Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 1 (4 lettori)

[Obi W. Kenobi]

'giorno.

un po' di roba sull'oil:

il ministro egiziano anticipa il ritorno dell'iran sui mercati, dicendo che stanno aumentando i volumi che passano delle pipeline della sumed: Iran's oil return to boost SUMED volumes - Egypt oil min | Reuters

settimana scorsa la libia, assieme allo sciopero in petrobras, hanno innescato il rally dell'oil... oggi il chairman della NOC ha rilasciato dichiarazioni riguardo al fatto che i porti sono di nuovo attivi, con export ritornati ai livelli precedenti (300 kbpd). aggiunge anche che sotto opportune condizioni si possa aumentare di nuovo la produzione riaprendo al sharara, un campo petrolifero chiuso da un anno con output di 450 kbp (negotiations on last stage): Libya's Tripoli NOC sees full backing for state oil company unity | Reuters

alcuni numeri sullo scipero di petrobras: Brazil oil union says Petrobras pushing back against strike | Reuters

alcune parole del vice-ministro al petrolio dell'arabia saudita. ci sono stati molti spending-cuts, con la conseguenza di ritardare molti progetti futuri che, secondo lui, avrebbero portato a un incremento di output di circa 5 Mbpd. ci sono anche alcune cifre, riportate anche da el-badri e al-naimi in altra sede: Saudi Vice Oil Minister Sees Price Surge After Cutbacks - Bloomberg Business

al-naimi sulla cina e sulla futura domanda. io sono molto, molto scettico su quei numeri: Al Naimi: Current oil price will spur demand growth

sullo shale americano. situazione da monitorare, potrebbe essere un primo segnale: Apache Said to Get Takeover Approach for $18 Billion Company - Bloomberg Business

sul paese... questi attacchi in campagna elettorale non si sono mai rivelati molto efficaci con maduro: Venezuela says U.S. intelligence plane violated air space | Reuters

riporto questo pezzettino che mi ha strappato un sorriso... "Not even vultures fly around here," he added, referring to the lack of international flights after airlines cut routes to Venezuela over debts.

riporto poi questo, non è l'unico a pensarla così: ?El régimen de Maduro tiene sus días contados?

 

[tommy271]

Fitch rivede al ribasso le sue stime per l'oil.
Per il WTI rimarrà a 50$ nel 1016 ed aumenterà a 60$ nel 2017.
Brent 55$ nel 2016 e 65$ nel 2017.

 

[tommy271]

La tendencia es más clara en los bonos de PDVSA. En estos momentos pierden en promedio 0,3% de su valor

 

[tommy271]

Los bonos soberanos abrieron el día de hoy con un comportamiento mixto

 

[tommy271]

Tweet da Caracas:


Apertura bonos

 

[tommy271]

Tweet da Caracas:


Andamento WTI

In questo istante: 44,48$

 

[Magician]

Venezuela / PDVSA

PDVSA is considering the possibility of a voluntary liability management exercise. In an interview with the local newspaper El Mundo, the president of the company, Eulogio Del Pino, said PDVSA could propose a voluntary rescheduling of the maturities of company bonds due in 2016 and 2017. He points out that the maturities of 2016 and 2017 are higher than those in 2018 and 2019, which suggests that there could be some kind of debt exchange in the works that would include PD16, PD17N and PD17.

Given current market prices, a transaction of this type would be expensive for PDVSA. In a voluntary transaction, it would need to offer an NPV-neutral exchange and likely more value to induce investor participation. We think the terms of the swap would not likely be attractive to investors and that the level of success will depend on the proportion of the bonds that could be in the hands of government-controlled entities.

In addition, we believe that in the absence of policy changes that improve the sustainability of Venezuela/PDVSA debt, markets will have little incentive to participate in a transaction. Nonetheless, we see it as positive that the authorities proposed a voluntary transaction and reiterated the willingness to pay in any scenario. Del Pino also highlighted that he wanted to improve PDVSA’s credit ratings. Hence, we think it would not pursue the transaction if rating agencies see it as a distressed exchange. Moreover, Mr Del Pino emphasized that the fulfillment of PDVSA obligations is not subject to any of these negotiations. He said the company is preparing to service its debt under the conditions agreed with bondholders. Nonetheless, if the government holds a large portion of these bonds and it is able to swap them, it certainly would reduce the probability of a default in the short term.

In Figure 1, we estimate exchange ratios that would imply a neutral net present value. To calculate PD 18 and PD19 prices, we use PDVSA’s interpolated market yield curve. Because even assuming 12% coupons PD18 and PD19 would have lower prices than PD16, PD17N and PD17, the company must increase debt to compensate investors. For example, a 1.75 ratio means that PDVSA would need to issue an additional 75% in face value to compensate for the price differential between old and new bonds.

The economics of the transaction may not be enough to encourage investor participation. The most recent experience of this type was in 2010, when PDVSA exchanged the PDVSA11 for the PDVSA 13; the participation rate was just 18% and had an exchange ratio of 1.125, even though they were swapping a zero coupon bond under local law for one with a coupon of 8.0% under New York law. Considering the higher probability of default that the market now assigns and the declining trend in the asset position of the country, which, in the absence of policy changes, increases the chances of a credit event the farther one moves along the curve, investors might prefer to see the payment of their bonds and then decide if they will reinvest part of that in longer maturities. As a consequence, the most likely outcome would be that mainly the short maturity bonds in the hands of the government or government-controlled entities participate in a potential exchange.

Friends and family
There is no official information about how much of these bonds could be in hands of the government. Recently, Minister of Finance Marco Torres commented that the government owns 20-25% of its bonds. However, even if the government were close to this figure, our estimate is that it had just 16% of the PDVSA 17N and not much more in the PDVSA 16. We were expecting it to start to build a position in these bonds after the payment of the PDVSA 15 and the portion of PDVSA 17N paid last week and this.

 

[russiabond]

SELL 100 K PDVSA 2024 6% ...prezzo OTC con BIM

acquistata cambio euro dollaro a circa 1,0950 se ben ricordo ora venduto anche i dollari ...tanto mi copro su piatta forex fregaunquazzo

prezzo 35,60

acquistat 35,20

resto con Venezuela 2028 100 K e Venezuela 2025 100 K

diciamo che avvevo voglia di tradare e ho venduto

non son diventato ricco ma 700 euri tra trading e cedole ci facciamo la pizza per qualche mese

saluti a todos



CAMBIO CONCORDATO con BIM 1,0735

 

[SPERANZA]

Russia pensi sempre che i bond Venezuela scendono a livelli estremi ?

 

[russiabond]

Russia pensi sempre che i bond Venezuela scendono a livelli estremi ?

ti basta come risposta ...

li trado da settimane compro e vendo

vendo e ricompro


resto con 200K ...strategici ...altrimenti sta martingala quando inizia ?