Rottweiler
Forumer storico
Declassamento S&P: Italia
Qualcuno potrebbe trovare utile leggere il testo del report di S&P, ampi stralci del quale sono stati riferiti dalla stampa:
Italy's Unsolicited Ratings Lowered To 'BBB+/A-2'; Outlook Negative
Publication date: 13-Jan-2012 16:44:48 EST
View Analyst Contact Information
*We are lowering our unsolicited long-term rating on Italy by two notches
to 'BBB+' from 'A' and the short-term rating to 'A-2' from 'A-1'.
*The downgrade reflects what we view as Italy's increasing vulnerabilities
to external financing risks and the negative implications these could
have for economic growth and hence public finances. We believe the
external financing risks are exacerbated by deepening political,
financial, and monetary problems within the eurozone.
*The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.
LONDON (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 13, 2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
said today that it lowered its unsolicited long-term sovereign credit ratings
on the Republic of Italy to 'BBB+' from 'A'. At the same time, we lowered the
unsolicited short-term sovereign credit rating to 'A-2' from 'A-1'. We also
removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were placed on Dec. 5, 2011. The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.
Our transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment for Italy, as for all
European Economic and Monetary Union (eurozone) members, is 'AAA', reflecting
Standard & Poor's view that the likelihood of the European Central Bank
restricting non-sovereign access to foreign currency needed for debt service
is extremely low. This reflects the full and open access to foreign currency
that holders of euro currently enjoy and which we expect to remain the case in
the foreseeable future.
The downgrade reflects what we see as Italy's increasing vulnerabilities to
external financing risks, given the high foreign ownership of its government
and financial sector debt. It is our view that deepening political, financial,
and monetary problems within the eurozone are exacerbating the external
funding constraints on the Italian public and private sectors.
The downgrade of Italy's ratings reflects our view that the country's external
financing costs have risen markedly and may remain elevated for an extended
period of time amid a reduction in cross-border financing of Italian banks and
the government. We expect that a difficult external financing environment will
have negative implications for growth performance and hence public finances.
Looking at BIS data, we note a marked and sustained decline in foreign banks'
claims on Italian borrowers; this represents a risk to the sustainability of
Italy's balance of payments, in our view, as it could reduce Italian
borrowers' capacity to roll over their debt at low interest rates acceptable
to the borrowers. Consequently we have lowered our external liquidity score
for Italy (one of the five key factors in our published sovereign ratings
criteria).
The lower external score also reflects our view of Italy's substantial
exposure to short-term external liabilities. Our calculations indicate that
the ratio of total short-term external debt by remaining maturity exceeds 100%
of current account receipts. We view current account receipts as an
appropriate measure of an economy's foreign currency generating capacity. In
our view, higher interest payments to non-resident creditors in turn will
require increased domestic savings or lower investment in order to stabilize
Italy's external debt net of liquid assets, which we estimate at 240% of
current account receipts at Dec. 31, 2011.
During 2012 and 2013, we expect the Italian Treasury will likely either pay
historically high yields at longer maturities or issue debt at lower
maturities to take advantage of the recent steepening of the yield curve. Over
time, the latter option would, in our opinion, diminish one of Italy's
important credit strengths: the relatively long average maturity of its debt
stock of over seven years, a phenomenon that slows the impact of rising yields
on the Italian government's budgetary performance.
The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements
from policymakers lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not
produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the
eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does
not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those
eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.
We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition
of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems
primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our
view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a
consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness
between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe
that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks
becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers'
rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national
tax revenues.
In our view, the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of European
policymaking and political institutions (with which Italy is closely
integrated) have not been as strong as we believe are called for by the
severity of a broadening and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.
Nevertheless, we have not changed our political risk score for Italy (one of
the five key factors in our published sovereign ratings criteria). We believe
that the weakening policy environment at European level is to a certain degree
offset by a stronger domestic Italian capacity to formulate and implement
crisis-mitigating economic policies. This reflects our view of the improved
policy environment under the recently inaugurated technocratic government
headed by Mario Monti, and our expectation that extensive growth-enhancing
measures will be implemented during the first half of 2012.
We believe that plans to deregulate the labor market, including closed
professions, could help to restore Italian competitiveness, potentially
enabling Italy to operate steady current account surpluses in a shift that
could strengthen Italy's creditworthiness. Nevertheless, we expect that there
could be opposition to some of the current government's ambitious reforms.
This, we believe, increases the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for growth
and hence public finances, in the context of a more challenging funding
environment for Italian banks and the Italian government.
Italy's ratings are also constrained by what we see as the country's very high
public sector debt and weak economic growth potential. The ratings are
supported by our view of Italy's wealthy and diversified economy, expected
primary fiscal surpluses, and sizable private sector savings.
The outlook on the long-term rating on Italy is negative, indicating that we
believe there is at least a one-in-three chance that the rating will be
lowered again in 2012 or 2013. According to our criteria, we could lower the
ratings if a weaker-than-expected macroeconomic environment and deflationary
pressures: reduce Italy's per capita GDP; result in Italy's net general
government debt ratio continuing its upward trajectory; or lead to what we
would consider a prolonged worsening of financing conditions. We could also
lower the ratings if we see that the technocratic administration fails to
implement structural reform measures that we believe are necessary to boost
growth potential, whether due to opposition from special interest groups and
other incumbents or if the new government's term is cut short before its
mandate is fulfilled.
Conversely, we expect that the ratings could stabilize at the current level if
structural reforms are fully implemented and shift the Italian economy to a
higher level of growth, or if we see that other measures--such as significant
asset sales and privatizations--are taken to substantially reduce the public
sector debt burden.
Qualcuno potrebbe trovare utile leggere il testo del report di S&P, ampi stralci del quale sono stati riferiti dalla stampa:
Italy's Unsolicited Ratings Lowered To 'BBB+/A-2'; Outlook Negative
Publication date: 13-Jan-2012 16:44:48 EST
View Analyst Contact Information
*We are lowering our unsolicited long-term rating on Italy by two notches
to 'BBB+' from 'A' and the short-term rating to 'A-2' from 'A-1'.
*The downgrade reflects what we view as Italy's increasing vulnerabilities
to external financing risks and the negative implications these could
have for economic growth and hence public finances. We believe the
external financing risks are exacerbated by deepening political,
financial, and monetary problems within the eurozone.
*The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.
LONDON (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 13, 2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
said today that it lowered its unsolicited long-term sovereign credit ratings
on the Republic of Italy to 'BBB+' from 'A'. At the same time, we lowered the
unsolicited short-term sovereign credit rating to 'A-2' from 'A-1'. We also
removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were placed on Dec. 5, 2011. The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.
Our transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment for Italy, as for all
European Economic and Monetary Union (eurozone) members, is 'AAA', reflecting
Standard & Poor's view that the likelihood of the European Central Bank
restricting non-sovereign access to foreign currency needed for debt service
is extremely low. This reflects the full and open access to foreign currency
that holders of euro currently enjoy and which we expect to remain the case in
the foreseeable future.
The downgrade reflects what we see as Italy's increasing vulnerabilities to
external financing risks, given the high foreign ownership of its government
and financial sector debt. It is our view that deepening political, financial,
and monetary problems within the eurozone are exacerbating the external
funding constraints on the Italian public and private sectors.
The downgrade of Italy's ratings reflects our view that the country's external
financing costs have risen markedly and may remain elevated for an extended
period of time amid a reduction in cross-border financing of Italian banks and
the government. We expect that a difficult external financing environment will
have negative implications for growth performance and hence public finances.
Looking at BIS data, we note a marked and sustained decline in foreign banks'
claims on Italian borrowers; this represents a risk to the sustainability of
Italy's balance of payments, in our view, as it could reduce Italian
borrowers' capacity to roll over their debt at low interest rates acceptable
to the borrowers. Consequently we have lowered our external liquidity score
for Italy (one of the five key factors in our published sovereign ratings
criteria).
The lower external score also reflects our view of Italy's substantial
exposure to short-term external liabilities. Our calculations indicate that
the ratio of total short-term external debt by remaining maturity exceeds 100%
of current account receipts. We view current account receipts as an
appropriate measure of an economy's foreign currency generating capacity. In
our view, higher interest payments to non-resident creditors in turn will
require increased domestic savings or lower investment in order to stabilize
Italy's external debt net of liquid assets, which we estimate at 240% of
current account receipts at Dec. 31, 2011.
During 2012 and 2013, we expect the Italian Treasury will likely either pay
historically high yields at longer maturities or issue debt at lower
maturities to take advantage of the recent steepening of the yield curve. Over
time, the latter option would, in our opinion, diminish one of Italy's
important credit strengths: the relatively long average maturity of its debt
stock of over seven years, a phenomenon that slows the impact of rising yields
on the Italian government's budgetary performance.
The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements
from policymakers lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not
produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the
eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does
not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those
eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.
We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition
of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems
primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our
view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a
consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness
between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe
that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks
becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers'
rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national
tax revenues.
In our view, the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of European
policymaking and political institutions (with which Italy is closely
integrated) have not been as strong as we believe are called for by the
severity of a broadening and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.
Nevertheless, we have not changed our political risk score for Italy (one of
the five key factors in our published sovereign ratings criteria). We believe
that the weakening policy environment at European level is to a certain degree
offset by a stronger domestic Italian capacity to formulate and implement
crisis-mitigating economic policies. This reflects our view of the improved
policy environment under the recently inaugurated technocratic government
headed by Mario Monti, and our expectation that extensive growth-enhancing
measures will be implemented during the first half of 2012.
We believe that plans to deregulate the labor market, including closed
professions, could help to restore Italian competitiveness, potentially
enabling Italy to operate steady current account surpluses in a shift that
could strengthen Italy's creditworthiness. Nevertheless, we expect that there
could be opposition to some of the current government's ambitious reforms.
This, we believe, increases the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for growth
and hence public finances, in the context of a more challenging funding
environment for Italian banks and the Italian government.
Italy's ratings are also constrained by what we see as the country's very high
public sector debt and weak economic growth potential. The ratings are
supported by our view of Italy's wealthy and diversified economy, expected
primary fiscal surpluses, and sizable private sector savings.
The outlook on the long-term rating on Italy is negative, indicating that we
believe there is at least a one-in-three chance that the rating will be
lowered again in 2012 or 2013. According to our criteria, we could lower the
ratings if a weaker-than-expected macroeconomic environment and deflationary
pressures: reduce Italy's per capita GDP; result in Italy's net general
government debt ratio continuing its upward trajectory; or lead to what we
would consider a prolonged worsening of financing conditions. We could also
lower the ratings if we see that the technocratic administration fails to
implement structural reform measures that we believe are necessary to boost
growth potential, whether due to opposition from special interest groups and
other incumbents or if the new government's term is cut short before its
mandate is fulfilled.
Conversely, we expect that the ratings could stabilize at the current level if
structural reforms are fully implemented and shift the Italian economy to a
higher level of growth, or if we see that other measures--such as significant
asset sales and privatizations--are taken to substantially reduce the public
sector debt burden.
se guardiamo le perpetue in quell ottica non ci investiremo + una lira... la realtà è che Lehman B. ha fatto capire al mondo cosa vuol dire lasciar fallire una banca sistemica ...poi ognuno tragga le sue conclusioni autonomamente 
se penso che ad esempio Intesa ha un patrimonio di vigilanza sotto i 50 miliardi di fronte che verrebbero azzerati al cospetto di una svalutazione del 7-8% del suo attivo (mi pare, potrei ricordare male però, abbia tra l'altro crediti incagliati o comunque di difficile esigibilità per 20-22 mil.) ci sarebbe poco da star tranquilli 
