Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 1 (3 lettori)
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- additional tier 1 bail in basilea 3 coco bonds crd iv genussscheine grandfathering hybrid bond loss absorption lower tier 2 make whole amount matusalem bond obbligazioni irredimibili obbligazioni perpetue obbligazioni subordinate perpetual bond preference shares restricted tier 1 tier 1 upper tier 2
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Riporto un post scritto da Avidya - che uno dei migliori forumer del sito di Fools - che fornisce la sua chiave di lettura dello stato dell'arte delle obbligazioni subordinate.
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Author: avidya
Number: of 27472 Subject: The politics of bank sub debt Date: 20/06/2011 23:40
So.....one of the wider concerns I have about the Irish situation is that it seems quite clear that the Irish decision to try and “burn” its subordinated bank debt holders was taken with at least the tacit approval of the wider EU authorities. Noonan has explicitly said as much in recent interviews, and given the complete dependence of the Irish banks on short term liquidity support from the ECB, not to mention the dependence of the entire Irish state on the EU bail out package, it is inconceivable that the EU authorities haven’t blessed the Irish attempt to burn its bank subordinated debt holders.
Why would they do this? Well, it’s pretty obvious really. Political pressures within the EU have now reached crunch point. Politically, it’s becoming virtually impossible for Germany in particular to keep funding chronic deficits in the peripheral Euro economies. Everyone knows that there is simply no way that Greece in particular will ever be able to repay its current sovereign debt burden via internal structural adjustments. Either Greece must default, or the stronger EU countries must keep funding both its structural deficit and its maturing external debt via fiscal transfers. Germany has no intention of doing this longer term, and the debate is simply about trying to manage the process so that the eventual (inevitable) default does not lead to wider contagion. Right now, they can’t allow a disorderly default, because the EU wide banking system is still too fragile to withstand the contagion effects. A disorderly Greek default would lead to an immediate run on Portugal, Ireland and probably also Spain and Italy. Funding sources for the many weaker banks in these areas would immediately dry up, and both governments and the ECB would be forced to inject huge amounts of extra capital and liquidity into the system to keep the banks afloat. The costs would dwarf the short term cost of keeping Greece afloat by further fiscal transfers.
I’d say EU politicians are well aware of this, and to the extent that they aren’t the ECB certainly is. But politically, it’s becoming increasingly impossible for the stronger EU countries to keep sending fiscal transfers of their own voters’ money to the periphery. So what do they do? Well, one obvious answer is to try and force burden sharing on bank subordinated debt holders. Right across the EU, banks are still very heavily funded in capital terms by traditional forms of subordinated debt and preference shares. Much of this stock of subordinated debt and quasi capital will, in the longer term, become useless under Basel III regulations. So, if holders of this debt can be forced to take a haircut then that will provide huge amounts of “free” new capital to the weaker EU banks. The authorities know they can’t (yet) burn senior bank debt holders because banks typically rely on such debt for funding up to a 25-30% of their gross lending books, and they need continued access to senior debt markets if only to refinance their maturing debt. But sub debt is a different kettle of fish. If holders of this debt can be bullied or persuaded into taking big haircuts without that having contagion effects on senior bank debt then (from the EU authorities’ point of view) “yippee, a free source of bank capital”.
I think it’s against this background that one has to see the current Irish situation. From the point of view of the wider EU, it’s a test case. If the Irish can get away with forcing losses on their bank subordinated debt, then investors will become resigned to it and the practice can be used more widely throughout the EU. No doubt the precise form such burden taking takes would vary from country to country and bank by bank. For the stronger banks, it would merely act as pressure for holders of legacy subordinated debt to agree to exchange that debt for new types of loss absorbing contingent capital. For the weaker banks in weaker economies, no doubt Irish type defenestration would await. But the overall political direction is clear: if you can get away with it, force losses on bank subordinated debt holders.
In my view, this now makes investment in this asset class extremely tricky. Hopefully, the legal position (at least as far as bonds governed by English law is concerned) will shortly become considerably clearer. But even so, fundamentally if you invest in this area you have to be aware that you are swimming against powerful political forces and that if things get tough and it’s in any way legally possible, you’ll get shafted. So when investing one will have to be very cautious and very sure of one’s legal ground. But paradoxically, this situation could also throw up investment opportunities. Conventional long only income investors are increasingly deserting the sector as just too dangerous and too complex, with the result that the yield premium of such legacy bank instruments over the “risk free” rate may continue to widen over time. For nimble, clued up investors this could throw up some very interesting investment opportunities. For example, the T1 “suspended coupon” prefs of Lloyds and RBs have been drifting back in price recently, and Lloyds “suspended” prefs currently yield 10% or so net despite Lloyds reportedly preparing to resume coupons next year.
Personally, I think it’s still too soon to buy even the UK bank prefs because if the Eurozone crisis worsens then they could well drift back further on worries over the possible impact on UK banks and fears that coupons might remain suspended for a more extended period. But in looking for where to “bottom fish” in due course it’s the UK banks instruments I’d be looking at most closely. The UK authorities have demonstrated a respect for capital hierarchies in their response to the credit crisis, we can print our own currency and hence are a safe haven for worried EU capital flows, we have an independent and strong judiciary to protect contract rights, and I think our present government is well aware of the potential to capture big capital inflows if we play our cards right and ensure our big banks behave properly towards investors.
TMF: The politics of bank sub debt / Banking Sector
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Author: avidya
Number: of 27472 Subject: The politics of bank sub debt Date: 20/06/2011 23:40 Recommendations: 30
I said earlier that I’d try and post on the political issues now impacting on the investment outlook for bank subordinated debt. As I said earlier, the immediate priority investors face with the Irish bonds is trying to ensure that the legal terms of these instruments are adhered to, that investors are playing on a level playing field, and that political decisions take place within the constraints of adhering to established contract and securities law. Happily, the current legal actions hold out some hope of progress towards this in the Irish case, but I think it is also worth considering the wider political background across the EU because that is also very relevant to what will happen to these investments.So.....one of the wider concerns I have about the Irish situation is that it seems quite clear that the Irish decision to try and “burn” its subordinated bank debt holders was taken with at least the tacit approval of the wider EU authorities. Noonan has explicitly said as much in recent interviews, and given the complete dependence of the Irish banks on short term liquidity support from the ECB, not to mention the dependence of the entire Irish state on the EU bail out package, it is inconceivable that the EU authorities haven’t blessed the Irish attempt to burn its bank subordinated debt holders.
Why would they do this? Well, it’s pretty obvious really. Political pressures within the EU have now reached crunch point. Politically, it’s becoming virtually impossible for Germany in particular to keep funding chronic deficits in the peripheral Euro economies. Everyone knows that there is simply no way that Greece in particular will ever be able to repay its current sovereign debt burden via internal structural adjustments. Either Greece must default, or the stronger EU countries must keep funding both its structural deficit and its maturing external debt via fiscal transfers. Germany has no intention of doing this longer term, and the debate is simply about trying to manage the process so that the eventual (inevitable) default does not lead to wider contagion. Right now, they can’t allow a disorderly default, because the EU wide banking system is still too fragile to withstand the contagion effects. A disorderly Greek default would lead to an immediate run on Portugal, Ireland and probably also Spain and Italy. Funding sources for the many weaker banks in these areas would immediately dry up, and both governments and the ECB would be forced to inject huge amounts of extra capital and liquidity into the system to keep the banks afloat. The costs would dwarf the short term cost of keeping Greece afloat by further fiscal transfers.
I’d say EU politicians are well aware of this, and to the extent that they aren’t the ECB certainly is. But politically, it’s becoming increasingly impossible for the stronger EU countries to keep sending fiscal transfers of their own voters’ money to the periphery. So what do they do? Well, one obvious answer is to try and force burden sharing on bank subordinated debt holders. Right across the EU, banks are still very heavily funded in capital terms by traditional forms of subordinated debt and preference shares. Much of this stock of subordinated debt and quasi capital will, in the longer term, become useless under Basel III regulations. So, if holders of this debt can be forced to take a haircut then that will provide huge amounts of “free” new capital to the weaker EU banks. The authorities know they can’t (yet) burn senior bank debt holders because banks typically rely on such debt for funding up to a 25-30% of their gross lending books, and they need continued access to senior debt markets if only to refinance their maturing debt. But sub debt is a different kettle of fish. If holders of this debt can be bullied or persuaded into taking big haircuts without that having contagion effects on senior bank debt then (from the EU authorities’ point of view) “yippee, a free source of bank capital”.
I think it’s against this background that one has to see the current Irish situation. From the point of view of the wider EU, it’s a test case. If the Irish can get away with forcing losses on their bank subordinated debt, then investors will become resigned to it and the practice can be used more widely throughout the EU. No doubt the precise form such burden taking takes would vary from country to country and bank by bank. For the stronger banks, it would merely act as pressure for holders of legacy subordinated debt to agree to exchange that debt for new types of loss absorbing contingent capital. For the weaker banks in weaker economies, no doubt Irish type defenestration would await. But the overall political direction is clear: if you can get away with it, force losses on bank subordinated debt holders.
In my view, this now makes investment in this asset class extremely tricky. Hopefully, the legal position (at least as far as bonds governed by English law is concerned) will shortly become considerably clearer. But even so, fundamentally if you invest in this area you have to be aware that you are swimming against powerful political forces and that if things get tough and it’s in any way legally possible, you’ll get shafted. So when investing one will have to be very cautious and very sure of one’s legal ground. But paradoxically, this situation could also throw up investment opportunities. Conventional long only income investors are increasingly deserting the sector as just too dangerous and too complex, with the result that the yield premium of such legacy bank instruments over the “risk free” rate may continue to widen over time. For nimble, clued up investors this could throw up some very interesting investment opportunities. For example, the T1 “suspended coupon” prefs of Lloyds and RBs have been drifting back in price recently, and Lloyds “suspended” prefs currently yield 10% or so net despite Lloyds reportedly preparing to resume coupons next year.
Personally, I think it’s still too soon to buy even the UK bank prefs because if the Eurozone crisis worsens then they could well drift back further on worries over the possible impact on UK banks and fears that coupons might remain suspended for a more extended period. But in looking for where to “bottom fish” in due course it’s the UK banks instruments I’d be looking at most closely. The UK authorities have demonstrated a respect for capital hierarchies in their response to the credit crisis, we can print our own currency and hence are a safe haven for worried EU capital flows, we have an independent and strong judiciary to protect contract rights, and I think our present government is well aware of the potential to capture big capital inflows if we play our cards right and ensure our big banks behave properly towards investors.
TMF: The politics of bank sub debt / Banking Sector
Metriko
Forumer attivo
Molto interessante
purtroppo non mi lascia molte speranze con le mie lt2 boi
e mi sembra sempre piu' palese che l'europa debba fare un passo molto importante e non è possibile rinviarlo all'infinito, quello di unire i bilanci statali o comunque coordinarsi in un unica entita'.
purtroppo non mi lascia molte speranze con le mie lt2 boi
e mi sembra sempre piu' palese che l'europa debba fare un passo molto importante e non è possibile rinviarlo all'infinito, quello di unire i bilanci statali o comunque coordinarsi in un unica entita'.
nik.sala
Money Never Sleeps
Metriko
Forumer attivo
Pare che il gruppo di ammericani stia discutendo con lo stato irlandese per entrare nel equity di Boi per una fetta consistente e allo stato questo pare non dispiaccia.
Government prepared to sell large stake in BoI | The Post
Government prepared to sell large stake in BoI | The Post
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XS0540295275 Charlottenburg Capital 10,750 NO CARTA
NL0000119105 WOLTERS KLOWER 6,875 96,6/100,4
DE000A0DYW70 BA-CA 60/60,5
XS0362491291 FORTIS 8,000 95,5/96,5
BE0934378747 KBC 8,000 95,5/97,5
DE000TUAG059 TUI AG 8,625 100,38/100,5
NL0000168714 EUREKO 6,000 82,5/84,5
FR0010814558 BPCE 9,250 1012/101,5
XS0362173246 EUREKO 8,380 102/102,5
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Security information
Listing venue Luxembourg / BdL Market
Trading currency EUR
Maturity date Perpetual
Security type Medium-term notes
Listing date 03/06/2011
Issue date 03/06/2011
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