Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 1 (2 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione negusneg
- Data di Inizio
-
- Tags
- additional tier 1 bail in basilea 3 coco bonds crd iv genussscheine grandfathering hybrid bond loss absorption lower tier 2 make whole amount matusalem bond obbligazioni irredimibili obbligazioni perpetue obbligazioni subordinate perpetual bond preference shares restricted tier 1 tier 1 upper tier 2
- Stato
Gallo Cedrone
Forumer storico
Da circa 2 settimane sono in attesa di una risposta definitiva, ma ho una mail del desk che mi "rassicura.." sulla fattibilità dell'operazione.
Non appena avrò la conferma (cioè l'ordine!) posterò la notizia.
lupomar
Forumer attivo
Da circa 2 settimane sono in attesa di una risposta definitiva, ma ho una mail del desk che mi "rassicura.." sulla fattibilità dell'operazione.
Non appena avrò la conferma (cioè l'ordine!) posterò la notizia.
Grazie speriamo bene.
Avevo inviato anch'io ormai mesi fa una richiesta via email ma mi avevano risposto che avrebbero permesso quanto prima di operare sui perpetuals (e anche sule obbligazioni Otc), ma i mesi sono passati e nisba.
Mi sto un po' rompendo mi sa che accetto il consiglio di imark.
Imark
Forumer storico
Grazie speriamo bene.
Avevo inviato anch'io ormai mesi fa una richiesta via email ma mi avevano risposto che avrebbero permesso quanto prima di operare sui perpetuals (e anche sule obbligazioni Otc), ma i mesi sono passati e nisba.
Mi sto un po' rompendo mi sa che accetto il consiglio di imark.
Te ne dò ancora uno: se posti ancora 1 msg entro oggi, puoi votare alle elezioni per i moderatori....
Gallo Cedrone
Forumer storico
Te ne dò ancora uno: se posti ancora 1 msg entro oggi, puoi votare alle elezioni per i moderatori....
A me è proprio sfuggita questa scadenza della data per il voto, mi spiace molto
Ma mi iscriverò sicuramente per le votazioni del 2010 !!!
Imark
Forumer storico
A me è proprio sfuggita questa scadenza della data per il voto, mi spiace molto
Ma mi iscriverò sicuramente per le votazioni del 2010 !!!
Non ti preoccupare, mica è un obbligo, ci mancherebbe...
se fa piacere, è carina l'idea che si decide fra noi... però nessuno deve sentirsi forzato a farlo, e non cambia nulla nei rapporti reciproci qui, ci mancherebbe...
Gallo Cedrone
Forumer storico
Non ti preoccupare, mica è un obbligo, ci mancherebbe...
ma certo !
Nessuna forzatura, sarebbe stato solo un piacere!
cricket72
a difesa del gregge
Hybrid Securities Of 9 European Banking Groups Receiving State Aid Lowered By 3 Or More Notches Following Review
Primary Credit Analysts:
Scott Bugie, Paris
Giles Edwards, London
Taos Fudji, Milan
Secondary Credit Analysts:
Nigel Greenwood, London
Nick Hill, London
Elisabeth Grandin, Paris
Publication date: 20-May-09, 14:00:19 EST
PARIS (Standard & Poor's) May 20, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
said today that it lowered its ratings by three or more notches on hybrid
capital securities of the following European banking groups: ABN AMRO Holding
N.V.; Allied Irish Banks PLC; Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.; Bank of Ireland;
Dexia S.A.; Fortis Bank Nederland (Holding) N.V.; Lloyds Banking Group PLC;
Northern Rock PLC; and The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC. At the same time,
we removed many of the issue ratings from CreditWatch. (See list of the issues
affected below.) The downgrades follow our review of the ratings on the hybrid
securities of certain European financial institutions that have received state
aid or that are likely, in our opinion, to receive state aid in the near
future. We concluded that the likelihood of suspension of payments on the
issues has increased. We did not change any of the issuer credit ratings
(ICRs) on the banking groups affected by these hybrid securities rating
actions.
We placed many of these hybrid securities on CreditWatch with negative
implications earlier this year due in part to uncertainty regarding European
Commission (EC) policy in applying European Union (EU) state aid rules. The EC
announcement of May 7, 2009, on the recapitalization of Commerzbank AG
(A/Negative/A-1) removed some uncertainty by specifying that Commerzbank's
business plan include measures aimed at keeping state aid to a minimum,
including "the suspension of dividend and interest payments to holders of
hybrid capital." This announcement prompted rating actions by Standard &
Poor's on the hybrid capital securities of the Commerzbank group (see "Various
Commerzbank, Dresdner, And Eurohypo Hybrid Capital Instruments Cut To 'CCC'
And Kept On Watch Negative," published May 11, 2009, on RatingsDirect).
The EC announcement about Commerzbank clarifies (to some degree) the EC's
position on hybrid capital securities of state-supported banks. In our view,
the announcement increases the potential that banking groups receiving EU
state aid will suspend payments on their hybrid securities. While the EC has
neither concluded reviews nor has made similar unequivocal statements
regarding banking groups whose hybrids are affected by today's rating actions,
we believe that the EC's position is that state funds granted to struggling
banks should be retained to strengthen capitalization and should not be paid
out to shareholders or holders of other capital instruments, including hybrid
securities. Despite this position, it appears that the EC will respect the
terms of the hybrid capital instruments and not alter the terms of hybrid
securities that link payments to financial performance, notably earnings,
distributable income, or specified capital levels.
The rating actions also reflect our view that European sovereign
governments over the medium term may be more willing than in the past to
encourage or force banks to suspend payments on hybrid securities to preserve
cash and build capital. We believe that hybrid capital securities of European
(and U.S.) banking groups whose creditworthiness is supported by
already-received and potential future government aid are relatively more
vulnerable to payment deferral than the hybrid securities of banking groups
whose ratings are more closely aligned with their stand-alone credit profiles
(see "Issue Ratings Lowered On Hybrid Instruments Of Some European Banks On
Heightened Deferral Risk," published Jan. 28, 2009).
Moreover, the recession and difficult operating environment, in our view,
increase the vulnerability of banks in Europe (and in other regions in the
world) that have not received state aid to payment deferrals on hybrid
securities due to pressure on retained earnings and capital. EC policy with
respect to state aid is an additional factor, but not the primary reason, for
EU banks to suspend payments on hybrid securities. Earlier in 2009, Standard &
Poor's took widespread actions on hybrid securities of many European and U.S.
banking groups due to our assessment of this vulnerability (see "Hybrid
Securities Of Over 60 European Financial Institutions Downgraded Following S&P
Review," published March 31, 2009, and "Review Results In Changes To Certain
U.S. Financial Institutions' Hybrid Capital Issue Ratings," published Feb. 24,
2009).
From a rating perspective, we generally widen the gap between the hybrid
rating and the ICR of the issuing entity to three or more notches when we
consider the potential for payment deferral has increased (see "Franchise
Stability, Confidence Sensitivity, And The Treatment Of Hybrid Securities In A
Downturn," published Dec. 1, 2008, and "Hybrid Capital Handbook," published
Sept. 15, 2008).
On May 19, 2009, Bank of Ireland made a tender offer for six of its
preference share issues. We characterize the tender offer as distressed and
consequently lowered the ratings on the six issues to 'C' from 'BB'. The
ratings on Bank of Ireland's three hybrid securities not subject to the tender
offer were lowered to 'B' (one issue) and 'B-' (two issues) from 'BB'. All
ratings were removed from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were originally placed on Nov. 14, 2008. (See "Bank of Ireland Hybrid
Securities Downgraded On Announced Tender Offers," published today on
RatingsDirect.)
HOW STANDARD & POOR'S DIFFERENTIATES EUROPEAN BANK HYBRID SECURITIES BY
RATINGS CATEGORY
Standard & Poor's broadly characterizes the rated hybrid securities of
European banking groups by rating category. While we cite general
characteristics by category, we note that the ratings on individual hybrid
securities may differ due to the specific terms of the security and the
particular credit profile and national jurisdiction of the issuing group.
For bank hybrid securities rated in the 'CCC' category, there is, in our
view, a clear and present risk of payment deferral or principal reduction. The
hybrid securities in question include those of wholly nationalized banks such
as Northern Rock and Anglo Irish Banks as well as those of
government-supported groups whose earnings are under severe pressure, such as
Commerzbank and KBC Group N.V.
We also rate preference shares with voting rights issued by Lloyds
Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC 'CCC+', one notch below
their other perpetual deferrable instruments, to reflect the "nationalization
risk" of the preference shares of these two banking groups. In the U.K. and
Ireland, perpetual preferred shares that grant voting rights to the holders in
certain circumstances have been included in nationalizations of a troubled
financial institution for the purpose of giving the government full control of
the institution. This happened to Northern Rock and Anglo Irish Banks.
Bank hybrid securities rated in the 'B' category are, in our view,
vulnerable to a potential further deterioration in the operating environment
that could result in significant losses at the issuing group and necessitate
further state aid from the applicable sovereign government. The European
banking groups whose hybrid securities are in the 'B' category typically have
received material direct support from their governments, and their
creditworthiness relies to an important extent on potential future government
aid. The hybrid securities of Allied Irish Banks, Fortis Bank Nederland,
Lloyds Banking Group, and Royal Bank of Scotland/ABN AMRO are part of this
group. Dexia's hybrids are also in this group, primarily due to the large
amount of government aid the Dexia group has received and less due to
vulnerability of Dexia's earnings to a more stressed environment. While this
article addresses the hybrid securities of European banking groups, the
characterization of the 'B' category also broadly fits the hybrid securities
of government-supported financial institutions in other mature markets. For
example, we rate the hybrid capital securities of Bank of America Corp. in the
U.S. in the 'B' category.
European bank hybrid securities in the 'BB' category are, in our view,
relatively less vulnerable to deterioration in the operating environment than
the bank hybrids in the 'B' category, but for reasons of reliance on future
state aid or the fundamental credit profile of the issuing group, the hybrid
securities have some speculative characteristics. The banking groups whose
hybrid securities are in the 'BB' category are in two groups:
--Banking groups that have received some direct support from their
governments, and with creditworthiness that relies to some extent on potential
future government aid, such as Swedish banks Swedbank AB and Skandinaviska
Enskilda Banken AB; and
--Banking groups that have an ICR in the 'BBB' category, such as the
major Greek banks, NIBC Bank N.V. of the Netherlands, and Italian banking
group Veneto Banca Holdings S.C.P.A.
Primary Credit Analysts:
Scott Bugie, Paris
Giles Edwards, London
Taos Fudji, Milan
Secondary Credit Analysts:
Nigel Greenwood, London
Nick Hill, London
Elisabeth Grandin, Paris
Publication date: 20-May-09, 14:00:19 EST
PARIS (Standard & Poor's) May 20, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
said today that it lowered its ratings by three or more notches on hybrid
capital securities of the following European banking groups: ABN AMRO Holding
N.V.; Allied Irish Banks PLC; Anglo Irish Bank Corp. Ltd.; Bank of Ireland;
Dexia S.A.; Fortis Bank Nederland (Holding) N.V.; Lloyds Banking Group PLC;
Northern Rock PLC; and The Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC. At the same time,
we removed many of the issue ratings from CreditWatch. (See list of the issues
affected below.) The downgrades follow our review of the ratings on the hybrid
securities of certain European financial institutions that have received state
aid or that are likely, in our opinion, to receive state aid in the near
future. We concluded that the likelihood of suspension of payments on the
issues has increased. We did not change any of the issuer credit ratings
(ICRs) on the banking groups affected by these hybrid securities rating
actions.
We placed many of these hybrid securities on CreditWatch with negative
implications earlier this year due in part to uncertainty regarding European
Commission (EC) policy in applying European Union (EU) state aid rules. The EC
announcement of May 7, 2009, on the recapitalization of Commerzbank AG
(A/Negative/A-1) removed some uncertainty by specifying that Commerzbank's
business plan include measures aimed at keeping state aid to a minimum,
including "the suspension of dividend and interest payments to holders of
hybrid capital." This announcement prompted rating actions by Standard &
Poor's on the hybrid capital securities of the Commerzbank group (see "Various
Commerzbank, Dresdner, And Eurohypo Hybrid Capital Instruments Cut To 'CCC'
And Kept On Watch Negative," published May 11, 2009, on RatingsDirect).
The EC announcement about Commerzbank clarifies (to some degree) the EC's
position on hybrid capital securities of state-supported banks. In our view,
the announcement increases the potential that banking groups receiving EU
state aid will suspend payments on their hybrid securities. While the EC has
neither concluded reviews nor has made similar unequivocal statements
regarding banking groups whose hybrids are affected by today's rating actions,
we believe that the EC's position is that state funds granted to struggling
banks should be retained to strengthen capitalization and should not be paid
out to shareholders or holders of other capital instruments, including hybrid
securities. Despite this position, it appears that the EC will respect the
terms of the hybrid capital instruments and not alter the terms of hybrid
securities that link payments to financial performance, notably earnings,
distributable income, or specified capital levels.
The rating actions also reflect our view that European sovereign
governments over the medium term may be more willing than in the past to
encourage or force banks to suspend payments on hybrid securities to preserve
cash and build capital. We believe that hybrid capital securities of European
(and U.S.) banking groups whose creditworthiness is supported by
already-received and potential future government aid are relatively more
vulnerable to payment deferral than the hybrid securities of banking groups
whose ratings are more closely aligned with their stand-alone credit profiles
(see "Issue Ratings Lowered On Hybrid Instruments Of Some European Banks On
Heightened Deferral Risk," published Jan. 28, 2009).
Moreover, the recession and difficult operating environment, in our view,
increase the vulnerability of banks in Europe (and in other regions in the
world) that have not received state aid to payment deferrals on hybrid
securities due to pressure on retained earnings and capital. EC policy with
respect to state aid is an additional factor, but not the primary reason, for
EU banks to suspend payments on hybrid securities. Earlier in 2009, Standard &
Poor's took widespread actions on hybrid securities of many European and U.S.
banking groups due to our assessment of this vulnerability (see "Hybrid
Securities Of Over 60 European Financial Institutions Downgraded Following S&P
Review," published March 31, 2009, and "Review Results In Changes To Certain
U.S. Financial Institutions' Hybrid Capital Issue Ratings," published Feb. 24,
2009).
From a rating perspective, we generally widen the gap between the hybrid
rating and the ICR of the issuing entity to three or more notches when we
consider the potential for payment deferral has increased (see "Franchise
Stability, Confidence Sensitivity, And The Treatment Of Hybrid Securities In A
Downturn," published Dec. 1, 2008, and "Hybrid Capital Handbook," published
Sept. 15, 2008).
On May 19, 2009, Bank of Ireland made a tender offer for six of its
preference share issues. We characterize the tender offer as distressed and
consequently lowered the ratings on the six issues to 'C' from 'BB'. The
ratings on Bank of Ireland's three hybrid securities not subject to the tender
offer were lowered to 'B' (one issue) and 'B-' (two issues) from 'BB'. All
ratings were removed from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were originally placed on Nov. 14, 2008. (See "Bank of Ireland Hybrid
Securities Downgraded On Announced Tender Offers," published today on
RatingsDirect.)
HOW STANDARD & POOR'S DIFFERENTIATES EUROPEAN BANK HYBRID SECURITIES BY
RATINGS CATEGORY
Standard & Poor's broadly characterizes the rated hybrid securities of
European banking groups by rating category. While we cite general
characteristics by category, we note that the ratings on individual hybrid
securities may differ due to the specific terms of the security and the
particular credit profile and national jurisdiction of the issuing group.
For bank hybrid securities rated in the 'CCC' category, there is, in our
view, a clear and present risk of payment deferral or principal reduction. The
hybrid securities in question include those of wholly nationalized banks such
as Northern Rock and Anglo Irish Banks as well as those of
government-supported groups whose earnings are under severe pressure, such as
Commerzbank and KBC Group N.V.
We also rate preference shares with voting rights issued by Lloyds
Banking Group and Royal Bank of Scotland Group PLC 'CCC+', one notch below
their other perpetual deferrable instruments, to reflect the "nationalization
risk" of the preference shares of these two banking groups. In the U.K. and
Ireland, perpetual preferred shares that grant voting rights to the holders in
certain circumstances have been included in nationalizations of a troubled
financial institution for the purpose of giving the government full control of
the institution. This happened to Northern Rock and Anglo Irish Banks.
Bank hybrid securities rated in the 'B' category are, in our view,
vulnerable to a potential further deterioration in the operating environment
that could result in significant losses at the issuing group and necessitate
further state aid from the applicable sovereign government. The European
banking groups whose hybrid securities are in the 'B' category typically have
received material direct support from their governments, and their
creditworthiness relies to an important extent on potential future government
aid. The hybrid securities of Allied Irish Banks, Fortis Bank Nederland,
Lloyds Banking Group, and Royal Bank of Scotland/ABN AMRO are part of this
group. Dexia's hybrids are also in this group, primarily due to the large
amount of government aid the Dexia group has received and less due to
vulnerability of Dexia's earnings to a more stressed environment. While this
article addresses the hybrid securities of European banking groups, the
characterization of the 'B' category also broadly fits the hybrid securities
of government-supported financial institutions in other mature markets. For
example, we rate the hybrid capital securities of Bank of America Corp. in the
U.S. in the 'B' category.
European bank hybrid securities in the 'BB' category are, in our view,
relatively less vulnerable to deterioration in the operating environment than
the bank hybrids in the 'B' category, but for reasons of reliance on future
state aid or the fundamental credit profile of the issuing group, the hybrid
securities have some speculative characteristics. The banking groups whose
hybrid securities are in the 'BB' category are in two groups:
--Banking groups that have received some direct support from their
governments, and with creditworthiness that relies to some extent on potential
future government aid, such as Swedish banks Swedbank AB and Skandinaviska
Enskilda Banken AB; and
--Banking groups that have an ICR in the 'BBB' category, such as the
major Greek banks, NIBC Bank N.V. of the Netherlands, and Italian banking
group Veneto Banca Holdings S.C.P.A.
fidw99
100% perpetual
Ciao Solenoide,
ieri ho preso Abn LT2 a 73 e stamattina mi danno già 74,5. Qualcosa si sta muovendo....
- Stato