Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3

Ti capisco perfettamente. Le scottature, una volta prese, non si dimenticano
tanto facilmente. Siamo qui proprio per confrontarci e fornire stimoli.....

Tornando alle Vivat 9% sono sempre stato convinto che la faccenda avrebbe
avuto un esito positivo. Altrimenti non si spiega come mai furono "salvate"
dall'esproprio SNS. Io le presi qualche mese dopo il tragico evento, non ai
minimi assoluti, ma certamente a buon prezzo.

Anch'io le presi sui 90 poi sono uscito l'altr'anno ai prezzi dell'altro ieri .essendo fuori spero in un bel crollo dopo il pagamento:D
 
European Commission’s Approval of State Aid for HSH Is Credit Positive
Last Monday, the European Commission (EC) gave its final approval on state aid for German ship lender
HSH Nordbank AG (HSH, Baa3/Baa3 developing, b33
), confirming its provisional approval in 2013 of the
reinstatement of a second-loss guaranty to €10 billion from €7 billion. The EC’s decision is credit positive for
HSH because it allows the bank to continue its operations and improve its weak financial profile. The
approval requires HSH’s mandatory privatization by 2018, and a failure to privatize by then will result in the
wind-down of the bank, according to the EC’s decision.
The bank’s majority owners, the city state of Hamburg (unrated) and federal state of Schleswig Holstein
(unrated), provided HSH with a €10 billion second-loss guaranty in 2009 at the height of the financial crisis.
HSH in 2011 reduced the guaranty to €7 billion, but this proved to be premature because HSH soon faced
renewed capital pressures and the guaranty was reinstated to its original amount in 2013. HSH’s finances
are weak, burdened by a large ship finance portfolio that totalled €24.6 billion as of June 2015 and which
has struggled amid a persistent global trade slump and structural overcapacity in the sector. The significant
annual fees associated with the guaranty have stifled HSH’s profitability.
The plan that the EC approved offers HSH material short-term relief, including an offloading of €8.2 billion
of impaired loans. HSH will sell €2.0 billion of loans into the market, and will transfer €6.2 billion to a winddown
vehicle owned by Hamburg and Schleswig Holstein. These steps will reduce impaired loans to
approximately €7 billion from about €15 billion as of June 2015, and lower HSH’s impaired loan ratio to 13%
from 23% as of June 2015.
We also expect HSH’s cost of aid to decline substantially. The guaranty fees will amount to 2.2% a year on
the amount not utilised under the guaranty, instead of 4.0% on the entire €10 billion guaranty plus
additional fees under the previous regime. This implies a substantial relief for HSH’s income statement of
about €300 million a year and should allow the bank to demonstrate sustained profitability and to even
retain some profits.
However, the agreement with the EC comes with conditions. The bank’s state owners must radically reduce
their combined stakes to 25% from 85.4% by 2018 at the latest. A failure to do so will result in the bank
being closed and unwound. A wind-down of HSH would raise new risks, particularly for
subordinated creditors.
We believe that additional efforts will be necessary to improve and sustain profitability to secure sufficient
equity investor interest in order for HSH’s privatisation to be successful. The bank’s profitability potential
after the asset sale will probably remain modest despite the relief from a major portion of the state
guaranty related cost. A low return on equity would be an obstacle to the owners’ efforts to sell the bank
sometime during 2017-18.
Moreover, the deal only partially addresses the weaknesses of HSH business model, in particular its large
concentration in highly cyclical sectors. The bank’s asset-based finance business model will still heavily rely
on ship finance activities, albeit to a lower extent.
 
Julius Baer’s Plan to Issue High-Trigger Additional Tier 1 Securities Is Credit Positive
On 22 October, Julius Baer Group Ltd. (JBG, A3 negative) announced plans to issue perpetual Tier 1
securities and list them on the Singapore stock exchange, the first such issuance by a foreign banking group
in the local Singapore market. The planned issuance is credit positive because it would optimise JBG’s
capital structure and help maintain its regulatory capital ratios, balancing the declining capital recognition
of the group’s outstanding preferred securities that are subject to gradual phase-out until 1 January 2019.
We expect JBG’s total capital ratio to improve by approximately 100 basis points upon the issuance of the
high-trigger additional Tier 1 securities, ceteris paribus and we expect Tier 1 leverage ratio to improve by 30
basis points to approximately 4.7%.
JBG is already well capitalised and reported a phased-in common equity Tier 1 (CET1) ratio of 19.1% and a
total capital ratio of 20.3% as of 30 June 2015. In addition, the group benefits from strong underlying
earnings generation capacity amounting to €600-€700 million per annum. However, the proposed issuance,
to which we assigned a provisional (P)Baa2(hyb) rating, will increase the group’s loss-absorbing goingconcern
capital and offer additional protection to senior bondholders.
The announcement follows a decline in capital ratios to 20.3% at the end of the first half of 2015 from
23.4% at year-end 2014 largely as a result of JBG’s decision to set aside CHF326 million ($350 million) of
specific provisions. JBG has said it believes the provisions will cover a large part of potential fines in
connection with US Department of Justice investigations into alleged tax evasion by US clients in JBG's
private banking businesses.
At the same time, the group concluded its acquisition of Bank of America, N.A.’s (A1/A1 stable, baa2 4
)
international wealth management business. We consider the acquisition credit positive because it has
significantly enhanced JBG’s earnings capacity, despite temporarily pressuring its capital and adding
goodwill to the group’s balance sheet.
Any further unexpected and more substantial decline in the group’s capital ratio from currently solid levels
would weaken the group’s credit profile, specifically if this lead to a sustained drop of the group's Tier 1
capital ratio to below 15%. JBG will therefore have to retain a high proportion of its earnings in order to
maintain a sizeable capital buffer over and above its regulatory (total capital) minimum of 12.2%.
 

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