vais
Forumer storico
- Grecia: lunedì 5 marzo metterò nel sito indicazioni sui titoli della Grecia. dal sito www.beppescienza.it
Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 2
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
ferdo
Utente Senior
mi riferivo al retail greco
discipline
Guest
The government’s tender offer has got off to a slow start, with its advisers trying to round up non-institutional bondholders and even Greek investors showing reluctance to sign up quickly, according to insiders.
...
Several investors said they expected that collective action clauses would need to be used, triggering credit default swaps. But some people close to the deal admitted other outcomes were possible: “We are confident. But ultimately this is all fingers in the wind type stuff.”
Many investors need to decide by Tuesday because of the complications of the deal. Because of the size of their holdings, a large number of bondholders will have to consult their boards, especially as the loss is about 75 per cent in net present value terms.
“We are entering the unknown. Everyone has their fingers crossed. But we are going to be flying blind for a few days,” an insider said.
Greek bond swap deal rests on knife-edge - FT.com
...
Several investors said they expected that collective action clauses would need to be used, triggering credit default swaps. But some people close to the deal admitted other outcomes were possible: “We are confident. But ultimately this is all fingers in the wind type stuff.”
Many investors need to decide by Tuesday because of the complications of the deal. Because of the size of their holdings, a large number of bondholders will have to consult their boards, especially as the loss is about 75 per cent in net present value terms.
“We are entering the unknown. Everyone has their fingers crossed. But we are going to be flying blind for a few days,” an insider said.
Greek bond swap deal rests on knife-edge - FT.com
gurt155
Nuovo forumer
Una considerazione, se ho ben letto e capito pare che in tutto gli investitori retail abbiano circa 16 miliardi di nominale di ggb .
Non credo che siano tutti comprati in europa, mettiamo l'80% in europa.
Ci sarà poi chi ne ha per 5/10.000 euro a capoccia e chi anche per 500.000/1.000.000 a testa , mettiamo una media di 50.000 euri a persona su un tot. di circa 13 miliardi di ggb(80% di europei).
Si giunge più o meno a 260.000 retailer coinvolti di cui almeno il 20% sarà in germania (più di 50.000). In Germania devono votare, sarebbe un 0,1% di voti persi per la Merkel che coinvolgendo nel passaparola amici e parenti può diventare il 0,2%
So che sono calcoli campati in aria, ma dimostra comunque che i tedeschi arrabbiati non sono tanti percentualmente su 50.000.000 (credo) di voti , e quindi a livello politico e mediatico poco incide.
Questa era l'unica tenue speranza,quindi un pò misera, e poi diranno che per la maggior parte siamo solo dei furbetti speculatori e che dovevamo stare attenti, che rischiando si può perdere,che della grecia si sapeva che era messa male, ecc... ma la sostanza non cambia, la truffa perchè di tale si tratta non cambia connotati. Credo CAC sicure al 99%.
Diverse possono essere le implicazioni future sulla fiducia, ma a me pare che il mondo sia andato avanti anche dopo l'argentina,parmalat, lehman, etc cioè alla fine poco cambierà almeno per chi non si è ancora scottato e ancor più per i professionisti in guanti bianchi di questa grande bisca globale.
Non credo che siano tutti comprati in europa, mettiamo l'80% in europa.
Ci sarà poi chi ne ha per 5/10.000 euro a capoccia e chi anche per 500.000/1.000.000 a testa , mettiamo una media di 50.000 euri a persona su un tot. di circa 13 miliardi di ggb(80% di europei).
Si giunge più o meno a 260.000 retailer coinvolti di cui almeno il 20% sarà in germania (più di 50.000). In Germania devono votare, sarebbe un 0,1% di voti persi per la Merkel che coinvolgendo nel passaparola amici e parenti può diventare il 0,2%
So che sono calcoli campati in aria, ma dimostra comunque che i tedeschi arrabbiati non sono tanti percentualmente su 50.000.000 (credo) di voti , e quindi a livello politico e mediatico poco incide.
Questa era l'unica tenue speranza,quindi un pò misera, e poi diranno che per la maggior parte siamo solo dei furbetti speculatori e che dovevamo stare attenti, che rischiando si può perdere,che della grecia si sapeva che era messa male, ecc... ma la sostanza non cambia, la truffa perchè di tale si tratta non cambia connotati. Credo CAC sicure al 99%.
Diverse possono essere le implicazioni future sulla fiducia, ma a me pare che il mondo sia andato avanti anche dopo l'argentina,parmalat, lehman, etc cioè alla fine poco cambierà almeno per chi non si è ancora scottato e ancor più per i professionisti in guanti bianchi di questa grande bisca globale.
discipline
Guest
In Grecia è già domani.. articolo da prendere cmq con le molle..
The Greek government implements a plan B ... The PSI + will not be achieved voluntarily, but will reach the 66.66% and will be mobilized CACs for GR bonds of 177.4 billion - On Friday, March 9, Greece on credit event, will be paid the CDS ...
?? ???????? ??????? ????????? ?? plan B??o PSI+ ??? ?? ??????? ??????????, ???? ?? ?????????? ?? 66,66% ??? ?? ?????????????? ?? CACs ??? ?? GR ??????? ????? 177,4 ??? - ??? ????????? 9 ??????? ? ?????? ?? credit event, ?? ????????? ?? CDS...
The Greek government implements a plan B ... The PSI + will not be achieved voluntarily, but will reach the 66.66% and will be mobilized CACs for GR bonds of 177.4 billion - On Friday, March 9, Greece on credit event, will be paid the CDS ...
EXCLUSIVE .... On Friday, March 9, Greece will be found under a credit event will be certified credit event in Greece and the CDS will be paid (cds triggers) provided by Greece on March 7 at 4 Central Europe did not decide to extend the process of PSI +.
Based on reliable Greek government source which came in contact BankingNews.gr | Online ????????? ????????? seems to have taken final decisions on the fate of Greece and PSI + participation of individuals in the Greek debt rescheduling. The same source, however, refused to comment on information already present BankingNews.gr | Online ????????? ????????? namely that participation will move between 68% and 72% indicating that there can not be estimated. (Note that new limit is 75% participation)
The ideal scenario would be participation in the PSI + to reach 90% and the process to succeed, but that does not seem possible.
Information transmitted from a very reliable source and the final draft is based and the data and processes that were over the weekend.
The Greek government in the process of focusing PSI + 177.4 billion in Greek bonds bearing ISIN GR and the ISIN XS and loans to the Greek government is a clearer picture of the evolution of participation.
Based on proprietary information the goal is to participate in the bonds ISIN GR be minimum 119 billion that is to catch the target of 67% in order to activate the CACs . noted that CACs will be activated only when participation in ISIN GR will exceed 66.66%.
From the plans elaborated by the Greek government has already shown that activated the plan B which contains the following 6 parameters Based on the process until March 7 at 4 Central Europe can the process be revoked.
The Greek state could revoke the whole process of PSI + until March 7.
On March 8 will complete the process of tender unless there is an extension and this will depend on participation.
Parameters
1) Participation in the PSI + will not be indicated and the process katapeftei.H rearrangement of the Greek debt can not be voluntary.
2) But participation in bonds ISIN GR exceeds 66.66% and by law no longer apply collective action clauses that would make the mandatory PSI + for those who did not participate. Please note that those who did not participate will suffer the same consequences as those who volunteered.
3) Participation in Greek ISIN XS bonds of 18 billion euros in loans to the Greek government of 7.9 billion would be appropriate. Eg XS bonds amounting to 18 billion goal is to assemble the 3/4 that at least 13.5 billion. Loans to the public is excluded the title of National Bank about 5.5 billion euros (the old swaps of Goldman Sachs) as it is derivative product and PSI + are not involved derivatives.
4) Individuals in Greece without exception they have purchased bonds primarily or secondarily, to participate in PSI +. This is final. But they will be compensated at a later stage by the Greek state.
5) By enabling collective action clauses CACs the Greek government will force the bondholders who did not participate in the process other than those exempted longer required to participate. The ECB, national central banks, The EIB also excluded from the CACs as the Japanese Samurai bond bonds governed by Japanese laws and local bring significant safeguards.
6) The ISDA Friday, March 9 will be required to certify credit event for Greece because of activation of CACs . The Greek CDS totaling 3.2 to 3.3 billion U.S. dollars will be paid or wholly or partially. Based on government source revealed that the project goal is through the CACs to participate universally hold Greek bonds to meet Hardliners countries as Germany, Holland and others. With the PSI + CACs will not go voluntarily but mandatory, but will proceed. If you still hope not achieved as a minimum target of 119 billion euros in participation bonds ISIN GR EUR 177.4 billion then the euro to as PSI + process will be canceled and the Greek state will necessarily proceed in a violent haircut 90% for all with large effects on the banking system in Europe, the national economy. It is a real tragedy. This is the plan C that do not wish to put the Greek state. Procedures With consultant Lazard and managers completing the Deutsche bank and HSBC trustees and the Wilmington Trust, began and completed the bid invitation on 8 March perspective, however, expansion of the PSI + redeployment of Greek debt with the involvement of individuals. Based on the process until March 7 at 4 Central Europe can the process be revoked. The Greek state could revoke the whole process of PSI + to March 7. On March 8 will complete the bid process unless there is an extension and this will depend on participation. Along directly to the Greek government granted 30 billion loan as a convention facility to fund part of fungible securities. On 12 March has define the settlement date of eligible securities. Between 27 and 29 March the meetings of holders - bondholders Greek non-euro bonds issued. On April 11 will be the settlement of foreign securities. In the new bonds will be issued nominal value to 70 billion will have different rates based on their liktotita. Between 2013 and 2015 the rate of 2% between 2016 and 2020 to 3% in 2021 to 3.65% in 2022 and then to 4.30%. Peter Leotsakos BankingNews.gr | Online ????????? ?????????
Based on reliable Greek government source which came in contact BankingNews.gr | Online ????????? ????????? seems to have taken final decisions on the fate of Greece and PSI + participation of individuals in the Greek debt rescheduling. The same source, however, refused to comment on information already present BankingNews.gr | Online ????????? ????????? namely that participation will move between 68% and 72% indicating that there can not be estimated. (Note that new limit is 75% participation)
The ideal scenario would be participation in the PSI + to reach 90% and the process to succeed, but that does not seem possible.
Information transmitted from a very reliable source and the final draft is based and the data and processes that were over the weekend.
The Greek government in the process of focusing PSI + 177.4 billion in Greek bonds bearing ISIN GR and the ISIN XS and loans to the Greek government is a clearer picture of the evolution of participation.
Based on proprietary information the goal is to participate in the bonds ISIN GR be minimum 119 billion that is to catch the target of 67% in order to activate the CACs . noted that CACs will be activated only when participation in ISIN GR will exceed 66.66%.
From the plans elaborated by the Greek government has already shown that activated the plan B which contains the following 6 parameters Based on the process until March 7 at 4 Central Europe can the process be revoked.
The Greek state could revoke the whole process of PSI + until March 7.
On March 8 will complete the process of tender unless there is an extension and this will depend on participation.
Parameters
1) Participation in the PSI + will not be indicated and the process katapeftei.H rearrangement of the Greek debt can not be voluntary.
2) But participation in bonds ISIN GR exceeds 66.66% and by law no longer apply collective action clauses that would make the mandatory PSI + for those who did not participate. Please note that those who did not participate will suffer the same consequences as those who volunteered.
3) Participation in Greek ISIN XS bonds of 18 billion euros in loans to the Greek government of 7.9 billion would be appropriate. Eg XS bonds amounting to 18 billion goal is to assemble the 3/4 that at least 13.5 billion. Loans to the public is excluded the title of National Bank about 5.5 billion euros (the old swaps of Goldman Sachs) as it is derivative product and PSI + are not involved derivatives.
4) Individuals in Greece without exception they have purchased bonds primarily or secondarily, to participate in PSI +. This is final. But they will be compensated at a later stage by the Greek state.
5) By enabling collective action clauses CACs the Greek government will force the bondholders who did not participate in the process other than those exempted longer required to participate. The ECB, national central banks, The EIB also excluded from the CACs as the Japanese Samurai bond bonds governed by Japanese laws and local bring significant safeguards.
6) The ISDA Friday, March 9 will be required to certify credit event for Greece because of activation of CACs . The Greek CDS totaling 3.2 to 3.3 billion U.S. dollars will be paid or wholly or partially. Based on government source revealed that the project goal is through the CACs to participate universally hold Greek bonds to meet Hardliners countries as Germany, Holland and others. With the PSI + CACs will not go voluntarily but mandatory, but will proceed. If you still hope not achieved as a minimum target of 119 billion euros in participation bonds ISIN GR EUR 177.4 billion then the euro to as PSI + process will be canceled and the Greek state will necessarily proceed in a violent haircut 90% for all with large effects on the banking system in Europe, the national economy. It is a real tragedy. This is the plan C that do not wish to put the Greek state. Procedures With consultant Lazard and managers completing the Deutsche bank and HSBC trustees and the Wilmington Trust, began and completed the bid invitation on 8 March perspective, however, expansion of the PSI + redeployment of Greek debt with the involvement of individuals. Based on the process until March 7 at 4 Central Europe can the process be revoked. The Greek state could revoke the whole process of PSI + to March 7. On March 8 will complete the bid process unless there is an extension and this will depend on participation. Along directly to the Greek government granted 30 billion loan as a convention facility to fund part of fungible securities. On 12 March has define the settlement date of eligible securities. Between 27 and 29 March the meetings of holders - bondholders Greek non-euro bonds issued. On April 11 will be the settlement of foreign securities. In the new bonds will be issued nominal value to 70 billion will have different rates based on their liktotita. Between 2013 and 2015 the rate of 2% between 2016 and 2020 to 3% in 2021 to 3.65% in 2022 and then to 4.30%. Peter Leotsakos BankingNews.gr | Online ????????? ?????????
?? ???????? ??????? ????????? ?? plan B??o PSI+ ??? ?? ??????? ??????????, ???? ?? ?????????? ?? 66,66% ??? ?? ?????????????? ?? CACs ??? ?? GR ??????? ????? 177,4 ??? - ??? ????????? 9 ??????? ? ?????? ?? credit event, ?? ????????? ?? CDS...
discipline
Guest
Tecnicamente l'operazione ci sta tutta, il punto è che qui la situazione è ancora fluida, la sorpresa è dietro l'angolo e l'arbitraggio in questione non è proprio gratis.. la google-traduzione dell'articolo del giornale greco riporta voci di piani B, discussioni febbrili per rivedere i termini, raggiungimento del 67%, revoca del PSI.. sarà per il maggiore coinvolgimento e la maggiore percezione del problema, ma vi assicuro che sui forum greci non stanno a ragionare su quali operazioni sarebbero più vantaggiose ma su come istruire la pratica per fare causa a Grecia ed EU..
Ultima modifica di un moderatore:
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
sembrano discussioni premature. Una parte significativa della colpa sta nell'enorme ritardo e grande approssimazione con le quali hanno lanciato la proposta di SWAP. E' presto per dire se raggiungono o meno il 75%.. e continuo a dubitare raggiungano il 90%.
se stanno tra il 75% e il 90%, sulla base delle più recenti dichiarazioni (le precedenti sono state tutte smentite dai fatti successivi).. si riservano di decidere, sentita l'UE.
In tal caso, immagino potremmo andare al "grace period" (7 giorni) sulla marzolina..
L'11 dovrebbero pagare il coupon della IT.. ergo i fondi dovrebbero mandarli il 9. Lo faranno?
carib
rerum cognoscere causas
detto questo.. la grecia é solo un aspetto. Il problema.. resta la Germania:
(FT)
One of the more intriguing recent developments of the eurozone crisis is the shock expressed by Germany’s economic establishment that the eurozone is, in fact, a monetary union. No one had apparently told them.
The story behind this is long, but needs to be told. At issue is a rather technical debate about imbalances in the eurozone’s central payment system, known as Target 2. Germany has built up claims of now more than €500bn ($660bn) against the eurosystem – the network that consists of the European Central Bank and the various national central banks. The Bundesbank is getting nervous about a counterparty risk if the euro were to collapse suddenly.
The discovery of the importance of Target 2 was made by Hans-Werner Sinn, president of the Ifo economics institute in Germany, and his co-author Timo Wollmershäuser*. They found that the Target 2 balance mirrors current account imbalances since the outbreak of the crisis. There was no problem before 2007, when current account balances were funded by commercial banks. Once that stopped, national central banks took over this role. Spanish banks can now refinance themselves with no limit from the Bank of Spain. If a Spanish company buys a German product, for example, the chain of transactions goes from the buyer’s Spanish bank to the Spanish central bank, which effectively creates the money for this transaction, and then sends it on to the Bundesbank, which records this transaction as a claim against the eurosystem.
The Bundesbank initially dismissed the Target 2 balance as a matter of statistics. Their argument was: yes, it is recorded in the Bundesbank’s accounts, but the counterparty risk is divided among all members according to their share in the system. But last week, Jens Weidmann, president of the Bundesbank, acknowledged the Target 2 imbalances are indeed important, and an unacceptable risk. The Bundesbank has now joined the united front of German academic opinion.
So, the two “Target 2” professors deserve credit for explaining the detailed mechanisms of how a monetary union functions in the presence of a broken banking sector. And they are also right in pointing out that if the euro were to collapse suddenly, Germany could stand to lose a large proportion of its claims – some 20 per cent of gross domestic product.
However, it is hard to understand why everybody feigns surprise at the fact that current account imbalances can be financed indefinitely in a monetary union. Is this not one of the characteristics that distinguish it from a fixed-exchange rate system?
As long as banks have access to the central bank, and can provide good collateral, countries can run current account deficits for an infinite period. A friend of mine once remarked – when I asked about the significance of intra-eurozone current account imbalances – that the way to solve the problem sustainably was no longer to publish the figures. He was only half joking.
The presence of unlimited funding does not mean imbalances are irrelevant. On the contrary, they have highly negative economic effects, as the crisis shows. The point is that in a monetary union, imbalances do not adjust automatically. If you want them to adjust, you need to do it yourself.
One would assume that the best policies would be those that attack the root of the problem – the imbalances themselves. One of the deep causes behind this problem is, of course, Germany’s persistent current account surplus. The problem can thus easily be solved through policies to encourage Germany to raise its imports relative to its exports. You need policies that provide eurozone-wide backstops to the banking sector, and also policies to insure against asymmetric shocks. And you need to harmonise many aspects of structural policy to ensure imbalances do not become entrenched.
But there is no appetite for any of this in Germany. Instead, the Bundesbank prefers to solve the problem by addressing the funding side. Mr Weidmann proposed last week that Germany’s Target 2 claims should be securitised. Just think about this for a second. He demands contingent access to Greek and Spanish property and other assets to a value of €500bn in case the eurozone should collapse. He might as well have suggested sending in the Luftwaffe to solve the eurozone crisis. The proposal is unbelievably extreme.
It also tells us something else: by seeking insurance against a collapse of the euro, the Bundesbank tells us it no longer regards the demise of the euro as a zero-probability event. If the Bundesbank seeks insurance, so should everybody else.
The Target 2 debate is important because it goes to the root of the problem. But Germany’s economic establishment is disingenuous. What people are really saying is that they no longer want a monetary union. They want a looser single currency regime.
(FT)
One of the more intriguing recent developments of the eurozone crisis is the shock expressed by Germany’s economic establishment that the eurozone is, in fact, a monetary union. No one had apparently told them.
The story behind this is long, but needs to be told. At issue is a rather technical debate about imbalances in the eurozone’s central payment system, known as Target 2. Germany has built up claims of now more than €500bn ($660bn) against the eurosystem – the network that consists of the European Central Bank and the various national central banks. The Bundesbank is getting nervous about a counterparty risk if the euro were to collapse suddenly.
The discovery of the importance of Target 2 was made by Hans-Werner Sinn, president of the Ifo economics institute in Germany, and his co-author Timo Wollmershäuser*. They found that the Target 2 balance mirrors current account imbalances since the outbreak of the crisis. There was no problem before 2007, when current account balances were funded by commercial banks. Once that stopped, national central banks took over this role. Spanish banks can now refinance themselves with no limit from the Bank of Spain. If a Spanish company buys a German product, for example, the chain of transactions goes from the buyer’s Spanish bank to the Spanish central bank, which effectively creates the money for this transaction, and then sends it on to the Bundesbank, which records this transaction as a claim against the eurosystem.
The Bundesbank initially dismissed the Target 2 balance as a matter of statistics. Their argument was: yes, it is recorded in the Bundesbank’s accounts, but the counterparty risk is divided among all members according to their share in the system. But last week, Jens Weidmann, president of the Bundesbank, acknowledged the Target 2 imbalances are indeed important, and an unacceptable risk. The Bundesbank has now joined the united front of German academic opinion.
So, the two “Target 2” professors deserve credit for explaining the detailed mechanisms of how a monetary union functions in the presence of a broken banking sector. And they are also right in pointing out that if the euro were to collapse suddenly, Germany could stand to lose a large proportion of its claims – some 20 per cent of gross domestic product.
However, it is hard to understand why everybody feigns surprise at the fact that current account imbalances can be financed indefinitely in a monetary union. Is this not one of the characteristics that distinguish it from a fixed-exchange rate system?
As long as banks have access to the central bank, and can provide good collateral, countries can run current account deficits for an infinite period. A friend of mine once remarked – when I asked about the significance of intra-eurozone current account imbalances – that the way to solve the problem sustainably was no longer to publish the figures. He was only half joking.
The presence of unlimited funding does not mean imbalances are irrelevant. On the contrary, they have highly negative economic effects, as the crisis shows. The point is that in a monetary union, imbalances do not adjust automatically. If you want them to adjust, you need to do it yourself.
One would assume that the best policies would be those that attack the root of the problem – the imbalances themselves. One of the deep causes behind this problem is, of course, Germany’s persistent current account surplus. The problem can thus easily be solved through policies to encourage Germany to raise its imports relative to its exports. You need policies that provide eurozone-wide backstops to the banking sector, and also policies to insure against asymmetric shocks. And you need to harmonise many aspects of structural policy to ensure imbalances do not become entrenched.
But there is no appetite for any of this in Germany. Instead, the Bundesbank prefers to solve the problem by addressing the funding side. Mr Weidmann proposed last week that Germany’s Target 2 claims should be securitised. Just think about this for a second. He demands contingent access to Greek and Spanish property and other assets to a value of €500bn in case the eurozone should collapse. He might as well have suggested sending in the Luftwaffe to solve the eurozone crisis. The proposal is unbelievably extreme.
It also tells us something else: by seeking insurance against a collapse of the euro, the Bundesbank tells us it no longer regards the demise of the euro as a zero-probability event. If the Bundesbank seeks insurance, so should everybody else.
The Target 2 debate is important because it goes to the root of the problem. But Germany’s economic establishment is disingenuous. What people are really saying is that they no longer want a monetary union. They want a looser single currency regime.
mago gambamerlo
Xx Phuket xX
Cac
A me sembra che abbiano applicato il criterio del " Quando e' Guerra e' Guerra x Tutti " della serie "Dove Kojo , Kojo e guardo cosa riesco a racimolare...." ed il tutto gestito con una Nota di Panico e di Impreparazione Totale , classica del Politico a cui sta prendendo Fuoco il Giochino e i Vigili del Fuoco sono gia' scappati !
Onestamente mi sarei aspettato che la UE , a suo tempo , avesse cacciato i 300 mld et avesse chiuso l' argomento nella soluzione politica piu' semplice x tutti et invece eccoci qua' con sto' ABORTO di soluzione ,costata 5 volte e tipica della classe Politica che la tira per le lunghe per spengere l' incendio , senza rendersi cto che ormai la Casa e' bruciata .
Io sono uno di quei Bischeri Cassettisti che le Grecia le aveva da San Mai x cui i miei prezzi medi non ve li dico se no' passo male
Ho la 2013 e 2015 e se ho capito bene a questo punto la situazione e' che se non accetto lo Swap "Volontario" allora mi Caccano e ,nel caso punitivo , non mi pagano gl' interessi maturati , (sai chi se ne frega !!!). E nel caso non mi Caccano che succede ? Vado a vedere se mi ripagano il capitale nel 2013 e 2015 qual' ora Grecia non fallisca prima .... ? E massimo rischio di non prendere il 15% dell' ESFS , visto che il 31.5% newBond Greco 30Y dello Swap lo perderei comunque lo stesso a fronte ipotesi futuro default Grecia!
Che CACchio !Voglio andare a vedere !
Ma a parte Banche , Vi sara' Class Action nei confronti della Grecia ?
A me sembra che abbiano applicato il criterio del " Quando e' Guerra e' Guerra x Tutti " della serie "Dove Kojo , Kojo e guardo cosa riesco a racimolare...." ed il tutto gestito con una Nota di Panico e di Impreparazione Totale , classica del Politico a cui sta prendendo Fuoco il Giochino e i Vigili del Fuoco sono gia' scappati !
Onestamente mi sarei aspettato che la UE , a suo tempo , avesse cacciato i 300 mld et avesse chiuso l' argomento nella soluzione politica piu' semplice x tutti et invece eccoci qua' con sto' ABORTO di soluzione ,costata 5 volte e tipica della classe Politica che la tira per le lunghe per spengere l' incendio , senza rendersi cto che ormai la Casa e' bruciata .
Io sono uno di quei Bischeri Cassettisti che le Grecia le aveva da San Mai x cui i miei prezzi medi non ve li dico se no' passo male
Ho la 2013 e 2015 e se ho capito bene a questo punto la situazione e' che se non accetto lo Swap "Volontario" allora mi Caccano e ,nel caso punitivo , non mi pagano gl' interessi maturati , (sai chi se ne frega !!!). E nel caso non mi Caccano che succede ? Vado a vedere se mi ripagano il capitale nel 2013 e 2015 qual' ora Grecia non fallisca prima .... ? E massimo rischio di non prendere il 15% dell' ESFS , visto che il 31.5% newBond Greco 30Y dello Swap lo perderei comunque lo stesso a fronte ipotesi futuro default Grecia!
Che CACchio !Voglio andare a vedere !
Ma a parte Banche , Vi sara' Class Action nei confronti della Grecia ? scusate ma riflettevo sullo strumento CAC...
L'introduzione di un tale strumento serve a dirimere problematiche che non possono essere raggiunte all'unanimità ma che in qualche modo DEVONO essere prese per il bene collettivo. Il bene di tutti è maggiore del bene del singolo. Su questo io sono d'accordo. Quello su cui non sono d'accordo è la trasformazione dello strumento in un mezzo per dire che tutti quelli che non aderiscono subiranno un trattamento peggiore. NON è questo il significato delle CAC. Se io sono ignorante (nel senso che ignoro lo stato delle cose perchè non ho gli strumenti necessari per capire la situazione, come i retail rispetto alla politica e alle banche) non faccio una scelta consapevole nè aderendo nè non aderendo. La maggioranza sceglie per me ma NON può esserci un trattamento peggiore. Questo non è CAC, a meno che nell'offerta pubblica sia chiaramente scritto che chi NON aderirà subira un trattamento peggiore... voi che ne pensate?
chiccodj
Nuovo forumer
puo aver senso fare una raccomandata rr alla banca con la richiesta di avere info su questa proposta , oggi che nn avrà mai risposta , parlo di FINECO, dato che mail e sito fanno capire ben poco ? solo x avere un domani in mano un foglio che attesti che loro si sono mossi male ? oggi aspetto anche la telefonata del promotore ! vediamo !
- Stato
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