Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 3 (29 lettori)

[FNAIOS]

unless the players decide to stop their uncooperative game very soon.

Ma non mi dire.

 

[vittocesa]

Forse sbagliamo pure noi a credere che questa vicenda sia solo una farsa...

Forse,Zio Jimmy, ma se,come credo, scopriremo che quello che concorderanno domani o fra una settimana avrebbero pure potuto concordarlo diverse settimane fa, allora avremo la riprova che questa vicenda -fra dichiarazioni,controdichirazioni,incontri istituzionali e anti-istituzionali (come quelli a 3 fra Merkel,Holland e Tsipras : ma se ci fosse l'Istituzione l'Europa, mi spieghi a che min...a servono questi incontri se non esattamente a smentirne l'esistenza?)- è stata davvero una farsa che ha certamente ottenuto un unico obiettivo : quello di far capire a tutti che l'Europa non esiste se non per creare casini.

 

[amorgos34]

Ecco, ma il computo del valore atteso non dovrebbe essere pesato per la probabilità?
Se io sono a 50, e all'80% (accordo) vado a 70 e al 20% vado a 0, l'EV è comunque >0.

Ho messo valori a caso, li si cambino come si vuole ma, per chi considera l'accordo probabile, rimanere dentro è EV+

Dipende, come dici, dai valori che, come dici, stimi.
Per me, per quel che vale, con l'accordicchio non si va a 70.

 

[vittocesa]

si si, infatti questo è quello che dicevo anche io.
Come dice Amorgos (cit.) FMI e potentati europei fanno giustamente la loro politica che può essere in contrasto con la volontà politica emersa dalle urne.

Quando la Politica non esiste, allora è normale che la finanza la faccia da padrona.
Che ai danni del Berlusca ci sia stato un complotto è ormai quasi universalmente riconosciuto; che il Berlusca sia stato (come la totalità degli attori della seconda repubblica, ancora in auge) politicamente mediocre è altrettanto riconosciuto.
Che in Europa ci sia tanta mediocrità politica, la vicenda greca lo sta a dimostrare.

 

[ficodindia]

John Nash's Game Theory and Greece


May 29, 2015 2:00 AM EDT By Mohamed A. El-Erian

Economics and finance suffered two tragedies in the past week: the death of the Nobel laureate John Nash and his wife in a horrible car accident, and more delays from Greece and its creditors in reaching an agreement on a path out of the costly and protracted crisis.
A mutually beneficial outcome would alleviate the long suffering of Greek citizens who have been devastated by unemployment, shrinking incomes and spreading poverty. It would also bolster the credibility, integrity and robustness of the euro zone as a viable economic, financial and political entity. And it would remove one of the uncertainties preventing the global economy from achieving a pace of growth consistent with its potential. At first sight there seem to be little to link the two tragedies. Yet the game theory insights that John Nash pioneered -- including the concept of a "cooperative game" -- shed important light on what is happening in Greece, and help explain why the drama is unlikely to have a happy ending anytime soon.
In a cooperative game, players coordinate to achieve better outcomes than the ones that would likely prevail in the absence of such coordination. If the game is played uncooperatively, however, the result is unfortunate for all players.
This simple idea accurately describes the protracted Greek drama, including the current rush at the Group of Seven meeting in Germany to find yet another way to kick the can down the road.
At the simplest level of analysis, Greece is seeking to regain economic growth, create jobs and restore its financial viability, while remaining part of the single currency. Its European partners, working with the International Monetary Fund, share these goals, so long as achieving them doesn't impose a disproportionately heavy burden on other euro zone states in terms of finances and political acceptability, and by setting a poor example for future crises.
The problem, in game theory terms, is that a game that needs to be played cooperatively to achieve the desired outcome continues to be played uncooperatively -- repeatedly. The reasons for this unfortunate state of affairs are understandable:
There is little trust between Greece and its creditors (in this case, the European Central Bank, the European Union, and the IMF).
The sides haven't defined a common understanding of the problem, even less a solution.
The process for ensuring that policy and financing commitments are met is patchy and often controversial, in part because of political undertones: The Greek government doesn't want to be perceived as subservient to other European nations and those countries don't want be viewed as financial hostages to the inadequacy of Greek policies.
And the functioning of the coalition of creditors (once known as the Troika) is far from smooth.
Thoughtful economists such as the Nobel laureate Michael Spence have extended this concept of a cooperative game being played uncooperatively to the broader dysfunctions influencing the global economy. This type of game points to costs that far exceed simply suboptimal outcomes; it also entails the possibility of collateral damage and unintended consequences.
There are at least four ways to transform uncooperative games into cooperative ones. Unfortunately, these approaches would be ineffective in the case of Greece.
One involves using two-sided and mutually supportive conditionality as the transformation agent: for example, by rewarding the implementation of economic reforms with the ready availability of external financing. This has been tried in Greece, but the results have fallen short, which has diminished the effectiveness of this tool. Specifically, Greece's record on making good on its policy-reform promises has been far from perfect; and its creditors have been too hesitant in providing the extent of debt relief and cash the country needs.
A second way involves a decisive external impetus. In the case of Greece and its creditors, this role has been played by fear, particularly the fear that the Greek economy would implode, which would force it out of the euro zone. This has stoked the additional fear that such an outcome would destabilize other euro zone economies, threaten the integrity of the single currency group and disrupt the global economy.
And fear is an inconsistent transformation agent because its impact is hard to sustain. As soon as it dissipates, all sides revert to uncooperative behavior. And this is what has happened in this case since at least 2010.
A third alternative involves the entry of new players that are willing and able to put aside uncooperative legacies. In today's Europe, however, the political reality is that new players tend to be even more skeptical than their predecessors. The electoral victory of Syriza in Greece is a case in point.
Finally, mutually beneficial developments could convince both sides to work together more closely. Regrettably, this hasn’t been the case of Greece and its European partners, given the limited progress on the ground.
Assessing the Greek drama through the lens of game theory explains why the crisis -- and the question of Greece's continued euro-zone membership -- are no closer to being resolved. Applying Nash's theory shows that the best we can realistically expect is yet another attempt to postpone painful decisions. But even this inadequate outcome is proving increasingly difficult to deliver, and if it materializes, the resulting delay will lead to an even more difficult situation, unless the players decide to stop their uncooperative game very soon.

Carissimo, se il mancato accordo implica un disastro per le parti negoziali ne discende che, Nash o non Nash, razionalmente l'accordo si dovrebbe fare. Purtroppo la realtà non è governata solo o sempre dalla razionalità.

 

[GiveMeLeverage]

Carissimo, se il mancato accordo implica un disastro per le parti negoziali ne discende che, Nash o non Nash, razionalmente l'accordo si dovrebbe fare. Purtroppo la realtà non è governata solo o sempre dalla razionalità.

Nash dimostra proprio la razionalità di comportamenti che a giudicare solo dagli esiti finali appaiono irrazionali.
Ciascun player può scegliere se cooperare o meno.
Entrambi sanno che se cooperano l'esito è drammaticamente migliore che se non cooperano.
D'altronde se uno dei due sceglie un comportamento cooperativo e l'altro no, questo risulta in un esito ancora peggiore per il primo.
Ne consegue che se i due player si fidano poco uno dell'altro il comportamento più razionale è non cooperare.

Naturalmente gli equilibri di Nash sono delle semplificazioni rispetto a quanto succede in realtà (quale modello non lo è?), ma sono molto efficaci ed immediati da comprendere.

 

[fabriziof]

varoufakis è un esperto di teoria dei giochi,ci ha scritto anche dei libri

 

[GiveMeLeverage]

varoufakis è un esperto di teoria dei giochi,ci ha scritto anche dei libri

imho avrebbe fatto bene a rimanere un esperto di teoria dei giochi

 

[Fabrib]

Tsipras cambia la squadra: l’ex socialista Panaritis nominata rappresentante greca all'Fmi - Il Sole 24 ORE

 

[GiveMeLeverage]

Tsipras cambia la squadra: l’ex socialista Panaritis nominata rappresentante greca all'Fmi - Il Sole 24 ORE

Non la conosco, qui ci vuole un commento di Tommy o Amorgos che sanno le biografie a memoria.

Panaritis' reform work in Peru implemented by Alberto Fujimori regime named "Fujishock", while "improving" macroeconomic figures and keeping the global financial community satisfied, led to poverty millions of people after a 10 year governance based on authoritarianism, corruption, human rights violations, mass population sterilisations and mass executions and ended failed in the year 2000 elections.

Trovato quanto sopra, ma sono passate ere geologiche da allora.