Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 1 (10 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione troppidebiti
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
Llukas
Frangar non Flectar
appunto, non credo sia molto affidabile, se neppure nei calcoli scrivono il giusto, quanto valore hanno le loro previsioni?
dierre
Forumer storico
qquebec
Super Moderator
La convenienza e la logica è per i poveri cristi (come noi). Negli affari vai te a capire quale criterio adottano (Esfg ha pagato una cedola poche settimane prima di fallire)
Myskin
Forumer stoico
a parte i numeri...però nel report parlano di cassa a 1.5 miliardi di $, direi un po' pochino per dormire sonni tranquilli
qquebec
Super Moderator
il report è sbagliato
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-...-5-billion-of-debt-for-dividend-correct-.html
Ultima modifica:
Magician
Forumer attivo
Da possessore di governativi Venezuelani sono solo felice se i dati reali sono migliori di quelli stimati in quel report.
Data l'opacità di alcuni numeri non mi cimento in mie stime... ma a riguardo dell'oro delle riserve mi permetto di ricordare che è vero che non è liquido, ma normalmente facilmente monetizzabile vendendolo o mettendolo a garanzia di linee di credito.
Inoltre nelle ultime settimane si sta rivalutando in dollari ed il dollaro è forte.
Il problema è il solito, Maduro non può più rimandare le riforme !
Data l'opacità di alcuni numeri non mi cimento in mie stime... ma a riguardo dell'oro delle riserve mi permetto di ricordare che è vero che non è liquido, ma normalmente facilmente monetizzabile vendendolo o mettendolo a garanzia di linee di credito.
Inoltre nelle ultime settimane si sta rivalutando in dollari ed il dollaro è forte.
Il problema è il solito, Maduro non può più rimandare le riforme !
Obi W. Kenobi
Forumer attivo
cambio sicad 2: 52.1 bv/usd
cambio nero: 156 bv/usd
riserve non aggiornate dal BCV.
chiusura dei bond da arca:
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articolo di bloomberg sullo shale americano. aprile sarà un mese particolarmente duro per tutti, non solo in america... A Credit Line Reset Looms Over Cash-Strapped Oil Drillers - Bloomberg
alcuni numeri con cui maduro deve presentarsi domani all'assemblea: Los números rojos rojitos antes del discurso de Nicolás Maduro | El Interes
domani le medidas, con aggiornamenti su cosa il giro per il mondo ha prodotto. oggi torres si è riunito in assemblea con il direttivo del cencoex. articolo generalista per gli annunci, giusto per ricordarsi: Venezuela pendiente de las medidas económicas que anunciará Maduro | El Estimulo
per quanto riguarda il nuovo debito che CITGO potrebbe emettere... l'articolo di reuters: Venezuela-owned refiner Citgo seeks $2.5 bln in loans, bonds: IFR | Reuters
interessante il commento di bloomberg, da riflettere: Citgo Said to Plan $2.5 Billion Debt for Venezuela Dividend - Bloomberg
il commento di hausmann sulla situazione paese. lo riporto tutto...
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6f6436a2-a0ae-11e4-8ad8-00144feab7de.html#axzz3POetBKGX
We know neither the terms of the Beijing loans nor the uses of the money, writes Ricardo Hausmann
Every economic catastrophe brings soul-searching. When Argentina collapsed at the end of 2001, the International Monetary Fund was forced into a critical assessment of its involvement in the country. Similar processes were triggered at the World Bank after unsuccessful development projects in Africa.
The coming implosion of the Venezuelan economy should prompt similar introspection — not at the IMF, which has been absent since its “expulsion” by President Hugo Chávez in 2007, but in China.
It is hard to exaggerate the magnitude of the Venezuelan collapse. People are queueing for hours to buy food, stores are empty, and the country is in a deep recession. Venezuela has the fastest inflation in the world, while its government debt is the most expensive to insure against default.
How did we get here? Venezuela used the period of high oil prices to quadruple its public foreign debt, in order to fuel a domestic spending boom. By 2012, when Venezuelan oil averaged $103, the country was spending as if the price was $194, running up a fiscal deficit of 17.5 per cent of gross domestic product. That is why the economy went into crisis in early 2014, when the oil price was still $100. The recent drop has just made a hopeless situation worse. Who gave the country the rope with which to hang itself? Mostly China.
China started to lend massively to Venezuela in 2007. Since then it has lent more than $45bn, of which about $20bn is still outstanding. After a visit to Beijing on January 8, President Nicolás Maduro said he had won further “investment”.
What makes China unusual is not just the amount it is willing to lend but the way it lends.
First, Beijing has chosen to be opaque: we know neither the terms of the loans nor the uses of the money. The debt is repaid in oil, making Wall Street bondholders junior to China. The Venezuelan public has little information on where the money is being spent. There are railways that were announced but abandoned, plants that never went far beyond the ribbon-cutting ceremony. There are allegations of corruption: in 2013, eight people in Venezuela were arrested for appropriating $84m from the Joint Chinese-Venezuela Fund.
Second, the debt was never authorised by the Venezuelan parliament due to the specious argument that it was not debt, but “finance”, because it was not to be paid in dollars but in oil. As a consequence, spending the money was never part of the national budget, thus escaping all forms of control and bypassing oil-revenue sharing rules, which would have transferred part of the income to opposition state and local governments.
Third, PDVSA — the national oil company — was asked to pay back a debt it had not borrowed. Since it could not afford to forgo the income on the oil it sent to China, it ended up borrowing the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars from the central bank, fuelling Venezuela’s inflation problem.
China ignored the lessons that many official lenders have learnt the hard way. There are reasons why these lenders delegate to the IMF the macroeconomic assessment of borrowers: lending into unsustainable policies only quickens the day of reckoning.
If China had been prudent, it would have made sure that the money it provided was invested in projects that could pay for themselves. Otherwise, the loans can only be repaid through future austerity.
Other official development banks have learnt that the political points gained when lending can quickly evaporate when it is time to collect on old loans. China may be a new player in the world of international development finance, but it has behaved, at least in Venezuela, in ways that are an exaggerated version of the worst of old development finance.
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situazione petrolio:
anche JP morgan ha allineato le previsioni sul crude a quelle di GS:
"J.P. Morgan cut its average 2015 Brent forecast to $49/bbl from $82/bbl, saying its analysts believe oil prices could dip to average $38/bbl in March."
cambio nero: 156 bv/usd
riserve non aggiornate dal BCV.
chiusura dei bond da arca:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
articolo di bloomberg sullo shale americano. aprile sarà un mese particolarmente duro per tutti, non solo in america... A Credit Line Reset Looms Over Cash-Strapped Oil Drillers - Bloomberg
alcuni numeri con cui maduro deve presentarsi domani all'assemblea: Los números rojos rojitos antes del discurso de Nicolás Maduro | El Interes
domani le medidas, con aggiornamenti su cosa il giro per il mondo ha prodotto. oggi torres si è riunito in assemblea con il direttivo del cencoex. articolo generalista per gli annunci, giusto per ricordarsi: Venezuela pendiente de las medidas económicas que anunciará Maduro | El Estimulo
per quanto riguarda il nuovo debito che CITGO potrebbe emettere... l'articolo di reuters: Venezuela-owned refiner Citgo seeks $2.5 bln in loans, bonds: IFR | Reuters
interessante il commento di bloomberg, da riflettere: Citgo Said to Plan $2.5 Billion Debt for Venezuela Dividend - Bloomberg
il commento di hausmann sulla situazione paese. lo riporto tutto...
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/6f6436a2-a0ae-11e4-8ad8-00144feab7de.html#axzz3POetBKGX
We know neither the terms of the Beijing loans nor the uses of the money, writes Ricardo Hausmann
Every economic catastrophe brings soul-searching. When Argentina collapsed at the end of 2001, the International Monetary Fund was forced into a critical assessment of its involvement in the country. Similar processes were triggered at the World Bank after unsuccessful development projects in Africa.
The coming implosion of the Venezuelan economy should prompt similar introspection — not at the IMF, which has been absent since its “expulsion” by President Hugo Chávez in 2007, but in China.
It is hard to exaggerate the magnitude of the Venezuelan collapse. People are queueing for hours to buy food, stores are empty, and the country is in a deep recession. Venezuela has the fastest inflation in the world, while its government debt is the most expensive to insure against default.
How did we get here? Venezuela used the period of high oil prices to quadruple its public foreign debt, in order to fuel a domestic spending boom. By 2012, when Venezuelan oil averaged $103, the country was spending as if the price was $194, running up a fiscal deficit of 17.5 per cent of gross domestic product. That is why the economy went into crisis in early 2014, when the oil price was still $100. The recent drop has just made a hopeless situation worse. Who gave the country the rope with which to hang itself? Mostly China.
China started to lend massively to Venezuela in 2007. Since then it has lent more than $45bn, of which about $20bn is still outstanding. After a visit to Beijing on January 8, President Nicolás Maduro said he had won further “investment”.
What makes China unusual is not just the amount it is willing to lend but the way it lends.
First, Beijing has chosen to be opaque: we know neither the terms of the loans nor the uses of the money. The debt is repaid in oil, making Wall Street bondholders junior to China. The Venezuelan public has little information on where the money is being spent. There are railways that were announced but abandoned, plants that never went far beyond the ribbon-cutting ceremony. There are allegations of corruption: in 2013, eight people in Venezuela were arrested for appropriating $84m from the Joint Chinese-Venezuela Fund.
Second, the debt was never authorised by the Venezuelan parliament due to the specious argument that it was not debt, but “finance”, because it was not to be paid in dollars but in oil. As a consequence, spending the money was never part of the national budget, thus escaping all forms of control and bypassing oil-revenue sharing rules, which would have transferred part of the income to opposition state and local governments.
Third, PDVSA — the national oil company — was asked to pay back a debt it had not borrowed. Since it could not afford to forgo the income on the oil it sent to China, it ended up borrowing the equivalent of tens of billions of dollars from the central bank, fuelling Venezuela’s inflation problem.
China ignored the lessons that many official lenders have learnt the hard way. There are reasons why these lenders delegate to the IMF the macroeconomic assessment of borrowers: lending into unsustainable policies only quickens the day of reckoning.
If China had been prudent, it would have made sure that the money it provided was invested in projects that could pay for themselves. Otherwise, the loans can only be repaid through future austerity.
Other official development banks have learnt that the political points gained when lending can quickly evaporate when it is time to collect on old loans. China may be a new player in the world of international development finance, but it has behaved, at least in Venezuela, in ways that are an exaggerated version of the worst of old development finance.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
situazione petrolio:
anche JP morgan ha allineato le previsioni sul crude a quelle di GS:
"J.P. Morgan cut its average 2015 Brent forecast to $49/bbl from $82/bbl, saying its analysts believe oil prices could dip to average $38/bbl in March."
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
E aggiungo dall'articolo di bbg linkato:
The only reason Citgo would issue the debt “is if they’re going to default on it,” Dallen said in a telephone interview. “And then the bank or the company they issued it to would be able to foreclose and take the property. It’s a back-door way of Venezuela selling the company.”
Se è vero che buona parte del debito di Venezuela & PDVSA è ormai vicina alle stime di recovery in caso di default, niente impedisce che i prezzi di mercato scendano ben sotto il recovery value se si verificasse il credit event tanto atteso.
E' probabile che questi continuino finché anche l'ultimo dollaro non sarà speso, quindi il 2015 potrebbe essere salvo.
Non so però quanto si possa gioire della cosa, dato che reputo l'incertezza cmq troppo alta per investire in bond brevi (che hanno ancora prezzi molto elevati), ma d'altra parte se default dev'essere sarebbe meglio subito perché più si trascina la cosa (con rimborso del debito a breve termine) e più s'abbassa il recovery sul debito outstanding (Grecia docet).
Commento sintetico:
OMG
Recommendation:
wait
PS:
Tutto rigorosamente imho, soprattutto la "Recommendation" che non vuole essere tale (se non per me stesso) e che ho inserito solo per strizzare l'occhio ai consigli per gli acquisti che si trovano in fondo a tanti (troppi) report
- Stato