Vet
Forumer storico
...meglio venetona...
questioni di ........portafoglio....ma anche di qualcosa d'altro ... piccoli dettagli...comunque auguri per la tua venetona che abbia lunga vita
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
questioni di ........portafoglio....ma anche di qualcosa d'altro ... piccoli dettagli...comunque auguri per la tua venetona che abbia lunga vita
ferdo
Utente Senior
Da domenica ad oggi che han fatto?! Lasciato uscire chi doveva ?! ... Lunedì le ns banche erano menate, idem oggi, popolari, e le due sfigate tutti i giorni ...
Comunque han dovuto aspettare il brexit per farlo, era da fare a gennaio
Fatto salvo che il diavolo si nasconde nei dettagli
Ultima modifica:
fabriziof
Forumer storico
Banche: l'Ue dà ragione all'Italia
tutti felici e contenti ,in Italia i subordinati non si toccano
tutti felici e contenti ,in Italia i subordinati non si toccano
Vet
Forumer storico
ci sarebbe da aggiungere che le regole del Bail in violano la costituzione italiana in riferimento alla tutela del risparmio.....non mi sembra il caso che in nome di un Unione che di fatto non esiste , ognuno cura esclusivamente il proprio piccolo orticello , si violi palesemente la costituzione di un paese
apaci2
Ad bestias
La notizia che ha dato la scossa è questa... non quella scemenza para politica eh eh eh
ECB Said to Weigh Looser QE Rules as Brexit Cuts Asset Pool
ECB Said to Weigh Looser QE Rules as Brexit Cuts Asset Pool
fabriziof
Forumer storico
ma quale costituzione...bailin cosa buona e giusta
bulogna
Forumer storico
A questo punto, con gli aiuti di stato alle banche, direi che i bail in sono accantonati fino a nuovo ordine.
NoWay
It's time to play the game
E nel mezzo c'è stata pure la dichiarazione contrarian della Merkel... in effetti qualche dubbio può venire...
Brexit Spurs Italy to Contemplate State Aid for Banks
Since the beginning of this week, Italian media outlets, including the newspaper II Sole, have reported that the Italian government is contemplating measures, potentially including a €40 billion state-aid package, to shield Italian banks from the turmoil that may arise from the consequences of the UK vote to leave the European Union (EU). This plan, which the Italian government has not confirmed and which the European Commission (EC) would have to approve, would be credit positive provided that it did not activate the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’s (BRRD) bail-in rules, which cannot be assumed to be the case. Italy’s plan might not materialize if the EC rebuffs it on the grounds that a bank resolution requires burdensharing under BRRD. Under this scenario, the Italian government is less likely to pursue the plan as reported, given the political and systemic implications of burden-sharing, particularly if a bail-in is extended to retail bondholders. Although it is true that the UK’s vote may have negative spillover effects on European banks, including Italy’s, it is also true that the Italian government already faces the daunting challenge of cleaning up its banking system, which is burdened with problem loans totalling around €360 billion. The steps taken to date, including a “bad bank” framework and using a fund called Atlante, have fallen short of addressing the full scope of the problem. Based on our own assumptions, rated Italian banks (which account for two thirds of the overall banking system by assets) would require €25 billion of new equity to reach the European Central Bank’s recently advocated problem loan coverage ratio of 70% for bad loans (the worst category) and 30% for other problem loans. Currently, Italian banks’ coverage is 45% for bad loans and 27% for other problem loans. The Italian government appears to be looking to act within the context of the current market turmoil following the UK referendum in order to address a longstanding issue that might otherwise trigger bail-in requirements under the current crisis management framework set out in the BRRD. In the Bank of Italy’s recent annual report, the governor lamented that an adequate transitional period had not been provided to give all parties sufficient time to acquire a full understanding of, and to adjust to, the new rules on resolution. To put it differently, the central bank implied that the bail-in framework was not the appropriate tool for dealing with the current banking crisis, and in fact had become an impediment to taking decisive action. In the same vein, the central bank criticised a rigid interpretation of the regulation on state aid that gave little regard to financial stability considerations and which had prevented the Italian government from handling the problem loan issue with public monies. The risks arising from the UK’s expected exit from the EU may help the Italian government convince the EC that the exceptional unfolding circumstances justify a deviation from the BRRD playbook. Whether or not the EC will let the Italian government infringe on European state aid rules is unknown. In fact, although the BRRD recognizes that governments may face exceptional circumstances and systemic risks, it nevertheless requires them to impose burden-sharing on banks’ shareholders and creditors (if need be) as a prerequisite to allowing governments to inject taxpayer money. Although the objective of preserving financial stability is commendable, the course of action reportedly under consideration by the Italian government may not yield the expected benefits and could result in a less orderly resolution process
Since the beginning of this week, Italian media outlets, including the newspaper II Sole, have reported that the Italian government is contemplating measures, potentially including a €40 billion state-aid package, to shield Italian banks from the turmoil that may arise from the consequences of the UK vote to leave the European Union (EU). This plan, which the Italian government has not confirmed and which the European Commission (EC) would have to approve, would be credit positive provided that it did not activate the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive’s (BRRD) bail-in rules, which cannot be assumed to be the case. Italy’s plan might not materialize if the EC rebuffs it on the grounds that a bank resolution requires burdensharing under BRRD. Under this scenario, the Italian government is less likely to pursue the plan as reported, given the political and systemic implications of burden-sharing, particularly if a bail-in is extended to retail bondholders. Although it is true that the UK’s vote may have negative spillover effects on European banks, including Italy’s, it is also true that the Italian government already faces the daunting challenge of cleaning up its banking system, which is burdened with problem loans totalling around €360 billion. The steps taken to date, including a “bad bank” framework and using a fund called Atlante, have fallen short of addressing the full scope of the problem. Based on our own assumptions, rated Italian banks (which account for two thirds of the overall banking system by assets) would require €25 billion of new equity to reach the European Central Bank’s recently advocated problem loan coverage ratio of 70% for bad loans (the worst category) and 30% for other problem loans. Currently, Italian banks’ coverage is 45% for bad loans and 27% for other problem loans. The Italian government appears to be looking to act within the context of the current market turmoil following the UK referendum in order to address a longstanding issue that might otherwise trigger bail-in requirements under the current crisis management framework set out in the BRRD. In the Bank of Italy’s recent annual report, the governor lamented that an adequate transitional period had not been provided to give all parties sufficient time to acquire a full understanding of, and to adjust to, the new rules on resolution. To put it differently, the central bank implied that the bail-in framework was not the appropriate tool for dealing with the current banking crisis, and in fact had become an impediment to taking decisive action. In the same vein, the central bank criticised a rigid interpretation of the regulation on state aid that gave little regard to financial stability considerations and which had prevented the Italian government from handling the problem loan issue with public monies. The risks arising from the UK’s expected exit from the EU may help the Italian government convince the EC that the exceptional unfolding circumstances justify a deviation from the BRRD playbook. Whether or not the EC will let the Italian government infringe on European state aid rules is unknown. In fact, although the BRRD recognizes that governments may face exceptional circumstances and systemic risks, it nevertheless requires them to impose burden-sharing on banks’ shareholders and creditors (if need be) as a prerequisite to allowing governments to inject taxpayer money. Although the objective of preserving financial stability is commendable, the course of action reportedly under consideration by the Italian government may not yield the expected benefits and could result in a less orderly resolution process
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