Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 2

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Declassamento S&P: Italia

Qualcuno potrebbe trovare utile leggere il testo del report di S&P, ampi stralci del quale sono stati riferiti dalla stampa:


Italy's Unsolicited Ratings Lowered To 'BBB+/A-2'; Outlook Negative

Publication date: 13-Jan-2012 16:44:48 EST
View Analyst Contact Information

*We are lowering our unsolicited long-term rating on Italy by two notches
to 'BBB+' from 'A' and the short-term rating to 'A-2' from 'A-1'.
*The downgrade reflects what we view as Italy's increasing vulnerabilities
to external financing risks and the negative implications these could
have for economic growth and hence public finances. We believe the
external financing risks are exacerbated by deepening political,
financial, and monetary problems within the eurozone.
*The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.


LONDON (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 13, 2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings Services
said today that it lowered its unsolicited long-term sovereign credit ratings
on the Republic of Italy to 'BBB+' from 'A'. At the same time, we lowered the
unsolicited short-term sovereign credit rating to 'A-2' from 'A-1'. We also
removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were placed on Dec. 5, 2011. The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.

Our transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment for Italy, as for all
European Economic and Monetary Union (eurozone) members, is 'AAA', reflecting
Standard & Poor's view that the likelihood of the European Central Bank
restricting non-sovereign access to foreign currency needed for debt service
is extremely low. This reflects the full and open access to foreign currency
that holders of euro currently enjoy and which we expect to remain the case in
the foreseeable future.

The downgrade reflects what we see as Italy's increasing vulnerabilities to
external financing risks, given the high foreign ownership of its government
and financial sector debt. It is our view that deepening political, financial,
and monetary problems within the eurozone are exacerbating the external
funding constraints on the Italian public and private sectors.

The downgrade of Italy's ratings reflects our view that the country's external
financing costs have risen markedly and may remain elevated for an extended
period of time amid a reduction in cross-border financing of Italian banks and
the government. We expect that a difficult external financing environment will
have negative implications for growth performance and hence public finances.
Looking at BIS data, we note a marked and sustained decline in foreign banks'
claims on Italian borrowers; this represents a risk to the sustainability of
Italy's balance of payments, in our view, as it could reduce Italian
borrowers' capacity to roll over their debt at low interest rates acceptable
to the borrowers. Consequently we have lowered our external liquidity score
for Italy (one of the five key factors in our published sovereign ratings
criteria).

The lower external score also reflects our view of Italy's substantial
exposure to short-term external liabilities. Our calculations indicate that
the ratio of total short-term external debt by remaining maturity exceeds 100%
of current account receipts. We view current account receipts as an
appropriate measure of an economy's foreign currency generating capacity. In
our view, higher interest payments to non-resident creditors in turn will
require increased domestic savings or lower investment in order to stabilize
Italy's external debt net of liquid assets, which we estimate at 240% of
current account receipts at Dec. 31, 2011.

During 2012 and 2013, we expect the Italian Treasury will likely either pay
historically high yields at longer maturities or issue debt at lower
maturities to take advantage of the recent steepening of the yield curve. Over
time, the latter option would, in our opinion, diminish one of Italy's
important credit strengths: the relatively long average maturity of its debt
stock of over seven years, a phenomenon that slows the impact of rising yields
on the Italian government's budgetary performance.

The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements
from policymakers lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not
produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the
eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does
not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those
eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.

We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition
of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems
primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our
view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a
consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness
between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe
that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks
becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers'
rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national
tax revenues.

In our view, the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of European
policymaking and political institutions (with which Italy is closely
integrated) have not been as strong as we believe are called for by the
severity of a broadening and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.
Nevertheless, we have not changed our political risk score for Italy (one of
the five key factors in our published sovereign ratings criteria). We believe
that the weakening policy environment at European level is to a certain degree
offset by a stronger domestic Italian capacity to formulate and implement
crisis-mitigating economic policies. This reflects our view of the improved
policy environment under the recently inaugurated technocratic government
headed by Mario Monti, and our expectation that extensive growth-enhancing
measures will be implemented during the first half of 2012.

We believe that plans to deregulate the labor market, including closed
professions, could help to restore Italian competitiveness, potentially
enabling Italy to operate steady current account surpluses in a shift that
could strengthen Italy's creditworthiness. Nevertheless, we expect that there
could be opposition to some of the current government's ambitious reforms.
This, we believe, increases the uncertainty surrounding the outlook for growth
and hence public finances, in the context of a more challenging funding
environment for Italian banks and the Italian government.

Italy's ratings are also constrained by what we see as the country's very high
public sector debt and weak economic growth potential. The ratings are
supported by our view of Italy's wealthy and diversified economy, expected
primary fiscal surpluses, and sizable private sector savings.

The outlook on the long-term rating on Italy is negative, indicating that we
believe there is at least a one-in-three chance that the rating will be
lowered again in 2012 or 2013. According to our criteria, we could lower the
ratings if a weaker-than-expected macroeconomic environment and deflationary
pressures: reduce Italy's per capita GDP; result in Italy's net general
government debt ratio continuing its upward trajectory; or lead to what we
would consider a prolonged worsening of financing conditions. We could also
lower the ratings if we see that the technocratic administration fails to
implement structural reform measures that we believe are necessary to boost
growth potential, whether due to opposition from special interest groups and
other incumbents or if the new government's term is cut short before its
mandate is fulfilled.

Conversely, we expect that the ratings could stabilize at the current level if
structural reforms are fully implemented and shift the Italian economy to a
higher level of growth, or if we see that other measures--such as significant
asset sales and privatizations--are taken to substantially reduce the public
sector debt burden.

 

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Declassaento S&P: Francia

Idem come sopra per la Francia:


France's Unsolicited Long-Term Ratings Lowered To 'AA+'; Outlook Negative

Publication date: 13-Jan-2012 16:38:19 EST
View Analyst Contact Information

*Standard & Poor's is lowering its unsolicited long-term sovereign credit
rating on the Republic of France to 'AA+'. At the same time, we are
affirming our unsolicited short-term sovereign credit rating on France at
'A-1+'.
*The downgrade reflects our opinion of the impact of deepening political,
financial, and monetary problems within the eurozone, with which France
is closely integrated.
*The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.

FRANKFURT (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 13, 2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings
Services said today that it lowered the unsolicited long-term sovereign credit
rating on the Republic of France to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. At the same time, we
affirmed the unsolicited short-term sovereign credit rating at 'A-1+'. We also
removed the ratings from CreditWatch with negative implications, where they
were placed on Dec. 5, 2011. The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.

Our transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment for France, as for all
European Economic and Monetary Union (eurozone) members, is 'AAA', reflecting
Standard & Poor's view that the likelihood of the European Central Bank
restricting nonsovereign access to foreign currency needed for debt service is
extremely low. This reflects the full and open access to foreign currency that
holders of euro currently enjoy and which we expect to remain the case in the
foreseeable future.

The downgrade reflects our opinion of the impact of deepening political,
financial, and monetary problems within the eurozone.

The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements
from policymakers lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not
produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the
eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does
not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those
eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.

We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition
of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems
primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our
view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a
consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness
between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery." As such, we believe
that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks
becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers'
rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national
tax revenues.

Accordingly, in line with our published sovereign criteria, we have adjusted
downward the political score we assign to France (see "Sovereign Government
Rating Methodology And Assumptions," published on June 30, 2011). This is a
reflection of our view that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability
of European policymaking and political institutions (with which France is
closely integrated) have not been as strong as we believe are called for by
the severity of what we see as a broadening and deepening financial crisis in
the eurozone.

France's ratings continue to reflect our view of its wealthy, diversified, and
resilient economy and its highly skilled and productive labor force. Partially
offsetting these strengths, in our view, are France's relatively high general
government debt, as well as its labor market rigidities. We note the
government is addressing these issues through, respectively, its budgetary
consolidation strategy and structural reforms.

The outlook on the long-term rating on France is negative, indicating that we
believe that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could lower the
rating further in 2012 or 2013 if:
*Its public finances deviated from the planned budgetary consolidation
path. Budgetary measures announced by the French government to date may
be insufficient to meet deficit targets in 2012 and 2013, should France's
underlying economic growth in these years fall below the government's
current forecast of 1% and 2%, respectively. If France's general
government deficit were to remain close to current levels, leading to a
gradual increase in the net general government debt to surpass 100% of
GDP (from just above 80% currently), or if economic growth were to remain
weak for an extended period, it could lead to a one-notch downgrade.
*Heightened financing and economic risks in the eurozone were to lead to a
significant increase in contingent liabilities, or to a material
worsening of external financing conditions.

Conversely, the ratings could stabilize at current levels if the authorities
are successful in further reducing the general government deficit in order to
stabilize the public debt ratio in the next two to three years and in
implementing reforms to support economic growth.

 

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Declassaento S&P: Austria

...e per l'Austria:


Austria's Long-Term Ratings Lowered To 'AA+'; Outlook Negative

Publication date: 13-Jan-2012 16:49:46 EST
View Analyst Contact Information

*We are lowering the long-term sovereign credit rating on the Republic of
Austria to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. At the same time, we are affirming Austria's
'A-1+' short-term sovereign credit rating.
*The downgrade reflects our opinion of the impact of deepening political,
financial, and monetary problems within the European Economic and
Monetary Union (eurozone), with which Austria is closely integrated.
*The outlook on the long-term rating is negative.

FRANKFURT (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 13, 2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings
Services today lowered the long-term sovereign credit ratings on the Republic
of Austria to 'AA+' from 'AAA'. We removed the ratings from CreditWatch, where
they were placed with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011. At the same time,
we affirmed the short-term sovereign credit rating on Austria at 'A-1+'. The
outlook on the long-term rating is negative.

Our transfer and convertibility (T&C) assessment for Austria, as for all
eurozone members, is 'AAA', reflecting Standard & Poor's view that the
likelihood of the European Central Bank restricting nonsovereign access to
foreign currency needed for debt service is extremely low. This reflects the
full and open access to foreign currency that holders of euro currently enjoy
and which we expect to remain the case in the foreseeable future.

The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements
from policymakers lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not
produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the
eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does
not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those
eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.

We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition
of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems
primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our
view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a
consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness
between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe
that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks
becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers'
rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national
tax revenues.

Accordingly, in line with our published sovereign criteria, we have adjusted
downward the political score we assign to the Austria (see "Sovereign
Government Rating Methodology And Assumptions," published on June 30, 2011).
This is a reflection of our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of European policymaking and political institutions (with which
Austria is closely integrated) have not been as strong as we believe are
called for by the severity of a broadening and deepening financial crisis in
the eurozone.

The ratings on Austria continue to reflect our view of its stable governance
and predictable economic policies, which remain hallmarks of Austrian
politics. We view Austria's economy as wealthy, diversified, and highly
competitive. We expect the pace of fiscal consolidation will increase, which
we believe could reduce fiscal deficits and debt faster than outlined in the
government's 2011 budget plan, and perhaps even in its budget for 2012. This
is provided the eurozone environment does not deteriorate such that it hampers
this goal. Austria, though still a net debtor on its external position, has
reported what we consider sound current account surpluses over the last 10
years, gradually improving its debtor position. In our opinion, contingent
liabilities are moderate and stem primarily from the banking industry's
exposure to Central and Eastern Europe.

In our view, Austrian banks' balance sheets could suffer from negative
developments in major trading and outward direct investment partners (such as
Italy and Hungary). In this instance, the banks could require additional
government support. Furthermore, if economic growth is much weaker than we
expect, this could undermine the government's attempts to consolidate its
budgets, and could also render structural reforms ineffective.

The outlook on the long-term rating on Austria is negative, indicating that we
believe that there is at least a one-in-three chance that we could lower the
rating further in 2012 or 2013. We may lower the rating if we come to believe
that:
*The weakening of Austrian banks' balance sheets stemming from negative
developments in major trading and outward direct investment partners
meant that the Austrian government needed to recapitalize the banks. This
could in turn lead to net general government debt rising above 80% of
GDP, and could also further increase contingent liabilities; and/or
*Economic growth is much weaker than we currently expect. This could
undermine the government's attempts to consolidate its budgets, and could
also render structural reforms ineffective. This could lead to an
increase in net general government debt beyond 80% of GDP.

The ratings could stabilize at the current level if the risks from the banking
sector remained contained, and if Austria were to enter into a more-ambitious
consolidation phase by implementing structural reforms, without damaging
economic growth prospects and competitiveness. In our view, such consolidation
measures would likely enable Austria to structurally balance its accounts and
decrease its net general government debt.

 

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Declassamenti S&P

E' anche interessante leggere i ragionamenti di S&P sull'Europa nel suo complesso, EFSF compreso:

Credit FAQ: Factors Behind Our Rating Actions On Eurozone Sovereign Governments

Publication date: 13-Jan-2012 17:28:16 EST
View Analyst Contact Information
FRANKFURT (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 13, 2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings
Services today completed its review of its ratings on 16 eurozone sovereigns,
resulting in downgrades for nine eurozone sovereigns and affirmations of the
ratings on seven others.

We have lowered the long-term ratings on Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain by
two notches; lowered the long-term ratings on Austria, France, Malta, the
Slovak Republic, and Slovenia, by one notch; and affirmed the long-term
ratings on Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the
Netherlands. All ratings on the 16 sovereigns have been removed from
CreditWatch where they were placed with negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011
(except for Cyprus, which was first placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).

The outlooks on our long-term ratings on all but two of the 16 eurozone
sovereigns are negative; the outlooks on the long-term ratings on Germany and
Slovakia are stable. See "Standard & Poor's Takes Various Rating Actions On 16
Eurozone Sovereign Governments," published today for full details.

This report addresses questions that we anticipate market participants might
ask in connection with our rating actions today.

WHAT HAS PROMPTED THE DOWNGRADES?
Today's rating actions are primarily driven by our assessment that the policy
initiatives that have been taken by European policymakers in recent weeks may
be insufficient to fully address ongoing systemic stresses in the eurozone. In
our view, these stresses include: (1) tightening credit conditions, (2) an
increase in risk premiums for a widening group of eurozone issuers, (3) a
simultaneous attempt to delever by governments and households, (4) weakening
economic growth prospects, and (5) an open and prolonged dispute among
European policymakers over the proper approach to address challenges.

The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements
from policymakers lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not
produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the
eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does
not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those
eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.

We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition
of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems
primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our
view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a
consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness
between the EMU's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe that
a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks becoming
self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers' rising
concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national tax
revenues.

Accordingly, in line with our published sovereign criteria, we have adjusted
downward our political scores (one of the five key factors in our criteria)
for those eurozone sovereigns we had previously scored in our two highest
categories. This reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of European policymaking and political institutions have not
been as strong as we believe are called for by the severity of a broadening
and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.

In addition to our assessment of the policy response to the crisis, downgrades
in some countries have also been triggered by external risks. In our view, it
is increasingly likely that refinancing costs for certain countries may remain
elevated, that credit availability and economic growth may further decelerate,
and that pressure on financing conditions may persist. Accordingly, for those
sovereigns we consider most at risk of an economic downturn and deteriorating
funding conditions, for example due to their large cross-border financing
needs, we have adjusted our external score downward.

WHY WERE SOME EUROZONE SOVEREIGNS DOWNGRADED BY TWO NOTCHES AND OTHERS BY ONE
NOTCH?

We believe that not all sovereigns are equally vulnerable to the possible
extension and intensification of the financial crisis. Those we consider most
at risk of an economic downturn and deteriorating funding conditions, for
example due to the large cross-border financing needs of its governments or
financial sectors, have been downgraded by two notches, as we lowered the
political score and/or the external score reflecting our view of the risk of a
marked deterioration in the country's external financing.

On the other hand, we affirmed the ratings of sovereigns which we believe are
likely to be more resilient at their current rating level in light of their
relatively strong external positions and less leveraged public and private
sectors. These credit strengths remain robust enough, in our opinion, to
neutralize the potential ratings impact from the lowering of our political
score.

In this context, we would note that the ratings on the eurozone sovereigns
remain at comparatively high levels, with only three below investment grade
(Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece). Historically, investment-grade rated
sovereigns have experienced very low default rates. From 1975 to 2010, the
15-year cumulative default rate for sovereigns rated in investment grades was
1.02%, and 0.00% for sovereigns rated in the 'A' category or higher.

WHY DO THE RATINGS ON MOST OF THESE SOVEREIGNS HAVE NEGATIVE OUTLOOKS?

For those sovereigns with negative outlooks, we believe that downside risks
persist and that a more adverse economic and financial environment could erode
their relative strengths within the next year or two to a degree that in our
view could warrant a further downward revision of their long-term ratings. We
believe that the main downside risks that could affect eurozone sovereigns to
various degrees are related to the possibility of further significant fiscal
deterioration as a consequence of a more recessionary macroeconomic
environment and/or vulnerabilities to further intensification and broadening
of risk aversion among investors, jeopardizing funding access at sustainable
rates. A more severe financial and economic downturn than we currently
envisage (see "Sovereign Risk Indicators," published Dec. 28, 2011) could also
lead to rising stress levels in the European banking system, potentially
leading to additional fiscal costs for the sovereigns through various bank
workout or recapitalization programs. Furthermore, we believe that there is a
risk that reform fatigue could be mounting, especially in those countries that
have experienced deep recessions and where growth prospects remain bleak,
which could eventually lead to lower levels of predictability of policy
orientation, potentially leading to another downward adjustment of the
political score, which might lead to lower ratings.

We believe that important risks related to potential near-term deterioration
of credit conditions remain for a number of sovereigns. This belief is based
on what we see as the sovereigns' very substantial financing needs in early
2012, the risk of further downward revisions of economic growth expectations,
and the challenge to maintain political support for unpopular and possibly
more severe austerity measures, as fiscal targets are endangered by
macroeconomic headwinds. Governments are also aiming to put greater focus on
growth-enhancing structural measures. While these may contribute positively to
a lasting solution of the current crisis, we believe they could also run
counter to powerful national interest groups, whose resistance could
potentially jeopardize the reform momentum and impede the recovery of market
confidence. In our view, it also remains to be seen whether European banks
will indeed use the ample term funding provided by the ECB (see below) to
purchase newly issued sovereign bonds of governments under financial stress.
We believe that as long as uncertainty about the bond buyers at primary
auctions remains, the risk of a deepening of the crisis remains a real one.
These risks could be exacerbated should renewed policy disagreements among
European policymakers emerge or the Greek debt restructuring lead to an
outcome that further discourages financial investors to add to their positions
in peripheral sovereign securities.

For two sovereigns, Germany and Slovakia, we concluded that downside scenarios
that could lead to a lowering of the relevant credit scores and the sovereign
ratings carry a likelihood of less than one-in-three during 2012 or 2013.
Accordingly we have assigned a stable outlook.

HOW DO WE INTERPRET THE CONCLUSIONS OF THE DECEMBER EUROPEAN SUMMIT?

We have previously stated our belief that an effective strategy that would
buoy confidence and lower the currently elevated borrowing costs for European
sovereigns could include, for example, a greater pooling of fiscal resources
and obligations as well as enhanced mutual budgetary oversight. We have also
stated that we believe that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal
austerity alone would risk becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls
in line with consumer's rising concerns about job security and disposable
incomes, eroding national tax revenues.

The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements
from policymakers, lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not
produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the
eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does
not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those
eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures. Instead, it
focuses on what we consider to be a one-sided approach by emphasizing fiscal
austerity without a strong and consistent program to raise the growth
potential of the economies in the eurozone. While some member states have
implemented measures on the national level to deregulate internal labor
markets, and improve the flexibility of domestic services sectors, these
reforms do not appear to us to be coordinated at the supra-national level; as
evidence, we would note large and widening discrepancies in activity and
unemployment levels among the 17 eurozone member states.

Regarding additional resources, the main enhancement we see has been to bring
forward to mid-2012 the start date of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM),
the successor vehicle to the European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF). This
will marginally increase these official sources' lending capacity from
currently €440bn to €500bn. As we noted previously, we expect eurozone
policymakers will accord ESM de-facto preferred creditor status in the event
of a eurozone sovereign default. We believe that the prospect of subordination
to a large creditor, which would have a key role in any future debt
rescheduling, would make a lasting contribution to the rise in long-term
government bond yields of lower-rated eurozone sovereigns and may reduce their
future market access.

We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition
of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems
primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our
view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a
consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness
between the EMU's core and the so-called "periphery." In our opinion, the
eurozone periphery has only been able to bear its underperformance on
competitiveness (manifest in sizeable external deficits) because of funding by
the banking systems of the more competitive northern eurozone economies.
According to our assessment, the political agreement reached at the summit did
not contain significant new initiatives to address the near-term funding
challenges that have engulfed the eurozone.

The summit focused primarily on a long-term plan to reverse fiscal imbalances.
It proposed to enshrine into national legislation requirements for
structurally balanced budgets. Certain institutional enhancements have been
introduced to strengthen the enforceability of the fiscal rules compared to
the Stability and Growth Pact, such as reverse qualified majority voting
required to overturn sanctions proposed by the European Commission in case of
violations of the broadly balanced budget rules. Notwithstanding this
progress, we believe that the enforcement of these measures is far from
certain, even if all member states eventually passed respective legislation by
parliaments (and by referendum, where this is required). Our assessment is
based on several factors, including:

*The difficulty of forecasting reliably and precisely structural deficits,
which we expect will likely be at the center of any decision on whether
to impose sanctions;
*The ability of individual member states' elected governments to extricate
themselves from the external control of the European Commission by
withdrawing from the intergovernmental agreement, which will not be part
of an EU-wide Treaty; and
*The possibility that the appropriateness of these fiscal rules may come
under scrutiny when a recession may, in the eyes of policymakers, call
for fiscal stimulus in order to stabilize demand, which could be
precluded by the need to adhere to the requirement to balance budgets.

Details on the exact content and operational procedures of the rules are still
to emerge and -- depending on the stringency of the rules -- the process of
passing national legislation may run into opposition in some signatory states,
which in turn could lower the confidence of investors and the credibility of
the agreed policies.

More fundamentally, we believe that the proposed measures do not directly
address the core underlying factors that have contributed to the market
stress. It is our view that the currently experienced financial stress does
not in the first instance result from fiscal mismanagement. This to us is
supported by the examples of Spain and Ireland, which ran an average fiscal
deficit of 0.4% of GDP and a surplus of 1.6% of GDP, respectively, during the
period 1999-2007 (versus a deficit of 2.3% of GDP in the case of Germany),
while reducing significantly their public debt ratio during that period. The
policies and rules agreed at the summit would not have indicated that the
boom-time developments in those countries contained the seeds of the current
market turmoil.

While we see a lack of fiscal prudence as having been a major contributing
factor to high public debt levels in some countries, such as Greece, we
believe that the key underlying issue for the eurozone as a whole is one of a
growing divergence in competitiveness between the core and the so-called
"periphery." Exacerbated by the rapid expansion of European banks' balance
sheets, this has led to large and growing external imbalances, evident in the
size of financial sector claims of net capital-exporting banking systems on
net importing countries. When the financial markets deteriorated and risk
aversion increased, the financing needs of both the public and financial
sectors in the "periphery" had to be covered to varying degrees by official
funding, including European Central Bank (ECB) liquidity as well as
intergovernmental, EFSF, and IMF loans.

HOW HAS THE EUROPEAN POLICY RESPONSE AFFECTED THE RATINGS?

We have generally adjusted downward our political scores (one of the five key
factors in our published sovereign ratings criteria) for those eurozone
sovereigns we had previously scored in our two highest categories. This score
change has been a contributing factor to the rating actions on the relevant
sovereigns cited above. Under the political score, we assess how a
government's institutions and policymaking affect a sovereign's credit
fundamentals by delivering sustainable public finances, promoting balanced
growth, and responding to economic or political shocks. Our political score
also captures the potential effect of external organizations on policy
settings.

It is our view that the limitations on monetary flexibility imposed by
membership in the eurozone are not adequately counterbalanced by other
eurozone economic policies to avoid the negative impact on creditworthiness
that the eurozone members are in opinion view currently facing. Financial
solidarity among member states appears to us to be insufficient to prevent
prolonged funding uncertainties. Specifically, we believe that the current
crisis management tools may not be adequate to restore lasting confidence in
the creditworthiness of large eurozone members such as Italy and Spain. Nor do
we think they are likely to instill sufficient confidence in these sovereigns'
ability to address potential financial system stresses in their jurisdiction.
In such a setting, the prospects of effectively intervening in the feedback
loop between sovereign and financial sector risk are in our opinion weak.


HOW DO YOU EXPECT MACROECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS WILL AFFECT THE REFORM AGENDA?

We believe that the elusiveness of an effective policy response is likely to
add to caution among households and investors alike, weighing on the growth
outlook for all eurozone members. Our base case still assumes that the
eurozone will record moderate growth in 2012 and 2013, i.e. 0.2% and 1%,
respectively -- down from 0.4% and 1.2% according to our early December
forecast, with a relatively mild recession in the first half of 2012.
Nevertheless, we estimate a 40% probability that a deeper and more prolonged
recession could hit the eurozone, with a likely reduction of economic activity
of 1.5% in 2012. Furthermore, we believe an even deeper and more prolonged
slump cannot be entirely excluded. We expect this weak macroeconomic outlook
if realized would complicate the implementation of budget plans, with
slippages to be expected, which would likely further dampen confidence and
potentially deepen the recession, as funding and credit is curtailed and the
private sector increases precautionary savings.

WHAT IS YOUR VIEW OF THE LATEST DEVELOPMENTS IN GREECE AND WHAT IMPACT DO THEY
HAVE YOUR ANALYSIS?

We did not change the rating on Greece, which had been downgraded to 'CC' in
July 2011, indicating our view of the risk of imminent default. Negotiations
with bondholders have taken longer than originally anticipated and we believe
may now run close to a large redemption of €14.5 billion on March 20, 2012,
raising the specter of a disorderly default. Such an event would in our view
further complicate the restoration of affordable market access for other
sovereigns experiencing market stress. We understand that the main unresolved
issues are related to the treatment of holdouts, the participation of official
creditors, and the coupon of the new bonds that will be offered (which partly
determine the effective recovery, which we continue to expect to lie between
30% and 50%). We do not believe that private-sector involvement will
necessarily be a one-off event in the case of the Greek restructuring and
would not be sought in possible future bail-out packages in a future case of
sovereign insolvency or prolonged loss of market access. All the more so as
official lenders are less likely to bear any future losses as their lending
will be channeled through the ESM, a privileged creditor that is expected to
be senior to bondholders in any future restructuring.

HOW DOES STANDARD & POOR'S VIEW THE ECB's RESPONSE TO DATE?

In our view, the actions of the ECB have been instrumental in averting a
collapse of market confidence. We see that the ECB has eased its eligibility
criteria, allowing an ever-expanding pool of assets to be used as collateral
for its funding operations, and has lowered the fixed rate on its main
refinancing operation to 1%, an all-time low. Most importantly in our view, it
has engaged in unprecedented repurchase operations for financial institutions.
In December 2011, it lent financial institutions almost €500 billion over
three years and announced further unlimited long-term funding auctions for
early 2012. This has greatly relieved the funding pressure for banks, which
will have to redeem over €200 billion of bonded debt (excluding in some
jurisdictions sizeable private placements) in the first quarter alone. By
lowering the ECB deposit rate to 0.25%, we believe that the central bank has
implicitly tried to encourage financial institutions to engage in a carry
trade of borrowing up to three-year funds cheaply from the central bank and
purchasing high-yielding government bonds. Recent Italian and other primary
auctions suggest to us, however, that banks and other investors may still only
be willing to lend longer term to governments facing market pressure if they
are offered interest rates that, all other things being equal, will make
fiscal consolidation harder to achieve.

Reports indicate that many investors had hoped that a breakthrough at the
December summit would have enticed the ECB to step up its direct government
bond purchases in the secondary market through its Security Market Program
(SMP). However, these hopes were quickly deflated as it became clearer that
the ECB would prefer to provide banks with unlimited funding, partly with the
expectation that those liquid funds in banks' balance sheets would find their
way into primary sovereign bond auctions. This indirect way of supporting the
sovereign bond market may yet be successful, but we believe that banks may
remain cautious when being faced with primary sovereign offerings, as most
financial institutions have aimed at shrinking their balance sheets by running
down security portfolios in order to comply with higher capital requirements,
which become effective in 2012. We believe that the ECB has not entirely
closed the door to expanding its involvement in the sovereign bond market but
remains reluctant to do so except in more dramatic circumstances. In our view,
this reluctance is likely prompted by concerns about moral hazard, the ECB's
own credibility (particularly should losses mount), and potential inflation
pressures in the longer term. We think it may also be the case that the ECB
(as well as some eurozone governments) is concerned that governments' reform
efforts would falter prematurely if market pressure subsides.

We believe that the risk of a credit crunch remains real in a number of
countries as economic conditions weaken and banks continue to consolidate
their balance sheets in light of tighter capital requirements and poor market
conditions in which to raise additional equity. However, the monetary policy
actions described above may mitigate the risk of a more extreme tightening of
credit conditions, which, if it were to come to pass, could put further
pressure on economic activity and employment.

In summary, while the monetary policy reaction has not been as accommodating
as many investors may have anticipated or hoped for, we believe that it has
nevertheless provided significant breathing space during which progress on
policy reform can be made. Furthermore, the ECB may yet engage in additional
supporting steps should the sovereign and bank funding crises intensify
further. Therefore, we have not changed our monetary score on eurozone
sovereigns.

HOW DOES STANDARD & POOR'S ASSESS THE REFORM EFFORTS OF THE NEW GOVERNMENTS IN
ITALY AND SPAIN?

In our view, the governments of Mario Monti and Mariano Rajoy have stepped up
initiatives to modernize their economies and secure the sustainability of
public finances over the long term. We consider that the domestic political
management of the crisis has improved markedly in Italy. Therefore, we have
not changed our political risk score for Italy because we are of the opinion
that the weakening policy environment at the European level is to a sufficient
degree offset by Italy's stronger domestic capacity to formulate and implement
crisis-mitigating economic policies.

Despite these encouraging developments on domestic policy, we downgraded both
sovereigns by two notches. This is due to our opinion that Italy and Spain are
particularly prone to the risk of a sudden deterioration in market conditions.
Thus, we believe that, as far as sovereign creditworthiness is concerned, the
deepening of the crisis and the risks of further market dislocation that could
accompany an inconclusive European crisis management strategy more than offset
our view of the enhanced national policy orientation.

WHY WAS IRELAND THE ONLY SOVEREIGN AMONG THE SO-CALLED "PERIPHERY" NOT
DOWNGRADED?

We have not adjusted our political score backing the rating on Ireland. This
reflects our view that the Irish government's response to the significant
deterioration in its public finances and the recent crisis in the Irish
financial sector has been proactive and substantive. This offsets our view
that the effectiveness, stability, and predictability of European policymaking
as a whole remains insufficient in addressing the deepening financial crisis
in the eurozone. Excluding government-funded banking sector recapitalization
payments, the authorities have adjusted Ireland's budget by almost 13% of
estimated 2012 GDP since 2008 and plan additional fiscal savings of close to
8% of GDP for 2012-2015. All other things being equal, we view the
government's fiscal consolidation plan as sufficient to achieve a general
government deficit of about 3% of GDP in 2015. In our view, there is currently
a strong political consensus behind the fiscal consolidation program and
policy implementation so far has been extremely strong.

In our view, Ireland has the most flexible and open economy among the
"periphery" sovereigns. We believe that Ireland's economic adjustment process
is further advanced than in the other sovereigns currently experiencing market
pressures. This is illustrated by the 25% depreciation in the trade-weighted
exchange rate since May 2008 and Irish exports growth contributed positively
to the muted Irish economic recovery in 2011. However, in our view this also
leaves the Irish economy and, ultimately, the Irish government's fiscal
consolidation program susceptible to worsening external economic conditions,
which is reflected in our negative outlook on the rating.

WHAT ARE THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EFSF AND OTHER EUROPEAN MULTILATERAL LENDING
INSTITUTIONS?

Following our placement of the ratings on the eurozone sovereigns on
CreditWatch in December, we also placed a number of supranational entities on
CreditWatch with negative implications. These included, among others, the
European Financial Stability Fund (EFSF), the European Investment Bank (EIB),
and the European Union's own funding program. We are currently assessing the
credit implications of today's eurozone sovereign downgrades on those
institutions and will publish our updated credit view in the coming days.

 

[Rottweiler]

Sempre S&P

E infine questo, sempre sui Paesi dell'Eurozona:


Standard & Poor's Takes Various Rating Actions On 16 Eurozone Sovereign Governments

Publication date: 13-Jan-2012 16:36:27 EST
View Analyst Contact Information
*In our view, the policy initiatives taken by European policymakers in
recent weeks may be insufficient to fully address ongoing systemic
stresses in the eurozone.
*We are lowering our long-term ratings on nine eurozone sovereigns and
affirming the ratings on seven.
*The outlooks on our ratings on all but two of the 16 eurozone sovereigns
are negative. The ratings on all 16 sovereigns have been removed from
CreditWatch, where they were placed with negative implications on Dec. 5,
2011 (except for Cyprus, which was first placed on CreditWatch on Aug.
12, 2011).

FRANKFURT (Standard & Poor's) Jan. 13, 2012--Standard & Poor's Ratings
Services today announced its rating actions on 16 members of the European
Economic and Monetary Union (EMU or eurozone) following completion of its
review.

We have lowered the long-term ratings on Cyprus, Italy, Portugal, and Spain by
two notches; lowered the long-term ratings on Austria, France, Malta,
Slovakia, and Slovenia, by one notch; and affirmed the long-term ratings on
Belgium, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.
All ratings have been removed from CreditWatch, where they were placed with
negative implications on Dec. 5, 2011 (except for Cyprus, which was first
placed on CreditWatch on Aug. 12, 2011).

. See list below for full details on the affected ratings.

The outlooks on the long-term ratings on Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Estonia,
Finland, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal,
Slovenia, and Spain are negative, indicating that we believe that there is at
least a one-in-three chance that the rating will be lowered in 2012 or 2013.
The outlook horizon for issuers with investment-grade ratings is up to two
years, and for issuers with speculative-grade ratings up to one year. The
outlooks on the long-term ratings on Germany and Slovakia are stable.

We assigned recovery ratings of '4' to both Cyprus and Portugal, in accordance
with our practice to assign recovery ratings to issuers rated in the
speculative-grade category, indicating an expected recovery of 30%-50% should
a default occur in the future.

Today's rating actions are primarily driven by our assessment that the policy
initiatives that have been taken by European policymakers in recent weeks may
be insufficient to fully address ongoing systemic stresses in the eurozone. In
our view, these stresses include: (1) tightening credit conditions, (2) an
increase in risk premiums for a widening group of eurozone issuers, (3) a
simultaneous attempt to delever by governments and households, (4) weakening
economic growth prospects, and (5) an open and prolonged dispute among
European policymakers over the proper approach to address challenges.

The outcomes from the EU summit on Dec. 9, 2011, and subsequent statements
from policymakers, lead us to believe that the agreement reached has not
produced a breakthrough of sufficient size and scope to fully address the
eurozone's financial problems. In our opinion, the political agreement does
not supply sufficient additional resources or operational flexibility to
bolster European rescue operations, or extend enough support for those
eurozone sovereigns subjected to heightened market pressures.

We also believe that the agreement is predicated on only a partial recognition
of the source of the crisis: that the current financial turmoil stems
primarily from fiscal profligacy at the periphery of the eurozone. In our
view, however, the financial problems facing the eurozone are as much a
consequence of rising external imbalances and divergences in competitiveness
between the eurozone's core and the so-called "periphery". As such, we believe
that a reform process based on a pillar of fiscal austerity alone risks
becoming self-defeating, as domestic demand falls in line with consumers'
rising concerns about job security and disposable incomes, eroding national
tax revenues.

Accordingly, in line with our published sovereign criteria, we have adjusted
downward our political scores (one of the five key factors in our criteria)
for those eurozone sovereigns we had previously scored in our two highest
categories. This reflects our view that the effectiveness, stability, and
predictability of European policymaking and political institutions have not
been as strong as we believe are called for by the severity of a broadening
and deepening financial crisis in the eurozone.

In our view, it is increasingly likely that refinancing costs for certain
countries may remain elevated, that credit availability and economic growth
may further decelerate, and that pressure on financing conditions may persist.
Accordingly, for those sovereigns we consider most at risk of an economic
downturn and deteriorating funding conditions, for example due to their large
cross-border financing needs, we have adjusted our external score downward.

On the other hand, we believe that eurozone monetary authorities have been
instrumental in averting a collapse of market confidence. We see that the
European Central Bank has successfully eased collateral requirements, allowing
an ever expanding pool of assets to be used as collateral for its funding
operations, and has lowered the fixed rate to 1% on its main refinancing
operation, an all-time low. Most importantly in our view, it has engaged in
unprecedented repurchase operations for financial institutions, greatly
relieving the near-term funding pressures for banks. Accordingly we did not
adjust the initial monetary score on any of the 16 sovereigns under review.

Moreover, we affirmed the ratings on the seven eurozone sovereigns that we
believe are likely to be more resilient in light of their relatively strong
external positions and less leveraged public and private sectors. These credit
strengths remain robust enough, in our opinion, to neutralise the potential
ratings impact from the lowering of our political score.

However, for those sovereigns with negative outlooks, we believe that downside
risks persist and that a more adverse economic and financial environment could
erode their relative strengths within the next year or two to a degree that in
our view could warrant a further downward revision of their long-term ratings.

We believe that the main downside risks that could affect eurozone sovereigns
to various degrees are related to the possibility of further significant
fiscal deterioration as a consequence of a more recessionary macroeconomic
environment and/or vulnerabilities to further intensification and broadening
of risk aversion among investors, jeopardizing funding access at sustainable
rates. A more severe financial and economic downturn than we currently
envisage (see "Sovereign Risk Indicators", published Dec. 28, 2011) could also
lead to rising stress levels in the European banking system, potentially
leading to additional fiscal costs for the sovereigns through various bank
workout or recapitalization programs. Furthermore, we believe that there is a
risk that reform fatigue could be mounting, especially in those countries that
have experienced deep recessions and where growth prospects remain bleak,
which could eventually lead us to the view that lower levels of predictability
exist in policy orientation, and thus to a further downward adjustment of our
political score.

Finally, while we currently assess the monetary authorities' response to the
eurozone's financial problems as broadly adequate, our view could change as
the crisis and the response to it evolves. If we lowered our initial monetary
score for all eurozone sovereigns as a result, this could have negative
consequences for the ratings on a number of countries.

In this context, we would note that the ratings on the eurozone sovereigns
remain at comparatively high levels, with only three below investment grade
(Portugal, Cyprus, and Greece). Historically, investment-grade-rated
sovereigns have experienced very low default rates. From 1975 to 2010, the
15-year cumulative default rate for sovereigns rated in investment grade was
1.02%, and 0.00% for sovereigns rated in the 'A' category or higher. During
this period, 97.78% of sovereigns rated 'AAA' at the beginning of the year
retained their rating at the end of the year.

Following today's rating actions, Standard & Poor's will issue separate media
releases concerning affected ratings on the funds, government-related
entities, financial institutions, insurance companies, public finance, and
structured finance sectors in due course.

 

[Zorba]

Mps esclude l'aumento Viola: «Capitale adeguato»

Dal sole di ieri. Riporto uno stralcio. Certo che se raccattasero 3.2 bln non sarebbe per nulla male per le P. Diventerebbero da cassetto.

«Il nostro piano per seguire le indicazioni dell'Eba non prevede alcun aumento di capitale», ha spiegato Viola, ricordando che le mosse allo studio saranno discusse nel consiglio d'amministrazione del 19 gennaio e inviate in Banca d'Italia il giorno dopo. «Ho potuto verificare che nel nostro bilancio c'è spazio di manovra per colmare il gap patrimoniale, peraltro interamente imputabile alla copertura del rischio collegato ai titoli di Stato - ha aggiunto il direttore generale di Montepaschi -. Al netto di questa voce, il capitale della banca è adeguato e noi stiamo lavorando per rispettare i parametri indicati dall'autorità europea utilizzando la leva del capital management, ottimizzando l'attivo e attuando alcune dismissioni parziali, in questo caso con un'ottica industriale, mirata a realizzare alleanze strategiche, e non per fare semplicemente cassa». Un approccio che ha subito incassato il plauso dei vertici della Fondazione senese.
Il "cuscinetto" di nuova finanza da 3,2 miliardi dovrebbe essere costituito per poco più di un miliardo dalla conversione dei prestiti ibridi fresh: quello 2003 (già realizzata per oltre 300 milioni a fine anno) e quello 2008, la cui "riserva sovrapprezzo di emissione" di 752 milioni passerà a capitale con l'assemblea straordinaria in programma il primo di febbraio; gli altri 2 miliardi arriveranno dall'adozione di un diverso modello di calcolo degli attivi a rischio e dal deconsolidamento di alcune partecipazioni in società-prodotto, per esempio Consum.it nel credito al consumo, che dovrebbero diventare oggetto di joint strategiche con altri operatori del settore.

http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/fina...nto-viola-capitale-081705.shtml?uuid=AayuzwdE

 

[Tobia]

Stesso mio pensiero se guardiamo le perpetue in quell ottica non ci investiremo + una lira... la realtà è che Lehman B. ha fatto capire al mondo cosa vuol dire lasciar fallire una banca sistemica ...poi ognuno tragga le sue conclusioni autonomamente

secondo i dettami di gau (pace all'anima sua visto che non so perchè ma è stato bannato) non ci sarebbe mercato sicuro su cui investire e le occasioni sarebbero tali solo sotto l'ottica "sinistra" del moral hazard
ovviamente è solo un aspetto didattico, da tenere in considerazione appena davanti a una birra se penso che ad esempio Intesa ha un patrimonio di vigilanza sotto i 50 miliardi di fronte che verrebbero azzerati al cospetto di una svalutazione del 7-8% del suo attivo (mi pare, potrei ricordare male però, abbia tra l'altro crediti incagliati o comunque di difficile esigibilità per 20-22 mil.) ci sarebbe poco da star tranquilli

 

[nik.sala]

Dal sole di ieri. Riporto uno stralcio. Certo che se raccattasero 3.2 bln non sarebbe per nulla male per le P. Diventerebbero da cassetto.

«Il nostro piano per seguire le indicazioni dell'Eba non prevede alcun aumento di capitale», ha spiegato Viola, ricordando che le mosse allo studio saranno discusse nel consiglio d'amministrazione del 19 gennaio e inviate in Banca d'Italia il giorno dopo. «Ho potuto verificare che nel nostro bilancio c'è spazio di manovra per colmare il gap patrimoniale, peraltro interamente imputabile alla copertura del rischio collegato ai titoli di Stato - ha aggiunto il direttore generale di Montepaschi -. Al netto di questa voce, il capitale della banca è adeguato e noi stiamo lavorando per rispettare i parametri indicati dall'autorità europea utilizzando la leva del capital management, ottimizzando l'attivo e attuando alcune dismissioni parziali, in questo caso con un'ottica industriale, mirata a realizzare alleanze strategiche, e non per fare semplicemente cassa». Un approccio che ha subito incassato il plauso dei vertici della Fondazione senese.
Il "cuscinetto" di nuova finanza da 3,2 miliardi dovrebbe essere costituito per poco più di un miliardo dalla conversione dei prestiti ibridi fresh: quello 2003 (già realizzata per oltre 300 milioni a fine anno) e quello 2008, la cui "riserva sovrapprezzo di emissione" di 752 milioni passerà a capitale con l'assemblea straordinaria in programma il primo di febbraio; gli altri 2 miliardi arriveranno dall'adozione di un diverso modello di calcolo degli attivi a rischio e dal deconsolidamento di alcune partecipazioni in società-prodotto, per esempio Consum.it nel credito al consumo, che dovrebbero diventare oggetto di joint strategiche con altri operatori del settore.

http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/fina...nto-viola-capitale-081705.shtml?uuid=AayuzwdE

che è quello che auspico maggiormente

 

[ferdo]

vi sposto in OT (e qualcosa tra i Criteri di gestione) (se non vi dispiace)

 

[Mais78]

Stasera tempo di conteggi...vediamo quanto e' profondo il lago di sangue 2011...