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Zorba

Bos 4 Mod
State aid: Commission approves ING restructuring plan and illiquid asset back-up facility
The European Commission has approved under EC Treaty state aid rules the restructuring plan of Dutch-based financial institution ING, including an illiquid asset back-up facility provided by the Dutch State. The approval of the facility has become possible after an additional agreement between the Dutch State and ING. On the basis of the notified restructuring plan, ING will pay a significant proportion of the restructuring costs, ING's long term commercial viability will be restored, and the aid will not lead to undue distortions of competition. The restructuring plan foresees that ING will reduce the risk profile and complexity of its operations and will sell its insurance activities over time. ING will also carve out, according to a detailed trustee-supervised timetable, a business unit (Westland Utrecht Hypotheekbank (WUH) / Interadvies), to step up competition in the Dutch retail banking market. Based on the proposed plan, the Commission concluded that the measures are compatible with EU rules on state aid to remedy a serious disturbance in a Member State's economy ( Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty).
Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes said: " I am satisfied that the Dutch authorities have adapted the terms of the illiquid asset back-up facility via an additional agreement to bring them into line with EU state aid rules. The restructuring plan is adequate to restore ING's viability, ING is financing a significant share of the restructuring costs and distortions of competition caused by the aid measures are sufficiently addressed."
The group
ING offer s banking, insurance and asset management services to over 85 million clients in more than 40 countries. It is one of the biggest financial institutions in the world, with a workforce of about 125 000 people and a balance sheet of €1 332 billion at the end of 2008.
Aid received
ING received a €10 billion capital injection from the Dutch State on 22 October 2008, authorised by the Commission as rescue aid on 13 November 2008 (see IP/08/1699 ). Given the early redemption of €5 billion before the end of 2009, ING obtained better repayment terms amounting to approximately €2 billion. This demonstrates that, having started the restructuring process, the bank has again become attractive for capital markets.
Moreover, ING received €12 billion of liquidity guarantees under the Dutch liquidity guarantee scheme, approved by the Commission in October 2008 (see IP/08/1610 ). Finally, on 26 January 2009, the Dutch Government provided ING with an illiquid asset back-up facility covering 80% of a portfolio of $39 billion. The Commission approved the measure on 31 March for six months while at the same time opening an in-depth investigation as regards the valuation of the portfolio and the degree of burden sharing (see IP/09/514 ).
Commission assessment
The Commission's doubts as regards the illiquid asset back-up facility have been allayed by a series of commitments made by the Dutch authorities to bring the conditions of the measure in line with the Commission guidelines (see IP/09/322 ). In particular, The Netherlands made the commitment to increase the remuneration in relation to the transaction to be paid by ING by €1.3 billion via an additional payment.
In addition to the carve-out of Westland Utrecht Hypotheekbank (WUH), the Netherlands also committed to temporarily ban ING from acquiring other firms and from exercising price leadership. Furthermore, ING will need formal Commission approval for calling (i.e. repaying) hybrid and subordinated debt capital instruments. These commitments will stay in place during a 3 year period or until the full amount of the capital injection is repaid to the Dutch State, whatever is shorter.
The Commission concluded that the restructuring measures will enable ING to restore its long-term viability, while making a sufficient own contribution to the costs of restructuring. Finally, the Commission is satisfied that the measures proposed are appropriate and proportional to offset the distortions of competition brought about by the aid.
The non-confidential version of the decision will be made available under the case number in the State Aid Register on the DG Competition website . New publications of state aid decisions on the internet and in the Official Journal are listed in the State Aid Weekly e-News .
See also MEMO/09/507

EUROPA - Press Releases - State aid: Commission approves ING restructuring plan and illiquid asset back-up facility
 

Zorba

Bos 4 Mod
State aid: Commission approves restructuring plan of Lloyds Banking Group
The European Commission has approved under EC Treaty state aid rules the restructuring plan of Lloyds Banking Group. Under a package of financial support measures approved by the Commission on 13 October 2008 (see IP/08/1496 ), the Lloyds Banking Group received a state recapitalisation of £17 billion (some €19 billion). The approval of this recapitalisation was conditional upon the submission of a restructuring plan. This plan was submitted to the Commission on 16 July 2009 and contained additional state aid measures. Having assessed the past and new aid on the basis of the notified plan, and in view of amendments agreed by the UK authorities, the Commission is satisfied that it is in line with its restructuring communication (see IP/09/1180 ) and as such compatible with EU rules on state aid to remedy a serious disturbance in a Member State's economy Article 87(3)(b) of the EC Treaty. In particular, the measures foresee that Lloyds will pay a significant proportion of the restructuring costs, ensure a sustainable future for Lloyds without continued state support and that there will not be undue distortions of competition.
Competition Commissioner Neelie Kroes said: "This plan effectively addresses the Commission's competition concerns and at the same time ensures the return of Lloyds Banking Group to long term viability. This decision once again demonstrates the important role that the EU's state aid rules play in facilitating sustainable bank restructuring whilst preventing undue distortions of competition. This is to the clear benefit of both customers and taxpayers".
The Lloyds Banking Group is the entity resulting from the acquisition of HBOS by Lloyds TSB in January 2009. In 2008, HBOS was close to bankruptcy as a result of risky lending practices and high dependence on wholesale funding. In light of the systemic importance of HBOS to the UK financial system, the UK Government facilitated the takeover of HBOS by Lloyds TSB, notably by making a £17 billion (€19billion) capital injection in the bank, which gave the UK State 43.5% ownership of Lloyds Banking Group.
On 7 March 2009, the UK authorities and Lloyds announced that the bank would take part in the UK's Asset Protection Scheme, under which the State would commit to refund losses exceeding a certain level on a pool of assets of £265 billion (€296 billion). At the same time, the State committed to underwrite and to participate in a share offer of £4 billion (€4.6 billion), which was completed in June 2009. On 3 November 2009, as an alternative to Lloyd's participation in the UK Asset Protection Scheme, a capital raising share offer of £20.5 billion capital was announced. The Commission found that the State's participation in this share offer for an amount of £5.9 billion (€6.6 billion) constitutes a state aid element, since it facilitated the placing of the shares. This was therefore also assessed in the framework of the restructuring plan.
The overall assessment was carried out on the basis of the Commission's Communication on restructurings in the financial sector in the current crisis ( IP/09/1180 ).
The Commission considers that the proposed measures are appropriate. They are targeted at ensuring Lloyds Banking Group's return to long term viability by exiting all non-core business lines and risky portfolios (mainly inherited from HBOS) and implementing Lloyds TSB's prudent risk management practices.
The Commission also found that the plan ensures a fair burden sharing of past losses and that the bank and its capital providers make a significant contribution to the financing of the restructuring costs. These elements are important to limit moral hazard (the risk that a company may take excessive risks if it considers it will not have to pay for the consequences) and distortions of competition.
In addition, the plan contains a divestment package in Lloyds Banking Group's core business of UK retail banking as a measure to limit the impact of the aid on competition. The divested entity will have a 4.6% market share in the personal current account market gained through a network of at least 600 branches. This proposed divestment package will facilitate the entry of a new competitor or the reinforcement of a smaller existing competitor on the UK retail banking market and will therefore remove the distortions of competition created by the aid.
Finally, the Commission found that the exit fee which will be paid by Lloyds Banking Group for not participating in the Asset Protection Scheme is sufficiently high to compensate for the advantage the bank gained from its announced participation of 7 March 2009.
The non-confidential version of the decision will be made available under the case number N428/2009 in the State Aid Register on the DG Competition website once any confidentiality issues are resolved. New publications of state aid decisions on the internet and in the Official Journal are listed in the State Aid Weekly e-News .
See also MEMO/09/507 .

EUROPA - Press Releases - State aid: Commission approves restructuring plan of Lloyds Banking Group
 

Zorba

Bos 4 Mod
La parte finale è una bomba: no cedole x Lloyds. sì cedole x Ing

State aid: Commission decisions on KBC, ING and Lloyds – frequently asked questions
(see also IP/09/1728 , IP/09/1729 and IP/09/1730 )

What criteria did the Commission use in its assessment of the three banks' restructuring plans?
The Commission's priority is to ensure that banks which have received state aid can operate in the future without such state support, and hence that they have sustainable long-term business models.

The Commission applies the same principles to all banks receiving restructuring aid. These are outlined in the bank restructuring Communication of 22 July 2009 (see IP/09/1180 ). The Commission requires:
  • that the bank will be viable under reasonable stress assumptions without further injections of taxpayers' money in the future;
  • that the bank contributes a significant proportion of the costs of its restructuring via the sale of assets or other means; and
  • that competition distortions created through the aid are sufficiently addressed through relevant reductions of activities.
Why do the restructuring plans aim at creating a new competitor on the UK, Dutch and Belgian markets respectively ?
The Commission's Restructuring Communication outlines that in its assessment, the Commission will examine the structure of the markets on which the banks operate. The three domestic markets in which the banks in question operate are concentrated, with the top five banks accounting for around 80% of each market. The divestments in question will therefore create opportunities for new entrants or an already present smaller player, and will therefore remedy any distortions of competition caused by the state aid.

What effect will the Commission's requirements have on the ability of the banks in question to compete in world markets ?
This ability will be enhanced once the banks in question, as a result of the restructuring plans, have established stable core activiites, solid finances and sound risk management methods.

Will there be sufficient market interest in the divested activities?
The divestments have been proposed by the banks themselves. The indications on the basis of consultations by the Commission are that there is a sufficient degree of market interest in the entities to be divested. The Commission will closely monitor the fulfilment of the relevant obligations.

What is the purpose of price leadership bans?
The price leadership bans ensure that, in line with the restructuring Communication, state aid that has been received cannot be used to offer terms which cannot be matched by competitors which have not received state aid. The specific form of any ban will depend on a case-by-case analysis, and will strike the most appropriate balance between distortions of competition caused by the state aid and the need to maintain competitive market conditions.
It should be recalled that for example in the case of ING where the most far reaching ban is foreseen, the restriction was just one option proposed to the Dutch authorities, which was acceptable to them and above all preferred over other measures.

What is the Commission's position as regards the bancassurance model ?
The Commission does not have a preference for one business model over the other. It will assess, on a case by case basis, whether an adjustment of the business model of the bank in question is necessary .

What effect will the Commission's actions have on taxpayers?
In the long run, better performing stocks are those of companies with sound financial structures, and stable and coherent business profiles. This is why the primary focus of the Commission's actions is on the return to long term viability based on fundamentally sound business models. This will ensure that the burden on taxpayers, who as shareholders have had to fund state intervention in the banks, will be alleviated.

Is reduction of the banks' balance sheets the Commissions main criterion when assessing measures to limit distortions of competition?
The Commission's assessment is based on a multiplicity of criteria and it would be too narrow-minded to only focus on one variable. In general, the Commission looks at two types of distortions of competition: lack of consequences for past errors (moral hazard) and remaining strong presence of the bank. Both effects can be addressed through tailored divestments and/or behavioural commitments.
In all cases, the Commission makes sure that the viability of the bank is given priority, so that divestments and other behavioural measures limit the competitive distortions without endangering long-term viability. For instance, the Commission agreed to preserve the low-cost business model of ING and the bank-insurance model of KBC and considered other divestements to compensate for competition distortions.
Not all banks got into trouble for the same reasons, or have the same market shares in their core markets. Size is not necessarily the decisive factor. For instance, among the recent cases, ING has received the highest amount of aid and has a strong position for current accounts in the Dutch retail market. However, the divestment package agreed with Dutch authorities in the ING case is relatively small in its core market, but is compensated by large divestitures in other key business units such as the entire Insurance business, ING Direct US, Asset Management and Private Banking. Similarly, total divestitures contained in the KBC restructuring plan are less extensive, but are compensated by the high price paid by the bank for the aid and the high quality of the divestment package.
Total amount of divestitures contained in the Lloyds Banking Group's plan is not at the level of ING's either, but is of high quality and constitutes an attractive business proposition for a new entrant on the concentrated UK retail banking market.

What is the Commission’s policy toward paying coupons or calling tier1 and tier 2 instruments. Are the present decisions building on the Commission's established policy in that respect?
The Commission, in MEMO/09/441 of 8 October 2009, recalled the rules concerning Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital transactions for banks subject to a restructuring aid investigation, thereby reminding banks that in a restructuring context, measures which reduce the total amount of own funds are in principle not compatible with the objective of "burden sharing" and the "aid to the minimum necessary" requirement. The Commission further stated that it could accept these transactions on the basis of a case by case assessment, after balancing the above mentioned principles of burden sharing and limiting aid to the minimum against the contribution of the transaction to the refinancing capability and return to viability of the institution.
Such a case by case assessment is now confirmed in the three decisions on Lloyds, KBC and ING:
In the Lloyds case, the Commission received a commitment from the bank not to pay investors any coupon on Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments or exercise any call option rights in relation to those instruments between 31 January 2010 and 31 January 2012, unless there is a legal obligation to do so. Such restriction also applies to newly issued instruments offered in exchange for existing instruments. There is however a specific exception for certain hybrid instruments to be issued in the context of the global recapitalisation package of Lloyds. This exception is justified due to the presence of a mandatory conversion feature into ordinary shares in case of financial stress, which provides an adequate burden sharing mechanism, while supporting the return to viability of the bank. In case of doubt, the Commission will be consulted.
In the KBC case, the Commission received a commitment from the bank not to pay investors any coupon on Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments or exercise any call option rights in relation to those instruments, unless there is a legal obligation to do so or the coupon payments can be covered by the current profits of the bank. In case of doubt, the Commission will be consulted. The Commission authorised over the last months certain exchange offers on outstanding hybrid instruments, made at terms that provided an adequate burden sharing for investors, while improving the Tier 1 capital position of the bank and hence supporting the return to viability of the bank.
In the ING case, given that the bank recently launched a €7.5 billion capital increase aimed at repaying more than 50% of the capital injection of the Dutch State (including the accrued interests and exit premium fee), it will not be obliged to defer coupon payments on Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments. Nevertheless, for the next three years or as long as ING will not have repaid the entire capital injection of the Dutch State (whichever is shorter), the calling of Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments will have to be authorised by the Commission on a case by case basis. The Commission took note that the bank called a lower Tier 2 bond on 14 October 2009 without prior consultation. This was taken into consideration in the overall appreciation of the restructuring package.

EUROPA - Press Releases - State aid: Commission decisions on KBC, ING and Lloyds – frequently asked questions
 

reef

...
In the ING case, given that the bank recently launched a €7.5 billion capital increase aimed at repaying more than 50% of the capital injection of the Dutch State (including the accrued interests and exit premium fee), it will not be obliged to defer coupon payments on Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments. Nevertheless, for the next three years or as long as ING will not have repaid the entire capital injection of the Dutch State (whichever is shorter), the calling of Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments will have to be authorised by the Commission on a case by case basis. The Commission took note that the bank called a lower Tier 2 bond on 14 October 2009 without prior consultation. This was taken into consideration in the overall appreciation of the restructuring package.

Mi pare non sia male.
Riguardo a ciò che ho evidenziato, forse non capisco così bene l'inglese... E' una tirata d'orecchie?
E il fatto che ne è stato tenuto conto cosa significa?
 

bosmeld

Forumer storico
In the Lloyds case, the Commission received a commitment from the bank not to pay investors any coupon on Tier 1 and Tier 2 instruments or exercise any call option rights in relation to those instruments between 31 January 2010 and 31 January 2012, unless there is a legal obligation to do so. Such restriction also applies to newly issued instruments offered in exchange for existing instruments. There is however a specific exception for certain hybrid instruments to be issued in the context of the global recapitalisation package of Lloyds. This exception is justified due to the presence of a mandatory conversion feature into ordinary shares in case of financial stress, which provides an adequate burden sharing mechanism, while supporting the return to viability of the bank. In case of doubt, the Commission will be consulted.


EUROPA - Press Releases - State aid: Commission decisions on KBC, ING and Lloyds – frequently asked questions


intanto grazie a varoon per le news:up::up:

leggendo questo, si dice chiaramente che llyods, non pagherà le cedole fino a gennaio 2012....

bisogna vedere adesso se le quotazioni saranno influenzate da ciò...

per di più si parla di TIER 1 e TIER 2.... stanno sulla stessa barca...


per quanto rigurda i titoli cumulativi sono curioso di vedere che faranno...



MOLTO BENE INVECE ING:up::up:


per l'affermazione riguardo alla call della lt2 per me non c'è da proccuparsi. loro stessi dicono di averne già tenuto conto nel piano di ristrutturazione
 

ferdo

Utente Senior
intanto grazie a varoon per le news:up::up:
leggendo questo, si dice chiaramente che llyods, non pagherà le cedole fino a gennaio 2012....
bisogna vedere adesso se le quotazioni saranno influenzate da ciò...
per di più si parla di TIER 1 e TIER 2.... stanno sulla stessa barca...
per quanto rigurda i titoli cumulativi sono curioso di vedere che faranno...
MOLTO BENE INVECE ING:up::up:
per l'affermazione riguardo alla call della lt2 per me non c'è da proccuparsi. loro stessi dicono di averne già tenuto conto nel piano di ristrutturazione

Chissà per la XS0156923913 - però ricordo che era cumulativa - se non erro.
 

Mais78

BAWAG fan club
Mi pare non sia male.
Riguardo a ciò che ho evidenziato, forse non capisco così bene l'inglese... E' una tirata d'orecchie?
E il fatto che ne è stato tenuto conto cosa significa?

Un po' ambigua ma pare di si, probabilmente hanno chiesto la consultazione in futuro proprio perche' hanno fatto lo scherzetto ad ottobre (altrimenti ING avrebbe potuto richiamare senza consultarsi??)
 

bosmeld

Forumer storico
Kbc: Ue approva dismissione Centea Bank, divisione assicurativa Fidea
BRUXELLES (MF-DJ)--La Commissione Europea ha approvato la revisione radicale della banca belga e societa' assicurativa Kbc ed ha richiesto alla banca di vendere buona parte dei suoi non-core asset in cambio degli aiuti statali ricevuti durante la crisi finanziaria. Kbc dovra' dismettere un "numero significativo" di business, tra i quali alcuni dell'Europa Centrale ed Orientale, ha affermato la commissione senza fornire ulteriori dettagli. Kbc vendera' anche il suo business bancario belga Centea e l'unita' assicurativa belga Fidea. Gli aiuti ricevuti dai governi regionali sono di 7 mld euro. red/est/bia (END) Dow Jones Newswires November 18, 2009 05:59 ET (10:59 GMT) Copyright (c) 2009 MF-Dow Jones News Srl.

*Kbc: intende ridistribuire dividendo dal 2011
*Kbc: mantenute opzioni crescita in Europa dell'Est
*Kbc: piu' focalizzati su core business, meno livello rischio
*Kbc: Ceo, ci focalizzeremo su Belgio e 5 Paesi Cee
*Kbc: Ceo, venderemo Kbl
*Kbc: Ceo, crescita organica senza grandi acquisizioni
*Kbc: Ceo; focus su Belgio, R.Ceca, Polonia, Ungheria, Slovacchia e Bulgaria
*Kbc: non vendera' asset in Russa e in Serbia a breve
*Kbc: vendera' Zagiel in Polonia
 
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