Imark
Forumer storico
Era l'ipotesi sponsorizzata a chiare lettere da Moody's, Ch 11 con il Governo USA nei panni (alquanto inusuali) di DIP lender ... difficilmente si sporgono così tanto sugli sviluppi possibili in mancanza di elementi...
Obbligazioni societarie GM, Ford, Chrysler: il 3D dell'automotive USA
- Creatore Discussione Imark
- Data di Inizio
Era l'ipotesi sponsorizzata a chiare lettere da Moody's, Ch 11 con il Governo USA nei panni (alquanto inusuali) di DIP lender ... difficilmente si sporgono così tanto sugli sviluppi possibili in mancanza di elementi...
quantotanto
Forumer attivo
Anche qualche anno prima...nel 2002 acquistai bond GM in dollari australiani e li vendetti nel 2004 perché circolavano report di debito fuori controllo...
paologorgo
Chapter 11
cose noiose.
visto che la strategia GM è non arrivare mai al nocciolo del problema, e vivere di rimandi e proroghe, ma sempre ovviamente evitando il ch 11 (con i soldi di un altro, perchè la strada maestra di evitarlo finanziando le spese con il cash flow aziendale non è percorribile...), vediamo fin dove possono prendere tutti in giro:
In the fourth quarter of 2008, our available liquidity dropped below the level necessary to operate our businesses. While we received significant liquidity through our borrowings pursuant to the UST Loan Facility, our efforts to continue to maintain adequate liquidity will be very challenging given the current business environment and the immediate working capital requirements of the Viability Plan required by the UST Loan Agreement. We anticipate that the effect on working capital of reductions in production volume and other restructuring initiatives we undertook in 2008 will result in significant liquidity needs during the first quarter of 2009. Moreover, even if our liquidity enhancing actions are successfully implemented, their full effect will not be realized until later in 2009. Our ability to maintain adequate liquidity through the first half of 2009 will depend significantly on the volume and quality of vehicle sales, the continuing curtailment of operating expenses and capital spending, the availability of funding under one or more current or future federal government programs and the completion of some of our planned asset sales. We currently have approximately $1 billion of outstanding Series D convertible debentures that mature on June 1, 2009. If we are unable to restructure the Series D convertible debentures prior to June 1, 2009, or otherwise satisfactorily address the payment due on June 1, 2009, a default would arise with respect to payment of these obligations, which could also trigger cross defaults in other outstanding debt and potentially require us to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
A Dio piacendo, non si dovrebbe (condizionale) andare oltre Giugno. Ormai non ne posso più...
Siamo passati per un buco stretto:
Our $4.5 billion secured revolving credit facility, $1.5 billion U.S. term loan and a $125 million inventory financing facility contain covenants making the debt thereunder callable by the lenders in the event that our independent auditors include a paragraph in their report expressing substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern. We have obtained waivers from the lenders, waiving their right to call the loans in connection with the report by our auditors dated March 4, 2009 containing such a paragraph. However, the waivers provide that the loans would be callable in the event that the UST does not approve the Viability Plan and the UST Loan becomes due and payable.
Usual staff, ma in particolare agli azionisti non la mandano mica a dire: le vostre amate azioni in caso di ch 11 non valgono nulla... :
There is substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern.
Our independent public accounting firm has issued an opinion on our consolidated financial statements that states that the consolidated financial statements were prepared assuming we will continue as a going concern and further states that our recurring losses from operations, stockholders’ deficit and inability to generate sufficient cash flow to meet our obligations and sustain our operations raise substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern. Our plans concerning these matters, including our Viability Plan, are discussed in Note 2 to the accompanying audited consolidated financial statements. Our future is dependent on our ability to execute our Viability Plan successfully or otherwise address these matters. If we fail to do so for any reason, we would not be able to continue as a going concern and could potentially be forced to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
If we are not able to obtain adequate financing from the U.S. government or other sources or to execute our Viability Plan or if our Viability Plan does not result in an entity capable of sustaining itself over the long-term, or if we are unable to restructure our Series D convertible debentures prior to June 1, 2009, we could potentially be required to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, either through a prepackaged plan of reorganization or under an alternative plan, which could include liquidation.
If we were not able to secure adequate funding to continue our operations or to execute our Viability Plan, for example because we could not execute the debt reduction or achieve other restructuring targets mandated by the UST Loan Agreement, we could potentially be required to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. We currently have approximately $1.0 billion of outstanding Series D convertible debentures that mature on June 1, 2009. If we are unable to restructure the Series D convertible debentures prior to June 1, 2009, or otherwise satisfactorily address the payment due on June 1, 2009, a default would arise with respect to payment of these obligations, which could also trigger cross defaults in other outstanding debt and potentially require us to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Such a restructuring would preferably be conducted through a prepackaged reorganization. We believe that the announcement of a prepackaged reorganization plan and its execution in Bankruptcy Court, however, could materially adversely affect the relationships between us and our customers, employees, suppliers, dealers, partners and others. Further, if we were unable to develop a prepackaged plan or to obtain confirmation of the prepackaged plan on a timely basis, because of a legal challenge to it or inability to obtain sufficient financing or another cause, or for other reasons, we could be forced to operate in bankruptcy for an extended period while we tried to develop a reorganization plan that could be confirmed.
Moreover, there is no assurance that we would be able to obtain debtor-in-possession financing to sustain us during bankruptcy proceedings, particularly if we do not have U.S. government support.
Substantial risks would result from any such bankruptcy filing. For example:
•
•
•
•
•
visto che la strategia GM è non arrivare mai al nocciolo del problema, e vivere di rimandi e proroghe, ma sempre ovviamente evitando il ch 11 (con i soldi di un altro, perchè la strada maestra di evitarlo finanziando le spese con il cash flow aziendale non è percorribile...), vediamo fin dove possono prendere tutti in giro:
In the fourth quarter of 2008, our available liquidity dropped below the level necessary to operate our businesses. While we received significant liquidity through our borrowings pursuant to the UST Loan Facility, our efforts to continue to maintain adequate liquidity will be very challenging given the current business environment and the immediate working capital requirements of the Viability Plan required by the UST Loan Agreement. We anticipate that the effect on working capital of reductions in production volume and other restructuring initiatives we undertook in 2008 will result in significant liquidity needs during the first quarter of 2009. Moreover, even if our liquidity enhancing actions are successfully implemented, their full effect will not be realized until later in 2009. Our ability to maintain adequate liquidity through the first half of 2009 will depend significantly on the volume and quality of vehicle sales, the continuing curtailment of operating expenses and capital spending, the availability of funding under one or more current or future federal government programs and the completion of some of our planned asset sales. We currently have approximately $1 billion of outstanding Series D convertible debentures that mature on June 1, 2009. If we are unable to restructure the Series D convertible debentures prior to June 1, 2009, or otherwise satisfactorily address the payment due on June 1, 2009, a default would arise with respect to payment of these obligations, which could also trigger cross defaults in other outstanding debt and potentially require us to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
A Dio piacendo, non si dovrebbe (condizionale) andare oltre Giugno. Ormai non ne posso più...
Siamo passati per un buco stretto:
Our $4.5 billion secured revolving credit facility, $1.5 billion U.S. term loan and a $125 million inventory financing facility contain covenants making the debt thereunder callable by the lenders in the event that our independent auditors include a paragraph in their report expressing substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern. We have obtained waivers from the lenders, waiving their right to call the loans in connection with the report by our auditors dated March 4, 2009 containing such a paragraph. However, the waivers provide that the loans would be callable in the event that the UST does not approve the Viability Plan and the UST Loan becomes due and payable.
Usual staff, ma in particolare agli azionisti non la mandano mica a dire: le vostre amate azioni in caso di ch 11 non valgono nulla... :
There is substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern.
Our independent public accounting firm has issued an opinion on our consolidated financial statements that states that the consolidated financial statements were prepared assuming we will continue as a going concern and further states that our recurring losses from operations, stockholders’ deficit and inability to generate sufficient cash flow to meet our obligations and sustain our operations raise substantial doubt about our ability to continue as a going concern. Our plans concerning these matters, including our Viability Plan, are discussed in Note 2 to the accompanying audited consolidated financial statements. Our future is dependent on our ability to execute our Viability Plan successfully or otherwise address these matters. If we fail to do so for any reason, we would not be able to continue as a going concern and could potentially be forced to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.
If we are not able to obtain adequate financing from the U.S. government or other sources or to execute our Viability Plan or if our Viability Plan does not result in an entity capable of sustaining itself over the long-term, or if we are unable to restructure our Series D convertible debentures prior to June 1, 2009, we could potentially be required to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, either through a prepackaged plan of reorganization or under an alternative plan, which could include liquidation.
If we were not able to secure adequate funding to continue our operations or to execute our Viability Plan, for example because we could not execute the debt reduction or achieve other restructuring targets mandated by the UST Loan Agreement, we could potentially be required to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. We currently have approximately $1.0 billion of outstanding Series D convertible debentures that mature on June 1, 2009. If we are unable to restructure the Series D convertible debentures prior to June 1, 2009, or otherwise satisfactorily address the payment due on June 1, 2009, a default would arise with respect to payment of these obligations, which could also trigger cross defaults in other outstanding debt and potentially require us to seek relief through a filing under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. Such a restructuring would preferably be conducted through a prepackaged reorganization. We believe that the announcement of a prepackaged reorganization plan and its execution in Bankruptcy Court, however, could materially adversely affect the relationships between us and our customers, employees, suppliers, dealers, partners and others. Further, if we were unable to develop a prepackaged plan or to obtain confirmation of the prepackaged plan on a timely basis, because of a legal challenge to it or inability to obtain sufficient financing or another cause, or for other reasons, we could be forced to operate in bankruptcy for an extended period while we tried to develop a reorganization plan that could be confirmed.
Moreover, there is no assurance that we would be able to obtain debtor-in-possession financing to sustain us during bankruptcy proceedings, particularly if we do not have U.S. government support.
Substantial risks would result from any such bankruptcy filing. For example:
•
It is likely that the filing would substantially erode consumers’ confidence in our ability to provide parts and service over the long-term, ensure the availability of warranty coverage or maintain acceptable resale values and that as a result there would be significant and precipitous decline in our revenues;
•
A significant decline in revenue would endanger the viability of our dealers and suppliers, threaten the ability of GMAC to fund itself and impair its capacity to provide essential wholesale and retail financing to our dealers and customers;
•
If we were not able to develop a successful plan for reorganization or if debtor-in-possession financing were not available, we would be forced to liquidate under Chapter 7 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code;
•
Holders of our debt obligations would have their claims significantly reduced, converted into equity or eliminated, depending upon the terms of the restructuring; and
•
The equity interests of our current stockholders would be completely eliminated.
paologorgo
Chapter 11
dimenticavo la fonte: GM 10-K, quelle strane cose che le aziende pubblicano trimestralmente (10-Q, questo è l'annuale) e che non piacciono a Shark... 
http://secfilings.nasdaq.com/filing...ORS+CORP&FormType=10-K&RcvdDate=3/5/2009&pdf=
http://secfilings.nasdaq.com/filing...ORS+CORP&FormType=10-K&RcvdDate=3/5/2009&pdf=
The Beast
Rating? No grazie!
In Germania non apprezzano come GM sta gestendo la situazione x quanto riguarda Opel, addirittura preferiscono una bancarotta pilotata ( per poi riprendere in mano le redini )...
Non ho capito il perchè ma sarebbe + facile x GM avere gli aiuti statali senza le varie controllate extraUSA...già si è disfatta di SAAB, la prossima è la OPEL?
Non ho capito il perchè ma sarebbe + facile x GM avere gli aiuti statali senza le varie controllate extraUSA...già si è disfatta di SAAB, la prossima è la OPEL?
troppidebiti
Forumer storico
una notiziuola un pò vecchia che riguarda il ramo bancario ford
10-K: FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO LLC
Last update: 6:32 a.m. EST Feb. 26, 2009
(EDGAR Online via COMTEX) -- ITEM 7. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Overview Our primary objective remains to profitably and consistently support the sale of Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, and Volvo vehicles. Meeting this objective in 2008 was more difficult due to: the adverse impact of the worldwide credit crisis on the capital markets; a decline in consumer confidence and spending; a decline in used vehicle auction values; higher repossessions; and the impact of our declining receivables on our ability to maintain a competitive cost structure. Despite these challenges, we have been able to fund our business and support the sale of Ford vehicles. We have accomplished this by: using our committed liquidity programs and government-sponsored funding programs in the United States and Europe; reducing our receivables; maintaining consistent risk management practices; and restructuring our business to maintain a competitive cost structure. The Challenging Economic Environment Consistent with the overall market, we have been impacted by volatility and disruptions in the capital markets since August 2007, particularly the asset-backed securities market where we obtain the majority of our funding. We now face the increased challenges of the global credit crisis, including reduced access to capital markets, increases in the credit spreads associated with our funding, higher renewal costs for our committed liquidity programs, greater enhancements for our securitizations, and a reduction in our capacity to obtain derivatives to manage market risk, including interest rate risk. Declining consumer confidence and increasing unemployment have contributed to lower consumer spending and reduced vehicle demand. Sales of new vehicles in the United States declined about 20% in 2008 compared with 2007. Significant increases in gasoline prices in the first half of 2008 contributed to this decline. These price increases resulted in lower demand for full-size trucks and traditional sport utility vehicles, which also resulted in lower used vehicle auction values. These lower values contributed to an impairment charge to our North America operating lease portfolio and significant increases to our provision for credit losses. Our provision for credit losses also increased due to higher repossessions in our retail installment and lease portfolio. Our Response Most of our funding during the second half of 2008 was completed through our committed liquidity programs and government-sponsored funding programs due to limited access to public and private securitization markets. Through December 31, 2008, we sold $7 billion of FCAR Owner Trust retail securitization program ("FCAR") asset-backed commercial paper to the U.S. Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility ("CPFF"). In addition, as of December 31, 2008, FCE Bank plc ("FCE") accessed $1.1 billion of short-term funding under the European Central Bank's ("ECB") open market operations program under which obligations are backed by either notes or receivables. We plan to continue utilizing existing government-sponsored funding programs (i.e., CPFF and ECB) and expect to use new programs for which we are eligible (e.g., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility - "TALF"). For additional information on our use of these programs, refer to the "Funding" and "Liquidity" sections of Item 7 of Part II of our 10-K Report. Our funding requirements have decreased as managed receivables declined to $118 billion at December 31, 2008 from $148 billion at year-end 2007. In 2008, as part of our commitment to support the sale of Ford vehicles, Jaguar, Land Rover, and Mazda began to transition their financing to other sources. We also continued our strategy to execute divestitures and alternative business arrangements in certain international markets where securitization and other funding availability was limited. Additionally, lower global automotive industry sales resulted in fewer originations of receivables. We will continue to explore alternative business arrangements and divestitures. For additional information on our divestitures in 2008, refer to Note 14 of our Notes to the Financial Statements. For our retail and lease business, our primary focus is on retail installment sale financing. While we continue to offer leasing to customers who prefer this product, lower auction values and the present funding environment have made leasing less economical for us, Ford, and our customers. This has contributed to a reduction in our lease originations and over time will reduce our residual risk exposure.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
the extent to which we purchase retail installment sale and lease contracts and the extent to which we provide wholesale financing;
the sales price of the vehicles financed;
the level of dealer inventories;
Ford-sponsored special-rate financing programs available exclusively through us; and
the availability of cost-effective funding for the purchase of retail installment sale and lease contracts and to provide wholesale financing.
For finance receivables, financing margin equals the difference between revenue earned on finance receivables and the cost of borrowed funds. For operating leases, financing margin equals revenue earned on operating leases, less depreciation expense and the cost of borrowed funds. Interest rates earned on most receivables and rental charges on operating leases generally are fixed at the time the contracts are originated. On some receivables, primarily wholesale financing, we charge interest at a floating rate that varies with changes in short-term interest rates.
Securitized off-balance sheet basis - includes receivables sold in securitization transactions that, when sold, do not remain on our balance sheet;
Managed basis - includes on-balance sheet receivables, excluding unearned interest supplements related to finance receivables, and securitized off-balance sheet receivables that we continue to service; and
Serviced basis - includes managed receivables and leases, and receivables sold in whole-loan sale transactions where we retain no interest in the sold receivables, but which we continue to service.
We analyze our financial performance primarily on a managed and on-balance sheet basis. We retain interests in receivables sold in off-balance sheet securitizations and, with respect to subordinated retained interests, we have credit risk. As a result, we evaluate credit losses, receivables, and leverage on a managed basis as well as on an on-balance sheet basis. In contrast, we do not have the same financial interest in the performance of receivables sold in whole-loan sale transactions, and as a result, we generally review the performance of our serviced portfolio only to evaluate the effectiveness of our origination and collection activities. To evaluate the performance of these activities, we monitor a number of measures, such as delinquencies, repossession statistics, losses on repossessions, and the number of bankruptcy filings. We measure the performance of our North America Segment and our International Segment primarily on an income before income taxes basis, after excluding the impact to earnings from gains and losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives primarily related to movements in interest rates, because our risk management activities are carried out on a centralized basis at the corporate level, with only certain elements allocated to our two segments. For additional information regarding our segments, see Note 18 of our Notes to the Financial Statements.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
Return volume - Our projection of the number of vehicles that will be returned at lease-end; and
Discount rate - Our estimation of the discount rate, reflecting hypothetical market assumptions regarding borrowing rates, credit loss patterns, and residual value risk.
At the time of the impairment, we estimated that a one percent decrease in the auction value of the impaired vehicles assumed in the impairment testing would have decreased the fair value estimate by about $50 million. A one percentage point increase in the return rate of the impaired vehicles assumed in the impairment testing would have decreased the fair value estimate by about $30 million. A one percentage point increase in the discount rate assumed in the impairment testing would have decreased the fair value estimate by about $100 million.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
A higher provision for credit losses (about $1.2 billion); and
Higher depreciation expense for leased vehicles (about $700 million).
Other factors to explain the decrease in pre-tax earnings included:
Higher net losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives (about $200 million); and
The non-recurrence of the gain related to the sale of a majority of our interest in AB Volvofinans (about $100 million);
These factors were offset partially by:
The non-recurrence of costs associated with our North American business transformation initiative (about $200 million);
Lower expenses primarily reflecting improved operating costs (about $300 million); and
A gain related to the sale of approximately half of our ownership interest in our Nordic operations (about $100 million).
In 2008 and 2007, pre-tax earnings included net losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives (unallocated risk management in the table below) of $317 million and $108 million, respectively.
Full Year
2008
Over/(Under)
2008 2007 2007
(in millions)
Income/(Loss) before income taxes
North America Segment $ (2,749 ) $ 701 $ (3,450 )
International Segment 507 622 (115 )
Unallocated risk management (317 ) (108 ) (209 )
Income/(Loss) before income taxes (2,559 ) 1,215 (3,774 )
Provision for/(Benefit from) income taxes,
Minority interests in net income of
subsidiaries, and Gain on disposal of
discontinued operations (1,023 ) 440 (1,463 )
Net income/(loss) $ (1,536 ) $ 775 $ (2,311 )
The decrease in North America Segment pre-tax earnings primarily reflected the second quarter 2008 impairment charge for operating leases, a higher provision for credit losses, higher depreciation expense for leased vehicles, and lower contract volume. These factors were offset partially by higher financing margin, the non-recurrence of costs associated with our business transformation initiative, and lower expenses primarily reflecting improved operating costs. The decrease in International Segment pre-tax earnings primarily reflected lower volume and financing margin, a higher provision for credit losses, the non-recurrence of a gain related to the sale of a majority of our interest in AB Volvofinans, and higher reserves for residual based products, offset partially by gains related to the sale of our ownership interests in several operations, lower operating costs, and changes in currency exchange rates.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
Lower financing margin primarily related to higher borrowing costs (about $400 million);
Unfavorable lease residual performance reflected in higher depreciation expense for leased vehicles (about $400 million); and
Higher other costs primarily due to our North American business transformation initiative (about $100 million).
These factors were offset partially by:
Lower net losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives (about $300 million).
In 2007 and 2006, pre-tax earnings included net losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives (unallocated risk management in the table below) of $108 million and $448 million, respectively.
Full Year
2007
Over/(Under)
2007 2006 2006
(in millions)
Income before income taxes
North America Segment $ 701 $ 1,729 $ (1,028 )
International Segment 622 672 (50 )
Unallocated risk management (108 ) (448 ) 340
Income before income taxes 1,215 1,953 (738 )
Provision for income taxes, Minority interests
in net income of subsidiaries and Gain on
disposal of discontinued operations 440 670 (230 )
Net income $ 775 $ 1,283 $ (508 )
The decrease in North America Segment pre-tax earnings primarily reflected higher provision for credit losses primarily related to the non-recurrence of credit loss reserve reductions, unfavorable lease residual performance as reflected in higher depreciation expense for leased vehicles, lower financing margin primarily related to higher borrowing costs and the costs associated with our business transformation initiative. These factors were offset partially by lower expenses, primarily reflecting improved operating costs.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations (Continued)
Placement Volume and Financing Share
Total worldwide financing contract placement volumes for new and used vehicles
are shown below:
Full Year
2008 2007 2006
(in thousands)
North America Segment
United States 1,043 1,256 1,574
Canada 149 186 189
Total North America Segment 1,192 1,442 1,763
International Segment
Europe 629 696 711
Other international 129 207 233
Total International Segment 758 903 944
Total contract placement volume 1,950 2,345 2,707
Shown below are our financing shares of new Ford, Lincoln and Mercury brand vehicles sold by dealers in the United States and new Ford brand vehicles sold by dealers in Europe. Also shown below are our wholesale financing shares of new Ford, Lincoln and Mercury brand vehicles acquired by dealers in the United States, excluding fleet, and of new Ford brand vehicles acquired by dealers in Europe:
Full Year
2008 2007 2006
United States
Financing share - Ford, Lincoln and Mercury
Retail installment and lease 39 % 38 % 44 %
Wholesale 77 78 80
Europe
Financing share - Ford
Retail installment and lease 28 % 26 % 27 %
Wholesale 98 96 95
North America Segment
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations (Continued)
Financial Condition
Finance Receivables and Operating Leases
Our receivable levels are shown below:
. . .
Feb 26, 2009
(c) 1995-2009 Cybernet Data Systems, Inc. All Rights Reserved
impressionante questa voce
A higher provision for credit losses (about $1.2 billion)
10-K: FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO LLC
Last update: 6:32 a.m. EST Feb. 26, 2009
(EDGAR Online via COMTEX) -- ITEM 7. MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF OPERATIONS Overview Our primary objective remains to profitably and consistently support the sale of Ford, Lincoln, Mercury, and Volvo vehicles. Meeting this objective in 2008 was more difficult due to: the adverse impact of the worldwide credit crisis on the capital markets; a decline in consumer confidence and spending; a decline in used vehicle auction values; higher repossessions; and the impact of our declining receivables on our ability to maintain a competitive cost structure. Despite these challenges, we have been able to fund our business and support the sale of Ford vehicles. We have accomplished this by: using our committed liquidity programs and government-sponsored funding programs in the United States and Europe; reducing our receivables; maintaining consistent risk management practices; and restructuring our business to maintain a competitive cost structure. The Challenging Economic Environment Consistent with the overall market, we have been impacted by volatility and disruptions in the capital markets since August 2007, particularly the asset-backed securities market where we obtain the majority of our funding. We now face the increased challenges of the global credit crisis, including reduced access to capital markets, increases in the credit spreads associated with our funding, higher renewal costs for our committed liquidity programs, greater enhancements for our securitizations, and a reduction in our capacity to obtain derivatives to manage market risk, including interest rate risk. Declining consumer confidence and increasing unemployment have contributed to lower consumer spending and reduced vehicle demand. Sales of new vehicles in the United States declined about 20% in 2008 compared with 2007. Significant increases in gasoline prices in the first half of 2008 contributed to this decline. These price increases resulted in lower demand for full-size trucks and traditional sport utility vehicles, which also resulted in lower used vehicle auction values. These lower values contributed to an impairment charge to our North America operating lease portfolio and significant increases to our provision for credit losses. Our provision for credit losses also increased due to higher repossessions in our retail installment and lease portfolio. Our Response Most of our funding during the second half of 2008 was completed through our committed liquidity programs and government-sponsored funding programs due to limited access to public and private securitization markets. Through December 31, 2008, we sold $7 billion of FCAR Owner Trust retail securitization program ("FCAR") asset-backed commercial paper to the U.S. Federal Reserve's Commercial Paper Funding Facility ("CPFF"). In addition, as of December 31, 2008, FCE Bank plc ("FCE") accessed $1.1 billion of short-term funding under the European Central Bank's ("ECB") open market operations program under which obligations are backed by either notes or receivables. We plan to continue utilizing existing government-sponsored funding programs (i.e., CPFF and ECB) and expect to use new programs for which we are eligible (e.g., Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan Facility - "TALF"). For additional information on our use of these programs, refer to the "Funding" and "Liquidity" sections of Item 7 of Part II of our 10-K Report. Our funding requirements have decreased as managed receivables declined to $118 billion at December 31, 2008 from $148 billion at year-end 2007. In 2008, as part of our commitment to support the sale of Ford vehicles, Jaguar, Land Rover, and Mazda began to transition their financing to other sources. We also continued our strategy to execute divestitures and alternative business arrangements in certain international markets where securitization and other funding availability was limited. Additionally, lower global automotive industry sales resulted in fewer originations of receivables. We will continue to explore alternative business arrangements and divestitures. For additional information on our divestitures in 2008, refer to Note 14 of our Notes to the Financial Statements. For our retail and lease business, our primary focus is on retail installment sale financing. While we continue to offer leasing to customers who prefer this product, lower auction values and the present funding environment have made leasing less economical for us, Ford, and our customers. This has contributed to a reduction in our lease originations and over time will reduce our residual risk exposure.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
the extent to which we purchase retail installment sale and lease contracts and the extent to which we provide wholesale financing;
the sales price of the vehicles financed;
the level of dealer inventories;
Ford-sponsored special-rate financing programs available exclusively through us; and
the availability of cost-effective funding for the purchase of retail installment sale and lease contracts and to provide wholesale financing.
For finance receivables, financing margin equals the difference between revenue earned on finance receivables and the cost of borrowed funds. For operating leases, financing margin equals revenue earned on operating leases, less depreciation expense and the cost of borrowed funds. Interest rates earned on most receivables and rental charges on operating leases generally are fixed at the time the contracts are originated. On some receivables, primarily wholesale financing, we charge interest at a floating rate that varies with changes in short-term interest rates.
Securitized off-balance sheet basis - includes receivables sold in securitization transactions that, when sold, do not remain on our balance sheet;
Managed basis - includes on-balance sheet receivables, excluding unearned interest supplements related to finance receivables, and securitized off-balance sheet receivables that we continue to service; and
Serviced basis - includes managed receivables and leases, and receivables sold in whole-loan sale transactions where we retain no interest in the sold receivables, but which we continue to service.
We analyze our financial performance primarily on a managed and on-balance sheet basis. We retain interests in receivables sold in off-balance sheet securitizations and, with respect to subordinated retained interests, we have credit risk. As a result, we evaluate credit losses, receivables, and leverage on a managed basis as well as on an on-balance sheet basis. In contrast, we do not have the same financial interest in the performance of receivables sold in whole-loan sale transactions, and as a result, we generally review the performance of our serviced portfolio only to evaluate the effectiveness of our origination and collection activities. To evaluate the performance of these activities, we monitor a number of measures, such as delinquencies, repossession statistics, losses on repossessions, and the number of bankruptcy filings. We measure the performance of our North America Segment and our International Segment primarily on an income before income taxes basis, after excluding the impact to earnings from gains and losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives primarily related to movements in interest rates, because our risk management activities are carried out on a centralized basis at the corporate level, with only certain elements allocated to our two segments. For additional information regarding our segments, see Note 18 of our Notes to the Financial Statements.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
Return volume - Our projection of the number of vehicles that will be returned at lease-end; and
Discount rate - Our estimation of the discount rate, reflecting hypothetical market assumptions regarding borrowing rates, credit loss patterns, and residual value risk.
At the time of the impairment, we estimated that a one percent decrease in the auction value of the impaired vehicles assumed in the impairment testing would have decreased the fair value estimate by about $50 million. A one percentage point increase in the return rate of the impaired vehicles assumed in the impairment testing would have decreased the fair value estimate by about $30 million. A one percentage point increase in the discount rate assumed in the impairment testing would have decreased the fair value estimate by about $100 million.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
A higher provision for credit losses (about $1.2 billion); and
Higher depreciation expense for leased vehicles (about $700 million).
Other factors to explain the decrease in pre-tax earnings included:
Higher net losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives (about $200 million); and
The non-recurrence of the gain related to the sale of a majority of our interest in AB Volvofinans (about $100 million);
These factors were offset partially by:
The non-recurrence of costs associated with our North American business transformation initiative (about $200 million);
Lower expenses primarily reflecting improved operating costs (about $300 million); and
A gain related to the sale of approximately half of our ownership interest in our Nordic operations (about $100 million).
In 2008 and 2007, pre-tax earnings included net losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives (unallocated risk management in the table below) of $317 million and $108 million, respectively.
Full Year
2008
Over/(Under)
2008 2007 2007
(in millions)
Income/(Loss) before income taxes
North America Segment $ (2,749 ) $ 701 $ (3,450 )
International Segment 507 622 (115 )
Unallocated risk management (317 ) (108 ) (209 )
Income/(Loss) before income taxes (2,559 ) 1,215 (3,774 )
Provision for/(Benefit from) income taxes,
Minority interests in net income of
subsidiaries, and Gain on disposal of
discontinued operations (1,023 ) 440 (1,463 )
Net income/(loss) $ (1,536 ) $ 775 $ (2,311 )
The decrease in North America Segment pre-tax earnings primarily reflected the second quarter 2008 impairment charge for operating leases, a higher provision for credit losses, higher depreciation expense for leased vehicles, and lower contract volume. These factors were offset partially by higher financing margin, the non-recurrence of costs associated with our business transformation initiative, and lower expenses primarily reflecting improved operating costs. The decrease in International Segment pre-tax earnings primarily reflected lower volume and financing margin, a higher provision for credit losses, the non-recurrence of a gain related to the sale of a majority of our interest in AB Volvofinans, and higher reserves for residual based products, offset partially by gains related to the sale of our ownership interests in several operations, lower operating costs, and changes in currency exchange rates.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
Lower financing margin primarily related to higher borrowing costs (about $400 million);
Unfavorable lease residual performance reflected in higher depreciation expense for leased vehicles (about $400 million); and
Higher other costs primarily due to our North American business transformation initiative (about $100 million).
These factors were offset partially by:
Lower net losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives (about $300 million).
In 2007 and 2006, pre-tax earnings included net losses related to market valuation adjustments to derivatives (unallocated risk management in the table below) of $108 million and $448 million, respectively.
Full Year
2007
Over/(Under)
2007 2006 2006
(in millions)
Income before income taxes
North America Segment $ 701 $ 1,729 $ (1,028 )
International Segment 622 672 (50 )
Unallocated risk management (108 ) (448 ) 340
Income before income taxes 1,215 1,953 (738 )
Provision for income taxes, Minority interests
in net income of subsidiaries and Gain on
disposal of discontinued operations 440 670 (230 )
Net income $ 775 $ 1,283 $ (508 )
The decrease in North America Segment pre-tax earnings primarily reflected higher provision for credit losses primarily related to the non-recurrence of credit loss reserve reductions, unfavorable lease residual performance as reflected in higher depreciation expense for leased vehicles, lower financing margin primarily related to higher borrowing costs and the costs associated with our business transformation initiative. These factors were offset partially by lower expenses, primarily reflecting improved operating costs.
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations (Continued)
Placement Volume and Financing Share
Total worldwide financing contract placement volumes for new and used vehicles
are shown below:
Full Year
2008 2007 2006
(in thousands)
North America Segment
United States 1,043 1,256 1,574
Canada 149 186 189
Total North America Segment 1,192 1,442 1,763
International Segment
Europe 629 696 711
Other international 129 207 233
Total International Segment 758 903 944
Total contract placement volume 1,950 2,345 2,707
Shown below are our financing shares of new Ford, Lincoln and Mercury brand vehicles sold by dealers in the United States and new Ford brand vehicles sold by dealers in Europe. Also shown below are our wholesale financing shares of new Ford, Lincoln and Mercury brand vehicles acquired by dealers in the United States, excluding fleet, and of new Ford brand vehicles acquired by dealers in Europe:
Full Year
2008 2007 2006
United States
Financing share - Ford, Lincoln and Mercury
Retail installment and lease 39 % 38 % 44 %
Wholesale 77 78 80
Europe
Financing share - Ford
Retail installment and lease 28 % 26 % 27 %
Wholesale 98 96 95
North America Segment
Table of Contents
Item 7. Management's Discussion and Analysis of Financial Condition and Results
of Operations (Continued)
Financial Condition
Finance Receivables and Operating Leases
Our receivable levels are shown below:
. . .
Feb 26, 2009
(c) 1995-2009 Cybernet Data Systems, Inc. All Rights Reserved
impressionante questa voce
A higher provision for credit losses (about $1.2 billion)
paologorgo
Chapter 11
Chinese firm interested in Volvo
Ben Marlow
div#related-article-links p a, div#related-article-links p a:visited { color:#06c; } THE Chinese firm that part-owns the manufacturer of London’s black cabs is preparing a bid for troubled Swedish carmaker Volvo.
Geely Automotive, a Chinese car manufacturer, has appointed NM Rothschild to advise on a possible bid for loss-making Volvo, which has been put up for sale by its ailing American parent Ford.
Geely owns 23% of Manganese Bronze, the maker of London’s famous black cabs, and 51% of a Shanghai-based joint venture with the British company. The news that Geely is serious about bidding for Volvo will come as a surprise after Geely’s chairman, Li Shufu, ruled out a move for the Swedish company last week. It is understood that Geely is looking for a private-equity firm to provide financial backing.
Bankers believe there is another party interested in buying Volvo. One rumour emanating from Sweden is that a former chief executive of the company is working on takeover plans. It could also be another Chinese firm.
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/transport/article5864471.ece
Ben Marlow
div#related-article-links p a, div#related-article-links p a:visited { color:#06c; } THE Chinese firm that part-owns the manufacturer of London’s black cabs is preparing a bid for troubled Swedish carmaker Volvo.
Geely Automotive, a Chinese car manufacturer, has appointed NM Rothschild to advise on a possible bid for loss-making Volvo, which has been put up for sale by its ailing American parent Ford.
Geely owns 23% of Manganese Bronze, the maker of London’s famous black cabs, and 51% of a Shanghai-based joint venture with the British company. The news that Geely is serious about bidding for Volvo will come as a surprise after Geely’s chairman, Li Shufu, ruled out a move for the Swedish company last week. It is understood that Geely is looking for a private-equity firm to provide financial backing.
Bankers believe there is another party interested in buying Volvo. One rumour emanating from Sweden is that a former chief executive of the company is working on takeover plans. It could also be another Chinese firm.
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/transport/article5864471.ece
c0ltran3
Forumer attivo
Canadian Auto Union Reaches Deal With G.M.
By IAN AUSTEN
Published: March 8, 2009
OTTAWA — The Canadian Auto Workers union agreed to a series of contract concessions with General Motors of Canada on Sunday. But the deal avoided reductions to base salaries or pension benefits.
The agreement, which will be voted on by union members later this week, followed three days of talks. Ken Lewenza, the union’s president, told a mid-day news conference that the cost savings from the plan were still being calculated.
“At 5:30 this morning, General Motors had stated to us that we have maintained our Canadian advantage for investment in Canada,” Mr. Lewenza said. “That’s all that’s important to us.”
G.M’s Canadian unit, which is based east of Toronto in Oshawa, Ontario, had no immediate comment.
The Conservative government of Canada said that it would only provide financial aid to G.M and Chrysler Canada if the union agreed to match the labor costs at plants operated by Toyota and Honda in Canada. As is the case in the United States, there has been considerable debate about the differences in labor costs between the Japanese- and American-owned companies.
The savings at G.M. Canada, whatever the amount, will come from several sources. Increases to pension payments and wage rates to cover inflation have been suspended until June 2012, and an additional annual payment of 1,700 Canadian dollars will be eliminated. Workers will also receive one less week of paid vacation a year
The most significant changes appear to involve health care. The bulk of the health care costs of Canadian workers are covered by government programs. But General Motors, like many employers, covers expenses that are outside of the state health care system, including dental, eyeglasses and prescription drugs for workers under the age of 65.
Under the proposed agreement, workers will contribute 30 Canadian dollars ($23.30) a month toward the benefits. Retirees over 65 will pay half that amount.
While it is not part of the agreement, the recent decline of the Canadian dollar appeared to be a factor that allowed the union to avoid wage cuts. Over the last year, the Canadian dollar has fallen from about parity to a roughly 25 percent discount relative to the United States dollar.
During the news conference, Jim Stanford, the union’s chief economist, acknowledged that if the Canadian currency returned to par, labor costs at Canadian plants would exceed those in the United States. However, he also dismissed the possibility of Canadian dollar strengthening to that extent between now and September 2012, when the proposed agreement would expire.
If approved by the 10,000 unionized G.M. workers in Canada, the new contract will extend an agreement reached about a year ago for another 12 months. The union claimed that the earlier contract collectively reduced Canadian labor costs at G.M., Ford and Chrysler by about 900 million Canadian dollars.
Mr. Lewenza urged the governments of Canada and Ontario to swiftly provide aid to General Motors once the contract is approved. “We believe we can get the rumors of bankruptcy off the table once and for all,” he said.
Officials at both levels of government were not available for comment..
Mr. Lewenza said last week that the union would also negotiate new agreements with the Canadian units of Chrysler and Ford. As is the case in the United States, Ford is not looking for government assistance in Canada.
By IAN AUSTEN
Published: March 8, 2009
OTTAWA — The Canadian Auto Workers union agreed to a series of contract concessions with General Motors of Canada on Sunday. But the deal avoided reductions to base salaries or pension benefits.
The agreement, which will be voted on by union members later this week, followed three days of talks. Ken Lewenza, the union’s president, told a mid-day news conference that the cost savings from the plan were still being calculated.
“At 5:30 this morning, General Motors had stated to us that we have maintained our Canadian advantage for investment in Canada,” Mr. Lewenza said. “That’s all that’s important to us.”
G.M’s Canadian unit, which is based east of Toronto in Oshawa, Ontario, had no immediate comment.
The Conservative government of Canada said that it would only provide financial aid to G.M and Chrysler Canada if the union agreed to match the labor costs at plants operated by Toyota and Honda in Canada. As is the case in the United States, there has been considerable debate about the differences in labor costs between the Japanese- and American-owned companies.
The savings at G.M. Canada, whatever the amount, will come from several sources. Increases to pension payments and wage rates to cover inflation have been suspended until June 2012, and an additional annual payment of 1,700 Canadian dollars will be eliminated. Workers will also receive one less week of paid vacation a year
The most significant changes appear to involve health care. The bulk of the health care costs of Canadian workers are covered by government programs. But General Motors, like many employers, covers expenses that are outside of the state health care system, including dental, eyeglasses and prescription drugs for workers under the age of 65.
Under the proposed agreement, workers will contribute 30 Canadian dollars ($23.30) a month toward the benefits. Retirees over 65 will pay half that amount.
While it is not part of the agreement, the recent decline of the Canadian dollar appeared to be a factor that allowed the union to avoid wage cuts. Over the last year, the Canadian dollar has fallen from about parity to a roughly 25 percent discount relative to the United States dollar.
During the news conference, Jim Stanford, the union’s chief economist, acknowledged that if the Canadian currency returned to par, labor costs at Canadian plants would exceed those in the United States. However, he also dismissed the possibility of Canadian dollar strengthening to that extent between now and September 2012, when the proposed agreement would expire.
If approved by the 10,000 unionized G.M. workers in Canada, the new contract will extend an agreement reached about a year ago for another 12 months. The union claimed that the earlier contract collectively reduced Canadian labor costs at G.M., Ford and Chrysler by about 900 million Canadian dollars.
Mr. Lewenza urged the governments of Canada and Ontario to swiftly provide aid to General Motors once the contract is approved. “We believe we can get the rumors of bankruptcy off the table once and for all,” he said.
Officials at both levels of government were not available for comment..
Mr. Lewenza said last week that the union would also negotiate new agreements with the Canadian units of Chrysler and Ford. As is the case in the United States, Ford is not looking for government assistance in Canada.
Yunus80
Del PIG non si butta nulla
dipende anche dal tuo concetto di pompatina...
il bello dei grafici è che stimolano riflessioni diverse. Io guardavo alla "distruzione" di valore GM (assets da 450,000 a meno di 100,000) ed al tentativo disperato di recuperare market share con la recente promozione dipendente (ma poi ricrolla subito...)
Di Ford è interessante il crollo degli assets negli ultimi Q, ma ci muoviamo in un range "umano", da 285,000 a 245,000...
Stavo osservando che mentre per GM la forbice asset-liabilities si allarga sempre più, per Ford i due grafici sono andati di pari passo. Hanno per caso venduto alcuni asset ripianando col ricavato parte del debito?
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