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Ultima modifica:
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 2 (1 Viewer)
- Creatore Discussione caligola2005
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
mavalà
Forumer storico
S&P su SNS ... (per chi gli da retta)
Da notare che 1) battezzano il T1 della Bank un notch sopra il T1 della Reaal,
e che 2) considererebbero motivo di positiva review se gli allungano la deadline del rimborso senza imposizioni esterne:
S&P revises SNS REAAL outlook to negative
Fri Jul 20, 2012 4:32pm BST
(The following statement was released by the rating agency)
Overview
-- We note Netherlands-based bancassurance group SNS REAAL N.V.'s
announcement that it is undertaking a strategic review.
-- We are revising the outlook on SNS REAAL and its subsidiary SNS Bank
N.V. to negative from stable and affirming most of the ratings on both
entities.
-- We are also placing the ratings on the hybrid instruments of both
entities on CreditWatch negative, pending the outcome of the strategic review
and its impact on the instruments.
-- The negative outlook on SNS REAAL and SNS Bank is based on our view
that the possible sale of some of the group's business activities could weaken
its overall franchise and earnings diversification. It also incorporates some
downside risk to our assessment of the bank's business position.
Rating Action
On July 20, 2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Netherlands-based bancassurance group SNS REAAL N.V. (SNS REAAL, or the group)
and its subsidiary SNS Bank N.V to negative from stable. At the same time, we
affirmed the 'BBB/A-3' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on SNS
REAAL and the 'BBB+/A-2' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
SNS Bank.
In addition, the 'BB+' and 'BBB-' ratings on the junior subordinated debt of
both entities were placed on CreditWatch negative. All other debt ratings have
been affirmed.
The ratings on the group's insurance entities have been placed on CreditWatch
developing, due to uncertainty over their future ownership, structure, and
composition (see "Ratings On Netherlands-Based SNS REAAL Group Insurance
Entities On CreditWatch Developing On Announced Strategic Review," published
today on RatingsDirect).
Rationale
The outlook revision primarily reflects our view that SNS REAAL may consider
some options as a result of its strategic review that could weaken its overall
franchise and earnings diversification. The possibility of business disposals
was highlighted in the group's market update of July 13, 2012. We believe that
the group could consider options such as the sale of parts or all of its
insurance operations, which we view as having a stronger credit profile
compared with the bank. We understand that the purpose of any business
disposal would be to facilitate the repayment by end-2013 of the capital
securities received from the Dutch government in November 2008. As we had
highlighted in previous publications earlier this year, we believe that the
current economic backdrop makes the commitment to repay the government
securities a more onerous undertaking, despite the group's rapid progress
against its initial capital release program.
The ratings on SNS REAAL are based on our view of the combined strength of its
banking and insurance operations. They are underpinned, to some extent, by our
view of the relatively stronger profile of the insurance operations compared
to the bank. The group's life and non-life operations (SRLEV N.V. and REAAL
Schadeverzekeringen) currently have a stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of
'a', compared with the bank, which has an SACP of 'bbb'. We believe that the
execution of some insurance asset disposals could lead to a weakening of the
overall group's franchise and earnings quality. In addition, the issuer credit
ratings (ICRs) on the group and the bank would be more sensitive to
developments that affect the bank's SACP.
At the bank level, we see some downside risk to our "adequate" assessment of
the bank's business position, including possible strategic distraction due to
its business disposals. We also incorporate this into our negative outlook on
SNS Bank and SNS REAAL.
Under our criteria, the ICR on SNS Bank benefits from one notch of group
support above its SACP, underpinned by the size and our view of the relatively
stronger profile of its sister insurance companies. As a result of the group
support approach followed, we do not factor any uplift for potential
extraordinary government support into the ratings on SNS Bank. Nevertheless,
we consider that the bank has "moderate" systemic importance in The
Netherlands, a country that we consider to be "supportive" to its banking
system, as our criteria define these terms. As a result, if we did not factor
group support into the ratings on the bank, the ICR could still benefit from a
one-notch uplift above its SACP under our government support approach.
Along with other insurance holding companies in the group, we rate SNS REAAL
one notch below the operating entities in line with our criteria for rating
nonoperating holding companies.
Outlook
The negative outlook on SNS REAAL and SNS Bank primarily reflects our view
that SNS REAAL may consider some options as a result of its strategic review
that could weaken its overall franchise and earnings diversification.
Some downside risk to the bank's SACP could arise, for example, if we revised
our assessment of its business position to "moderate" from "adequate" based on
evidence of erosion in its franchise or strategic distraction due to business
sales. We could lower the ratings on the group and the bank if their liquidity
position or overall capitalization were to weaken.
We would likely revise our outlook to stable if we saw:
-- A reduction in the bank's impairment charges to a level that we
consider to be more supportive of meaningful capital generation by the bank;
-- An extension of the deadline for the repayment of the government
capital securities without materially adverse conditions being imposed by the
national or European authorities; or
-- Other evidence of the group's ability to meet its capital repayment
commitment without materially eroding its franchise.
CreditWatch
We expect to resolve the CreditWatch on the ratings on SNS REAAL and SNS
Bank's hybrid instruments once we have more insight into the likely outcome of
the strategic review and its likely impact on the risk profile of these
instruments.
Resolution of the CreditWatch could result in a downgrade of the instruments
by at least one notch. If we were to include uplift for government, rather
than group, support in the ICRs on both entities--for example, if the group
were to sell a large part or all of its insurance operations--we would not
factor any government support into the ratings on the hybrids. If the group
were granted an extension of the deadline for the repayment of the government
capital securities we would also try and assess whether possible EC-imposed
conditions would affect coupon payment on the hybrids.
Related Criteria And Research
-- Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
-- Group Rating Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
-- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Methodology And Assumptions,
Nov. 9, 2011
-- Bank Hybrid Capital Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 1, 2011
-- Interactive Ratings Methodology, April 22, 2009
Ratings List
Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
To From
SNS REAAL N.V.
Counterparty Credit Rating BBB/Negative/A-3 BBB/Stable/A-3
Junior Subordinated BB+/Watch Neg BB+
Senior Unsecured BBB
Subordinated BBB-
SNS Bank N.V.
Counterparty Credit Rating BBB+/Negative/A-2 BBB+/Stable/A-2
Certificate Of Deposit BBB+/A-2
Junior Subordinated BBB-/Watch Neg BBB-
Senior Unsecured BBB+
Subordinated BBB
Commercial Paper A-2
Da notare che 1) battezzano il T1 della Bank un notch sopra il T1 della Reaal,
e che 2) considererebbero motivo di positiva review se gli allungano la deadline del rimborso senza imposizioni esterne:
S&P revises SNS REAAL outlook to negative
Fri Jul 20, 2012 4:32pm BST
(The following statement was released by the rating agency)
Overview
-- We note Netherlands-based bancassurance group SNS REAAL N.V.'s
announcement that it is undertaking a strategic review.
-- We are revising the outlook on SNS REAAL and its subsidiary SNS Bank
N.V. to negative from stable and affirming most of the ratings on both
entities.
-- We are also placing the ratings on the hybrid instruments of both
entities on CreditWatch negative, pending the outcome of the strategic review
and its impact on the instruments.
-- The negative outlook on SNS REAAL and SNS Bank is based on our view
that the possible sale of some of the group's business activities could weaken
its overall franchise and earnings diversification. It also incorporates some
downside risk to our assessment of the bank's business position.
Rating Action
On July 20, 2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services revised its outlook on
Netherlands-based bancassurance group SNS REAAL N.V. (SNS REAAL, or the group)
and its subsidiary SNS Bank N.V to negative from stable. At the same time, we
affirmed the 'BBB/A-3' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on SNS
REAAL and the 'BBB+/A-2' long- and short-term counterparty credit ratings on
SNS Bank.
In addition, the 'BB+' and 'BBB-' ratings on the junior subordinated debt of
both entities were placed on CreditWatch negative. All other debt ratings have
been affirmed.
The ratings on the group's insurance entities have been placed on CreditWatch
developing, due to uncertainty over their future ownership, structure, and
composition (see "Ratings On Netherlands-Based SNS REAAL Group Insurance
Entities On CreditWatch Developing On Announced Strategic Review," published
today on RatingsDirect).
Rationale
The outlook revision primarily reflects our view that SNS REAAL may consider
some options as a result of its strategic review that could weaken its overall
franchise and earnings diversification. The possibility of business disposals
was highlighted in the group's market update of July 13, 2012. We believe that
the group could consider options such as the sale of parts or all of its
insurance operations, which we view as having a stronger credit profile
compared with the bank. We understand that the purpose of any business
disposal would be to facilitate the repayment by end-2013 of the capital
securities received from the Dutch government in November 2008. As we had
highlighted in previous publications earlier this year, we believe that the
current economic backdrop makes the commitment to repay the government
securities a more onerous undertaking, despite the group's rapid progress
against its initial capital release program.
The ratings on SNS REAAL are based on our view of the combined strength of its
banking and insurance operations. They are underpinned, to some extent, by our
view of the relatively stronger profile of the insurance operations compared
to the bank. The group's life and non-life operations (SRLEV N.V. and REAAL
Schadeverzekeringen) currently have a stand-alone credit profile (SACP) of
'a', compared with the bank, which has an SACP of 'bbb'. We believe that the
execution of some insurance asset disposals could lead to a weakening of the
overall group's franchise and earnings quality. In addition, the issuer credit
ratings (ICRs) on the group and the bank would be more sensitive to
developments that affect the bank's SACP.
At the bank level, we see some downside risk to our "adequate" assessment of
the bank's business position, including possible strategic distraction due to
its business disposals. We also incorporate this into our negative outlook on
SNS Bank and SNS REAAL.
Under our criteria, the ICR on SNS Bank benefits from one notch of group
support above its SACP, underpinned by the size and our view of the relatively
stronger profile of its sister insurance companies. As a result of the group
support approach followed, we do not factor any uplift for potential
extraordinary government support into the ratings on SNS Bank. Nevertheless,
we consider that the bank has "moderate" systemic importance in The
Netherlands, a country that we consider to be "supportive" to its banking
system, as our criteria define these terms. As a result, if we did not factor
group support into the ratings on the bank, the ICR could still benefit from a
one-notch uplift above its SACP under our government support approach.
Along with other insurance holding companies in the group, we rate SNS REAAL
one notch below the operating entities in line with our criteria for rating
nonoperating holding companies.
Outlook
The negative outlook on SNS REAAL and SNS Bank primarily reflects our view
that SNS REAAL may consider some options as a result of its strategic review
that could weaken its overall franchise and earnings diversification.
Some downside risk to the bank's SACP could arise, for example, if we revised
our assessment of its business position to "moderate" from "adequate" based on
evidence of erosion in its franchise or strategic distraction due to business
sales. We could lower the ratings on the group and the bank if their liquidity
position or overall capitalization were to weaken.
We would likely revise our outlook to stable if we saw:
-- A reduction in the bank's impairment charges to a level that we
consider to be more supportive of meaningful capital generation by the bank;
-- An extension of the deadline for the repayment of the government
capital securities without materially adverse conditions being imposed by the
national or European authorities; or
-- Other evidence of the group's ability to meet its capital repayment
commitment without materially eroding its franchise.
CreditWatch
We expect to resolve the CreditWatch on the ratings on SNS REAAL and SNS
Bank's hybrid instruments once we have more insight into the likely outcome of
the strategic review and its likely impact on the risk profile of these
instruments.
Resolution of the CreditWatch could result in a downgrade of the instruments
by at least one notch. If we were to include uplift for government, rather
than group, support in the ICRs on both entities--for example, if the group
were to sell a large part or all of its insurance operations--we would not
factor any government support into the ratings on the hybrids. If the group
were granted an extension of the deadline for the repayment of the government
capital securities we would also try and assess whether possible EC-imposed
conditions would affect coupon payment on the hybrids.
Related Criteria And Research
-- Banks: Rating Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
-- Group Rating Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 9, 2011
-- Banking Industry Country Risk Assessment Methodology And Assumptions,
Nov. 9, 2011
-- Bank Hybrid Capital Methodology And Assumptions, Nov. 1, 2011
-- Interactive Ratings Methodology, April 22, 2009
Ratings List
Ratings Affirmed; CreditWatch/Outlook Action
To From
SNS REAAL N.V.
Counterparty Credit Rating BBB/Negative/A-3 BBB/Stable/A-3
Junior Subordinated BB+/Watch Neg BB+
Senior Unsecured BBB
Subordinated BBB-
SNS Bank N.V.
Counterparty Credit Rating BBB+/Negative/A-2 BBB+/Stable/A-2
Certificate Of Deposit BBB+/A-2
Junior Subordinated BBB-/Watch Neg BBB-
Senior Unsecured BBB+
Subordinated BBB
Commercial Paper A-2
mavalà
Forumer storico
S&P sulla Regione Sicilia
buffo l'inizio:
per quello che sanno (publicly available information) confermano il rating,
ma poi in pratica dicono che, siccome le informazioni sulla Sicilia sono .... fumose (lack of sufficient information from Sicily), allora sospendono i giudizi.
Forse, quel 'lack of info' è perche chi doveva parlare non può piu farlo ?
S&P affirms, then suspends Sicily 'BBB+' rating
Fri Jul 20, 2012 10:35pm BST
(The following statement was released by the rating agency)
Overview
-- Based on publicly available information, we are of the view that the
Region of Sicily likely didn't meet our forecast expectations during 2012,
though such underperformance doesn't appear under our criteria to warrant a
lowering of the rating.
-- We have therefore affirmed our 'BBB+' long-term rating on Sicily.
-- However, owing to lack of sufficient information from Sicily, we have
also determined to suspend the rating.
-- We may reinstate the rating once we've met with government officials
and received sufficient information to assess Sicily's creditworthiness.
Rating Action
On July 20, 2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed, based on
publicly available information, its 'BBB+' long-term issuer credit rating on
the Italian Region of Sicily. The outlook remains negative.
We subsequently suspended the rating because we lack sufficient information to
maintain appropriate surveillance.
Rationale
The rating actions follow the recent public availability of information that
leads us to believe that Sicily likely didn't meet our forecast expectations
in 2012. We also took into account the Italian central government's (Italy;
unsolicited ratings BBB+/Negative/A-2) recent announcement that it will
transfer close to EUR400 million to Sicily. We understand that the central
government owed this amount to Sicily for payments that Sicily had previously
made.
Based on publicly available information at the time of suspension, we also
revised our assessment of Sicily's indicative credit level (ICL) to 'bbb+'
from 'a+'. The ICL is not a rating but a means of assessing the intrinsic
creditworthiness of a local and regional government (LRG) under the assumption
that there is no sovereign rating cap. The ICL results from the combination of
our assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the benefits we see
of the institutional framework where it operates.
The revision of the ICL reflects our view that financial management now has a
negative impact on the rating owing to the current lack of sufficient
disclosure.
The rating suspension is owing to what we believe is a temporary lack of a
sufficient and timely flow of information from the region, that would permit
us to carry out our surveillance on the credit.
We would expect to reinstate the rating if we receive what we view as the
currently lacking information within the next three months. If we determine
that it is unlikely that we will receive the missing information within that
period, we would likely withdraw the rating.
Outlook
At the time of suspension, the negative outlook on Sicily mirrored that on
Italy. It also reflected our view that current domestic economic conditions
could constrain Sicily's creditworthiness, particularly its tax base.
Related Criteria And Research
-- Methodology For Rating International Local And Regional Governments,
Sept. 20, 2010
-- Methodology: Rating A Regional Or Local Government Higher Than Its
Sovereign, Sept. 9, 2009
Ratings List
Ratings Affirmed
Sicily (Region of)
Issuer Credit Rating BBB+/Negative/--
Senior Unsecured BBB+
Ratings Subsequently Suspended
To From
Sicily (Region of)
Issuer Credit Rating NR BBB+/Negative/--
Senior Unsecured NR BBB+
(Caryn Trokie, New York Ratings Unit)
buffo l'inizio:
per quello che sanno (publicly available information) confermano il rating,
ma poi in pratica dicono che, siccome le informazioni sulla Sicilia sono .... fumose (lack of sufficient information from Sicily), allora sospendono i giudizi.
Forse, quel 'lack of info' è perche chi doveva parlare non può piu farlo ?
S&P affirms, then suspends Sicily 'BBB+' rating
Fri Jul 20, 2012 10:35pm BST
(The following statement was released by the rating agency)
Overview
-- Based on publicly available information, we are of the view that the
Region of Sicily likely didn't meet our forecast expectations during 2012,
though such underperformance doesn't appear under our criteria to warrant a
lowering of the rating.
-- We have therefore affirmed our 'BBB+' long-term rating on Sicily.
-- However, owing to lack of sufficient information from Sicily, we have
also determined to suspend the rating.
-- We may reinstate the rating once we've met with government officials
and received sufficient information to assess Sicily's creditworthiness.
Rating Action
On July 20, 2012, Standard & Poor's Ratings Services affirmed, based on
publicly available information, its 'BBB+' long-term issuer credit rating on
the Italian Region of Sicily. The outlook remains negative.
We subsequently suspended the rating because we lack sufficient information to
maintain appropriate surveillance.
Rationale
The rating actions follow the recent public availability of information that
leads us to believe that Sicily likely didn't meet our forecast expectations
in 2012. We also took into account the Italian central government's (Italy;
unsolicited ratings BBB+/Negative/A-2) recent announcement that it will
transfer close to EUR400 million to Sicily. We understand that the central
government owed this amount to Sicily for payments that Sicily had previously
made.
Based on publicly available information at the time of suspension, we also
revised our assessment of Sicily's indicative credit level (ICL) to 'bbb+'
from 'a+'. The ICL is not a rating but a means of assessing the intrinsic
creditworthiness of a local and regional government (LRG) under the assumption
that there is no sovereign rating cap. The ICL results from the combination of
our assessment of an LRG's individual credit profile and the benefits we see
of the institutional framework where it operates.
The revision of the ICL reflects our view that financial management now has a
negative impact on the rating owing to the current lack of sufficient
disclosure.
The rating suspension is owing to what we believe is a temporary lack of a
sufficient and timely flow of information from the region, that would permit
us to carry out our surveillance on the credit.
We would expect to reinstate the rating if we receive what we view as the
currently lacking information within the next three months. If we determine
that it is unlikely that we will receive the missing information within that
period, we would likely withdraw the rating.
Outlook
At the time of suspension, the negative outlook on Sicily mirrored that on
Italy. It also reflected our view that current domestic economic conditions
could constrain Sicily's creditworthiness, particularly its tax base.
Related Criteria And Research
-- Methodology For Rating International Local And Regional Governments,
Sept. 20, 2010
-- Methodology: Rating A Regional Or Local Government Higher Than Its
Sovereign, Sept. 9, 2009
Ratings List
Ratings Affirmed
Sicily (Region of)
Issuer Credit Rating BBB+/Negative/--
Senior Unsecured BBB+
Ratings Subsequently Suspended
To From
Sicily (Region of)
Issuer Credit Rating NR BBB+/Negative/--
Senior Unsecured NR BBB+
(Caryn Trokie, New York Ratings Unit)
cumulate
Forumer storico
ne sono da sempre convinto
la finanza anglossassone che muove miliardi da tutte le parti del mondo (dalle isolette della manica, ai cuori pulsanti della city e di NY) deve fare i soldi in qualche modo.
Nell'ultimo lustro (dopo il crack Lehman) lo sport preferito è stato l'euro.
Purtroppo la risposta delle istituzioni non è mai tempestiva ne efficace
solovaloreaggiunto
Forumer storico
Generali prima o poi farà un bel aumento di capitale da 3/4 bn .. Se ne parla da mesi.. Alla fine è la cosa piu saggia, sperando che mb abbia gli sghei per sottoscriverlo. Questo , come al solito va a tutto vantaggio dei t1 e lt2 .. Non a caso, in questo torrido fine luglio sui btp, il nuovo 10,125 si è parcheggiato sopra la parità ...qualcosa vorrà dire. Short equity generali, long t1 e lt2
camaleonte
Forumer storico
Il pensiero di Pimco ma, preferisco quello di Bosmeld.
MERCOLEDI' 13 LUGLIO 2011
Crisi: Pimco scommette su titoli Stato Italia (Die Welt)
"Esagerati" trend recenti sul reddito fisso italiano (Il Sole 24 Ore Radiocor) - Milano, 13 lug - Pimco, primo bond fund manager al mondo, scommette sull'Italia e sulla capacita' del Paese di superare la crisi, comprando titoli di Stato italiani. Lo dice Andrew Bosomworth, numero uno della gestione di portafoglio di Pimco (gruppo Alllianz), al quotidiano tedesco 'Die Welt', aggiungendo che, secondo Pimco, che ha fondi in gestione per mille miliardi di dollari, il recente sell-off di titoli di Stato italiani "e' eccessivo da un punto di vista dei fondamentali" e che queste fasi di turbolenza "sono state sfruttate per acquisti". "L'Italia non e' la Grecia" e "non e' nella stessa barca degli altri Paesi periferici", afferma Bosomworth, pur sottolineando che la situazione sul mercato dei capitali e' "critica". L'Italia ha accumulato livelli di debito molto elevati che deve essere rifinanziato, con forti volumi, ogni anno. Il Paese non puo' quindi permettersi di restare tagliato fuori dal mercato: tuttavia, la situazione a Roma non e' paragonabile con quella greca. "In tutti e due i casi il problema principale e' il debito elevato, ma il deficit di bilancio italiano e' piu' basso e il gettito fiscale corrente molto piu' alto. Inoltre, buona parte del debito pubblico e' detenuto all'interno". Pimco non aveva a tutt'oggi una significativa esposizione sui titoli di Stato italiani e spagnoli, mentre la capogruppo, la compagnia assicurativa tedesca Allianz, e' esposta per circa 28 miliardi di euro nel reddito fisso italiano. Red-mir- (RADIOCOR) 13-07-11 14:04:34 (0237) 5 NNNN
Visualizza altro Crisi: Pimco scommette su titoli Stato Italia (Die Welt) | Radiocor, mercoledi' 13 luglio 2011 (articolo 956352)
MERCOLEDI' 13 LUGLIO 2011
Crisi: Pimco scommette su titoli Stato Italia (Die Welt)
"Esagerati" trend recenti sul reddito fisso italiano (Il Sole 24 Ore Radiocor) - Milano, 13 lug - Pimco, primo bond fund manager al mondo, scommette sull'Italia e sulla capacita' del Paese di superare la crisi, comprando titoli di Stato italiani. Lo dice Andrew Bosomworth, numero uno della gestione di portafoglio di Pimco (gruppo Alllianz), al quotidiano tedesco 'Die Welt', aggiungendo che, secondo Pimco, che ha fondi in gestione per mille miliardi di dollari, il recente sell-off di titoli di Stato italiani "e' eccessivo da un punto di vista dei fondamentali" e che queste fasi di turbolenza "sono state sfruttate per acquisti". "L'Italia non e' la Grecia" e "non e' nella stessa barca degli altri Paesi periferici", afferma Bosomworth, pur sottolineando che la situazione sul mercato dei capitali e' "critica". L'Italia ha accumulato livelli di debito molto elevati che deve essere rifinanziato, con forti volumi, ogni anno. Il Paese non puo' quindi permettersi di restare tagliato fuori dal mercato: tuttavia, la situazione a Roma non e' paragonabile con quella greca. "In tutti e due i casi il problema principale e' il debito elevato, ma il deficit di bilancio italiano e' piu' basso e il gettito fiscale corrente molto piu' alto. Inoltre, buona parte del debito pubblico e' detenuto all'interno". Pimco non aveva a tutt'oggi una significativa esposizione sui titoli di Stato italiani e spagnoli, mentre la capogruppo, la compagnia assicurativa tedesca Allianz, e' esposta per circa 28 miliardi di euro nel reddito fisso italiano. Red-mir- (RADIOCOR) 13-07-11 14:04:34 (0237) 5 NNNN
Visualizza altro Crisi: Pimco scommette su titoli Stato Italia (Die Welt) | Radiocor, mercoledi' 13 luglio 2011 (articolo 956352)
Vet
Forumer storico
Se non erro Allianz e' il primo possessore di tds nostrani subito dopo le ns banche........ Mi auguro vivamente che non faccia come la sua connazionale DB l'anno scorso ......che emetteva dei report consigliando di acquistare i tds italici.......mentre li vendeva a tutto spiano.......el alamein insegna in merito agli "amici" crucchi.....
claudioborghi
Twitter: @borghi_claudio
Centrato il puntoTutta l'europa periferica è in fila per svuotare le proprie banche e portare i quattrini da lei. Il migliore dei mondi possibili. Ci ha riempito dei suoi prodotti, ha incenerito la concorrenza, adesso pulisce i cassetti con i soldi che restano e poi tanti saluti. E ci sentiamo pure in colpa.
E mi tocca pure sentire Giannino che pure è meglio dei tassatori dire che dovevamo essere come la germania. Ma benedetto figliolo, ammesso e non concesso che fosse possibile riuscirci, se in Europa c'erano 12 Germanie, senza un universo parallelo con dodici Spagne mi spiega come facevano ad essere tutti esportatori? Il sistema Europa è come le gabbie del wrestling dove alla fine vince uno. As simple as that.
E, come dici tu, il fatto che fino ad ora nessuna evidenza mi dice che ho torto (vedi esempio bufala ultimo vertice) mi fa venire il sospetto che abbia ragione
Comunque, sempre in spirito domenicale, mia intervista dove racconto cose a voi note
http://www.ilsussidiario.net/News/E...un-altro-92-dobbiamo-uscire-dall-euro/304432/
Ultima modifica:
- Stato