bosmeld
Forumer storico
MOLTO IMPORTANTE capacità residua banche ita acquisto btp
posto questi 2 passaggi che fanno capire che le nostre banchette non ci potranno proteggere ancora per molto comprando btp senza nuovo ltro....
e a quel punto lo spread andrà dove gli pare
Residual capacity for sovereign purchases
Based on the most recent data, Italian and Spanish banks’ sovereign purchases have
respectively reached €93bn (Italy) and €54bn (Spain). The sovereign purchases represent
respectively 41% of Italian government 2012 maturities and 57% of Spanish government 2012
maturities. We have estimated the residual capacity of sovereign purchases at €69bn for the
Italian banks and €46bn for the Spanish banks. The remaining capacity of the Spanish banks
looks narrower. However, key issue is that the Spanish banks can cover 115% of their 2012
sovereign refinancing needs but the Italian banks only 52%, i.e. leaving €65bn uncovered.
talian banks cannot absorb the remaining sovereign placements
In 2012 Italy has to refinance €227bn of sovereign debt. Placements have been put under
pressure by the debt crisis, with most of the purchases made by domestic banks and with
foreign institutional investors and banks having sharply reduced their exposure to peripheral
sovereign debt. The share of Italian government debt in the hands of foreign investors fell from
50% in summer 2011 to 38% in Q1 12. Domestic banks have played a primary role in
sovereign purchases, along with domestic households, for which the Italian Treasury has
arranged dedicated placements. However, the domestic banks face two constraints to making
sovereign purchases: (i) funding; and (ii) relative exposure. The funding constraint is defined by
the remaining purchases (after the use of the LTRO for the core funding needs of the banks).
We qualify as core funding needs mainly wholesale maturities, as the debt market is currently
closed for most of the peripheral banks. Relative exposure to sovereigns is the weight of
sovereign bonds as a percentage of tangible equity: note that negative mark-to-market may
impact tangible equity via AFS negative adjustments.
As Italian households also bought sovereigns we may assume that the remaining €134bn of
sovereign purchases to be refinanced in 2012 (€227bn-€93bn) could be smaller by, say,
€20bn, giving a final estimated figure for sovereign placements of €114bn for the rest of the
year. While smaller, this number does not change the picture: with €69bn of sovereign
purchases capacity left, the Italian banks are unable to cover upcoming sovereign
placements. In terms of exposure to Italian sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity, the
average ratio was 167.4% in Q1 12 (vs 159.9% in Q4 11). For Q2 12, the small increase of
marginal purchases combined with the increasing negative impact of the AFS reserve due to
negative mark-to-market (for spread widening), should drive up the weight of Italian
sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity (in the region of at least 170%).
In the absence of marginal buyers of the sovereign and following the Moody’s downgrade, the
spread is likely to suffer any further widen going forward, unless (i) the Italian government asks
for a bailout (which could trigger SMP/PMP by the ESM); or (ii) eurozone countries by next
autumn agree on a more flexible use of the EFSF/ESM for countries already compliant in
terms of fundamental requirements but out of line in terms of spread.
se non iniziano a comprare investitori esteri o la Ue in qualche maniera, c'è poco da stare allegri, si rischia di non comprire le aste se non a tassi insostenibili.
devono sbrigarsi a far tornare la fiducia...
e ora come ora vi garantisco che gli istituzionali esteri stanno allegerendo piuttosto che comprando, una delle poche eccezioni è Allianz
se non iniziano a comprare investitori esteri o la Ue in qualche maniera, c'è poco da stare allegri, si rischia di non comprire le aste se non a tassi insostenibili.
devono sbrigarsi a far tornare la fiducia...
e ora come ora vi garantisco che gli istituzionali esteri stanno allegerendo piuttosto che comprando, una delle poche eccezioni è Allianz
Conclusion
Conclusions
Even though our calculations show potential room for additional sovereign purchases capacity
by the domestic banks, we cannot rule out that capacity being absorbed by larger-than-
expected deposits outflows. In our calculations we work on the assumption of ‘deposits being
equal’ and we also assume no deleveraging measures. Bearing in mind that deleveraging can
take time while deposit outflows can occur overnight, the theoretical residual sovereign
purchases could be used to cover potentially sharper-than-expected deposit outflows. In the
absence of data on the most recent deposits trends (June and July), we cannot rule out the
possibility that Italian and Spanish banks may have run out of ammunition. This leads us to the
question asked by investors: ‘Who will buy Spanish and Italian bonds?’
Who will buy Spanish and Italian bonds?’
mi sa che in spagna si trovano già nella cac.... perchè probabilmente gli outflow di depositi di giugno e luglio sono stati forti, su ita, penso (spero) che i depositi bancari siano stati più stabili
ora ho capito perchè MOnti ha spinto così tanto per scudo anti spread c'è il rischio che se non fanno nulla, qualche asta tra qualche mese vada non comperta
(purtroppo non scherzo)
posto questi 2 passaggi che fanno capire che le nostre banchette non ci potranno proteggere ancora per molto comprando btp senza nuovo ltro....
e a quel punto lo spread andrà dove gli pare
Residual capacity for sovereign purchases
Based on the most recent data, Italian and Spanish banks’ sovereign purchases have
respectively reached €93bn (Italy) and €54bn (Spain). The sovereign purchases represent
respectively 41% of Italian government 2012 maturities and 57% of Spanish government 2012
maturities. We have estimated the residual capacity of sovereign purchases at €69bn for the
Italian banks and €46bn for the Spanish banks. The remaining capacity of the Spanish banks
looks narrower. However, key issue is that the Spanish banks can cover 115% of their 2012
sovereign refinancing needs but the Italian banks only 52%, i.e. leaving €65bn uncovered.
talian banks cannot absorb the remaining sovereign placements
In 2012 Italy has to refinance €227bn of sovereign debt. Placements have been put under
pressure by the debt crisis, with most of the purchases made by domestic banks and with
foreign institutional investors and banks having sharply reduced their exposure to peripheral
sovereign debt. The share of Italian government debt in the hands of foreign investors fell from
50% in summer 2011 to 38% in Q1 12. Domestic banks have played a primary role in
sovereign purchases, along with domestic households, for which the Italian Treasury has
arranged dedicated placements. However, the domestic banks face two constraints to making
sovereign purchases: (i) funding; and (ii) relative exposure. The funding constraint is defined by
the remaining purchases (after the use of the LTRO for the core funding needs of the banks).
We qualify as core funding needs mainly wholesale maturities, as the debt market is currently
closed for most of the peripheral banks. Relative exposure to sovereigns is the weight of
sovereign bonds as a percentage of tangible equity: note that negative mark-to-market may
impact tangible equity via AFS negative adjustments.
As Italian households also bought sovereigns we may assume that the remaining €134bn of
sovereign purchases to be refinanced in 2012 (€227bn-€93bn) could be smaller by, say,
€20bn, giving a final estimated figure for sovereign placements of €114bn for the rest of the
year. While smaller, this number does not change the picture: with €69bn of sovereign
purchases capacity left, the Italian banks are unable to cover upcoming sovereign
placements. In terms of exposure to Italian sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity, the
average ratio was 167.4% in Q1 12 (vs 159.9% in Q4 11). For Q2 12, the small increase of
marginal purchases combined with the increasing negative impact of the AFS reserve due to
negative mark-to-market (for spread widening), should drive up the weight of Italian
sovereigns as a percentage of tangible equity (in the region of at least 170%).
In the absence of marginal buyers of the sovereign and following the Moody’s downgrade, the
spread is likely to suffer any further widen going forward, unless (i) the Italian government asks
for a bailout (which could trigger SMP/PMP by the ESM); or (ii) eurozone countries by next
autumn agree on a more flexible use of the EFSF/ESM for countries already compliant in
terms of fundamental requirements but out of line in terms of spread.
se non iniziano a comprare investitori esteri o la Ue in qualche maniera, c'è poco da stare allegri, si rischia di non comprire le aste se non a tassi insostenibili.
devono sbrigarsi a far tornare la fiducia...
e ora come ora vi garantisco che gli istituzionali esteri stanno allegerendo piuttosto che comprando, una delle poche eccezioni è Allianz
se non iniziano a comprare investitori esteri o la Ue in qualche maniera, c'è poco da stare allegri, si rischia di non comprire le aste se non a tassi insostenibili.
devono sbrigarsi a far tornare la fiducia...
e ora come ora vi garantisco che gli istituzionali esteri stanno allegerendo piuttosto che comprando, una delle poche eccezioni è Allianz
Conclusion
Conclusions
Even though our calculations show potential room for additional sovereign purchases capacity
by the domestic banks, we cannot rule out that capacity being absorbed by larger-than-
expected deposits outflows. In our calculations we work on the assumption of ‘deposits being
equal’ and we also assume no deleveraging measures. Bearing in mind that deleveraging can
take time while deposit outflows can occur overnight, the theoretical residual sovereign
purchases could be used to cover potentially sharper-than-expected deposit outflows. In the
absence of data on the most recent deposits trends (June and July), we cannot rule out the
possibility that Italian and Spanish banks may have run out of ammunition. This leads us to the
question asked by investors: ‘Who will buy Spanish and Italian bonds?’
Who will buy Spanish and Italian bonds?’
mi sa che in spagna si trovano già nella cac.... perchè probabilmente gli outflow di depositi di giugno e luglio sono stati forti, su ita, penso (spero) che i depositi bancari siano stati più stabili
ora ho capito perchè MOnti ha spinto così tanto per scudo anti spread c'è il rischio che se non fanno nulla, qualche asta tra qualche mese vada non comperta
(purtroppo non scherzo)
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