Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3 (2 lettori)

Maxwhite

Bondonly
Ciao Nik,
scusa se preciso :
la 751 non è stata sostituita dalla 513; la 751 è stata callata l'anno dopo alla prima call utile (l'outstanding era rimasto poco perchè in molti avevano scambiato).
Per un anno ne giravano 4 : 414 (T1),751 (UT2),513 (T2) e 464 (LT2).
Non dimentichiamoci che la 414 ha skippato anche una cedola. Non propriamente market friendly......
 

TheLondoner

Forumer storico
a) Gaudente ;

b) track record : la UT2 FR0010208751 è stata callata al primo giro; mi sembra di ricordare che , precedentemente al 2011 (mi sembra che ne parlasse, appunto, un report di JPM del 2011) Groupama non richiamò un subordinato, ma si impegnò a farlo al trimestre successivo (e così fece).

Per me (il competente sei tu, quindi io vado solo a naso) calla ma aspetto un po' a prendere posizione (la 414 potrebbe scendere ancora).
Di 414 ho solo un lotto dispari (rispetto alla conversione in 513 che ho fatto tra gli ultimi mesi del 2015 e i primi del 2016)

ciao Cat, la 513 alias 6,375 nasce dall'ops del 2014. Il post call della 414 è piuttosto magro e ciò rende il rischio piuttosto asimmetrico.
Però Groupama è molto cambiata negli ultimi due anni e il rating riflette questo miglioramento complessivo dell'emittente.
Come discutemmo mesi fa, andrebbe rafforzato l'equity, perchè il solvency margin si basa un po' troppo sulle famose transitional measures.
Io sinceramente una puntatina sulla call la farei ma aspetterei la conference call di metà marzo quando sforneranno il bilancio 2016.
Un'altra via che potrebbero seguire sarebbe emettere preventivamente un nuovo perpetual per finanziare la call o fare una nuova proposta di scambio.
La faccenda è interessante e merita di essere seguita.
 

Fabrib

Forumer storico
The Federal Bureau of Investigation has arrested a Volkswagen AG executive on charges of conspiracy to defraud the United States, the New York Times reported on Monday.
Oliver Schmidt, who headed the company's regulatory compliance office in the U.S. from 2014 to March 2015, was arrested on Saturday by federal investigators in Florida, the newspaper said, citing people familiar with the matter. http://nyti.ms/2iTA73S

VW admitted in September 2015 to installing secret software known as "defeat devices" in 475,000 U.S. 2.0-liter diesel cars to cheat exhaust emissions tests and make them appear cleaner in testing. In reality, the vehicles emitted up to 40 times the legally allowable pollution levels.

Volkswagen declined to comment on the reported arrest.

"Volkswagen continues to cooperate with the Department of Justice as we work to resolve remaining matters in the United States. It would not be appropriate to comment on any ongoing investigations or to discuss personnel matters," it said.

The FBI was not immediately available for comment.

Schmidt is expected to be brought before court in Detroit on Monday, the NYT said.

Senior VW officials are not attending this year's Detroit auto show, which is taking place this week.

The news comes as Volkswagen was nearing a deal to resolve criminal and civil allegations over its diesel cheating, crucial steps toward moving past the scandal, which has cost it billions of dollars and its reputation.

Volkswagen shares were up 2 percent at 141.75 euros by 3.16 a.m. ET, at the top of a 0.2 percent-weaker German blue-chip DAX <.GDAXI>, on the expected deal.



(Reporting by Gaurika Juneja in Bengaluru and Edward Taylor in Frankfurt; Editing by Sunil Nair and Louise Heavens)
 

gionmorg

low cost high value
Membro dello Staff
Delayed Completion of Basel 3 Reform Is Credit Negative for Banks
On 3 January, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) announced that the final decision on the completion of the Basel 3 reform (also referred to as Basel 4) has been postponed. The scheduled January meeting of the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision (GHOS) to agree on final capital regulations was postponed because of the lack of agreement on calibrating parameters for the use of internal capital models. The protracted process is credit negative for banks and signals the supervisors’ difficult reach for a consensus on adopting rules for a common/global capital framework, which is critical to preserve a level playing field. The delay could also dent investors’ confidence in banks’ capital ratios and result in higher cost of funding. GHOS’ decision to postpone the meeting is unsurprising given differing views among BCBS members. The BCBS is striving to define a revised framework that fairly reflects risks and does not result in “significant” capital increases. Officials from EU countries including France and Germany and the European Commission are worried about choking off bank lending to economies where loans are the primary form of corporate finance. Although what would constitute a significant capital increase has not been quantified, BCBS Chairman Stefan Ingves last month acknowledged that this objective does not mean avoiding any increase for any bank and it may result in significant increases at some banks. BCBS members agree on the overarching objective, which is to restore confidence in banks’ calculation of their risk-weighted assets (RWAs). That means achieving greater consistency and reducing variability in the calculation methodology for RWAs. The BCBS seeks to constrain the benefit of modelling techniques: in some cases, supervisors consider that the models too frequently result in low capital requirements and the BCBS is specifically targeting banks that have developed aggressive modelling techniques. However, defining the threshold at which such capital benefits become unacceptable is proving thorny for BCBS. BCBS has a consensus on the need to get rid of unjustified variability, yet lacks a consensus on the acceptable level of difference between the “standardized” measure of risks and banks’ internal model estimates. Banks will be required to assess their risks under both methods and the general floor, which will be set between 60% and 90% of standardized risk weights, will determine the benefits risk modelling could bring: the lower the floor, the greater banks can benefit from models’ outcomes. Those regulators who place greater trust in banks’ internal models favor a lower floor while others, based on well-documented failures that occurred during the financial crisis, argue the standardized approach should drive the outcome, and therefore prefer a higher floor. The more intensive use of models by EU banks makes them sensitive to the floor. The final decision on the general floor will attract a lot of attention from investors. If the general floor is set at a high level (close to 90%), the GHOS will have been relatively conservative; even more so if the implementation period is short. Were the floor to be set closer to 60% with a long transition phase, it would indicate a more permissive stance. However there are also many technical parameters that are critical to form a view on the framework’s toughness (or lack thereof); for example, floors could be imposed at the model level (setting a minimum level of probability of default or loss given default). For now, the absence of an agreement and the BCBS’ difficulties in clinching a deal continue to fuel investors’ lack of confidence in RWAs and hence in capital ratios and skepticism towards the adoption of harmonized rules.
 

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