potentially sharper-than-expected deposit outflows. In the
absence of data on the most recent deposits trends (June and July), we cannot rule out the
possibility that Italian and Spanish banks may have run out of ammunition. This leads us to the
question asked by investors: ‘Who will buy Spanish and Italian bonds?’
mi sa che in spagna si trovano già nella cac.... perchè probabilmente gli outflow di depositi di giugno e luglio sono stati forti, su ita, penso (spero) che i depositi bancari siano stati più stabili
ora ho capito perchè MOnti ha spinto così tanto per scudo anti spread c'è il rischio che se non fanno nulla, qualche asta tra qualche mese vada non comperta
giusto. Conclusione : Short generali
vbrm
Forumer attivo
non voglio sembrare l'uccello del mal augurio, ma mi sa che se non interviene la bce, a agosto, voleranno paduli a più non posso.
io nel dubbio mi sono comprato mutande di ghisa....
posto questi 2 passaggi che fanno capire che le nostre banchette non ci potranno proteggere ancora per molto comprando btp senza nuovo ltro....
e a quel punto lo spread andrà dove gli pare
Residual capacity for sovereign purchases
Based on the most recent data, Italian and Spanish banks’ sovereign purchases have respectively reached €93bn (Italy) and €54bn (Spain). The sovereign purchases represent respectively 41% of Italian government 2012 maturities and 57% of Spanish government 2012 maturities. We have estimated the residual capacity of sovereign purchases at €69bn for the
Italian banks and €46bn for the Spanish banks. The remaining capacity of the Spanish banks looks narrower. However, key issue is that the Spanish banks can cover 115% of their 2012
sovereign refinancing needs but the Italian banks only 52%, i.e. leaving €65bn uncovered.
talian banks cannot absorb the remaining sovereign placements
In 2012 Italy has to refinance €227bn of sovereign debt. Placements have been put under pressure by the debt crisis, with most of the purchases made by domestic banks and with foreign institutional investors and banks having sharply reduced their exposure to peripheral sovereign debt. The share of Italian government debt in the hands of foreign investors fell from
50% in summer 2011 to 38% in Q1 12. Domestic banks have played a primary role in sovereign purchases, along with domestic households, for which the Italian Treasury has arranged dedicated placements. However, the domestic banks face two constraints to making sovereign purchases: (i) funding; and (ii) relative exposure. The funding constraint is defined by
the remaining purchases (after the use of the LTRO for the core funding needs of the banks).
We qualify as core funding needs mainly wholesale maturities, as the debt market is currently closed for most of the peripheral banks. Relative exposure to sovereigns is the weight of sovereign bonds as a percentage of tangible equity: note that negative mark-to-market may impact tangible equity via AFS negative adjustments.
As Italian households also bought sovereigns we may assume that the remaining €134bn of sovereign purchases to be refinanced in 2012 (€227bn-€93bn) could be smaller by, say, €20bn, giving a final estimated figure for sovereign placements of €114bn for the rest of the year. While smaller, this number does not change the picture: with €69bn of sovereign purchases capacity left, the Italian banks are unable to cover upcoming sovereign placements. In terms of exposure to Italian sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity, the
average ratio was 167.4% in Q1 12 (vs 159.9% in Q4 11). For Q2 12, the small increase of marginal purchases combined with the increasing negative impact of the AFS reserve due to negative mark-to-market (for spread widening), should drive up the weight of Italian sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity (in the region of at least 170%).
In the absence of marginal buyers of the sovereign and following the Moody’s downgrade, the spread is likely to suffer any further widen going forward, unless (i) the Italian government asks
for a bailout (which could trigger SMP/PMP by the ESM); or (ii) eurozone countries by next autumn agree on a more flexible use of the EFSF/ESM for countries already compliant in
terms of fundamental requirements but out of line in terms of spread.
se non iniziano a comprare investitori esteri o la Ue in qualche maniera, c'è poco da stare allegri, si rischia di non comprire le aste se non a tassi insostenibili.
devono sbrigarsi a far tornare la fiducia...
e ora come ora vi garantisco che gli istituzionali esteri stanno allegerendo piuttosto che comprando, una delle poche eccezioni è Allianz
Conclusion
Even though our calculations show potential room for additional sovereign purchases capacity
by the domestic banks, we cannot rule out that capacity being absorbed by larger-than-
expected deposits outflows. In our calculations we work on the assumption of ‘deposits being
equal’ and we also assume no deleveraging measures. Bearing in mind that deleveraging can
take time while deposit outflows can occur overnight, the theoretical residual sovereign
purchases could be used to cover potentially sharper-than-expected deposit outflows. In the
absence of data on the most recent deposits trends (June and July), we cannot rule out the
possibility that Italian and Spanish banks may have run out of ammunition. This leads us to the
question asked by investors: ‘Who will buy Spanish and Italian bonds?’
mi sa che in spagna si trovano già nella cac.... perchè probabilmente gli outflow di depositi di giugno e luglio sono stati forti, su ita, penso (spero) che i depositi bancari siano stati più stabili
ora ho capito perchè MOnti ha spinto così tanto per scudo anti spread c'è il rischio che se non fanno nulla, qualche asta tra qualche mese vada non comperta
Con tutto il rispetto, non riesco a capire la logica di un discorso che sostanzialmente dice: se la % di investitori stranieri scende e se gli italiani iniziano a ritirare i soldi dalle banche, le aste non saranno più coperte.
Con lo stesso metro si potrebbe dire che il signor vbrm gode di salute discreta, ma se gli cade una tegola in testa non si può escludere che vada all'altro mondo.
Forse bosmeld non cita la fonte per riservatezza, ma sarei curioso di sapere chi è l'autore del pezzo. Tra parentesi, noto che Allianz vuol dire anche PIMCO, cioè il maggior gestore obbligazionario al mondo, che evidentemente non la pensa così.
Il problema di un documento così è solo uno: dopo che uno l'ha letto, viene spinto a comportarsi in modo tale da avverare gli scenari disegnati.
vbrm
Forumer attivo
non mi piacciono gli scenari complottistici, ed ho sempre pensato che l'Italia ha moltissimo lavoro da fare a casa propria. Però, se voi foste inglesi o americani, cosa pensereste di un progetto che, se ha successo, potrebbe trasferire il principale centro finanziario europeo da Londra a Francoforte e fare concorrenza al dollaro come moneta di riserva mondiale ?
L'euro non è un progetto economico, ma politico. Di conseguenza, anche le reazioni, inevitabilmente, hanno una componente sullo stesso piano.
bosmeld
Forumer storico
a mio avviso la ricerca è interessante perchè da informazioni che la persona comune non puo sapere, poi ognuno ne trae le proprie considerazioni e fa le sue mosse.
l'informazione importante per me è la seguente:
le banche italiane con depositi stabili non hanno i soldi per sottoscrivere tutte le aste da qui a fine anno, quindi serve l'intervento di qualcun altro.
nel caso in cui i depositi delle banche invece scendano la situazione è ovviamente ancora peggiore e questo penso sia quello che sta succedendo ora in spagna.
ciò che ho riportato è un dato di fatto, che io personalmente non avevo considerato, e mi fa riflettere.
prima di leggere questo report non sapevo a quanto ammontasse ancora la firepower delle banche ita, francamente pensavo che almeno fino a fine anno fossimo coperti, e ora che so che non è così, posso ragionare meglio sugli eventuali scenari avendo a disposizione un numero maggiori di dati.
per quanto rigaurda allianz, la ricerca non ne parlava, lo ho scirtto io, visto che sapevo che erano abbastanza positivi su ita.
ma cercando in giro, sembra che ora la loro view sia più neutrale, peraltro allianz ha un bilancio immenso, si possono anche pemettere di avere qualche bln di btp
Allianz SE (ALV.XE), Europe's biggest insurer by market capitalization and premium income, faces business challenges in the euro area's peripheral countries Italy, Spain and Portugal, where it expects operating profits to remain flat over the medium term, according to an online investor presentation Wednesday.
By comparison, business prospects in France, Latin America and Turkey look much better, where Allianz expects improvements both in revenues and operating profits.
Allianz didn't provide any forecast figures for those regions. In 2011, the three peripheral euro-zone countries together contributed some 14% of Allianz's total revenue of 103.6 billion euros ($127.2 billion) and about 17% of the group's operating profit of EUR7.9 billion.
Addressing the current low interest rate environment, which curbs life insurers' returns, Chief Financial Officer Oliver Baete emphasized to investors the resilience of the profit margins in Allianz's life insurance business.
"There are very strong buffers between what we are earning and new money we are investing," Mr. Baete said.
He also reiterated that Allianz has consistently derisked its investment portfolio, for instance by reducing its exposure to the financial sector, which it will continue to do. For example, it has gradually cut its stakes in Commerzbank AG (CBK.XE), UniCredit SpA (UCG.MI) and Hartford Financial Services Group Inc. (HIG).
Allianz has also "dramatically reduced" exposure to sovereign debt in peripheral euro zone countries, except for Italy, where it carefully manages exposure and duration of the bonds it holds, Mr. Baete said, citing figures that were released at the end of the first quarter.
secondo me dobbiamo lasciarci alle spalle TUTTE LE NOSTRE CONVINZIONI, e cercare di avere più dati possibili, perchè il mondo sta cambiando a una velocità spaventosa...
3 anni fa, l'italia non aveva problemi
ora siamo in balia degli aiuti esterni, anche se non diretti, come in grecia e co.
chi se lo sarebbe mai aspettato?
peraltro leggendo i dati e le info del passato in maniera asettica, mi rendo conto che era abbastanza facile ipotizzare un nostro contagio, eppure insistevo col dire che noi eravamo diversi.
ragionavo col cuore più che con il cervello, mentre invece i soldi non hanno nazione.
Ultima modifica:
- Stato