Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 2 (3 lettori)

[carib]

Secondo un mio modesto parere, qui si sta enfatizzando un problema no/problema almeno per il momento.......
se consideriamo le esigue somme detenute dal retail, questi pezzi di m@rda non avranno interesse a gettare sul lastrico migliaia di risparmiatori privati (in primis quelli Greci) che già soffrono misure di austerità da diverso tempo.
Perciò, prima di fasciarci la testa, aspettiamo.........
Sarà che ci sono dentro fino al collo a pmc altissimi ma secondo me ci sarebbero ampi spazi per noi altri.

chi ti ha detto che il "retail", globalmente, detiene "esigue somme"?
io in realtà non ho idea dell'entità del credito detenuto globalmente dal "retail".

Russiabond.. é "retail"?
credo di si.. anche se ha oltre un milione in portafoglio..

 

[discipline]

In un certo senso questo è il copione di tutta la vicenda, speriamo che le valutazioni fatte sui retail a suo tempo dall'autore vengano ancora tenute in considerazione.. non a caso il retail non è ancora stato esplicitamente nominato.. suggerirei di leggere con attenzione..

Information about the holders of Greek bonds is anecdotal.
From press reports, however, it appears that French and German banks have the heaviest exposures,1 but mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds and other categories of investors also own Greek bonds. Significantly, the extent of retail (non-institutional) ownership appears to be small.

The fact that so few Greek bonds seem to have fallen into the hands of retail (non-institutional) investors may also be a blessing. Those countries (for example, Argentina (2001-05)), that have had to deal with thousands of retail bondholders in a debt restructuring have found this a messy and thankless task.

An interesting question will be whether some way can be found to exclude from the restructuring the bonds in retail hands, or at least to moderate the terms of any restructuring of those bonds. This will depend on two things. First, the total amount of bonds in the hands of natural persons would have to be relatively small. Institutional holders may recognize the public relations benefit of not having widows and orphans complaining on the evening news, but only up to a point. If the exclusion of retail holders appreciably increases the severity of the financial sacrifice that must be borne by institutional creditors, these sympathies will quickly fade. Second, some mechanism must be found that will permit the government to identify which bonds are in retail hands when the restructuring is announced.
Otherwise, bonds will tend to migrate temporarily into the hands of individuals until the restructuring storm passes over.

The terms of the new instrument or instruments that would be offered in such an exchange will be a function of the nature and extent of the debt relief the transaction is designed to achieve. At the soft end of the spectrum would be a simple “reprofiling” of existing bonds (or some discrete portion of them such as bonds maturing over the next three to five years) involving a deferral of the maturity date of each affected bond. Uruguay (2003) stretched out the maturity date of each of its bonds by five years, while leaving the coupons untouched.

At the sharper end of the spectrum would be a transaction designed to achieve a significant net present value (“NPV”) reduction in the stock of debt. If Brady Bonds were chosen as the model for the transaction, this might entail allowing holders to elect to exchange their existing credits for either a Par Bond (a new bond exchanged at par for existing instruments, having a long maturity and a low coupon), or a Discount Bond (a new bond exchanged for existing instruments at a discount from the face amount of those instruments, but typically carrying a higher coupon and perhaps a shorter maturity than the Par Bond). The precise financial terms of the Par Bond and the Discount Bond would be calibrated to achieve an equivalent NPV reduction.

CACs. Some version of a collective action clause appears in most of Greece’s foreign law-governed bonds. There is no reason not to use these clauses to minimize the number of non-participating creditors.

One legislative measure that might be perceived as balanced and proportional in these circumstances, however, would be to enact what amounts to a statutory collective action clause. It could operate in this way: local law would be changed to say that if the overall exchange offer is supported by a supermajority of affected debtholders (say, 75%, to use the conventional CAC threshold), then the terms of any untendered local law bonds would automatically be amended so that their payment terms (maturity profile and interest rate) match those of one of the new instruments being
issued in the exchange.

Assuming some version of a Mopping-Up Law could survive any legal challenge, however, it could have significant tactical implications for a Greek debt restructuring. More than 90% of Greek bonds are governed by local law. If, to use our example, holders of 75% of all eligible bonds (local law and foreign law) were to support a restructuring, our version of a Mopping-Up Law should operate to ensure that more than 90% of the debt stock will be covered by the restructuring. The Mopping-Up Law would not affect holders of foreign law bonds. Participation by those holders would
need to be encouraged by moral suasion and the use of contractual collective action clauses in the relevant bonds.

How Long Would a Restructuring Take?
Our guess? If done efficiently, five to six months, less if necessary.
One month or so would be needed for preparation; one to two months for creditor consultations; one month during which the exchange offer would be in the market and road shows would take place; another four to six weeks to convene bondholder meetings for those bonds containing CACs, and two to four weeks to prepare for a closing.
If done efficiently.

 

[giofio]

[Reuters] Euro zone ministers send Greek PSI offer back for lower coupon-sources
BRUSSELS, Jan 23 (Reuters) - Euro zone finance
ministers sent back for further negotiations a debt
restructuring offer from private Greek bondholders to achieve a
lower average coupon on new Greek bonds as well as other aspects
of the proposal, euro zone officials said.
"The ministers have sent the offer back for negotiations,"
one euro zone official with knowledge of the talks said on
Monday as euro zone ministers were meeting in Brussels.
The offer, which had been negotiated between the Greek
government and private investors grouped in the Institute of
International Finance (IIF) last week, assumed an average coupon
on the new Greek bonds of four percent.
The new bonds, likely to have maturity of 30 years, would
replace existing Greek debt.
"The ministers want a lower coupon than presented in the
offer," the official said.
A second official involved in the ministerial talks
confirmed the proposal from the IIF had been sent back for
reconsideration of the coupon.
Apart from the coupon, euro zone finance ministers also
asked the negotiators to look at other aspects of the deal,
including the size of the losses for private investors.
The first official also said that there were no talks to
increase the 130 billion euros of official financing for Greece
under a second bailout package agreed in October.
The official said the target was still to achieve Greek debt
sustainability in 2020 with a debt-to-GDP ratio of 120 percent,
but that the figure was no longer very precise, and could be
slightly higher.

(Reporting By Jan Strupczewski; editing by Rex Merrifield)
(([email protected])(+32 2 287 68 37)(Reuters
Messaging: [email protected]))

Keywords: EUROZONE GREECE/PSI URGENT)

 

[carib]

In un certo senso questo è il copione di tutta la vicenda, speriamo che le valutazioni fatte sui retail a suo tempo dall'autore vengano ancora tenute in considerazione.. non a caso il retail non è ancora stato esplicitamente nominato.. suggerirei di leggere con attenzione..

Information about the holders of Greek bonds is anecdotal.
From press reports, however, it appears that French and German banks have the heaviest exposures,1 but mutual funds, pension funds, hedge funds and other categories of investors also own Greek bonds. Significantly, the extent of retail (non-institutional) ownership appears to be small.

The fact that so few Greek bonds seem to have fallen into the hands of retail (non-institutional) investors may also be a blessing. Those countries (for example, Argentina (2001-05)), that have had to deal with thousands of retail bondholders in a debt restructuring have found this a messy and thankless task.

An interesting question will be whether some way can be found to exclude from the restructuring the bonds in retail hands, or at least to moderate the terms of any restructuring of those bonds. This will depend on two things. First, the total amount of bonds in the hands of natural persons would have to be relatively small. Institutional holders may recognize the public relations benefit of not having widows and orphans complaining on the evening news, but only up to a point. If the exclusion of retail holders appreciably increases the severity of the financial sacrifice that must be borne by institutional creditors, these sympathies will quickly fade. Second, some mechanism must be found that will permit the government to identify which bonds are in retail hands when the restructuring is announced.
Otherwise, bonds will tend to migrate temporarily into the hands of individuals until the restructuring storm passes over.

The terms of the new instrument or instruments that would be offered in such an exchange will be a function of the nature and extent of the debt relief the transaction is designed to achieve. At the soft end of the spectrum would be a simple “reprofiling” of existing bonds (or some discrete portion of them such as bonds maturing over the next three to five years) involving a deferral of the maturity date of each affected bond. Uruguay (2003) stretched out the maturity date of each of its bonds by five years, while leaving the coupons untouched.

At the sharper end of the spectrum would be a transaction designed to achieve a significant net present value (“NPV”) reduction in the stock of debt. If Brady Bonds were chosen as the model for the transaction, this might entail allowing holders to elect to exchange their existing credits for either a Par Bond (a new bond exchanged at par for existing instruments, having a long maturity and a low coupon), or a Discount Bond (a new bond exchanged for existing instruments at a discount from the face amount of those instruments, but typically carrying a higher coupon and perhaps a shorter maturity than the Par Bond). The precise financial terms of the Par Bond and the Discount Bond would be calibrated to achieve an equivalent NPV reduction.

CACs. Some version of a collective action clause appears in most of Greece’s foreign law-governed bonds. There is no reason not to use these clauses to minimize the number of non-participating creditors.

One legislative measure that might be perceived as balanced and proportional in these circumstances, however, would be to enact what amounts to a statutory collective action clause. It could operate in this way: local law would be changed to say that if the overall exchange offer is supported by a supermajority of affected debtholders (say, 75%, to use the conventional CAC threshold), then the terms of any untendered local law bonds would automatically be amended so that their payment terms (maturity profile and interest rate) match those of one of the new instruments being
issued in the exchange.

Assuming some version of a Mopping-Up Law could survive any legal challenge, however, it could have significant tactical implications for a Greek debt restructuring. More than 90% of Greek bonds are governed by local law. If, to use our example, holders of 75% of all eligible bonds (local law and foreign law) were to support a restructuring, our version of a Mopping-Up Law should operate to ensure that more than 90% of the debt stock will be covered by the restructuring. The Mopping-Up Law would not affect holders of foreign law bonds. Participation by those holders would
need to be encouraged by moral suasion and the use of contractual collective action clauses in the relevant bonds.

How Long Would a Restructuring Take?
Our guess? If done efficiently, five to six months, less if necessary.
One month or so would be needed for preparation; one to two months for creditor consultations; one month during which the exchange offer would be in the market and road shows would take place; another four to six weeks to convene bondholder meetings for those bonds containing CACs, and two to four weeks to prepare for a closing.
If done efficiently.

Non so se l'autore del testo vive sulla luna o su marte.. o se é un anal-ista.

Quello che scrive sul caso Argentino é una bestemmia: l'argentina e ne fotte ampliamente dei creditori (sia corporate che retail) e delle sentenze dei tribunali nazionali e internazionali, inclusi quelli di cui riconosce la giurisdizione.

Dire che servono sei mesi per ristrutturare.. ignora che hanno sei settimane.

Passate quelle.. sono in default.. e se la possono prendere tranquilla: sei mesi o tre anni.. fa poca differenza.

Dire poi che "gli istituzionali" sono sensibili all'immagine, per definizione.. é una corbelleria: gli hedge funds sono "istituzionali".. e investono per fare utili, non per difendere l'immagine.

 

[discipline]

Non so se l'autore del testo vive sulla luna o su marte.. o se é un anal-ista.

A difesa dell'autore va detto che il testo citato fu originariamente scritto nel 2010, una sorta di libro bianco sulla questione della insostenibilità del debito greco e dei relativi scenari. Il problema che ci tocca assai da vicino è che di lì a poco ricevette l'incarico di consulente legale del governo greco (http://www.law.com/jsp/tal/PubArticleTAL.jsp?id=1202509608703&slreturn=1). Si tratta del sig. Lee Buchheit, esperto in ristrutturazione di debiti a livello internazionale. Il suo pensiero in breve: "Buchheit and Gulati's proposal for solving the crisis is centered on the idea that Greece needs to ensure voluntary bondholder participation in the country's restructuring by stressing to the bondholders that more than 90 percent of the country's foreign debt is governed by Greek law."

Questo invece il testo originale completo, integrato della prefazione scritta nell'aprile 2011:
http://faculty.london.edu/mjacobides/assets/documents/Greek_Debt_-_The_Endgame_Scenarios.pdf

 

[porchetto]

io faccio metà.. circa 55% in immobili affittati e 45% cash con un 10 % totale su az.ad alto rend.strategia quasi perfetta! ciao a tutti voi

ciao stefano io non ho neanche un ggb
seguo il 3d perchè ammiratore del grande sig Russia

poi tu sarai andato alla grande ora con la ripresa dei btp

 

[baleng]

Stiamo tutti trepidando per i nostri ... 4 soldi ... ma in effetti il problema è intanto divenuto biblico. Anche se pagassero e non defaultassero ora, e nemmeno tra un bel po', resta il fatto che il modello dell'euro alla prova dei fatti è fallito, ahimè. La realtà ha dimostrato che economie molto diverse e con differenti amministrazioni politico-finanziarie in un mercato aperto hanno enormi difficoltà a sopravvivere insieme, in mancanza di strumenti compensatori (come iniezioni di moneta o vere e proprie donazioni).
A questo punto ogni intervento previsto è palliativo e basta, come dimostrano le previsioni sul destino greco: esse dicono che in mancanza di una vera e propria fusione politico-finanziaria, con strumenti di solidarietà ed anche di autorità - tipo commissariamento - la Grecia può solo trascinarsi verso i prossimi fallimenti. Ma, ciò che è peggio, con lo stesso meccanismo anche quasi tutti gli altri paesi, chi prima chi poi, vivranno lo stesso destino.
Queste sono ore decisive, ma pare che non se ne rendano conto. Forse neanche nei forum la cosa è chiara. Altro che un PSI serve, occorrerebbe una spinta possente verso una rifondazione totale, con grandi impegni precisi a breve termine per tutti.
Poiché vedo la cosa impossibile, aspetterò qualche settimana, ma sin d'ora inizio a provvedere: smobilizzare tutto dall'euro, acquistare ETF in Asia ecc., immobili, persino oro ecc., obbligazioni svedesi e simili, insomma il 2012 dei Maya.
Un rimborso della marzo sarà solo l'ultima dose di cocaina per il depresso prima del suo suicidio, se non avviene il resto che ho detto. Nel migliore dei casi si resisterà sino a settembre, poi nera. E la Merkel sarà lo Schettino di tutti.
NB se qualcuno intende salvarsi con le obbligazioni di paesi dittatoriali, quali il Venezuela o la Cina, vorrà dire che ha scelto i treni in orario del fascismo piuttosto che la democrazia, i risparmi della schiavitù ai costi della solidarietà. AMMP.

 

[tommy271]

Buonasera Tommy, Karl, Baro, Firmaoro, Russia Imark e tutti gli utenti!
Sono sempre 'dentro' con il mio 80% circa (Marzo e Maggio 2012 + Agosto 2014) e sono (resto dato che tra alti e bassi lo sono sempre stato) fiducioso per il rimborso a 100 per noi retail. Non credo che l'Europa possa permettersi un default nella zona Euro senza far crollare tutto. Non mi aspetto che lo dichiarino ufficialmente (chi comprerebbe più Bund?) ma non è una questione di finanza e di bilanci ma soprattutto (quasi totalmente) politica.

Ciao Asterix, tempi duri ... specialmente se si è sovraesposti con il portafoglio.

 

[tommy271]

mesi fa.. e hai ragione a chiedere di verificare:
in effetti il grace period sul capitale sembra essere di 7 giorni,
e di 30 sugli interessi.

ergo 27 marzo, salvo smentita..

Events of Default: If any of the following events (“Events of Default”) occurs:

(a) the Republic defaults in any payment of interest in respect of any of the Bonds and
such default is not cured by payment thereof within 30 days from the due date for
such payment; or
(b) the Republic defaults in the payment of principal in respect of any of the Bonds
when due at maturity or otherwise and such default is not cured by payment thereof
within seven days from the due date for such payment;

Grazie Carib, sempre preciso.
La calendarizzazione è strettissima, probabilmente l'accordo resterà "volontario" per il retail perchè non c'è tempo sufficiente.
In quei sette giorni di "periodo di grazia" per il rimborso del capitale ci sarà il caos.
Vediamo se dopo la conclusione dello swap metteranno le CAC.
Intanto la prossima tappa sarà vedere il livello di adesioni...

 

[tommy271]

Secondo un mio modesto parere, qui si sta enfatizzando un problema no/problema almeno per il momento.......
se consideriamo le esigue somme detenute dal retail, questi pezzi di m@rda non avranno interesse a gettare sul lastrico migliaia di risparmiatori privati (in primis quelli Greci) che già soffrono misure di austerità da diverso tempo.
Perciò, prima di fasciarci la testa, aspettiamo.........
Sarà che ci sono dentro fino al collo a pmc altissimi ma secondo me ci sarebbero ampi spazi per noi altri.

Saranno esigue le quote del retail (lo sono sempre state) ma sono cresciute quelle in mano agli Hedge che lavorano su due tavoli paralleli: istituzionale e privato.
Nelle trattative ci sono e minacciano azioni legali, al contempo giocano la carta dell'holdout come noi del "parco buoi".