Ancora un esempio di come le agenzie continuino a valutare i rating degli strumenti di capitale ibridi (preferred shares e junior subordinated) Tier 1 e Upper Tier 2, in considerazione dell'accresciuto rischio di differimento/cancellazione della cedola (deferral, al quale, come detto, può non seguire il recupero della cedola per pagamento posticipato, dipendendo dalle Offering Circular).
S&P non solo procede in questa direzione ma ritiene di poterlo fare in considerazione di un accresciuto rischio di deferral che si estenda contestualmente a più emittenti, ad esempio sul presupposto che vi sia già stato un intervento di sostegno statale agli emittenti e che il contesto macroeconomico in cui le banche supportate si trovano ad operare lasci presagire ulteriori perdite future ed ulteriori interventi statali.
La linea di questa agenzia è oggi (si citano due report, ed in particolare uno del 1 dic. 2008) quella di ammettere che il rating dei T1 e dei UT2 possa scendere fino a 3 livelli al di sotto di quello degli altri bond del medesimo emittentte bancario in caso di accresciuto rischio di deferral event.
La stessa presenza dei governi nel capitale delle banche supportate è un fattore che incrementa il rischio di differimento, in quanto se da un lato il deferral incide sulle future capacità delle banche di raccogliere capitali e di tale circostanza occorre tenere conto, dall'altro occorre preservare la destinazione dei soldi del contribuente a ricostruire il capitale sociale delle banche (questo in sostanza il ragionamento) e tale esigenza fa premio sulla prima.
Anche il possibile intervento in materia della legislazione comunitaria è visto da S&P come un possibile elemento sfavorevole, rammentandosi come i capitali statali, in quanto forma di Aiuto di Stato, richiedano il placet della Commissione Europea, la quale deve stabilire fra l'altro se la banca soffre di una carenza di liquidità, oppure se è da considerare distressed.
In almeno un caso, quello di BayernLB, la Commissione ha espressamente chiesto il deferral sugli strumenti di capitale ibrido, in considerazione della situazione della banca, riconoscendo come questa fosse, appunto distressed. In prospettiva, l'intervento della Commissione ove fossero necessari ulteriori aiuti di stato a banche già sostenute finanziariamente accresce il rischio che possa essere chiesto il deferral rispetto ai bond in questione...
Di qui la decisione di degradare il rating contestualmente sui T1 e UT2 di più banche contestualmente, sulla'ssunto di una situazione che acuisce per tutte il deferral risk.
In basso, la lista di T1 e UT2 oggetto di downgrade.
Issue Ratings Lowered On Hybrid Instruments Of Some European Banks On Heightened Deferral Risk
PARIS (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 28, 2009--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services said today that it has lowered the issue ratings on the hybrid capital securities of several European financial institutions by two or more notches following our review of institutions that have received material government capital support:
--Commerzbank AG (A/Stable/A-1), plus subsidiaries Dresdner Bank AG
(A/Stable/A-1) and Eurohypo AG (A/Negative/A-1);
--Entities of the group Dexia S.A.: Dexia Crédit Local, Dexia Banque
Internationale à Luxembourg, and Dexia Bank S.A. (all three entities
A/Stable/A-1);
--Fortis Bank SA/NV (A/Watch Pos/A-1), and
--Northern Rock PLC (A/Stable/A-1).
Note that several of the issue ratings of the issuing groups remain on
CreditWatch with negative or developing implications due to uncertainties
regarding restructuring plans and the future nature and extent of state aid.
Also note that the counterparty credit ratings (CCRs) on the financial
institutions whose hybrid securities this action affects remain unchanged.
(See the Ratings List below.)
We lowered the issue ratings on the junior subordinated (Tier 1 and Upper Tier 2) instruments of these financial groups because of our view of:
--The current and projected difficult operating environment will result
in significant bottom-line losses for most of the issuing financial groups,
and
--Their reliance on their respective governments for capital support.
Under Standard & Poor's rating approach for hybrid capital securities
(see "Franchise Stability, Confidence Sensitivity, And The Treatment Of Hybrid Securities In A Downturn," published Dec. 1, 2008, and "Hybrid Capital Handbook," published Sept. 15, 2008), we widen the gap between the CCR and the hybrid issue rating of the issuer entity to three or more notches when we consider that the probability of payment deferral has increased.
Hybrid capital instruments are designed to absorb losses and preserve
capital on a going-concern basis in times of stress, such as the present and projected difficult economic and industrial environment. We believe that in the short to medium term there is a greater potential that financial institutions may, through their own initiative or under government order,
defer coupon or dividend payments to preserve cash and capital.
Governments fully or partly own the four financial groups involved in
this rating action. We believe that governments in mature market economies are not willing to support hybrid capital issues to the same extent as more senior obligations. When a bank incurs material net losses and needs to conserve cash and rebuild capital with help from the government, deferral of payments on hybrid securities may be one way to accomplish this.
We recognize the broader negative market implications of a payment deferral on banks' future access to capital markets. However, we believe that governments may be more prone to using the deferral option because their recent support programs for banks are significant and the need to shore up bank capital is great.
We also believe that weak financial performance and poor near-term
earnings prospects heighten the risk of payment deferral on hybrid instruments of financial institutions that have not received material direct government investment. Leading indicators of heightened risk of hybrid payment deferral include reduction or elimination of common dividends and potential for a breach of minimum regulatory capital requirements.
EU law regarding state aid may, in our view, contribute to heightened
payment deferral of the hybrid capital securities of financial institutions. A
capital injection from an EU government into a financial (or other)
institution requires an application to the European Commission (EC) under EU State Aid rules.
We observe that over the past few months, the EC has granted conditional approval to a number of national support schemes. As part of its assessment of an application, the EC determines whether a bank is distressed or fundamentally sound at the time it receives the support. In one instance involving Germany's Bayerische Landesbank (BayernLB) we note that the EC requested that the bank defer payments on hybrid capital instruments, reflecting BayernLB's financial situation and the scope of the recapitalization measures.
We believe that as a policy matter the EC aims to ensure that state aid granted to banks in difficulties is preserved and used to strengthen capitalization and not paid out to shareholders or other holders of capital instruments. This potential intervention of the EC in certain cases of state aid to banks is a further consideration in our assessment of payment deferral risk for European financial institutions. However, in our opinion, the EC will not prohibit payments that banks are contractually obliged to make.
Standard & Poor's will continue to monitor the various factors that
influence payment deferral risk of hybrid capital securities of financial
institutions and will follow the same approach in similar instances.
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