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Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 2
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
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frmaoro
il Fankazzista
Per un accordo definitivo per l'PSI + ... il danno cumulativo raggiunge il 65% -68%, la cedola media ponderata raggiungerà il 4,1% con il 4,2%, mentre la partecipazione può raggiungere il 60% al 65% - arriva la bancarotta temporanea
20/01/12 - 21:30
(Upd8) Vicino accordo sul PSI + sembra essere in Grecia e creditori, ma le trattative su alcune questioni individuali, con un'altezza di picco della cedola nei legami nuovo governo greco ha continuato. Probabilmente ci saranno annunci tardi questa sera. In corso è la nuova riunione del premier con Ch. L. Papademos. Dallara della IIF, alla presenza del ministro delle Finanze Ev. Venizelos, al Mansion Massimo.
Se in precedenza le perdite da fonti bancarie ha detto che la Grecia e creditori convergono in accordo con le nuove obbligazioni greche sono probabilmente 30 anni di durata e cedola media ponderata di muoversi tra il 4% e il 4,2% e il danno cumulativo debito greco a essere stimato tra il 65% e il 70%, dati recenti indicano che la FMI e diversi paesi europei, con i più importanti in Germania, riferito spingendo per cedola ancora più basso.
15% che era quello di dare liquidità dice di essere scambiati per . 2 anni di titoli che garantiranno l'EFSF
Altre informazioni si riferiscono a possibili pre - accordo che sarà annunciato oggi e la discussione di problemi tecnici nel fine settimana ...
I principali punti di accordo sembra essere:
. 1) La cedola dei nuovi titoli da emettere sarà compreso tra 4,1% e del 4,3% medio ponderato del 4,2%
La cedola dei nuovi titoli, ma sarà scaglionata inizia che p . x. . dal 3,4 al 3,3% per raggiungere il 4,5%
Il tasso di interesse medio ponderato raggiungerà il 4,2% o 4,1% probabilmente.
2) Con cedola tra il 4,2% e 4; 1% della perdita totale complessivo raggiungerà il debito greco tra il 65% al 66% o al massimo al 70%.
3) La chiave per l'attivazione di clausole di azione collettiva di clausole di azione collettiva sarà esclusivamente coinvolti. Ci sono rapporti fin dal primo momento che, con oltre il 70% non si eccita clausole di azione collettiva che avrebbe reso obbligatorio dalla partecipazione volontaria al taglio di capelli debito greco.
informazioni recenti indicano che la chiave sarà 2 / 3 dei partecipanti ovvero 66 %.
Tuttavia, sulla base di buon senso se la partecipazione raggiunge il 66% al 70% allora è molto probabile che per evitare l'attivazione di clausole di azione collettiva.
Ma se la frequenza è inferiore al 60% come 55%, poi le clausole di azione collettiva sarà attivato e si parla di bancarotta e la classificazione legale della Grecia.
Come ha ricordato l'agenzia di rating internazionale Fitch se clausole innescare la Grecia, poi sarà bancarotta.
Se avete semplicemente votare per rendere legge statale non causa di eventi di credito.
il 4 °) Le nuove obbligazioni porterà l'ombrello legale del diritto inglese. rapidamente avvicinando al fallimento e la classificazione legale della Grecia ... Il fallimento si avvicina. Ma siamo di classificazione e legali. Grecia ha temporaneamente trovato
66 % non mi sembra irragiungibile e dai un p'ò di ottimismo
20/01/12 - 21:30
(Upd8) Vicino accordo sul PSI + sembra essere in Grecia e creditori, ma le trattative su alcune questioni individuali, con un'altezza di picco della cedola nei legami nuovo governo greco ha continuato. Probabilmente ci saranno annunci tardi questa sera. In corso è la nuova riunione del premier con Ch. L. Papademos. Dallara della IIF, alla presenza del ministro delle Finanze Ev. Venizelos, al Mansion Massimo.
Se in precedenza le perdite da fonti bancarie ha detto che la Grecia e creditori convergono in accordo con le nuove obbligazioni greche sono probabilmente 30 anni di durata e cedola media ponderata di muoversi tra il 4% e il 4,2% e il danno cumulativo debito greco a essere stimato tra il 65% e il 70%, dati recenti indicano che la FMI e diversi paesi europei, con i più importanti in Germania, riferito spingendo per cedola ancora più basso.
15% che era quello di dare liquidità dice di essere scambiati per . 2 anni di titoli che garantiranno l'EFSF
Altre informazioni si riferiscono a possibili pre - accordo che sarà annunciato oggi e la discussione di problemi tecnici nel fine settimana ...
I principali punti di accordo sembra essere:
. 1) La cedola dei nuovi titoli da emettere sarà compreso tra 4,1% e del 4,3% medio ponderato del 4,2%
La cedola dei nuovi titoli, ma sarà scaglionata inizia che p . x. . dal 3,4 al 3,3% per raggiungere il 4,5%
Il tasso di interesse medio ponderato raggiungerà il 4,2% o 4,1% probabilmente.
2) Con cedola tra il 4,2% e 4; 1% della perdita totale complessivo raggiungerà il debito greco tra il 65% al 66% o al massimo al 70%.
3) La chiave per l'attivazione di clausole di azione collettiva di clausole di azione collettiva sarà esclusivamente coinvolti. Ci sono rapporti fin dal primo momento che, con oltre il 70% non si eccita clausole di azione collettiva che avrebbe reso obbligatorio dalla partecipazione volontaria al taglio di capelli debito greco.
informazioni recenti indicano che la chiave sarà 2 / 3 dei partecipanti ovvero 66 %.
Tuttavia, sulla base di buon senso se la partecipazione raggiunge il 66% al 70% allora è molto probabile che per evitare l'attivazione di clausole di azione collettiva.
Ma se la frequenza è inferiore al 60% come 55%, poi le clausole di azione collettiva sarà attivato e si parla di bancarotta e la classificazione legale della Grecia.
Come ha ricordato l'agenzia di rating internazionale Fitch se clausole innescare la Grecia, poi sarà bancarotta.
Se avete semplicemente votare per rendere legge statale non causa di eventi di credito.
il 4 °) Le nuove obbligazioni porterà l'ombrello legale del diritto inglese. rapidamente avvicinando al fallimento e la classificazione legale della Grecia ... Il fallimento si avvicina. Ma siamo di classificazione e legali. Grecia ha temporaneamente trovato
66 % non mi sembra irragiungibile e dai un p'ò di ottimismo
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discipline
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Why Greece has the upper hand
January 20, 2012 @ 8:09 pm
By Felix Salmon
Stephen Fidler [1] makes a good point today: the difference between a “voluntary” exchange and a “coercive” exchange, when Greece finally puts an offer to its creditors, is largely semantic. Or, to put it another way, the only real difference is that in a voluntary exchange, you have the IIF’s Charles Dallara saying nice things about the Greeks, while in a coercive exchange, you have the IIF’s Charles Dallara saying nasty things about the Greeks. But the fact is that precious few bondholders who are going to change their vote based on what Charles Dallara thinks.
Most of the bondholders are European banks, and as Fidler says, European banks are subject to “moral suasion” — having their arms twisted by their national governments — which is much more likely to affect their final decision than the official judgment of Dallara. Meanwhile, an increasing proportion of the bondholder base is made up of hedge funds, who certainly don’t care what Dallara thinks.
Landon Thomas [2] reports that the two sides are getting closer to agreement; the sticking point seems to be the coupon on the new bonds, and the likely outcome, on that front, is likely to be just below 4%. No word on the governing law of the new bonds, though I suspect that Greece will go along with doing the market-friendly thing of issuing its new debt in London.
The reason why none of the negotiations really matter very much is, as Fidler says, that “if they don’t agree, the holdouts will have the ‘voluntary’ deal forced down their throats”. Greece is going to bolt collective action clauses onto its outstanding bonds — and use those clauses in what’s known as a “cram down”: the minority has to do whatever the majority wants.
Now with most collective action clauses, this would be non-trivial. Often these clauses require a large supermajority of bondholders to agree before the CAC is triggered — 85%, say. And they’re generally done on a bond-by-bond basis, making it much easier for a hedge fund to build up a blocking stake in one bond.
But Greece is in the very nice position of being able to craft its CACs now, rather than at the time the bonds were issued. As a result, it can set the CAC threshold very low, if it wants, and it can also draft them so that the percentage which matters is the percentage of all bonds tendered into the exchange, rather than the percentage of any individual bond.
All it needs to do then is have a quiet word with the technocrats at the EU, who have a very good idea how much moral suasion they can wield. Greece has a pretty good idea what the minimum take-up of any exchange offer is likely to be. And it just needs to set its CAC level at or just below that minimum take-up level.
Of course, the lower the CAC level, the more coercive the Greece exchange will be considered. If the CACs are set at 85%, the deal will be “voluntary”; if they’re set at 51%, it will be highly coercive. But either way, the deal will get done. And Greece has absolutely nothing to worry about with respect to hedge funds threatening [3] to sue the country in the European Court of Human Rights. Good luck with that one, guys, you’re going to need it.
The only real risk for Greece, as I see it, is that its offer is so bad that less than 51% of bondholders tender into the exchange: you can’t set a CAC below 50%. But I doubt we’ll see that. Banks hate holding defaulted debt. Greece is going to offer them a choice, between holding defaulted debt and holding new instruments which are paying in a timely fashion. When push comes to shove, the banks are going to take the new instruments. Whether Charles Dallara likes it or not.
© Thomson Reuters 2011. All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this website for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Republication or redistribution of Thomson Reuters content, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters and its logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of the Thomson Reuters group of companies around the world.
Thomson Reuters journalists are subject to an Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and disclosure of relevant interests.
This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to colleagues, clients or customers, use the Reprints tool at the top of any article or visit: www.reutersreprints.com.
Why Greece has the upper hand | Felix Salmon
January 20, 2012 @ 8:09 pm
By Felix Salmon
Stephen Fidler [1] makes a good point today: the difference between a “voluntary” exchange and a “coercive” exchange, when Greece finally puts an offer to its creditors, is largely semantic. Or, to put it another way, the only real difference is that in a voluntary exchange, you have the IIF’s Charles Dallara saying nice things about the Greeks, while in a coercive exchange, you have the IIF’s Charles Dallara saying nasty things about the Greeks. But the fact is that precious few bondholders who are going to change their vote based on what Charles Dallara thinks.
Most of the bondholders are European banks, and as Fidler says, European banks are subject to “moral suasion” — having their arms twisted by their national governments — which is much more likely to affect their final decision than the official judgment of Dallara. Meanwhile, an increasing proportion of the bondholder base is made up of hedge funds, who certainly don’t care what Dallara thinks.
Landon Thomas [2] reports that the two sides are getting closer to agreement; the sticking point seems to be the coupon on the new bonds, and the likely outcome, on that front, is likely to be just below 4%. No word on the governing law of the new bonds, though I suspect that Greece will go along with doing the market-friendly thing of issuing its new debt in London.
The reason why none of the negotiations really matter very much is, as Fidler says, that “if they don’t agree, the holdouts will have the ‘voluntary’ deal forced down their throats”. Greece is going to bolt collective action clauses onto its outstanding bonds — and use those clauses in what’s known as a “cram down”: the minority has to do whatever the majority wants.
Now with most collective action clauses, this would be non-trivial. Often these clauses require a large supermajority of bondholders to agree before the CAC is triggered — 85%, say. And they’re generally done on a bond-by-bond basis, making it much easier for a hedge fund to build up a blocking stake in one bond.
But Greece is in the very nice position of being able to craft its CACs now, rather than at the time the bonds were issued. As a result, it can set the CAC threshold very low, if it wants, and it can also draft them so that the percentage which matters is the percentage of all bonds tendered into the exchange, rather than the percentage of any individual bond.
All it needs to do then is have a quiet word with the technocrats at the EU, who have a very good idea how much moral suasion they can wield. Greece has a pretty good idea what the minimum take-up of any exchange offer is likely to be. And it just needs to set its CAC level at or just below that minimum take-up level.
Of course, the lower the CAC level, the more coercive the Greece exchange will be considered. If the CACs are set at 85%, the deal will be “voluntary”; if they’re set at 51%, it will be highly coercive. But either way, the deal will get done. And Greece has absolutely nothing to worry about with respect to hedge funds threatening [3] to sue the country in the European Court of Human Rights. Good luck with that one, guys, you’re going to need it.
The only real risk for Greece, as I see it, is that its offer is so bad that less than 51% of bondholders tender into the exchange: you can’t set a CAC below 50%. But I doubt we’ll see that. Banks hate holding defaulted debt. Greece is going to offer them a choice, between holding defaulted debt and holding new instruments which are paying in a timely fashion. When push comes to shove, the banks are going to take the new instruments. Whether Charles Dallara likes it or not.
© Thomson Reuters 2011. All rights reserved. Users may download and print extracts of content from this website for their own personal and non-commercial use only. Republication or redistribution of Thomson Reuters content, including by framing or similar means, is expressly prohibited without the prior written consent of Thomson Reuters. Thomson Reuters and its logo are registered trademarks or trademarks of the Thomson Reuters group of companies around the world.
Thomson Reuters journalists are subject to an Editorial Handbook which requires fair presentation and disclosure of relevant interests.
This copy is for your personal, non-commercial use only. To order presentation-ready copies for distribution to colleagues, clients or customers, use the Reprints tool at the top of any article or visit: www.reutersreprints.com.
Why Greece has the upper hand | Felix Salmon
Nobody's
Γένοιο οἷος εἷ
...ad ottobre ho anticipato sono entrato pochi giorni prima dell'accordo ...
i prezzi erano in effetti intorno ai 30 poco sopra almeno per le 22...
ma resta il fatto che si sbandierava ancora la volontarietà...
infatti dopo una breve salita i corsi hanno ricominciato a scendere ...
ho capito che dovevo diffidare ...ma commettere l'errore per la seconda volta da parte dei politici europei secondo me era troppo per loro no ...
è questa continua vendita di volontarietà,...che è di per se una truffa ...
dillo e scrivetelo chiaramente è Default .....
invece secondo loro era volontario anche l'accordo di ottobre ...giusto per permettere lo scarico ulteriore di merce ...
Il fatto è che ognuna delle parti ha giocato la sua partita, loro hanno fatto leva sulla nostra fiducia promettendo di risolvere le questioni, ma le questioni da risolvere erano le loro e l' agnello sacrificale noi.
A un certo punto la fiducia l' ho persa completamente, e questo mi ha parzialmente salvato.
Ora i margini li han davvero finiti....e la partita può terminare
GAME OVER RUSSIA.
CACs scontate.
A ogni modo resta qualche giro di giostra "BCE, buyback"......speriamo che qualcosa riesca ad incastrarsi in modo positivo.
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discipline
Guest
Greek Psi Here We Come? Be Careful What You Wish For
So it looks like we should get an announcement sometime today about the proposed Greek PSI deal. Yes, proposed, not finalized. Asides from the obvious fact that there will be limited or no documentation for the deal, we still have no clue who has agreed to what.
As far as I can tell, no one has given the IIF negotiators any binding power. Obviously some of the institutions that the IIF negotiators are associated would have trouble not approving the “deal”, but how many bonds do they really represent?
I think this will be a relatively small portion of bondholders and then the real game begins. The carrot and stick that the EU and ECB can use with other holders and the desire to maximize profits (or minimize losses) on the other side. So far, this news seems to be acting inversely to the “downgrades” price action, as early front-running is meeting sell the news.
If the terms of the deal being leaked are true, it will be extremely interesting to see what other countries do. Not only will Greece receive a 50% notional reduction (except from the ECB and other “public” holders), but they will get very long dated money at very low rates. Who wouldn’t want that? Why should Spain both going through semi-legitimate auctions when Greece can get longer dated money at lower rates? Why should Portugal or Hungary bother with painful steps to reduce debt when the alternative is spend more, reduce debt via restructuring, and get lower rates on that reduced debt?
I have to admit that there is one thing that strikes me as strange. For a country that doesn’t have a reputation for working excessively hard, the politicians seem more than happy to work whatever hours necessary when it comes to getting some free money. It seems like most of their austerity votes come in the middle of the night, and here we are waiting for them to begin more negotiations at 7:30 pm on a Friday, but maybe that is just me being bitter?
http://www.tfmarketadvisors.com/2012/01/20/greek-psi-here-we-come-be-careful-what-you-wish-for/
So it looks like we should get an announcement sometime today about the proposed Greek PSI deal. Yes, proposed, not finalized. Asides from the obvious fact that there will be limited or no documentation for the deal, we still have no clue who has agreed to what.
As far as I can tell, no one has given the IIF negotiators any binding power. Obviously some of the institutions that the IIF negotiators are associated would have trouble not approving the “deal”, but how many bonds do they really represent?
I think this will be a relatively small portion of bondholders and then the real game begins. The carrot and stick that the EU and ECB can use with other holders and the desire to maximize profits (or minimize losses) on the other side. So far, this news seems to be acting inversely to the “downgrades” price action, as early front-running is meeting sell the news.
If the terms of the deal being leaked are true, it will be extremely interesting to see what other countries do. Not only will Greece receive a 50% notional reduction (except from the ECB and other “public” holders), but they will get very long dated money at very low rates. Who wouldn’t want that? Why should Spain both going through semi-legitimate auctions when Greece can get longer dated money at lower rates? Why should Portugal or Hungary bother with painful steps to reduce debt when the alternative is spend more, reduce debt via restructuring, and get lower rates on that reduced debt?
I have to admit that there is one thing that strikes me as strange. For a country that doesn’t have a reputation for working excessively hard, the politicians seem more than happy to work whatever hours necessary when it comes to getting some free money. It seems like most of their austerity votes come in the middle of the night, and here we are waiting for them to begin more negotiations at 7:30 pm on a Friday, but maybe that is just me being bitter?
http://www.tfmarketadvisors.com/2012/01/20/greek-psi-here-we-come-be-careful-what-you-wish-for/
Ultima modifica di un moderatore:
cariatide
Forumer attivo
Non dire gatto finchè non ce l'hai nel sacco ...
discipline
Guest
Neither side gives in at PSI talks
Troika and bondholders remained at loggerheads over the interest rate of the new bonds
By Yiannis Papadoyiannis
Talks aimed at reaching an agreement on the private sector involvement plan (PSI+) hit a snag on Friday despite widespread optimism for a deal by the end of the day.
There was still some distance between the two sides on the interest rate of the new bonds Greece will issue, as the private bondholders are asking for an average coupon of 4.25 percent, while Greece, the eurozone and the International Monetary Fund are insisting on a 3 percent rate.
Late on Friday there was a fresh meeting between Prime Minister Lucas Papademos, Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos and Charles Dallara, the head of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), which represents most of the private creditors, but no deal was reached.
Sources suggested that before the meeting there was a teleconference among IIF members who authorized Dallara to negotiate a coupon of no less than 3.8 percent. The snag emerged in the afternoon as Greece’s international creditors -- known as the troika -- insisted on a smaller rate.
The proposal that the IIF originally proposed was for an average rate of 4.25 percent -- 3 percent for bonds maturing by 2014, 4 percent for bonds up to 2021 and 4.5 percent after 2022. The IIF also wants a rate surplus in the case of future growth in the Greek economy. The haircut will be a nominal 50 percent, as agreed at the eurozone summit in October, but its impact on the bonds’ net present value will range between 64.5 percent and 69.5 percent, depending on the discount rate to be used.
The new bonds will have a 30-year maturity period, while there will be a 10-year grace period during which bondholders will only receive interest and after which Greece will pay both interest and capital. For every 100 euros of current debt, bondholders will receive 35 euros in 30-year paper that will be under the same status (British law) as the bonds issued by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and 15 euros in two-year bonds from the EFSF, instead of the original plan for cash payment.
Talks are set to continue over the weekend and into next week, as a deal needs to be reached as soon as possible.
Troika and bondholders remained at loggerheads over the interest rate of the new bonds
Talks aimed at reaching an agreement on the private sector involvement plan (PSI+) hit a snag on Friday despite widespread optimism for a deal by the end of the day.
There was still some distance between the two sides on the interest rate of the new bonds Greece will issue, as the private bondholders are asking for an average coupon of 4.25 percent, while Greece, the eurozone and the International Monetary Fund are insisting on a 3 percent rate.
Late on Friday there was a fresh meeting between Prime Minister Lucas Papademos, Finance Minister Evangelos Venizelos and Charles Dallara, the head of the Institute of International Finance (IIF), which represents most of the private creditors, but no deal was reached.
Sources suggested that before the meeting there was a teleconference among IIF members who authorized Dallara to negotiate a coupon of no less than 3.8 percent. The snag emerged in the afternoon as Greece’s international creditors -- known as the troika -- insisted on a smaller rate.
The proposal that the IIF originally proposed was for an average rate of 4.25 percent -- 3 percent for bonds maturing by 2014, 4 percent for bonds up to 2021 and 4.5 percent after 2022. The IIF also wants a rate surplus in the case of future growth in the Greek economy. The haircut will be a nominal 50 percent, as agreed at the eurozone summit in October, but its impact on the bonds’ net present value will range between 64.5 percent and 69.5 percent, depending on the discount rate to be used.
The new bonds will have a 30-year maturity period, while there will be a 10-year grace period during which bondholders will only receive interest and after which Greece will pay both interest and capital. For every 100 euros of current debt, bondholders will receive 35 euros in 30-year paper that will be under the same status (British law) as the bonds issued by the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF), and 15 euros in two-year bonds from the EFSF, instead of the original plan for cash payment.
Talks are set to continue over the weekend and into next week, as a deal needs to be reached as soon as possible.
Nobody's
Γένοιο οἷος εἷ
Giusto, ma sono consapevole che l' uscita è veramente molto molto stretta
baleng
Bannato di là per aver svelato la verità
Mi sembra che stia agendo in te l'effetto rimorso. Vale a dire che (inconsciamente, ma neanche tanto) se le cose andassero bene, il fatto di essere uscito prima ti darebbe un dolore indicibile.
So che non ci auguri che vada male, ma ti chiedo: se tu fossi ancora dentro come prima, diresti le stesse cose? Non stai scongiurando il fatto che ... possa andare bene???
Perciò forse ti conviene rientrare con la metà di quanto avevi venduto, pensaci bene e auguri.
- Stato
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