Rottweiler
Forumer storico
No: nel mio periodare contorto cercavo solo di dire che i danni saranno grandi se cercherà di attuare ciò che ha annunciato in campagna elettorale; viceversa...
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 3 (5 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione Joe Silver
- Data di Inizio
No: nel mio periodare contorto cercavo solo di dire che i danni saranno grandi se cercherà di attuare ciò che ha annunciato in campagna elettorale; viceversa...
vbrm
Forumer attivo
Effettivamente riuscire a realizzare il sogno di Wall Street presentandosi anche come il campione di Main Street, ed anche di chi è al di fuori di tutte e due, sarebbe il massimo. Teoricamente i poteri forti della finanza avrebbero dovuto essere dall parte della Clinton.
Jackrussel
Forumer storico
Si potrebbe dire che anche DJ T ha un "non programma"....
Lui si aspettava coerentemente una non vittoria
Ma a sorpresa non è una non vittoria, nonostante un non partito
drbs315
Forumer storico
Lo erano. Gli andamenti borsistici dei gg precedenti (e i futures durante lo scrutinio dei voti) e gli endorsement più o meno indiretti erano inequivocabili.
Poi sono stati presto rasserenati, oltre che contattati. Spritz a base di tassi in salita e deregolamentazione.
(E, tra l'altro, non vedono l'ora che la colombella zoppa a capo della Fed muova i tassi a dicembre - l'andamento sulla curva è chiaro. Debito+inflazione+rialzo tassi... una manna nel brevissimo periodo.
Main street viene tranquillamente spernacchiata.
Ps: non è importante che questo succeda - deregolamentazione compresa. L'importante è che si pensi possa succedere)
drbs315
Forumer storico
Si potrebbe dire che anche DJ T ha un "non programma"....
Lui si aspettava coerentemente una non vittoria
Ma a sorpresa non è una non vittoria, nonostante un non partito
In effetti...
(Mi ricorda i commenti post-Brexit di qualche esponente di spicco dell'armata pro-Brexit - "non pensavamo..." o le ritrattazioni sulle promesse elettorali... "non sarà possibile...")
Mi piacerebbe vedere la faccia di qualche elettore di The Donald se Dimon - o qcn altro del gruppo - salisse al soglio governativo... e questo indipendentemente da ogni competenza tecnica dei personaggi, ovviamente. Il mio sogno sarebbe Blankfein..
un buon esito del populismo...
vbrm
Forumer attivo
E' ora di guardare a qualche steepener ?
Sean Thorton
The Quiet Man
The Solvency II capital ratio of Aegon's Dutch business suffered a 5-10 percentage-point hit from the revision to the volatility adjustment (VA) reference portfolio.
The reference portfolio is set by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (Eiopa) to reflect the average investment portfolio of EU insurers. Since most insurers are not perfectly aligned with the reference portfolio, the VA portfolio revision creates a regulatory risk to their solvency ratios.
Axa last week reported a 6 percentage-point hit from the VA portfolio revision.
Aegon said that in the Netherlands, the impact of the VA declined from an 18 basis-point adjustment to the discount curve, to 10 basis points. This knocked Solvency II ratio in the Dutch business by between 5 and 10 percentage points, according to chief financial officer Darryl Button.
"We have basis risk in our solvency position," Button explained. The risk is that spreads tighten in Eiopa's reference portfolio, and spreads in assets that Aegon actually holds widen. "That's exactly what happened in this quarter," he added.
The Dutch business' ratio was also hit to a lesser degree by increased longevity expectations, but that was balanced out by management actions.
Those management actions included additional spread hedging in the Netherlands. "We do find that under Solvency II, a lot of the capital we end up holding is for sovereign spread risk and overall spread risk. We put hedges in place that help bring down that component of Solvency II capital," said Button.
Aegon's group Solvency II ratio only dropped by 2 points between 30 June and 30 September, to 156%. The main negative impact was from adverse market movements that affected the group's pension fund.
The reference portfolio is set by the European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Authority (Eiopa) to reflect the average investment portfolio of EU insurers. Since most insurers are not perfectly aligned with the reference portfolio, the VA portfolio revision creates a regulatory risk to their solvency ratios.
Axa last week reported a 6 percentage-point hit from the VA portfolio revision.
Aegon said that in the Netherlands, the impact of the VA declined from an 18 basis-point adjustment to the discount curve, to 10 basis points. This knocked Solvency II ratio in the Dutch business by between 5 and 10 percentage points, according to chief financial officer Darryl Button.
"We have basis risk in our solvency position," Button explained. The risk is that spreads tighten in Eiopa's reference portfolio, and spreads in assets that Aegon actually holds widen. "That's exactly what happened in this quarter," he added.
The Dutch business' ratio was also hit to a lesser degree by increased longevity expectations, but that was balanced out by management actions.
Those management actions included additional spread hedging in the Netherlands. "We do find that under Solvency II, a lot of the capital we end up holding is for sovereign spread risk and overall spread risk. We put hedges in place that help bring down that component of Solvency II capital," said Button.
Aegon's group Solvency II ratio only dropped by 2 points between 30 June and 30 September, to 156%. The main negative impact was from adverse market movements that affected the group's pension fund.
Ventodivino
מגן ולא יראה
Political risk in the Euro area after the US election
As far as Europe is concerned, the key near-term issue following the US Presidential election is more about politics than economics. To a large extent, the same underlying political forces at work in the Brexit referendum in the UK and in the Trump Presidential victory in the US are also at work in the Euro area. Many people in the Euro area also feel disenfranchised and are angry, frustrated and anxious about economic decline, globalization and migration. The US and UK experiences also suggest that the slow and steady approach adopted by Euro area policy makers is not much of a defense against populist pressures. It is striking that populist tendencies in the US and UK have dominated even when unemployment rates are close to 5% in these two economies. In the Euro area the unemployment rate remains at 10% and is likely to come down only slowly. Against this backdrop, the national elections in the Netherlands, France and Germany next year are even more important than usual.
Our central view is that mainstream political parties will continue to run these countries after the elections. Not only is there a deep-seated commitment to the monetary union, partly because the costs of unwinding it would be so great, but the technicalities of Euro area electoral mechanisms also reduce the likelihood of populist governments, in particular proportional representation in Germany and the Netherlands and the two-round electoral system in France. At this stage, the polls in France and Germany suggest a center-right government in France and a centrist coalition led by Merkel in Germany. There is a risk of a surprise in the Netherlands, where the non-mainstream anti-EU Party for Freedom (PVV) party tops the polls, but we anticipate that the mainstream parties will avoid entering coalition talks with the PVV and will ultimately form an enlarged mainstream coalition.
But the region should not be complacent. Go back six months and the prospect of a Trump presidency seemed very, very unlikely. But it has happened. If you look at the polls on the second round of the French presidential election, the safety margin is not as large as you might want it to be. Polls suggest that the National Front leader, Marine Le Pen, will make it through to the second round. If she does, much will depend on who the other candidate is. If Juppe is the center-right candidate, the current polls suggest that 69% of the electorate will vote for him rather than Le Pen. But, if Sarkozy is the center-right candidate, the current polls suggest that only 58% of the electorate will vote for him rather than Le Pen.
Aside from these general elections, there is also the issue of the Italian constitutional referendum on December 4th. Although we have a constructive view on the outlook even if Renzi loses the vote, a path towards a populist government in Italy after the 2018 election is not hard to see. A large no vote in the referendum could interact negatively with the ongoing bank recapitalization process and the economy could suffer accordingly. The ruling Democratic Party is currently leading in the polls ahead of the non-mainstream Five Star Movement, but the margin is not huge. A weak macro economy next year could increase support for the populists.
Euro area leaders should not be complacent in the face of these pressures. There needs to be a shift towards fiscal expansion, a move to enable bank bail-outs without bail-ins and more aggressive supply-side reform. But none of this seems terribly likely. European policy makers are either underappreciating the risks or are unable to respond even with a sufficient understanding of the threats to the region. Our central view remains that the Euro area will survive, but the threats to the region are real.
As far as Europe is concerned, the key near-term issue following the US Presidential election is more about politics than economics. To a large extent, the same underlying political forces at work in the Brexit referendum in the UK and in the Trump Presidential victory in the US are also at work in the Euro area. Many people in the Euro area also feel disenfranchised and are angry, frustrated and anxious about economic decline, globalization and migration. The US and UK experiences also suggest that the slow and steady approach adopted by Euro area policy makers is not much of a defense against populist pressures. It is striking that populist tendencies in the US and UK have dominated even when unemployment rates are close to 5% in these two economies. In the Euro area the unemployment rate remains at 10% and is likely to come down only slowly. Against this backdrop, the national elections in the Netherlands, France and Germany next year are even more important than usual.
Our central view is that mainstream political parties will continue to run these countries after the elections. Not only is there a deep-seated commitment to the monetary union, partly because the costs of unwinding it would be so great, but the technicalities of Euro area electoral mechanisms also reduce the likelihood of populist governments, in particular proportional representation in Germany and the Netherlands and the two-round electoral system in France. At this stage, the polls in France and Germany suggest a center-right government in France and a centrist coalition led by Merkel in Germany. There is a risk of a surprise in the Netherlands, where the non-mainstream anti-EU Party for Freedom (PVV) party tops the polls, but we anticipate that the mainstream parties will avoid entering coalition talks with the PVV and will ultimately form an enlarged mainstream coalition.
But the region should not be complacent. Go back six months and the prospect of a Trump presidency seemed very, very unlikely. But it has happened. If you look at the polls on the second round of the French presidential election, the safety margin is not as large as you might want it to be. Polls suggest that the National Front leader, Marine Le Pen, will make it through to the second round. If she does, much will depend on who the other candidate is. If Juppe is the center-right candidate, the current polls suggest that 69% of the electorate will vote for him rather than Le Pen. But, if Sarkozy is the center-right candidate, the current polls suggest that only 58% of the electorate will vote for him rather than Le Pen.
Aside from these general elections, there is also the issue of the Italian constitutional referendum on December 4th. Although we have a constructive view on the outlook even if Renzi loses the vote, a path towards a populist government in Italy after the 2018 election is not hard to see. A large no vote in the referendum could interact negatively with the ongoing bank recapitalization process and the economy could suffer accordingly. The ruling Democratic Party is currently leading in the polls ahead of the non-mainstream Five Star Movement, but the margin is not huge. A weak macro economy next year could increase support for the populists.
Euro area leaders should not be complacent in the face of these pressures. There needs to be a shift towards fiscal expansion, a move to enable bank bail-outs without bail-ins and more aggressive supply-side reform. But none of this seems terribly likely. European policy makers are either underappreciating the risks or are unable to respond even with a sufficient understanding of the threats to the region. Our central view remains that the Euro area will survive, but the threats to the region are real.
fabriziof
Forumer storico
Quando guardo Juncker mi chiedo come faccia l'Europa a stare ancora in piedi