nik.sala
Money Never Sleeps
Concordo, vedo un'altra emissione da 50 mln sempre 2016, ma è sicuramente meno liquido e i prezzi sono comunque quelli.
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3 (5 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
Concordo, vedo un'altra emissione da 50 mln sempre 2016, ma è sicuramente meno liquido e i prezzi sono comunque quelli.
fabriziof
Forumer storico
è la XS0241326924? taglio 50k, comunque si può provare a sentire
nik.sala
Money Never Sleeps
Vet
Forumer storico
Ciao Claudio
Direi che hai centrato perfettamente il punto, le nuove normative permetteranno a banche che hanno operato in maniera a dir poco scellerata di cavarsela comunque ...e a pagare saranno solamente chi ha prestato loro dei denari....e questo va contro qualsiasi regola economica....se una societa' non è più in grado di onorare i suoi debiti...fallisce...e dalla vendita di tutti i suoi beni si onorano i creditori....punto.....se invece si ritiene che il fallimento di quella società provochi danni economici ben maggiori per la collettività ( vedi LB..Grecia).e quindi diventa una soluzione antieconomica....la si salva.....
Ultima modifica:
Commento di Moodys sulle nuove norme relative ai bail-in bancari:
European Union Bank Resolution and Bail-In Rules
Last Thursday, the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers reached agreement on a draft directive
regarding the recovery and resolution of troubled banks in the 27-nation alliance. The agreed-upon
framework will play an important role in the proposed European banking union and includes “bail-in” rules
covering par write down or the conversion to equity of bank liabilities. It follows several months of debate
among EU countries on how to impose losses on creditors in the resolution of a failing bank and also limit
taxpayer-funded government support. In the articles that follow, we examine the credit implications for
senior creditors and covered bondholders, among others.
Bank Bail-In Rules Are Credit Negative for Senior Creditors
The agreed-on framework’s completion increases the likelihood of creditor bail-ins, even for banks outside
of formal resolution. The framework would allow losses to be imposed on a broad range of liabilities,
including senior unsecured debt, and is credit negative for EU bank senior creditors.
As a compromise text produced after long hours of negotiations, the agreement’s full implications are not
yet clear. In particular, the text leaves open to question the latitude national authorities are really intended
to have to deviate from the harmonised and strict approach to bailing in creditors at the heart of the
agreement. This likely reflects continuing differences of view among national authorities. Nevertheless, the
agreement is clear in its basic intent to harmonise the resolution process in the EU, limit national
discretion, and ensure that unsecured creditors of all classes bear losses before taxpayers do.
The ministers’ endorsement of the rules, and the limited number of exclusions, supports our view that the
final bail-in framework will be broad and will include senior unsecured liabilities. The exhibit below
describes the EU ministers’ agreement.
Details of the European Union’s Agreed-Upon Bail-In Rules
Features Approach
Mandatory exclusions
from bail-in
Limited to:
Covered deposits (insured by deposit guarantee schemes)
Wages (such as fixed salary and pension benefits)
Secured borrowing (including covered bonds)
Commercial claims relating to goods and services critical to the daily function of a bank
Liabilities resulting from payment systems with a remaining maturity of fewer than seven days
Interbank liabilities with original maturities of fewer than seven days
Discretionary exclusions
(optional) from bail-in
Discretion to exclude any liabilities for specific reasons of financial stability: 1) if these liabilities
cannot be bailed in within a reasonable timeframe; 2) to ensure continuity of critical functions;
3) to avoid contagion; or 4) to avoid value destruction that raises losses borne by other creditors
Exclusions can be compensated for by passing the losses on to other creditors, as long as no
creditor is worse off than in normal insolvency proceedings
Exclusions can also be compensated for through a contribution from the national resolution fund,
provided only if 8% of the bank’s total liabilities, including own funds, have been bailed in (or under
special circumstances, 20% of the bank’s risk-weighted assets) and if this contribution is capped at
5% of the bank’s total liabilities (subject to exceptions)
Treatment of the deposit
guarantee scheme
Deposit guarantee schemes (which assume the claims of insured deposits if a bank fails) are
included in bail-in, but have preference over all other liabilities subject to bail-in
Treatment of uninsured
depositors and other
senior unsecured creditors
Uninsured deposits of small and midsize enterprises and natural persons included in bail-in, but
have preference over other uninsured deposits and other senior unsecured liabilities
Uninsured deposits from large corporations and other senior unsecured liabilities subject to bailin on a pari passu basis
Although the newly agreed-on rules presumethat senior unsecured creditors will be subject to bail-in where
needed to support a bank resolution, EU countries will retain some discretion in deciding which liabilities
to bail in. Resolution authorities could decide not to impose losses on certain types of liabilities, including
senior unsecured debt, where, for example, there was a risk of potential contagion. The rules allow limited
discretionary exclusions to be financed under certain conditions by shifting the cost to other creditors or by
drawing on a national resolution fund. In extremis, taxpayers’ money or ultimately European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) funds could be tapped to resolve banks. For senior creditors, this flexibility reduces the
predictability of potential losses in a bank resolution: the risk of being bailed in will vary across
jurisdictions, institutions and circumstances. However, the exercise of national discretion is clearly
intended, in principle at least, to be a rare occurrence and will be subject to strict conditions.
In exceptional instances of discretionary exclusion, national resolution funds will only be able to contribute
if losses have been imposed on at least 8% of the bank’s total liabilities, including capital and reserves, and
their contribution could not exceed 5% of the bank’s total liabilities. It remains unclear how member states
might use this discretion or apply these restrictions in practice. The European Commission, which has
historically taken a hard line on imposing losses on creditors, is likely to play a central role in determining
whether exclusions can be applied.
Overall, the agreed-upon bail-in framework is a clear and binding statement of intent by EU economic and
finance ministers that creditors should bear losses ahead of taxpayers in resolutions. While some flexibility
exists, the policymakers’ clear intention is that flexibility should not be used to support bank debtholders
except in extremis, a credit negative for all senior unsecured debtholders.
The proposed rules will now be negotiated among the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and
the European Parliament in the ‘trilogue’ process, and are subject to change before the European Parliament
adopts the final rules, which we expect in late 2013 as part of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
European Union Bank Resolution and Bail-In Rules
Last Thursday, the European Union (EU) Council of Ministers reached agreement on a draft directive
regarding the recovery and resolution of troubled banks in the 27-nation alliance. The agreed-upon
framework will play an important role in the proposed European banking union and includes “bail-in” rules
covering par write down or the conversion to equity of bank liabilities. It follows several months of debate
among EU countries on how to impose losses on creditors in the resolution of a failing bank and also limit
taxpayer-funded government support. In the articles that follow, we examine the credit implications for
senior creditors and covered bondholders, among others.
Bank Bail-In Rules Are Credit Negative for Senior Creditors
The agreed-on framework’s completion increases the likelihood of creditor bail-ins, even for banks outside
of formal resolution. The framework would allow losses to be imposed on a broad range of liabilities,
including senior unsecured debt, and is credit negative for EU bank senior creditors.
As a compromise text produced after long hours of negotiations, the agreement’s full implications are not
yet clear. In particular, the text leaves open to question the latitude national authorities are really intended
to have to deviate from the harmonised and strict approach to bailing in creditors at the heart of the
agreement. This likely reflects continuing differences of view among national authorities. Nevertheless, the
agreement is clear in its basic intent to harmonise the resolution process in the EU, limit national
discretion, and ensure that unsecured creditors of all classes bear losses before taxpayers do.
The ministers’ endorsement of the rules, and the limited number of exclusions, supports our view that the
final bail-in framework will be broad and will include senior unsecured liabilities. The exhibit below
describes the EU ministers’ agreement.
Details of the European Union’s Agreed-Upon Bail-In Rules
Features Approach
Mandatory exclusions
from bail-in
Limited to:
Covered deposits (insured by deposit guarantee schemes)
Wages (such as fixed salary and pension benefits)
Secured borrowing (including covered bonds)
Commercial claims relating to goods and services critical to the daily function of a bank
Liabilities resulting from payment systems with a remaining maturity of fewer than seven days
Interbank liabilities with original maturities of fewer than seven days
Discretionary exclusions
(optional) from bail-in
Discretion to exclude any liabilities for specific reasons of financial stability: 1) if these liabilities
cannot be bailed in within a reasonable timeframe; 2) to ensure continuity of critical functions;
3) to avoid contagion; or 4) to avoid value destruction that raises losses borne by other creditors
Exclusions can be compensated for by passing the losses on to other creditors, as long as no
creditor is worse off than in normal insolvency proceedings
Exclusions can also be compensated for through a contribution from the national resolution fund,
provided only if 8% of the bank’s total liabilities, including own funds, have been bailed in (or under
special circumstances, 20% of the bank’s risk-weighted assets) and if this contribution is capped at
5% of the bank’s total liabilities (subject to exceptions)
Treatment of the deposit
guarantee scheme
Deposit guarantee schemes (which assume the claims of insured deposits if a bank fails) are
included in bail-in, but have preference over all other liabilities subject to bail-in
Treatment of uninsured
depositors and other
senior unsecured creditors
Uninsured deposits of small and midsize enterprises and natural persons included in bail-in, but
have preference over other uninsured deposits and other senior unsecured liabilities
Uninsured deposits from large corporations and other senior unsecured liabilities subject to bailin on a pari passu basis
Although the newly agreed-on rules presumethat senior unsecured creditors will be subject to bail-in where
needed to support a bank resolution, EU countries will retain some discretion in deciding which liabilities
to bail in. Resolution authorities could decide not to impose losses on certain types of liabilities, including
senior unsecured debt, where, for example, there was a risk of potential contagion. The rules allow limited
discretionary exclusions to be financed under certain conditions by shifting the cost to other creditors or by
drawing on a national resolution fund. In extremis, taxpayers’ money or ultimately European Stability
Mechanism (ESM) funds could be tapped to resolve banks. For senior creditors, this flexibility reduces the
predictability of potential losses in a bank resolution: the risk of being bailed in will vary across
jurisdictions, institutions and circumstances. However, the exercise of national discretion is clearly
intended, in principle at least, to be a rare occurrence and will be subject to strict conditions.
In exceptional instances of discretionary exclusion, national resolution funds will only be able to contribute
if losses have been imposed on at least 8% of the bank’s total liabilities, including capital and reserves, and
their contribution could not exceed 5% of the bank’s total liabilities. It remains unclear how member states
might use this discretion or apply these restrictions in practice. The European Commission, which has
historically taken a hard line on imposing losses on creditors, is likely to play a central role in determining
whether exclusions can be applied.
Overall, the agreed-upon bail-in framework is a clear and binding statement of intent by EU economic and
finance ministers that creditors should bear losses ahead of taxpayers in resolutions. While some flexibility
exists, the policymakers’ clear intention is that flexibility should not be used to support bank debtholders
except in extremis, a credit negative for all senior unsecured debtholders.
The proposed rules will now be negotiated among the Council of Ministers, the European Commission and
the European Parliament in the ‘trilogue’ process, and are subject to change before the European Parliament
adopts the final rules, which we expect in late 2013 as part of the Bank Recovery and Resolution Directive.
Discepolo
Negusneg Fan Club
TubeChop - In fuga dal voto e da Grillo - Linea d'Ombra 27/05/2013 (05:02)
Complimenti per la lezione. Condivido al 100%.
Qui non si tratta di filosofeggiare su cosa accadrebbe al prezzo della benzina, alla nuova moneta, ecc. ma di guardare cosa sta capitando in Italia. Semplicemente guardare (e magari parlare con qualche imprenditore che ti dice con poche parole: non potevo più tirare avanti in Italia, quindi mi devo spostare per non affogare).
Complimenti per la lezione. Condivido al 100%.
Qui non si tratta di filosofeggiare su cosa accadrebbe al prezzo della benzina, alla nuova moneta, ecc. ma di guardare cosa sta capitando in Italia. Semplicemente guardare (e magari parlare con qualche imprenditore che ti dice con poche parole: non potevo più tirare avanti in Italia, quindi mi devo spostare per non affogare).
warren baffo
Forumer storico
sulle ikb invece (come ci indica il prezzo di mkt) secondo me c'è una grossa differenza tra T1 e T2. Sono d'accordo che in caso di bail in il risultato sarebbe simile, ma in caso contrario queste rimborsano nel 2016 con buon gain mentre le T1 probabilmente mai e per loro stessa ammissione non faranno utili e pageranno cedole per molti anni a venire.. mai è un po' troppo lungo anche per un cassettista paziente come me.
Se intendi spingere su questo titolo io consiglio di diversificare su titoli simili come hsh o oevag che pure hanno LT2 scadenza 2016-2017, struttura simile e quotazioni non distanti (hsh un po' più giù..), abbassando un poco il rischio di bail in e informazioni scorrette.
A me piacciono nel senso che in generale trovo i titoli con cash yield molto basso spesso sottovalutati, mentre a me interessa YTM, con in più in Italia il vantaggio di posticipare la tassazione.
Ovviamente sono titoli molto pericolosi in un contesto nuovo in cui in caso di bail in ti faranno a pezzi anche oltre il legittimo, e anche in caso di grosso cigno nero europeo o comunque forte pressione sul mondo finanziario.
fabriziof
Forumer storico
Presente sui 3 lt2,in ordine di pericolosità decrescente
evag,hsh,ikb
Erste Group’s Capital Raise Will Help Repay State Aid, a Credit Positive
Last Monday, Austria’s Erste Group Bank AG (A3 negative, D+/baa3 negative)7
announced its plans to
raise around €660 million of equity and fully repay participation capital of €1.76 billion, both sometime in
the third quarter. These measures are credit positive for Erste because they allow the bank to exit state
support and address the declining regulatory capital eligibility of participation capital proactively.
The repayment covers a €1.2 billion capital injection from the Austrian government and €559 million of
private investor money, both issued in spring 2009, and hinges on the bank’s success in raising the €660
million of equity.
We consider the decline in the bank’s capitalization from the smaller equity raise relative to the repayment
of the participation capital to be manageable, given Erste’s efforts to reduce risk over recent quarters. These
efforts include disposing of non-core assets, including credit default swaps, and changing its business mix
towards a larger portion of mortgage loans. As a result, risk-weighted assets declined to €105 billion in firstquarter 2013 from €120 billion in December 2010. During the same period, Erste also increased its onbalance sheet loan-loss reserves to €7.7 billion from €6.1 billion, thereby improving its coverage ratio to
62.4% from 60.1%.
As of 31 March, Erste’s reported Tier 1 ratio was 11.6%. Pro forma a successful capital raise and the bank
repaying the participation capital, the ratio should decline to 10.6% and continue to include approximately
40 basis points of hybrid capital components. As a result, Erste’s capital will weaken in comparison to other
banks with operations inCentral and Eastern Europe, while the composition of its Tier 1 capital will
improve.
Nevertheless, the bank maintained its guidance on credit costs (loan-loss provisions) declining by 10%-15%
from last year’s €2.0 billion.
Despite this setback against the bank’s earlier expectations, we still consider Erste’s future earnings capacity
to be sufficient in reaching its stated Basel III fully loaded common equity Tier 1 target of 10% by 31
December 2014. Adjusting for the bank’s estimate for the introduction of the Basel III capital regime (30
basis points) and the planned implementation of an internal ratings-based approach in one of Erste’s core
markets, Romania, by 2015 (40 basis points), Erste’s fully loaded Basel III capital ratio would have been
9.5% as of 31 March on a pro forma basis.
Last Monday, Austria’s Erste Group Bank AG (A3 negative, D+/baa3 negative)7
announced its plans to
raise around €660 million of equity and fully repay participation capital of €1.76 billion, both sometime in
the third quarter. These measures are credit positive for Erste because they allow the bank to exit state
support and address the declining regulatory capital eligibility of participation capital proactively.
The repayment covers a €1.2 billion capital injection from the Austrian government and €559 million of
private investor money, both issued in spring 2009, and hinges on the bank’s success in raising the €660
million of equity.
We consider the decline in the bank’s capitalization from the smaller equity raise relative to the repayment
of the participation capital to be manageable, given Erste’s efforts to reduce risk over recent quarters. These
efforts include disposing of non-core assets, including credit default swaps, and changing its business mix
towards a larger portion of mortgage loans. As a result, risk-weighted assets declined to €105 billion in firstquarter 2013 from €120 billion in December 2010. During the same period, Erste also increased its onbalance sheet loan-loss reserves to €7.7 billion from €6.1 billion, thereby improving its coverage ratio to
62.4% from 60.1%.
As of 31 March, Erste’s reported Tier 1 ratio was 11.6%. Pro forma a successful capital raise and the bank
repaying the participation capital, the ratio should decline to 10.6% and continue to include approximately
40 basis points of hybrid capital components. As a result, Erste’s capital will weaken in comparison to other
banks with operations inCentral and Eastern Europe, while the composition of its Tier 1 capital will
improve.
Nevertheless, the bank maintained its guidance on credit costs (loan-loss provisions) declining by 10%-15%
from last year’s €2.0 billion.
Despite this setback against the bank’s earlier expectations, we still consider Erste’s future earnings capacity
to be sufficient in reaching its stated Basel III fully loaded common equity Tier 1 target of 10% by 31
December 2014. Adjusting for the bank’s estimate for the introduction of the Basel III capital regime (30
basis points) and the planned implementation of an internal ratings-based approach in one of Erste’s core
markets, Romania, by 2015 (40 basis points), Erste’s fully loaded Basel III capital ratio would have been
9.5% as of 31 March on a pro forma basis.