In un bell'articolo che dà il senso di quanto sta accadendo sul mercato HY europeo, il Financial Times si interroga sulla natura del risorgere della domanda per i bond HY: chi compra in Europa ?
E' questa la domanda di partenza. La risposta è che i vecchi investitori professionali del debito HY, quali gli hedge funds, sostenuti dal credito bancario ed esposti a leva, sono stati sostituiti, letteramente, da "fondi pensione", "fondi assicurativi" ed altri fondi di investimento che collocano sul mercato denaro proveniente da investori privati.
Certamente, come nota l'estensore dell'articolo, questi soggetti apportano capitali veri (non comprano cioè con soldi presi a prestito dalle banche ed amplificati dall'utilizzo della leva
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) e di conseguenza, verrebbe da dire, le perdite che dovessero riportare dall'investimento un domani non si ripercuoteranno su bilanci bancari.
Ma giacché si tratta di soldi con i quali un domani andrebbero integrate pensioni o pagate polizze assicurative di varia natura, o piuttosto di soldi provenienti da investitori privati, il rischio si trasferisce dal bilancio delle banche a quello dei privati interessati.
E' una svolta in quanto, e qui il racconto si fa interessante, negli anni passati lo sviluppo del mercato HY europeo è stato "alterato" (le virgolette sono mie) dal proliferare delle cartolarizzazioni dei finanziamenti bancari HY, in quanto i principali protagonisti del mercato erano i fondi interessanti a raccogliere finanziamenti bancari HY e a cartolarizzarli per poi vendere i bond asset backed.
Dietro a questi fondi tuttavia c'era il credito dei brokers e degli investment bankers, e per paradosso gli stessi soggetti erano spesso anche acquirenti di trance importanti dei bond "asset backed" del comparto (CLOs' bonds).
E difatti le perdite generate dai default corporate (salva la copertura assicurativa originariamente resa disponibile da colossi come AIG, e poi di fatto pagata dal contribuente americano dopo la nazionalizzazione di tale società) hanno finito, e avrebbero finito per le perdite "a venire", per riverberarsi sui conti delle banche, sia in quanto acquirenti di trance di questi titoli, sia soprattutto in quanto prestatori di capitali a chi collateralizzava.
Non stupisce quindi l'entusiasmo del dirigente a capo dell'European leveraged finance di Barclays, il quale afferma che il mercato dei CLO "è morto", ma c'è un numero di investitori, come i fondi pensione, interessati nel mercato dei loans HY, che apportano capitali freschi e non levereggiati (e soprattutto, aggiungo io, i cui destini sono ad impatto zero sui bilanci delle banche).
European high-yield bonds are in demand
By Anousha Sakoui
Published: August 14 2009 03:00 | Last updated: August 14 2009 03:00
As €10bn ($14.28bn) in orders flooded in from investors for Italian car maker Fiat's junk bond last month, even the company's bankers were surprised by the torrent of demand for a €1.25bn offering of risky debt. Just a few weeks earlier, such a deal might not have been possible.
Indeed, risk aversion levels were so high during the first 18 months of the financial crisis that the European high-yield market was completely closed to new issues.
Yet such has been the change of sentiment in recent weeks that European high-yield bonds have become the best performing fixed income asset class globally - returning almost 50 per cent in 2009, according to Credit Suisse.
So far this year the market has swallowed €6.1bn of euro-denominated junk bonds, according to Société Générale. The total includes a €2.7bn bond from Italian telecom company Wind - the biggest ever unsecured European junk bond - and the Fiat issue. Overall issuance is bigger because it includes other currencies.
Digging down into banks' order books highlights a radical change in the sources of demand for high- yield paper.
With both Wind and Irish bottling company Ardagh Glass, over 70 per cent of orders were from longer term or so-called 'real money' investors, according to analysis by debt information provider CapitalStructure.
Before the credit crunch, it was typically hedge funds and structured credit investors which accounted for the bulk of demand in Europe.
Demand now is driven by pension and insurance funds, suggesting a new pool of long-term liquidity is evolving for riskier European borrowers and one which could be more permanent.
The buyers include fund management groups such as Threadneedle - as well as investors that have dedicated high-yield funds such as Bluebay Asset Management. Aviva Investors, the asset management arm of the insurance company, is another such investor, having launched a Global High Yield Bond Fund last year.
"European high yield has had a number of false dawns but the expectation is that this time it will be more sustainable," says Dagmar Kent Kershaw, Head of Credit Fund Management at Intermediate Capital Group. " It is fantastic news for a high-yield market which has been starved of product."
Mathew Cestar, co-head of Credit Capital Markets at Credit Suisse, says: "Wind was a seminal deal for Europe, given its multibillion euro size and complexity. Even in the US, we have only seen a handful of high-yield deals north of a billion dollars. There was some scepticism about whether you could get a deal away this size, but it was well digested and has rallied because of the scarcity of paper and the quality of the company."
The revival in the high- yield market reflects the strong increase in global risk appetite in recent months as well as a view that default levels may fall short of earlier estimates. Partly because of the improvement in the market, Moody's says it now expects the default rate for European speculative grade companies to peak at 12 per cent in the first quarter of 2010, down from an earlier forecast of a peak of 15 per cent by the end of 2009.
While the US junk bond market has been long established, the European high- yield market has only developed over the past decade. Unlike the US, where borrowers have a long tradition of using bond markets to fund themselves, European companies relied heavily on bank debt in the past.
The development of the European market was further distorted by the proliferation of collateralised debt obligations - funds that pool leveraged loans. Traditional high-yield and leveraged loan money managers were squeezed out of the market, and hedge funds and CLOs accounted for the majority of demand.
But when the credit crisis hit in the summer of 2007, the investor base for leveraged credit in Europe folded. The bond markets shut to any borrower that did not have an investment grade rating and concerns started to build over how some €360bn of leveraged debt would be refinanced.
Earlier this year that changed. Suddenly, risk appetite revived and credit was in vogue again. Investment grade borrowers were able to sell record volumes of bonds and as returns on those started to fall, investors turned to the high- yield market instead.
Given this rebound, analysts are now taking a much more optimistic view about longer-term prospects. According to Barclays Capital, the European junk bond market is set to grow from €100bn currently to €150bn by the end of 2012. The revival in high yield has also sparked interest in the leveraged loan market, which has rallied 25 per cent this year.
"A lot of banks that shut up shop will be open for deals again, initially in their home markets, once they get through the slew of restructurings," says David Shaw, co-head of European leveraged finance at Barclays Capital. "The CLO market is dead but a number of investors interested in the leveraged loan market, such as pension funds, are providing unlevered capital to CLO managers to invest. "
In early August, the prices of the most traded risky European and US loans reached their highest levels for more than a year.
However, observers sound a note of caution over the outlook for leveraged credit and the ability of speculative grade companies to refinance. Edward Eyerman, managing director at Fitch Ratings, says the cost of capital is high - and more than many junk-rated companies can afford.
"Coupons are likely to be far more expensive than the legacy loans high-yield investors will be refinancing," he says