Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 2 (5 lettori)

[Nerone975]

Io purtroppo posseggo 40k nominali, con un carico medio intorno al 65 di ago2014, da quel che ho capito, dovrei aspettarmi dalla mia banca (ISP)una richiesta di adesione allo swap.....nel caso arrivasse, cosa consigliereste di fare ?

se ti arrivasse una richiesta di swap per me al momento conviene stare fermi se dovesse andare bene l'adesione degli istituzionali (cosa per me difficile ma cmq possibile) te la potresti cavare almeno per il momento... magari comprano i restanti bond in circolazione a prezzo di mercato ovviamente (nessuno ti regala niente in questo mondo)...quindi no SWAP per sperare

Quali sono secondo voi le reali possibilità di poter arrivare a termine avendo rimborso a 100 ?

al di là di quel che si dice tra ottimisti e pessimisti...sapendo la situazione Greca che è da disastro a dir poco...le possibilità di rimborso già a 65 sono ridotte a decimali...figuriamoci a 100 probabilità 0

 

[discipline]

Per gli amanti dei numeri, la lista completa dei bond greci, compresi quelli esclusi dal PSI.
Ma da cosa si deduceva che gli acquisti BCE erano concentrati sui decennali (come ho più volte visto scrivere anche qui)?

http://3.bp.blogspot.com/-CVNQWuhHrok/T0ztD63aNEI/AAAAAAAAAEw/6tH1RogtzuA/s640/PSI_BONDS.png

 

[giub]

The Final Final Greek PSI Decision Tree

Submitted by Tyler Durden on 02/27/2012 20:49 -0500


A few days ago, before the definitive Greek PSI term sheet was available, we presented the complete preliminary BNP PariBas decision which despite having some assumptions was almost spot on in its flow chartness of Greek next steps. Today, to avoid any confusion on the matter, here is Bank of America with its take on the finalized Greek PSI Terms and the final final (until changed yet again) Greek decision tree.
From BofA's Sphia Salim (who may have borrowed an idea or two from BNP):

Greek PSI: total notional at €206bn; SMP holdings excluded

On 24 February, Greece released the Invitation that marks the start of the Private Sector Involvement (PSI). The Invitation is a combination of 1) an Exchange offer, and/or 2) a Consent Solicitation, applicable to a total notional amount of €206bn of Greek government bonds and government guaranteed bonds (some holders may receive only one of (1) or (2) due to regulatory requirements). We also note that the bonds that are held by the ECB and the NCB as a result of the SMP purchases do not count in the targeted €206bn notional.

There are still three possible outcomes for the Greek PSI

Depending on the percentage amount of the bonds that will be tendered for exchange and the percentage amount for which amendment consents are given, there are three possible outcomes: i) the PSI will go through voluntarily, ii) the PSI will go through via amendments enforced by the exercise of CACs (Collective Action Clauses), or iii) the PSI will simply be abandoned. We derive the scenarios leading to each potential outcome in a decision tree (Chart 1, page 3).

Tenders for exchange differ from consents for amendments

For the majority of the bonds, Greece will invite private sector holders to proceed voluntarily with two distinct actions: 1) to tender their bonds for the Exchange (details in FX snapshot 21-Feb), and 2) to submit a Participation Instruction to state if they would consent and/or vote in favor of a change in the terms of the bonds, with the amendments providing for the redemption of the affected bonds in exchange for exactly the same package as in (1).

A bondholder who agrees to (1) would automatically be considered as consenting in (2). On the other hand, a bondholder who does not agree to exchange his bonds voluntarily in (1) may still submit his consent for the amendments in (2). This may be what a holder who aims to benefit from a CDS trigger would do, as he may be in favor of the PSI only if it is enforced with the exercise of CACs.

66% is the threshold of Greek Law CACs, not the PSI target

Among the €206bn targeted bonds, a €177bn notional is governed by Greek Law while the remainder is subject to foreign laws. With the recently ratified Greek Bondholder Act, the terms of the aggregated €177bn of Greek law bonds can be amended with the exercise of specific CACs. More specifically, if deemed desirable, Greece would be able to enforce the exchange of these bonds so long as holders of more than 50% of the €177bn have tender their bonds or just submitted their instructions in (2), and more than two-third of these instructions correspond to a positive consent. Such a decision would trigger CDS, as the exchange becomes binding on all holders of Greek law bonds. It would also mean 86% of the targeted €206bn will be exchanged. The two-third threshold discussed here differs therefore from the minimum 75% participation targeted for the PSI.

If ≥ 90% participation can be engineered, it will be

If a) 90% of the €206bn of bonds are voluntarily tendered for exchange, or b) Greece has received sufficient consents and/or votes in (2) to enforce changes in the terms of some bonds through CACs (Greek law bonds in aggregate, and/or individual International law bonds), and guarantee that more than 90% of the €206bn would be either exchanged or amended, then the PSI would likely be completed with more than 90% participation. In the first case, Greece would be required to settle the exchanges and the PSI would be purely voluntary. In the latter, it would come with a CDS trigger and would therefore be subject to a consultation with the official sector creditors (See cases (a) and (b) in Chart 1).

If not possible to engineer ≥ 75%, PSI will be abandoned

On the other hand, we understand that the PSI would be abandoned if less than 75% of the €206bn have been tendered for the exchange, and Greece cannot enforce amendments in enough bonds based on the consents submitted, to guarantee that over 75% of the €206bn notional will either exchanged or amended (case (e) in the decision tree). We believe this should only occur if CACs cannot be enforced in the Greek Law bonds (because these would allow for 86% forced PSI), meaning that either less than 50% of the €177bn holders have tendered their bonds or submitted a Participation Instruction (be it positive or negative), or that those who submitted a negative Participation Instruction represent more than 1/3 of that set (aka blocking stake).
​

And now the chart you've all been waiting for

 

[ingsilvio]

Qui mi sembra che la Grecia la stiamo salvando solo noi.

Noi perdiamo i soldi e quella se salva

 

[ingsilvio]

Ma se alla fine si arriva al 91% si applicano le CAC? COME ANDRA' PER i retai?

 

[Nobody's]

Bloomberg: la BEI non entrerà a far parte il taglio dei titoli greci







La Banca europea per gli investimenti, che appartiene al 27 Stati membri dell'UE riceverà la stessa eccezione alla svalutazione del debito greco applicabili alla Banca centrale europea trasmette Bloomberg citando due funzionari con conoscenza del caso.

***
Altra esenzione.
A PSI+ gia avviato?

����:Capital.gr​

Bene bene.
Trattati comi i figli della serva.

Caporetto

 

[giub]

Greek retail investors may be compensated in PSI

By Adam Button || February 28, 2012 at 18:40 GMT
|| 3 comments || Add comment
In a Bloomberg story, German investor group DSW says it is aware of plans by the Greek government to compensate Greek retail investors for their losses.
Last week, there were reports that all private retail investors were lobbying for an exemption with DSW saying only 1% of Greek bonds are held by private investors.
DSW also says many of its members do not want to take part in the PSI and ”there will almost certainly be lawsuits” if bonds due March 20 are not serviced.
Three risks here:

1. Giving exemptions encourages a disruption and fragmentation.
2. An individual could theoretically buy bonds due March 20 from an institution at the PSI price and claim the exemption.
3. Greece decides triggering CAC isn’t worth it and pays out the holdouts fully, adding to its debt and pissing off PSI participants.

 

[giub]

Greek retail investors may be compensated in PSI

By Adam Button || February 28, 2012 at 18:40 GMT
|| 3 comments || Add comment
In a Bloomberg story, German investor group DSW says it is aware of plans by the Greek government to compensate Greek retail investors for their losses.
Last week, there were reports that all private retail investors were lobbying for an exemption with DSW saying only 1% of Greek bonds are held by private investors.
DSW also says many of its members do not want to take part in the PSI and ”there will almost certainly be lawsuits” if bonds due March 20 are not serviced.
Three risks here:

1. Giving exemptions encourages a disruption and fragmentation.
2. An individual could theoretically buy bonds due March 20 from an institution at the PSI price and claim the exemption.
3. Greece decides triggering CAC isn’t worth it and pays out the holdouts fully, adding to its debt and pissing off PSI participants.

risposta di Tommy:

My understanding of European Union law is that each citizen of the European Union must be treated equally Consequently, any citizen of an European Union member country would be entitled to the same treatment in respect of their holding of Greek debt. Thus this idea sounds to be dead in the water even before it is promoted. Thus I cannot see Greece being in a position to compensate all individual citizens of the European Union who hold their debt.
The absolute essence of the European Union (or that is how it was taught me back at Law School in the 1970’s) is to create a level playing field across European member states. An amusing thing about this aspect is that in Spain, all Spanish citizens were allowed to visit the Royal Palace on a Tuesday for free. Since Spain is a member of the European Union, the free visit had to be extended to the citizens of all states that are a member of the European Union.

 

[giub]

http://www.ft.com/servicestools/help/terms
February 28, 2012 10:55 pm
CDS payouts on Greek bond deal on agenda

By Michael Mackenzie in New York


A group of banks and investors in the credit derivatives market will meet on Thursday to determine whether Greece’s planned debt swap deal should trigger payments on its default insurance.
The question facing the International Swaps and Derivatives Association is whether the deal constitutes a “credit event” because it creates two classes of bond holders – the European Central Bank, which is spared losses, and private investors, who are being forced to take losses of up to 75 per cent on their Greek bond holdings.
If the 10 banks and five investors on the ISDA determinations committee decide a credit event has occurred, payments would be made on $3.2bn in net outstanding credit derivative contracts.
ISDA’s move comes after Standard & Poor's on Monday downgraded Greece to “Selective Default”, providing the latest sign that the country may have defaulted.
Greece wants nearly all holders of some €206bn of its debt to participate in a debt swap known as private sector involvement so that the country can start receiving the €130bn of rescue funds from the European Union. Bondholders have until March 12 to agree to the PSI, which could lead to a reduction of up to 75 per cent in the value of their holdings.
The prospect that existing bondholders would face a “haircut” has long been expected and has led some investors to buy credit protection in recent years from banks and other investors to insure their bonds against a default. But the issue of a “voluntary” restructuring of Greece’s debt, as the PSI has been termed, has muddied the waters as to whether it constitutes an actual credit event.
Last week, the Greek parliament approved the retroactive insertion of a collective action clause, which would force all bondholders to accept the terms of the deal put forward by the Greek government. This comes after the Greek government recently agreed to replace €55bn in bonds held by the European Central Bank with new bonds that are immune from a default.
Usually ISDA’s determination committee is asked to make a ruling on a credit event once bondholders have incurred actual losses. It has accepted a question from an investor ahead of next month’s bond swap as to whether Greece has triggered a credit event because of the exclusion of the ECB from losses.
“A question relating to a potential credit event with respect to the Hellenic Republic has been submitted to, and subsequently accepted for consideration,” ISDA said in a statement on Tuesday.
As it stands, the net $3.2bn of outstanding Greek CDS is a relatively small market and bankers say their exposures have been hedged. But some in the bond market say that if the committee does not rule a credit event has occurred, then the creditability of the sovereign CDS market will be damaged.
A ruling that a credit event has occurred must be passed by at least 12 members.

 

[giub]

Greece’s default gets messier

By Felix Salmon
February 28, 2012

Back on February 17, the European Central Bank sprinkled its magical pixie dust on its Greek sovereign bonds, with the effect that they effectively ended up exempt from the restructuring and haircut being inflicted on everybody else. I wasn’t very excited about this development at the time:

On a conceptual level, it makes sense that the Troika — of which the ECB is a third — might be granted immunity from haircuts, in return for providing new money to Greece. On a legal and practical level, however, this is ugly — and you can be quite sure that it’s only going to get uglier from here on in.
​

Today, we’re beginning to get a hint of the messiness that this decision caused.
First, there’s a formal question which has been put to ISDA’s Determinations Committee, asking whether the ECB magical pixie dust, combined with the passage of the Greek law to allow the haircut, doesn’t in itself constitute a credit event under ISDA rules.
The question takes the form of a single 179-word sentence, which some lawyer somewhere probably thinks is very clever. But here’s the idea: the two events together have effectively cleaved the stock of Greek bonds into two parts, with one part (the bonds owned by the ECB) being effectively senior to the other part (the bonds owned by everybody else). This is known as Subordination, and Subordination is a credit event under ISDA rules.
Now there’s no doubt that the private sector’s Greek bonds are de facto subordinate to the ECB’s Greek bonds now, and that they weren’t subordinate a couple of weeks ago. But so far there’s nothing de jure about this subordination — there’s no intrinsic reason why bonds with CACs, for instance, should be subordinate to bonds without CACs. So my guess is that this request is going to go nowhere, and/or get overtaken by events.
But now there’s news that another European institution has managed to get its hands on the ECB’s magical pixie dust.

The European Investment Bank, owned by the 27-member bloc, is getting exemptions from Greek debt writedowns in the same way as the euro area’s central bank, according to two regional officials familiar with the matter.
The European Central Bank negotiated a deal to avoid the 53.5 percent loss on principal that’s costing private investors as much as 106 billion euros ($143 billion). The EIB, which unlike its Frankfurt-based counterpart represents the entire European Union, also owns Greece’s debt and is sidestepping the so-called haircut in the same way, said the officials, who declined to be identified because the plan isn’t public.
​

While the ECB exemption was understandable, on the grounds that the ECB was part of the Troika and the Troika is putting up new money here, an EIB exemption is less so. The EIB is not putting money into this latest Greece bailout. Indeed, it represents countries like the UK which are quite explicitly removing themselves from any such thing.
Now, admittedly, the European Commission is a member of the Troika, and the European Commission is the executive body of the European Union, and the European Union collectively owns the European Investment Bank. So this decision is, as the lawyers would say, colorable. But if the decision to exempt the ECB from the Greece haircut was ugly, then the decision to exempt the EIB is, at the margin, even uglier. I’m not saying it’s the wrong decision, necessarily. After all, sovereign restructurings necessarily have an ad hoc, make-it-up-as-you-go-along element to them.
Indeed, if the ECB’s magical pixie dust means that there’s substantially more EU support for this deal, then it might well be worth spreading it around a bit. But at the same time, predictability and consistency are important as well. And both of those seem to have gone out the window at this point. I wouldn’t be at all surprised if ISDA’s Determinations Committee just said “enough already” and declared an event of default. Because in recent weeks private-sector bondholders have been treated in an extremely cavalier manner. And those decisions have consequences.