mac
Forumer storico
Isin XS0119643897- sono 2 settimane che cerco di vendere queste BAWAG- liquide su EXTRA e Stoccarda. Però IWBANK non ha mai controparti! Com'è possibile?
... idem...
Mi domando come hanno fatto a vendercele
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
... idem...
Mi domando come hanno fatto a vendercele
eporedia
Nuovo forumer
bosmeld
Forumer storico
Idea non è cambiata di molto, resta una banca molto debole e l'unica speranza è che arrivi qualcun altro a tirarla fuori dai guai
è quindi una scommessa pure
ora scommetere 99 per recuperare 1 non mi pareva una grande idea, considerando poi che c'era la necessità di andare in size per vedere gain decenti. Io infatti la senior non l'ho toccata.
prendere 20k per fare 200 euro mi sembrava inutile. prendere size mi sembrava troppo rischioso per il gain che offriva
Semplicemente ho messo in guardia dai possibili rischi, visto che mi sembrava che il 95% pensava semplicemente che non ce ne fossero di rischi sulla senior
qui sul sub c'è la situazione opposta, il 95% considera giustamente sto bond rischiosissimo. Nei prezzi la situazione di forte difficoltà di banca marche è ben visibilile. La scommessa è più rischiosa ma anche più remunerativa. (quello che piace a me)
essendo però proprio una scommessa 1 lotto ho preso e 1 lotto resta, Ben conscio che lo possiamo rivedere anche a 0
fabriziof
Forumer storico
oggi
Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena’s Challenging Restructuring Plan Is Credit Negative
for Subordinated Bondholders
Last Monday, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS, B2 negative, E/caa3)5
published its 2013-17
restructuring plan, prepared under guidelines agreed upon with the European Commission (EC). The plan
faces higher implementation obstacles than MPS’s 2012-15 restructuring plan. We believe the plan has high
execution risks, and a failure to raise the required capital from private shareholders would force the Italian
Treasury to become a shareholder and likely cause subordinated creditors to sustain a loss in the event of a
bank rescue.
From details disclosed so far, the entire restructuring plan hinges on the success of a planned €2.5 billion
share issue in 2014, which we believe will be a challenge without the emergence of a “white knight”
investor. So far, no such investor has appeared.
If the capital increase is unsuccessful, the Italian Treasury would partly convert into equity the €4.1 billion
of state aid it has granted to MPS. In such an event, there is a heightened risk that European or Italian
authorities would require subordinated creditors to share the cost of the recapitalisation. MPS has about
€30 billion in senior subordinated debt outstanding and €6 billion in preferred stock and junior
subordinated debt, and has already stopped payment of non-cumulative coupons on its preferred stock.
Proceeds from the share issue would be used in 2014 to repay €3 billion of the expensive (9% coupon, with
step-up) €4.1 billion of state aid that MPS has already received. Repayment would potentially reduce MPS’s
cost of funding by strengthening its creditworthiness and reducing bail-in risk.
Full details of the plan – particularly related to revenues – will only be disclosed after the EC’s final and
formal approval of the plan, which we expect in mid-November. But in addition to the share issue, other
elements appear very challenging given the adverse operating environment, including the following:
» The 50% cost-to-income target for 2017 (from 80% in 2012), considering that the bank’s brand has
suffered and that this will constrain revenues
» A planned headcount reduction of 5,300 (in addition to 2,700 since 2011) to cut costs, which will likely
encounter strong union opposition
» The €900 million net income target for 2017 (from a €3.2 billion loss in 2012), which will be
constrained by significant deleveraging and a required reduction of MPS’s loan-to-deposit ratio by 34
percentage points to 100%
» The 9% return on tangible equity target, which, even if MPS achieves, will still be lower than the cost of
capital
for Subordinated Bondholders
Last Monday, Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena (MPS, B2 negative, E/caa3)5
published its 2013-17
restructuring plan, prepared under guidelines agreed upon with the European Commission (EC). The plan
faces higher implementation obstacles than MPS’s 2012-15 restructuring plan. We believe the plan has high
execution risks, and a failure to raise the required capital from private shareholders would force the Italian
Treasury to become a shareholder and likely cause subordinated creditors to sustain a loss in the event of a
bank rescue.
From details disclosed so far, the entire restructuring plan hinges on the success of a planned €2.5 billion
share issue in 2014, which we believe will be a challenge without the emergence of a “white knight”
investor. So far, no such investor has appeared.
If the capital increase is unsuccessful, the Italian Treasury would partly convert into equity the €4.1 billion
of state aid it has granted to MPS. In such an event, there is a heightened risk that European or Italian
authorities would require subordinated creditors to share the cost of the recapitalisation. MPS has about
€30 billion in senior subordinated debt outstanding and €6 billion in preferred stock and junior
subordinated debt, and has already stopped payment of non-cumulative coupons on its preferred stock.
Proceeds from the share issue would be used in 2014 to repay €3 billion of the expensive (9% coupon, with
step-up) €4.1 billion of state aid that MPS has already received. Repayment would potentially reduce MPS’s
cost of funding by strengthening its creditworthiness and reducing bail-in risk.
Full details of the plan – particularly related to revenues – will only be disclosed after the EC’s final and
formal approval of the plan, which we expect in mid-November. But in addition to the share issue, other
elements appear very challenging given the adverse operating environment, including the following:
» The 50% cost-to-income target for 2017 (from 80% in 2012), considering that the bank’s brand has
suffered and that this will constrain revenues
» A planned headcount reduction of 5,300 (in addition to 2,700 since 2011) to cut costs, which will likely
encounter strong union opposition
» The €900 million net income target for 2017 (from a €3.2 billion loss in 2012), which will be
constrained by significant deleveraging and a required reduction of MPS’s loan-to-deposit ratio by 34
percentage points to 100%
» The 9% return on tangible equity target, which, even if MPS achieves, will still be lower than the cost of
capital
CreVal’s Decision Not to Proceed with an Acquisition of Banca Tercas Is Credit
Positive
Last Tuesday, the board of directors of Credito Valtellinese (CreVal, Ba3 negative, E+/b1 stable)6
decided
not to proceed with an acquisition of Banca Tercas (unrated), a troubled bank that has been under the
administration of the Bank of Italy since April 2012. CreVal’s decision is credit positive because it will
avoid increased risks, added complexity, integration challenges and lower capital ratios that would have
emerged with the acquisition given Italy’s recessionary environment.
CreVal’s decision also indicates that the bank was able to reach an independent decision based on the merits
of the possible acquisition free of regulatory influence. This addresses a concern in the market that healthier
Italian banks might come under political pressure to acquire weak institutions to preserve the stability of
Italy’s financial system at the expense of their own credit quality.
So far, CreVal has withstood the pressure on asset quality and earnings that has emerged in the Italian
banking system. However, CreVal’s earnings have been affected by a rise in nonperforming loans and the
low interest rate environment. CreVal also has avoided growth from acquisitions since 2008, and its
decision not to acquire Tercas is a further sign of its limited risk appetite.
CreVal’s decision highlights that Italian regulators will find it challenging to find buyers for other banks
that have recently entered administration, including Banca delle Marche S.p.A. (Caa1 review for
downgrade, E/ca), Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara (unrated) and Banca Popolare di Spoleto (unrated). In the
past, the acquisition of weaker banks by stronger banks in the system had helped avoid government
intervention. Such was the case in Intesa Sanpaolo Spa’s (Baa2 negative, D+/baa3 negative) 2011
acquisition of Banca Monte Parma (unrated), which at the time was facing a capital shortfall.
CreVal’s decision also increases the uncertainties regarding the conclusion of Tercas’ administration.
Without the intervention of an external investor, the risk to bondholders is high. Since the Bank of Italy
placed Tercas into administration in April 2012, Tercas has not released any financial information. As such,
we are not aware of the amount of capital that may be needed by the bank to return to a regular activity and
exit administration.
Positive
Last Tuesday, the board of directors of Credito Valtellinese (CreVal, Ba3 negative, E+/b1 stable)6
decided
not to proceed with an acquisition of Banca Tercas (unrated), a troubled bank that has been under the
administration of the Bank of Italy since April 2012. CreVal’s decision is credit positive because it will
avoid increased risks, added complexity, integration challenges and lower capital ratios that would have
emerged with the acquisition given Italy’s recessionary environment.
CreVal’s decision also indicates that the bank was able to reach an independent decision based on the merits
of the possible acquisition free of regulatory influence. This addresses a concern in the market that healthier
Italian banks might come under political pressure to acquire weak institutions to preserve the stability of
Italy’s financial system at the expense of their own credit quality.
So far, CreVal has withstood the pressure on asset quality and earnings that has emerged in the Italian
banking system. However, CreVal’s earnings have been affected by a rise in nonperforming loans and the
low interest rate environment. CreVal also has avoided growth from acquisitions since 2008, and its
decision not to acquire Tercas is a further sign of its limited risk appetite.
CreVal’s decision highlights that Italian regulators will find it challenging to find buyers for other banks
that have recently entered administration, including Banca delle Marche S.p.A. (Caa1 review for
downgrade, E/ca), Cassa di Risparmio di Ferrara (unrated) and Banca Popolare di Spoleto (unrated). In the
past, the acquisition of weaker banks by stronger banks in the system had helped avoid government
intervention. Such was the case in Intesa Sanpaolo Spa’s (Baa2 negative, D+/baa3 negative) 2011
acquisition of Banca Monte Parma (unrated), which at the time was facing a capital shortfall.
CreVal’s decision also increases the uncertainties regarding the conclusion of Tercas’ administration.
Without the intervention of an external investor, the risk to bondholders is high. Since the Bank of Italy
placed Tercas into administration in April 2012, Tercas has not released any financial information. As such,
we are not aware of the amount of capital that may be needed by the bank to return to a regular activity and
exit administration.
lory
Forumer attivo
grazie fabriziof
fabriziof
Forumer storico
prego,se ti interessa il prospetto lo trovi nel 3d dei prospettigrazie fabriziof
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