darkog
In Hoc Signo Vince..
Il buyback di Erste non mi sembra una brutta notizia.
Non penso che dopo Hypo si possano permettere un altro duro colpo.
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
Il buyback di Erste non mi sembra una brutta notizia.
Non penso che dopo Hypo si possano permettere un altro duro colpo.
solovaloreaggiunto
Forumer storico
boh ragazzi, non lo so..vedo la RZB callable 2016 che e' scesa a 89 lettera... 14% di YTC.. iniziano a girare prezzi che mi fanno pensare.. bisognerà aspettare l aqr e farsi il segno della croce.. magari faranno altro aumento di capitale, ma in Austria (sti 'cani) hanno anticipato le nuove discipline di bail in a gennaio 2015 ... serenamente...
Rottweiler
Forumer storico
Qualcuno mi può aiutare a interpretare la parte grassettata?
Mi sembra di capire (ma non sono certo andato a leggermi tutti i prospetti...) che i bonds oggetto di tender siano LT2. Se così fosse, non capirei come possano parlare di mancato o parziale pagamento per questi bonds nel 2015.
Qualcuno ha per caso visto se alcune delle cedole sono differibili? Oppure mi sono perso qualcosa?
In ogni caso quella affermazione, insieme con alcuni dei prezzi offerti per titoli in scadenza tra il 2015 e il 2017, non mi sembrano da emittente "market friendly".
Erste e Raiffeisen sono indubbiamente iscritte in questa categoria.
ferdo
Utente Senior
Rottweiler
Forumer storico
stesso miei dubbi
Altro dubbio: se si calcola il capitale T1 "vintage" ancora in circolazione, si vede che una parte non si qualifica più.
Naturale chiedersi perchè non abbiano incluso nella tender anche (una parte de)i T1..
E su quelli potevano più facilmente giocare a spaventare i bondholders, a prescindere da quello che prevede il prospetto, che, al contrario, è parecchio "friendly"...
Forse perchè hanno in mente una manovra con l'AT1, annunciato in termini generici, ma mai lanciato?
Questi managers bancari austriaci sono proprio difficili da decifrare: non si capisce se siano più furbi o più rimbambiti...
Ultima modifica:
Rottweiler
Forumer storico
In queste ore il mercato si sta ponendo molte domande su ciò che Draghi farà con l'acquisto degli ABS.
L'articolo che riporto qui sotto spiega bene quali vincoli la BCE si sia data, vincoli che Draghi cercherebbe di attenuare per Grecia e Cipro:
September 30, 2014 4:00 pm
Mario Draghi pushes for ECB to accept Greek and Cypriot ‘junk’ loan bundles
By Claire Jones and Sam Fleming
©Bloomberg
Mario Draghi
Mario Draghi is to push the European Central Bank to buy bundles of Greek and Cypriot bank loans with “junk” ratings, in a move that is set to exacerbate tensions between Germany and the bank.
Mr Draghi, ECB president, will this week unveil details of a plan to buy hundreds of billions of euros’ worth of private-sector assets – the central bank’s latest attempt to save the eurozone from economic stagnation.
The ECB’s executive board will propose that existing requirements on the quality of assets accepted by the bank are relaxed to allow the eurozone’s monetary guardian to buy the safer slices of Greek and Cypriot asset backed securities, or ABS, say people familiar with the matter.
Mr Draghi’s proposal is designed to make the programme of buying ABS, which are bundles of packaged loans, as inclusive as possible. If it is backed by the majority of members of the ECB’s governing council, the central bank would be able to buy instruments from banks of all 18 eurozone member states.
However, the idea is likely to face staunch opposition in Germany, straining already tense relations between the ECB and officials in the eurozone’s largest economy.
Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann, who also sits on the ECB’s policy making governing council, has already objected to the plan to buy ABS, which he says leaves the central bank’s balance sheet too exposed to risks.
Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister, has also voiced his opposition, saying purchases would heighten concerns about potential conflicts of interest between the ECB’s role as monetary policy maker and bank supervisor.
While the safer slices – or senior tranches – of Greek and Cypriot ABS only make up a tiny proportion of Europe’s securitisation market, it would free up billions in liquidity for banks in two of the eurozone’s weakest economies, and potentially boost lending to credit-starved smaller businesses in the currency area’s periphery.
Relaxing the rules would also signal the central bank’s intent to rid the region of the threat posed by weak growth and low inflation, which at 0.3 per cent is now at a five-year low.
A senior Greek banker says easing the requirements “would have a significant positive impact for the Greek banking system and the Greek economy”. The ECB’s efforts to ease monetary conditions in the periphery were being hampered by the rules on low credit ratings, the banker argues.
As the assets created in Greece and Cyprus are potentially riskier than those from banks elsewhere in the eurozone, the ECB would compensate by purchasing smaller proportions of these securitisations, according to a Eurosystem official.
Greece debt crisis
Greece will emerge this year from an unprecedented six-year recession, according to projections by the European Union and International Monetary Fund. Yet without a pick-up in the pace of structural reform, the recovery could prove fragile Further reading
At present, the ECB only accepts ABS as collateral in exchange for its cheap loans if they hold a minimum rating of at least triple B, the lowest investment-grade rating.
The ratings on senior tranches are capped by the sovereign rating of the country where the bank is based. If those rules were to apply to the ECB’s buying plan, the central bank could not accept any securitisations of Greek or Cypriot issuers. Standard & Poor’s rates Greece and Cyprus as single B sovereigns – a sub-investment-grade rating. Fitch rates Greece as single B, and Cyprus as single B-minus. Moody’s rates Greece Caa1 and Cyprus as Caa3.
An ECB official declined to comment on Tuesday, saying proposals made to the governing council were confidential.
Meanwhile, the euro – which has fallen some 9 per cent against the dollar since the start of May – dipped below $1.26 on Tuesday for the first time since September 2012.
L'articolo che riporto qui sotto spiega bene quali vincoli la BCE si sia data, vincoli che Draghi cercherebbe di attenuare per Grecia e Cipro:
September 30, 2014 4:00 pm
Mario Draghi pushes for ECB to accept Greek and Cypriot ‘junk’ loan bundles
By Claire Jones and Sam Fleming
©Bloomberg
Mario Draghi
Mario Draghi is to push the European Central Bank to buy bundles of Greek and Cypriot bank loans with “junk” ratings, in a move that is set to exacerbate tensions between Germany and the bank.
Mr Draghi, ECB president, will this week unveil details of a plan to buy hundreds of billions of euros’ worth of private-sector assets – the central bank’s latest attempt to save the eurozone from economic stagnation.
The ECB’s executive board will propose that existing requirements on the quality of assets accepted by the bank are relaxed to allow the eurozone’s monetary guardian to buy the safer slices of Greek and Cypriot asset backed securities, or ABS, say people familiar with the matter.
Mr Draghi’s proposal is designed to make the programme of buying ABS, which are bundles of packaged loans, as inclusive as possible. If it is backed by the majority of members of the ECB’s governing council, the central bank would be able to buy instruments from banks of all 18 eurozone member states.
However, the idea is likely to face staunch opposition in Germany, straining already tense relations between the ECB and officials in the eurozone’s largest economy.
Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann, who also sits on the ECB’s policy making governing council, has already objected to the plan to buy ABS, which he says leaves the central bank’s balance sheet too exposed to risks.
Wolfgang Schäuble, Germany’s finance minister, has also voiced his opposition, saying purchases would heighten concerns about potential conflicts of interest between the ECB’s role as monetary policy maker and bank supervisor.
While the safer slices – or senior tranches – of Greek and Cypriot ABS only make up a tiny proportion of Europe’s securitisation market, it would free up billions in liquidity for banks in two of the eurozone’s weakest economies, and potentially boost lending to credit-starved smaller businesses in the currency area’s periphery.
Relaxing the rules would also signal the central bank’s intent to rid the region of the threat posed by weak growth and low inflation, which at 0.3 per cent is now at a five-year low.
A senior Greek banker says easing the requirements “would have a significant positive impact for the Greek banking system and the Greek economy”. The ECB’s efforts to ease monetary conditions in the periphery were being hampered by the rules on low credit ratings, the banker argues.
As the assets created in Greece and Cyprus are potentially riskier than those from banks elsewhere in the eurozone, the ECB would compensate by purchasing smaller proportions of these securitisations, according to a Eurosystem official.
Greece debt crisis
Greece will emerge this year from an unprecedented six-year recession, according to projections by the European Union and International Monetary Fund. Yet without a pick-up in the pace of structural reform, the recovery could prove fragile Further reading
At present, the ECB only accepts ABS as collateral in exchange for its cheap loans if they hold a minimum rating of at least triple B, the lowest investment-grade rating.
The ratings on senior tranches are capped by the sovereign rating of the country where the bank is based. If those rules were to apply to the ECB’s buying plan, the central bank could not accept any securitisations of Greek or Cypriot issuers. Standard & Poor’s rates Greece and Cyprus as single B sovereigns – a sub-investment-grade rating. Fitch rates Greece as single B, and Cyprus as single B-minus. Moody’s rates Greece Caa1 and Cyprus as Caa3.
An ECB official declined to comment on Tuesday, saying proposals made to the governing council were confidential.
Meanwhile, the euro – which has fallen some 9 per cent against the dollar since the start of May – dipped below $1.26 on Tuesday for the first time since September 2012.
ferdo
Utente Senior
Altro dubbio: se si calcola il capitale T1 "vintage" ancora in circolazione, si vede che una parte non si qualifica più.
Naturale chiedersi perchè non abbiano incluso nella tender anche (una parte de)i T1..
E su quelli potevano più facilmente giocare a spaventare i bondholders, a prescindere da quello che prevede il prospetto, che, al contrario, è parecchio "friendly"...
Forse perchè hanno in mente una manovra con l'AT1, annunciato in termini generici, ma mai lanciato?
Questi managers bancari austriaci sono proprio difficili da decifrare: non si capisce se siano più furbi o più rimbambiti...
avessi tempo scriverei all'ir
amorgos34
CHIAGNI & FOTTI SRL
We met with management of UBI Banca, Banco Popolare, Banca
Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna, and Banca Popolare di Milano at our
JPMorgan Italian conference. Overall, the operating environment
remains challenging with still weak credit demand until at least year end.
However, Q3 should confirm the ongoing decline in new NPL inflows and
all the banks we met expected to pass the AQR & stress test exercise.
Popolare dell’Emilia Romagna, and Banca Popolare di Milano at our
JPMorgan Italian conference. Overall, the operating environment
remains challenging with still weak credit demand until at least year end.
However, Q3 should confirm the ongoing decline in new NPL inflows and
all the banks we met expected to pass the AQR & stress test exercise.
solovaloreaggiunto
Forumer storico
no non ha rimborsato e' in call il 30 dicembre 2014 al massimo
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