Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 1
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Rating Action: Moody's downgrades Venezuela's rating to Caa3 from Caa1; outlook stable
Global Credit Research - 13 Jan 2015
New York, January 13, 2015 -- Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded Venezuela's government bond ratings to Caa3 from Caa1 and changed the outlook to stable from negative.
The key drivers of today's rating actions are the following:
1) Default risk has increased substantially as external finances continue to deteriorate due to a strong decline in oil prices.
2) In the event of a default, Moody's believes that the loss given default (LGD) is likely to be greater than 50%.
The stable outlook is based on Moody's view that even if the oil price drops further, expected losses to bondholders are likely to be consistent with a Caa3 rating and unlikely to reach levels associated with lower ratings.
The sovereign's senior unsecured and senior secured ratings have also been downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1, as well as the senior unsecured medium term note program and the senior unsecured program to (P)Caa3 from (P)Caa1.
Venezuela's long-term local-currency country risk ceilings were also adjusted to Caa2 from Caa1, the foreign currency bond ceiling to Caa3 from Caa1, and the foreign-currency bank deposit ceilings to Ca from Caa2. The short-term foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings remain at NP. These ceilings reflect a range of undiversifiable risks to which issuers in any jurisdiction are exposed, including economic, legal and political risks. These ceilings act as a cap on ratings that can be assigned to the foreign and local-currency obligations of entities domiciled in the country.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The principal driver of Moody's decision to downgrade Venezuela's sovereign rating is a marked increase in default risk owing to lower oil prices. The recent oil price shock has exerted pressure on Venezuela's balance of payments and dwindling foreign reserves. The price of Venezuela's oil basket, which is typically priced at a modest discount to the price of Brent, fell to an average of $54.03 per barrel in December 2014 from an average of $88.42 per barrel in 2014. As a result, Moody's forecasts that Venezuela's current account balance is likely to shift to a deficit of approximately 2% of GDP in 2015 from an estimated surplus of over 2% of GDP in 2014, the first such yearly deficit since 1998. The dramatic oil price drop, which we expect will be sustained, will negatively affect the balance of payments and will more than outweigh the potential benefits of future foreign investment inflows.
Moody's believes that the key source of vulnerability for the sovereign's credit profile is the external accounts. Given a heavy dependence on imports, external finances remain very rigid, decreasing the possibility of import adjustment to prevent a balance of payments crisis. Foreign currency outflows in Venezuela are likely to decrease only marginally in the event of policy measures to further curb import demand and capital account outflows. Although Moody's believes the sovereign is highly likely to honor the upcoming €1 billion Eurobond maturing in March 2015, given the large mismatch between inflows and outflows, the probability of a debt default occurring in the next 1-2 years has risen from an already high level.
The second driver of the rating action is Moody's assessment that in the event of a default, bondholder losses are likely to exceed 50% on the sovereign's external debt instruments. Moody's believes that balance of payments outflows are likely to exceed inflows by a significant margin at least through 2016, leading to a significant external funding gap that would suggest material debt reduction would be required to ensure balance of payments sustainability.
Moody's believes that the authorities are unlikely to implement forceful policy measures to curb macroeconomic distortions and imbalances in the near term. Even if implemented, measures that target (1) further administrative controls to curb imports, (2) adjustments to the multiple exchange rate regimes, or (3) raising domestic oil prices to lower consumption and marginally increase exports, are unlikely to materially alter the current conditions that heighten the probability of default.
Despite the potential for increased external bilateral financing, Moody's estimates that even under a best-case scenario the external funding gap would not be fully covered. Moreover, Moody's believes that the current stock of foreign currency assets, including official reserves of $22 billion at the end of December 2014, would be insufficient to cover the country's external financing gap.
In addition to the rising risk of a balance of payments crisis, Venezuela is in the midst of an economic recession and has a highly discretionary policy framework that reflects weak institutions. These challenges more than offset its credit strengths that include low albeit rising government debt and high income levels relative to emerging market and Latin American countries.
WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN
The rating would face upward pressure if balance of payments prospects improve significantly given a strong recovery in oil prices or if a sufficiently large increase of financing flows ensures stabilization of external accounts.
Conversely, the rating would face further downward pressure if external finances weaken in the absence of a recovery in oil prices, increasing the risk of greater losses to bondholders.
GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 18,453 (2013 Actual) (also known as Per Capita Income)
Real GDP growth (% change): 1.3% (2013 Actual) (also known as GDP Growth)
Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 56.2% (2013 Actual)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.8% (2013 Actual) (also known as Fiscal Balance)
Current Account Balance/GDP: 2% (2013 Actual) (also known as External Balance)
External debt/GDP: 30.3% (2013 Actual)
Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience
Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans) has been recorded since 1983.
On 08 January 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of Venezuela, Government of. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including its economic strength, have materially decreased. The issuer's institutional strength/framework, remains unchanged. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has materially decreased. An analysis of this issuer, relative to its peers, indicates that a repositioning of its rating would be appropriate.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings published in September 2013. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.
The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.
REGULATORY DISCLOSURES
For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.
For any affected securities or rated entities receiving direct credit support from the primary entity(ies) of this rating action, and whose ratings may change as a result of this rating action, the associated regulatory disclosures will be those of the guarantor entity. Exceptions to this approach exist for the following disclosures, if applicable to jurisdiction: Ancillary Services, Disclosure to rated entity, Disclosure from rated entity.
Regulatory disclosures contained in this press release apply to the credit rating and, if applicable, the related rating outlook or rating review.
Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued the rating.
Please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for additional regulatory disclosures for each credit rating.
Jaime C. Reusche
Vice President - Senior Analyst
Sovereign Risk Group
Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653
Alastair Wilson
MD-Global Sovereign Risk
Sovereign Risk Group
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454
Releasing Office:
Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653
Global Credit Research - 13 Jan 2015
New York, January 13, 2015 -- Moody's Investors Service has today downgraded Venezuela's government bond ratings to Caa3 from Caa1 and changed the outlook to stable from negative.
The key drivers of today's rating actions are the following:
1) Default risk has increased substantially as external finances continue to deteriorate due to a strong decline in oil prices.
2) In the event of a default, Moody's believes that the loss given default (LGD) is likely to be greater than 50%.
The stable outlook is based on Moody's view that even if the oil price drops further, expected losses to bondholders are likely to be consistent with a Caa3 rating and unlikely to reach levels associated with lower ratings.
The sovereign's senior unsecured and senior secured ratings have also been downgraded to Caa3 from Caa1, as well as the senior unsecured medium term note program and the senior unsecured program to (P)Caa3 from (P)Caa1.
Venezuela's long-term local-currency country risk ceilings were also adjusted to Caa2 from Caa1, the foreign currency bond ceiling to Caa3 from Caa1, and the foreign-currency bank deposit ceilings to Ca from Caa2. The short-term foreign currency bond and deposit ceilings remain at NP. These ceilings reflect a range of undiversifiable risks to which issuers in any jurisdiction are exposed, including economic, legal and political risks. These ceilings act as a cap on ratings that can be assigned to the foreign and local-currency obligations of entities domiciled in the country.
RATINGS RATIONALE
The principal driver of Moody's decision to downgrade Venezuela's sovereign rating is a marked increase in default risk owing to lower oil prices. The recent oil price shock has exerted pressure on Venezuela's balance of payments and dwindling foreign reserves. The price of Venezuela's oil basket, which is typically priced at a modest discount to the price of Brent, fell to an average of $54.03 per barrel in December 2014 from an average of $88.42 per barrel in 2014. As a result, Moody's forecasts that Venezuela's current account balance is likely to shift to a deficit of approximately 2% of GDP in 2015 from an estimated surplus of over 2% of GDP in 2014, the first such yearly deficit since 1998. The dramatic oil price drop, which we expect will be sustained, will negatively affect the balance of payments and will more than outweigh the potential benefits of future foreign investment inflows.
Moody's believes that the key source of vulnerability for the sovereign's credit profile is the external accounts. Given a heavy dependence on imports, external finances remain very rigid, decreasing the possibility of import adjustment to prevent a balance of payments crisis. Foreign currency outflows in Venezuela are likely to decrease only marginally in the event of policy measures to further curb import demand and capital account outflows. Although Moody's believes the sovereign is highly likely to honor the upcoming €1 billion Eurobond maturing in March 2015, given the large mismatch between inflows and outflows, the probability of a debt default occurring in the next 1-2 years has risen from an already high level.
The second driver of the rating action is Moody's assessment that in the event of a default, bondholder losses are likely to exceed 50% on the sovereign's external debt instruments. Moody's believes that balance of payments outflows are likely to exceed inflows by a significant margin at least through 2016, leading to a significant external funding gap that would suggest material debt reduction would be required to ensure balance of payments sustainability.
Moody's believes that the authorities are unlikely to implement forceful policy measures to curb macroeconomic distortions and imbalances in the near term. Even if implemented, measures that target (1) further administrative controls to curb imports, (2) adjustments to the multiple exchange rate regimes, or (3) raising domestic oil prices to lower consumption and marginally increase exports, are unlikely to materially alter the current conditions that heighten the probability of default.
Despite the potential for increased external bilateral financing, Moody's estimates that even under a best-case scenario the external funding gap would not be fully covered. Moreover, Moody's believes that the current stock of foreign currency assets, including official reserves of $22 billion at the end of December 2014, would be insufficient to cover the country's external financing gap.
In addition to the rising risk of a balance of payments crisis, Venezuela is in the midst of an economic recession and has a highly discretionary policy framework that reflects weak institutions. These challenges more than offset its credit strengths that include low albeit rising government debt and high income levels relative to emerging market and Latin American countries.
WHAT COULD MOVE THE RATING UP/DOWN
The rating would face upward pressure if balance of payments prospects improve significantly given a strong recovery in oil prices or if a sufficiently large increase of financing flows ensures stabilization of external accounts.
Conversely, the rating would face further downward pressure if external finances weaken in the absence of a recovery in oil prices, increasing the risk of greater losses to bondholders.
GDP per capita (PPP basis, US$): 18,453 (2013 Actual) (also known as Per Capita Income)
Real GDP growth (% change): 1.3% (2013 Actual) (also known as GDP Growth)
Inflation Rate (CPI, % change Dec/Dec): 56.2% (2013 Actual)
Gen. Gov. Financial Balance/GDP: -1.8% (2013 Actual) (also known as Fiscal Balance)
Current Account Balance/GDP: 2% (2013 Actual) (also known as External Balance)
External debt/GDP: 30.3% (2013 Actual)
Level of economic development: Low level of economic resilience
Default history: At least one default event (on bonds and/or loans) has been recorded since 1983.
On 08 January 2015, a rating committee was called to discuss the rating of Venezuela, Government of. The main points raised during the discussion were: The issuer's economic fundamentals, including its economic strength, have materially decreased. The issuer's institutional strength/framework, remains unchanged. The issuer's fiscal or financial strength, including its debt profile, has materially decreased. An analysis of this issuer, relative to its peers, indicates that a repositioning of its rating would be appropriate.
The principal methodology used in these ratings was Sovereign Bond Ratings published in September 2013. Please see the Credit Policy page on www.moodys.com for a copy of this methodology.
The weighting of all rating factors is described in the methodology used in this rating action, if applicable.
REGULATORY DISCLOSURES
For ratings issued on a program, series or category/class of debt, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to each rating of a subsequently issued bond or note of the same series or category/class of debt or pursuant to a program for which the ratings are derived exclusively from existing ratings in accordance with Moody's rating practices. For ratings issued on a support provider, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the rating action on the support provider and in relation to each particular rating action for securities that derive their credit ratings from the support provider's credit rating. For provisional ratings, this announcement provides certain regulatory disclosures in relation to the provisional rating assigned, and in relation to a definitive rating that may be assigned subsequent to the final issuance of the debt, in each case where the transaction structure and terms have not changed prior to the assignment of the definitive rating in a manner that would have affected the rating. For further information please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page for the respective issuer on www.moodys.com.
For any affected securities or rated entities receiving direct credit support from the primary entity(ies) of this rating action, and whose ratings may change as a result of this rating action, the associated regulatory disclosures will be those of the guarantor entity. Exceptions to this approach exist for the following disclosures, if applicable to jurisdiction: Ancillary Services, Disclosure to rated entity, Disclosure from rated entity.
Regulatory disclosures contained in this press release apply to the credit rating and, if applicable, the related rating outlook or rating review.
Please see www.moodys.com for any updates on changes to the lead rating analyst and to the Moody's legal entity that has issued the rating.
Please see the ratings tab on the issuer/entity page on www.moodys.com for additional regulatory disclosures for each credit rating.
Jaime C. Reusche
Vice President - Senior Analyst
Sovereign Risk Group
Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653
Alastair Wilson
MD-Global Sovereign Risk
Sovereign Risk Group
JOURNALISTS: 44 20 7772 5456
SUBSCRIBERS: 44 20 7772 5454
Releasing Office:
Moody's Investors Service, Inc.
250 Greenwich Street
New York, NY 10007
U.S.A.
JOURNALISTS: 212-553-0376
SUBSCRIBERS: 212-553-1653
Obi W. Kenobi
Forumer attivo
Certo, hai detto giusto. Le compagnie USA hanno 200 miliardi di debiti, devono pagarli, fanno come tutti forse anche più in "survival mode". Il vero problema di quei dati è che il decadimento dei pozzi è basso. Come avevo scritto, l'esaurimento dei pozzi di molte piccole compagnie avviene dai 3 ai 6 mesi. Secondo i dati di goldman sachs tali compagnie avevano rottura fiscale dagli 80 usd al barile in giù. Considerati i tempi e i dati passati, speravo di essere più vicino ad un arresto della crescita dell'output...
Ultima modifica:
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
Ford CEO: Don't get used to cheap gas
“Clearly we’re seeing some of the supply-and-demand statistics play out and we’re seeing low fuel prices...but our medium and long term view is that they will go up,” says Ford CEO Mark Fields.
“Clearly we’re seeing some of the supply-and-demand statistics play out and we’re seeing low fuel prices...but our medium and long term view is that they will go up,” says Ford CEO Mark Fields.
tommy271
Forumer storico
Tweet da Caracas:
El #WTI inició 2015 en su nivel más bajo en los últimos 6 años: 46,42 $/barril, acercándose a los precios de la crisis del 2009
Rendimiento de la deuda soberana de Grecia a 10 años (9,13%) registra la caída más alta en las últimas semanas: 9,10% en relación al viernes
Pdvsa 2016 cede 1,60 ptos registrando un nuevo mínimo en el año (48,17%), destacando así mismo el Pdvsa 2022 con una caída cercana a 1 pto
#Pdvsa: En la curva de la petrolera estatal las caídas en promedio suman 0,40 puntos.
El #bono Venz 2023 cedió 1,25 puntos retomando los precios de mediados de diciembre pasado.
El #bono soberano Venz 2022 presenta su caída más elevada en el arranque del año (1,50 puntos)
Las caídas en los precios de los bonos soberanos son en promedio de 0,10 ptos, registrándose las variaciones más elevadas en la parte media.
Hoy Moody´s redujo la calificación crediticia de la deuda venezolana de Caa1 a Caa3, modificando su perspectiva de "negativa" a "estable"
Tendencia de la deuda externa soberana y de Pdvsa se asocia a las caídas del crudo: en el caso del WTI 4,75%, y 5,30% en el Brent de Londres
En las primeras horas de la jornada la deuda soberana muestra una tendencia mixta mientras que la de Pdvsa se mantiene en terreno negativo
El #WTI inició 2015 en su nivel más bajo en los últimos 6 años: 46,42 $/barril, acercándose a los precios de la crisis del 2009
Rendimiento de la deuda soberana de Grecia a 10 años (9,13%) registra la caída más alta en las últimas semanas: 9,10% en relación al viernes
Pdvsa 2016 cede 1,60 ptos registrando un nuevo mínimo en el año (48,17%), destacando así mismo el Pdvsa 2022 con una caída cercana a 1 pto
#Pdvsa: En la curva de la petrolera estatal las caídas en promedio suman 0,40 puntos.
El #bono Venz 2023 cedió 1,25 puntos retomando los precios de mediados de diciembre pasado.
El #bono soberano Venz 2022 presenta su caída más elevada en el arranque del año (1,50 puntos)
Las caídas en los precios de los bonos soberanos son en promedio de 0,10 ptos, registrándose las variaciones más elevadas en la parte media.
Hoy Moody´s redujo la calificación crediticia de la deuda venezolana de Caa1 a Caa3, modificando su perspectiva de "negativa" a "estable"
Tendencia de la deuda externa soberana y de Pdvsa se asocia a las caídas del crudo: en el caso del WTI 4,75%, y 5,30% en el Brent de Londres
En las primeras horas de la jornada la deuda soberana muestra una tendencia mixta mientras que la de Pdvsa se mantiene en terreno negativo
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tommy271
Forumer storico
tommy271
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VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 2
