Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 1
- Creatore Discussione troppidebiti
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
Investor2015
A.D. 2015
Analisi di JPM datata (30.03.15) ma molto completa e ancora attuale.
Se però avete qlc di + recente ben venga.
Quello che mi ha colpito:
1. il petrolio è del Venezuela, diventa di PDVSA solo dopo l'estrazione (l'immaginavo, ma la conferma è importante);
2. il maggior creditore di PDVSA è la BCV, il credito è in VEF e non in $ ma come sappiamo il cambio in Venezuela è una funzione esclusiva dell'opportunità politica, quindi come si fa a sapere se verrà conteggiato a 6.3 (cencoex), 12.8 (sicad 2), 200 (simadi) o magari 700 (dolartoday)?
Personalmente se volessi usare poca gentilezza ai miei creditori, fisserei il cambio al cencoex, a quel punto PDVSA avrebbe un debito superiore a 100 mld $ verso la banca centrale (a fine 2014, immagino ora sia cresciuto ancora), inoltre darei alla BCV lo status di creditore privilegiato (possono farlo? non lo so, io lo farei cmq se fossi disperato, in fondo le BC qlc privilegio ce l'hanno sempre, vedi anche l'ECB nella ristrutturazione greca).
A quel punto agli altri creditori non resterebbe pressoché nulla, forse qlc barile di petrolio ma vuoto.
Ovviamente sarebbe piuttosto "messy" come dice jpm, d'altra parte taglierebbe in modo significativo il debito e darebbe alcuni anni di respiro.
Ma il Venezuela per diversi decenni si dovrebbe scordare il mercato dei capitali esteri.
amorgos34
CHIAGNI & FOTTI SRL
Non sparate sul pianista...
Due reportini del 13 e del 10 agosto di JPM
Venezuela: Opposition turning up the rhetoric on external debt
Venezuelan opposition groups held a public forum on August 13 in Caracas to discuss policy proposals regarding the country's external debt. The general tone would seem to be sobering for bondholders, though not particularly startling given distressed levels observed most of this year for Venezuelan market debt.
Starting to hear some specific proposals
Freddy Guevara, a candidate in the December legislative elections from Voluntad Popular (Leopoldo Lopez's party), declared his party would have the National Assembly audit the debt to understand how much indebtedness there is and under what conditions it was contracted.1
Jose Guerra, former chief economist of the Central Bank and currently a National Assembly candidate for the Primero Justicia party (Henrique Capriles’s party), considers that at the current level of oil prices, Venezuela can only pay external debt at an “enormous economic and social cost”. Guerra, without going into great detail, proposed a "refinancing" of 2016-17 maturities. Guerra emphasized the need to implement "a coherent economic program that attracts investment, that can be accepted by the financial community and from that starting point put forward negotiations with creditors to refinance principal of $10bn that matures in 2016 and 2017 while still paying interest". Guerra is also quoted as saying "in no moment do I propose a default or a non-payment of the debt, on the contrary, this new economic program and the refinancing is to avoid a default if oil doesn't end up rebounding".2, 3
Guerra has previously made the case that if “default is inevitable” in 2016, it makes no sense to continue paying now, especially as Venezuela’s credit spreads are not benefitting from an ongoing demonstration of willingness to pay4. Nonetheless, in public statements as the economic advisor to the MUD, he has discussed a "voluntary" refinancing strategy5.
The forum in our view further turns up the volume on a theme that began making headlines last year with the widely publicized blog post from Harvard professors Hausmann and Santos, but has been gaining additional traction as an opposition talking point since a July press conference by former president candidate Capriles. Capriles generally sought to lay out the opposition’s economic agenda, and the topic of external debt was also broached. As we wrote in our July Venezuela EMOS, Capriles at the time strongly criticized the government for “irresponsible” indebtedness of recent years, which the current Miranda state governor even characterized as “onerous.” While Capriles was clear he would not advocate "default", he mentioned the possibility of a future opposition government pursuing a voluntary re-profiling.
The opposition is not in power, but the rhetoric might gain traction
First and foremost, the opposition is not in power, and there is no clear path to them gaining control of the executive in the short term. The institutional path by which the opposition could end up in the presidency would involve a snap election following a hypothetical successful recall referendum on President Maduro in mid-2016. Thus, at this point any rhetoric from the opposition regarding debt is largely that: rhetoric—which we would also note is taking place in the context of an election campaign.
We continue think the Venezuelan opposition—if it eventually is in a position to make policy decisions—would prefer to have the market as an ally, so we would not expect it to advocate any harsh restructuring, but, as we wrote in the July EMOS, we would not be surprised if it hints at the "onerous debt" card as an implicit stick in the context of a hypothetical exchange proposal as part of an overall program to stabilize the economy.
Perhaps a more relevant aspect for the market to track in the short term is whether heightened debate on the merits of restructuring external debt gains more traction within Chavismo. Willingness to pay has hitherto been extremely strong, with only some fleeting exceptions to the government’s overall stance (see for example Venezuela: Willingness to pay “unless”; December 16, 2014); or comments coming from relatively low-profile officials. Thus far we remain of the view that the Maduro administration will continue to service external bonded debt normally, as it has been doing. We maintain our view that 2015 maturities will be serviced.
Still, with the economic backdrop worsening, oil prices falling, and politics highly uncertain, the administration’s reaction function probably can’t be taken for granted indefinitely. Considering most Venezuelan external bonds trade in the $30s, we think this view has already been internalized by the market. We remain Neutral in our EMBIG model portfolio.
Venezuela: Forecasts anticipating more deterioration
We updated our growth and inflation forecasts this week, as published in the Andean page of Global Data Watch.
GDP growth now seen contracting 8% in 2015
Inflation seen closing 2015 at 200%
There is no indication that official data releases will be forthcoming in order to assess these views
Despite a dearth of official data releases, we now anticipate an even direr macro outlook for Venezuela this year. The Central Bank (BCV) has not reported GDP or BOP statistics since 3Q14, or published inflation data since last December. Nonetheless, we understand the technical team at the BCV is still producing the data, and in recent weeks the local press has leaked some figures. In the absence of official reporting we revise our 2015 forecasts to reflect what appears to be even more significant deterioration than we had expected.
On the growth side, the last official data marked a 4% contraction through the first three quarters of last year versus the same period of 2013; we assumed a 2%q/q, saar, decline in 4Q14, implying a 4% full-year GDP contraction in 2014. For 2015, the local daily El Nacional has reported that GDP slumped more than 6%oya in 1Q and more than 7%oya in 2Q.
Without 4Q GDP figures or information on possible backward revisions, it is difficult to analyze these headline numbers, but—all things equal—and based on our 2014 assumption, these data suggest a massive sequential contraction of around 30%, saar in 1Q followed by some stabilization thereafter. Based on this analysis, we revise our GDP forecast for full-year 2015, from a 5.5%oya contraction to an 8% slump.
As for inflation, in June we revised up the 2015 end-of-period forecast to 140% from 125% previously. Last week, El Nacional reported that July inflation was 12.8%m/m, reaching 139% on a 12-month basis. This figure is consistent with tax collection data marking a 140% nominal increase up to June.
Given a complete de-anchoring of expectations on the back of ongoing monetary financing of presumed double-digit (as a % of GDP) public sector fiscal deficits (fiscal data are only partially reported) and a plummeting parallel FX rate, we now anticipate double-digit monthly CPI inflation readings for much of the rest of the year, taking annual inflation to 200%oya in December. However, there is no indication that official data releases will be forthcoming any time soon with which we can assess this view.
Analisi di JPM datata (30.03.15) ma molto completa e ancora attuale.
Se però avete qlc di + recente ben venga.
Due reportini del 13 e del 10 agosto di JPM
Venezuela: Opposition turning up the rhetoric on external debt
Venezuelan opposition groups held a public forum on August 13 in Caracas to discuss policy proposals regarding the country's external debt. The general tone would seem to be sobering for bondholders, though not particularly startling given distressed levels observed most of this year for Venezuelan market debt.
Starting to hear some specific proposals
Freddy Guevara, a candidate in the December legislative elections from Voluntad Popular (Leopoldo Lopez's party), declared his party would have the National Assembly audit the debt to understand how much indebtedness there is and under what conditions it was contracted.1
Jose Guerra, former chief economist of the Central Bank and currently a National Assembly candidate for the Primero Justicia party (Henrique Capriles’s party), considers that at the current level of oil prices, Venezuela can only pay external debt at an “enormous economic and social cost”. Guerra, without going into great detail, proposed a "refinancing" of 2016-17 maturities. Guerra emphasized the need to implement "a coherent economic program that attracts investment, that can be accepted by the financial community and from that starting point put forward negotiations with creditors to refinance principal of $10bn that matures in 2016 and 2017 while still paying interest". Guerra is also quoted as saying "in no moment do I propose a default or a non-payment of the debt, on the contrary, this new economic program and the refinancing is to avoid a default if oil doesn't end up rebounding".2, 3
Guerra has previously made the case that if “default is inevitable” in 2016, it makes no sense to continue paying now, especially as Venezuela’s credit spreads are not benefitting from an ongoing demonstration of willingness to pay4. Nonetheless, in public statements as the economic advisor to the MUD, he has discussed a "voluntary" refinancing strategy5.
The forum in our view further turns up the volume on a theme that began making headlines last year with the widely publicized blog post from Harvard professors Hausmann and Santos, but has been gaining additional traction as an opposition talking point since a July press conference by former president candidate Capriles. Capriles generally sought to lay out the opposition’s economic agenda, and the topic of external debt was also broached. As we wrote in our July Venezuela EMOS, Capriles at the time strongly criticized the government for “irresponsible” indebtedness of recent years, which the current Miranda state governor even characterized as “onerous.” While Capriles was clear he would not advocate "default", he mentioned the possibility of a future opposition government pursuing a voluntary re-profiling.
The opposition is not in power, but the rhetoric might gain traction
First and foremost, the opposition is not in power, and there is no clear path to them gaining control of the executive in the short term. The institutional path by which the opposition could end up in the presidency would involve a snap election following a hypothetical successful recall referendum on President Maduro in mid-2016. Thus, at this point any rhetoric from the opposition regarding debt is largely that: rhetoric—which we would also note is taking place in the context of an election campaign.
We continue think the Venezuelan opposition—if it eventually is in a position to make policy decisions—would prefer to have the market as an ally, so we would not expect it to advocate any harsh restructuring, but, as we wrote in the July EMOS, we would not be surprised if it hints at the "onerous debt" card as an implicit stick in the context of a hypothetical exchange proposal as part of an overall program to stabilize the economy.
Perhaps a more relevant aspect for the market to track in the short term is whether heightened debate on the merits of restructuring external debt gains more traction within Chavismo. Willingness to pay has hitherto been extremely strong, with only some fleeting exceptions to the government’s overall stance (see for example Venezuela: Willingness to pay “unless”; December 16, 2014); or comments coming from relatively low-profile officials. Thus far we remain of the view that the Maduro administration will continue to service external bonded debt normally, as it has been doing. We maintain our view that 2015 maturities will be serviced.
Still, with the economic backdrop worsening, oil prices falling, and politics highly uncertain, the administration’s reaction function probably can’t be taken for granted indefinitely. Considering most Venezuelan external bonds trade in the $30s, we think this view has already been internalized by the market. We remain Neutral in our EMBIG model portfolio.
Venezuela: Forecasts anticipating more deterioration
We updated our growth and inflation forecasts this week, as published in the Andean page of Global Data Watch.
GDP growth now seen contracting 8% in 2015
Inflation seen closing 2015 at 200%
There is no indication that official data releases will be forthcoming in order to assess these views
Despite a dearth of official data releases, we now anticipate an even direr macro outlook for Venezuela this year. The Central Bank (BCV) has not reported GDP or BOP statistics since 3Q14, or published inflation data since last December. Nonetheless, we understand the technical team at the BCV is still producing the data, and in recent weeks the local press has leaked some figures. In the absence of official reporting we revise our 2015 forecasts to reflect what appears to be even more significant deterioration than we had expected.
On the growth side, the last official data marked a 4% contraction through the first three quarters of last year versus the same period of 2013; we assumed a 2%q/q, saar, decline in 4Q14, implying a 4% full-year GDP contraction in 2014. For 2015, the local daily El Nacional has reported that GDP slumped more than 6%oya in 1Q and more than 7%oya in 2Q.
Without 4Q GDP figures or information on possible backward revisions, it is difficult to analyze these headline numbers, but—all things equal—and based on our 2014 assumption, these data suggest a massive sequential contraction of around 30%, saar in 1Q followed by some stabilization thereafter. Based on this analysis, we revise our GDP forecast for full-year 2015, from a 5.5%oya contraction to an 8% slump.
As for inflation, in June we revised up the 2015 end-of-period forecast to 140% from 125% previously. Last week, El Nacional reported that July inflation was 12.8%m/m, reaching 139% on a 12-month basis. This figure is consistent with tax collection data marking a 140% nominal increase up to June.
Given a complete de-anchoring of expectations on the back of ongoing monetary financing of presumed double-digit (as a % of GDP) public sector fiscal deficits (fiscal data are only partially reported) and a plummeting parallel FX rate, we now anticipate double-digit monthly CPI inflation readings for much of the rest of the year, taking annual inflation to 200%oya in December. However, there is no indication that official data releases will be forthcoming any time soon with which we can assess this view.
fabriziof
Forumer storico
Grazie
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
Ma il Venezuela per diversi decenni si dovrebbe scordare il mercato dei capitali esteri.
Il Venezuela in queste condizioni già si scorda il mercato dei capitali esteri, o pensi che possano emettere a rendimenti del 30-40%?
Una NewCo con accesso ai pozzi e senza debito avrebbe sicuramente più capacità di finanziarsi che non PDVSA ora.
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
Giusto, da un punto di vista strettamente finanziario continuare ad onorare un debito sul quale tra non molto si farà cmq default (o cmq lo si ristrutturerà) è insensato.
D'altronde è ancora più insensato il sistema di cambi o regalare benzina quando si hanno budget gap nell'ordine del 20%.
Dato però che tutte queste misure sono ritenute funzionali al mantenimento del potere, si continuerà imperterriti fino all'ultimo minuto (o dollaro).
Investor2015
A.D. 2015
Se il greggio continua a scendere non ci sarà ristrutturazione del debito che possa tenere e prima o poi fallirà anche una PDVSA senza debiti. Al contrario, se il barile troverà un bottom e comincerà a risalire sarà assai opportuno che sia PDVSA, sia il Venezuela possano emettere ancora bond. Ma questo potrà avvenire solo se la "ristrutturazione" del debito non verrà fatta o verrà effettuata in modo indolore... ad esempio, swap volontario con bond a scadenza allungata.
Investor2015
A.D. 2015
Fino alle elezioni di dicembre non si muoverà foglia... subito dopo, qualunque Governo esca dalle urne, assisteremo a degli interventi economico-finanziari più o meno radicali.
http://www.prensa-latina.cu/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=4088481&Itemid=1
policeman
Forumer storico
per una NewCo intendi una che va a esplorare e estrare o intendi smantellare la PDVSA?
una NewCo a necesita di qualche anno per trovare e estrare questo petrolio,invece se intendi smantellare la PDVSA e dai le concessioni alla NewCo entri in un mare di guai legali e sequestri a non finire piu'
Have a nice evening e non pensare di cambiare le cose nell' giro di pocco tempo
- Stato