solovaloreaggiunto
Forumer storico
sta ripartendo la rzb 5.169% XS0253262025
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3 (4 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
bosmeld
Forumer storico
Cat XL
Shizuka Minamoto
Io avevo scritto dei post e allegato delle ricerche della MS sulla potenziale non call. Chiaro che le strategie delle banche cambiano.
solovaloreaggiunto
Forumer storico
In our opinion the FSB (Financial Stability Board) guidance on the TLAC (total loss absorbing capacity) does not necessarily presage a flood of Tier II issuance, with institutions having a variety of options that they can exercise in meeting these requirements. Given the incremental cost of regulatory constraints, we are no longer of the opinion that European banks will issue Tier II debt instruments in order to preserve senior unsecured bondholders and expect issuers to resort to either HoldCo senior unsecured instruments or OpCo contractual senior. In the case of the UK banks, we expect that HoldCo debt will be part of the solution, a development which is in keeping with the guidance from the BoE on how SPE is the preferred resolution outcome. By contrast, we expect that European banks will resort to contractual senior unsecured debt in order to meet TLAC requirements given the incremental cost and complexity of setting up HoldCo structures.
· In our opinion, initial contractual senior unsecured issuances are likely to carry a material premium due to the fact that this will be a thin tranche in the capital structure. However, we think that once existing legacy senior is fully recycled into contractual senior, bondholders are unlikely to be in a materially worse off position than they are today on the basis that the contractual obligations merely formalize what is in the BRRD (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive). While the FSB’s guidance leaves open the possibility of bail-in debt under a statutory regime being eligible for TLAC, we note that there is a material caveat with regard to ‘authorities must ensure that this would not give rise to material risk of successful legal challenge’ with the contribution being capped at 2.5% of RWA. Hence, in the event that authorities deem that existing senior is not eligible, then it would be positive for the existing instruments on the basis of a tacit admission of not being actually ‘bail-innable’, in addition to these instruments also benefitting from the issuance of more subordinated instruments, either by structure (Tier II / HoldCo) or contract.
· With the minimum TLAC requirements as the ultimate driver of supply, we think that under a worst-case scenario net positive supply could potentially be €137bn if the NCWO (‘no creditor worst off’) condition of BRRD deems current senior unsecured debt ineligible. If the minimum TLAC floor is closer to the low-end - 16% - net supply could be much smaller; €27bn. According to our estimates, gross supply could be in the €324bn – 640bn range. In our view, the incremental supply will not be disruptive to market dynamics as banks will have four years (or more) to achieve higher capital ratios as per TLAC requirements. We also highlight that the implementation of TLAC could be complicated by the fact that the EU already has the MREL (minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities) metric which is total liability based versus TLAC which is based on RWA.
· In our opinion, initial contractual senior unsecured issuances are likely to carry a material premium due to the fact that this will be a thin tranche in the capital structure. However, we think that once existing legacy senior is fully recycled into contractual senior, bondholders are unlikely to be in a materially worse off position than they are today on the basis that the contractual obligations merely formalize what is in the BRRD (Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive). While the FSB’s guidance leaves open the possibility of bail-in debt under a statutory regime being eligible for TLAC, we note that there is a material caveat with regard to ‘authorities must ensure that this would not give rise to material risk of successful legal challenge’ with the contribution being capped at 2.5% of RWA. Hence, in the event that authorities deem that existing senior is not eligible, then it would be positive for the existing instruments on the basis of a tacit admission of not being actually ‘bail-innable’, in addition to these instruments also benefitting from the issuance of more subordinated instruments, either by structure (Tier II / HoldCo) or contract.
· With the minimum TLAC requirements as the ultimate driver of supply, we think that under a worst-case scenario net positive supply could potentially be €137bn if the NCWO (‘no creditor worst off’) condition of BRRD deems current senior unsecured debt ineligible. If the minimum TLAC floor is closer to the low-end - 16% - net supply could be much smaller; €27bn. According to our estimates, gross supply could be in the €324bn – 640bn range. In our view, the incremental supply will not be disruptive to market dynamics as banks will have four years (or more) to achieve higher capital ratios as per TLAC requirements. We also highlight that the implementation of TLAC could be complicated by the fact that the EU already has the MREL (minimum requirements for own funds and eligible liabilities) metric which is total liability based versus TLAC which is based on RWA.
solovaloreaggiunto
Forumer storico
pe Rott!
capt.harlock
MENA IL CAMMELLO FAN CLUB
si e' appena formata una veglia di preghiera costituita di subbisti mps, al fine di scongiurare una smentita a breve da parte di bnp su rumors..
darkog
In Hoc Signo Vince..
Ma non aveva già smentito BNP il 5.11 su una possibile acquisizione di MPS?
bosmeld
Forumer storico
mi ero sccordato sta cosa. Cercando ora indietro, hai ragione, ma il rumor è tornato di nuovo sul tavolo.
Azione mps sospesa teorico 0,7 per ora.
ferdo
Utente Senior
ma non deve acquisire BES ?!?!
negusneg
New Member
Personalmente sono sempre stato convinto che il fattore reputazionale alla fine sarebbe prevalso su meri calcoli di convenienza permessi dalla complessità della regolamentazione, spesso andando controcorrente rispetto alle previsioni prevalenti di analisti e commentatori.
A maggior ragione oggi, con le maggiori banche che dopo la crisi hanno ricostituito significativi buffer di capitale ed anzi dovranno continuare ad emettere nuova carta di qualità superiore agli strumenti legacy.
La maggior robustezza delle banche, il basso livello dei tassi e la necessità di emettere nuove obbligazioni credo che porterà sempre più emittenti di prima e seconda fascia a seguire l'esempio di Barclays.
Intanto, da possessore della 336 (e della 199) non posso che rallegrarmi
