Titoli di Stato paesi-emergenti VENEZUELA e Petroleos de Venezuela - Cap. 1 (19 lettori)

[qquebec]

Citgo Says Conoco Probe May ?Freak Out? Potential Buyers - Bloomberg

Domandina per i più esperti Ma Citgo quanto pesa sul giro d'affari di PDVSA? Mi rende perplessa questa cosa:

Petroleos de Venezuela was trying to sell the unit for as much as $15 billion in July, according to people familiar with the plan. Venezuelan government officials said publicly in September and October that Citgo was no longer on the market. People familiar with the sales campaign said Citgo’s representatives were approaching buyers as recently as November.

 

[tommy271]

Domandina per i più esperti Ma Citgo quanto pesa sul giro d'affari di PDVSA? Mi rende perplessa questa cosa:

Petroleos de Venezuela was trying to sell the unit for as much as $15 billion in July, according to people familiar with the plan. Venezuelan government officials said publicly in September and October that Citgo was no longer on the market. People familiar with the sales campaign said Citgo’s representatives were approaching buyers as recently as November.

E' un polmone di liquidità per il Venezuela.

 

[NoWay]

I russi non indietreggiano...

*Russia: min.Energia, mercato petrolio si stabilizzerà da solo

 

[policeman]

Concede i diritti di estrazione ad un altro veicolo ... può chiamarlo Petroleos de Bolivarianos.
Telefona ai cinesi e dice, nessun problema i contratti li rispettiamo ma la carta intestata sarà diversa.

di norma i contratti di Vendita/acquisti petrolio sono molto complicati.il compratore esige garanzie.
1- il venditore deve fare una garanzia da una banca internazionale che tutte le clausole dell contrato vengono rispettate è in caso di contestazione paga il penale
2-un certificato dall tribunale dove ha sede il venditore che non è in stato fallimentare
3-un certificato di una società di controllo che dicchiara che il petrolio ha le specifiche come da contratto
naturalmente ci sono altre clausole che se vado avanti ad elencare non finisco piu'
p.s ricordate che una petroliera piena di petrolio vale us$ 30 millioni.escluso lo scafo
l'unico modo di solvolare questi ostacoli è tramite un intermediario a percentuale

 

[qquebec]

I russi non indietreggiano...

*Russia: min.Energia, mercato petrolio si stabilizzerà da solo

Nessuno vuole tagliare il proprio livello di produzione, ancor di più in questo momento con i prezzi che sono crollati. O qualcuno cede o scoppia una guerra da qualche parte.

 

[NoWay]

Nessuno vuole tagliare il proprio livello di produzione, ancor di più in questo momento con i prezzi che sono crollati. O qualcuno cede o scoppia una guerra da qualche parte.

Senza bisogno di guerre, basterebbe sedersi ad un tavolo e fare ognuno un passo indietro rispetto alle rispettive posizioni...

 

[amorgos34]

Venezuela: Willingness to pay, "unless"




•President Maduro has reacted defensively to the worsening economic outlook, adding a familiar antagonist (the US) and a newer one (the market) to the “economic war” narrative
•Maduro says Venezuela is solvent and won’t default…
•…however, new rhetoric about a “financial blockade” suggests a crack in the armor of previously strong willingness to pay external debt
•Economic announcements continue to fall short: Maduro is not ready to hike gasoline prices, and only tweaks were previewed to the FX regime, no structural change
•We maintain our Neutral call on Venezuelan external debt, as we remain cautious despite the currently extreme valuations



President Maduro in several speeches over the past week has begun to weave a new thread into the “economic war” narrative he has used this year to defend himself from the country’s bleak economic results. The standard economic war narrative has largely blamed domestic economic elites and “speculative mafias” that are inducing inflation and scarcity to undermine the Maduro government. In recent weeks, the narrative has shifted, a reaction to oil and bond prices collapsing to new 5-year lows, and following the approval in the U.S. Senate of targeted sanctions against certain individuals in the Venezuelan government (revoking visas and freezing assets, but without any blanket sanctions impacting bilateral trade or financial access for the sovereign or PDVSA). Maduro has now incorporated a new set of antagonists into the narrative, characterizing US sanctions as a hostile action against the country at large. Maduro has also been insinuating that the US government is behind the oil price drop as part of an international political strategy. Harsh rhetoric against the US is hardly unfamiliar territory during the Chavez era.

The novelty of the economic war narrative is that Maduro is now also reacting to the recent fall in bond prices and implicating “rating agencies” for imposing a “financial blockade” against the country. While this is not the first time Maduro and Chavez have criticized negative market perceptions of the country, we are concerned that the path of this new rhetorical shift leads to a slippery slope. Maduro has said this week that markets are denying Venezuela credit it needs to overcome the impact of lower USD revenues amid lower oil prices, credit “to which Venezuela has a right,” according to Maduro’s public comments.

Moreover, for the first time under Chavismo, Maduro seems to have qualified Venezuela’s willingness to pay. In a public event on Saturday, December 13, Maduro made the following statement: “There is no possibility of default, unless we would decide to not pay anymore as part of an economic strategy for development. And that’s not the strategy that has been constructed in these years of economic thought laid out by Hugo Chavez” (Bloomberg news translation). To be clear, Maduro is still saying Venezuela will avoid default and pay external debt, and by linking Chavez himself to this strategy, it seems that he is insinuating to the domestic audience that this is a correct and legitimate approach. He also continues to contend that Venezuela is solvent, playing up the country’s strong track record of debt service and its ample reserves of oil and gas (first and fourth most in the world). Nonetheless, Maduro seems to be qualifying this strategy and at least trying on for size the type of rhetoric that could be utilized if a liquidity crisis eventually compromises the country's ability to service debt.

Previewing tweaks to the FX regime, but not much else

Maduro keeps previewing economic measures, but still without details. On Sunday, Maduro gave a wide-ranging hour-long interview to Chavez’s former VP and long-time journalist Jose Vicente Rangel (summarized in Spanish by El Universal: part 1 and part 2). Rangel asked pointed questions both on political stability and the government’s inability to execute measures to improve the economy. Despite Maduro having previewed that the session would include new economic announcements, there were few new details. Maduro did announce that the time is not right to increase gasoline prices, which would exacerbate inflationary pressures. Inflation must be brought back under control first, before the removal of gasoline subsidies might be considered next year (former PDVSA president Ramirez quantified the cost of the subsidy at US$12.5bn last year; we estimate costs to PDVSA of VEF300bn annually or 8% of GDP).

On the FX regime, only tweaks were previewed. Maduro mentioned that there would be adjustments to Sicad-2 (currently fixed just below USD/VEF 50), but suggested that the current regime with three highly controlled official platforms would be maintained. Maduro said Cencoex would continue to sell FX for food, medicine and priority goods at USD/VEF 6.3, while Sicad-1 (currently USD/VEF 12) would attend to the needs of the rest of the economy. As for Sicad-2, Maduro acknowledged that it had fallen short of expectations, but that going forward would incorporate “new elements” to make it more effective.

These comments reinforce our view that the multiple FX rates regime will be maintained, with more and more items being shifted up from lower rate to higher rate platforms. Most likely, the authorities will tweak the current Exchange Agreement 28 of April 4, 2014 (specifically Article 5) so that PDVSA and its partners can sell at least part of the dollars obtained from oil exports at the higher Sicad-2 platform; currently, export proceeds must be sold at the official Cencoex USD/VEF 6.3 rate. We believe that this would be a necessary and positive change, meeting a request from PDVSA and its partners that would improve the viability of JV projects and PDVSA cash flow. Such a change could reduce, at least on the margin, the degree to which PDVSA must rely on monetary financing from the Central Bank. However, without a credible, confidence inducing anti-inflation plan to accompany it, and with multiple rates still keeping arbitrage and rent-seeking channels open, this gradual approach to tweaking the FX regime seems insufficient to diminish extreme economic imbalances, especially amid lower oil prices. Indeed, the current oil price for Venezuelan crude (below USD $60/bbl) implies some $22bn less revenue in 2015 compared to 2014, a year in which it has already proven difficult to close external accounts. Overall volumes of USD for official imports should now face a significant drop from already reduced (though unreported) current levels. We maintain our view expressed in our November 23 Trip Notes that there is a very high degree of uncertainty about how the government will deal with BoP constraints without upsetting a tenuous political and social equilibrium in 2015. We maintain our Neutral call on Venezuelan external debt, as we remain cautious despite the currently extreme valuations.


Ben Ramsey (AC)
(1-212) 834-4308
[email protected]
J.P. Morgan Securities LLC

 

[Gian-ale]

senza entrare in dettagli giuridici che non sono in grado di affrontare mi limito alla osservazione che il default della pdsva avrebbe impatto POLITICO assai meno dirompente....maduro potrebbe darne la colpa a molti soggetti interni. il default dei titoli sovrani ricadrebbe su di lui come fallimento di un intero progetto politico.

 

[tommy271]

di norma i contratti di Vendita/acquisti petrolio sono molto complicati.il compratore esige garanzie.
1- il venditore deve fare una garanzia da una banca internazionale che tutte le clausole dell contrato vengono rispettate è in caso di contestazione paga il penale
2-un certificato dall tribunale dove ha sede il venditore che non è in stato fallimentare
3-un certificato di una società di controllo che dicchiara che il petrolio ha le specifiche come da contratto
naturalmente ci sono altre clausole che se vado avanti ad elencare non finisco piu'
p.s ricordate che una petroliera piena di petrolio vale us$ 30 millioni.escluso lo scafo
l'unico modo di solvolare questi ostacoli è tramite un intermediario a percentuale

Ti ringrazio, Policeman.

Mai dubitato che i contratti, su queste transazioni, siano molto rigorosi.
Ciò non toglie che, in via assoluta, non sia fattibile svuotare una società e trasferire parte degli obblighi ad un'altra.

In America Latina (ma anche da altre parti) può succedere.

Detto questo, le mie esperienze su bond sovereign vedono un default di questi con salvaguardia delle aziende di stato.

 

[Magician]

Da Bloomberg a riguardo come PDVSA sia da considerarsi autonoma rispetto Venezuela.

By Ye Xie, Katia Porzecanski and Pietro D. Pitts
(Bloomberg) -- Venezuela’s bondholders have long held that
if the South American country ever defaulted, they’d be able to
seize its refineries and almost 6,000 gas stations in the U.S.
That notion is starting to unravel, just as plunging oil
prices, a collapsing economy and dwindling foreign reserves has
made swaps traders almost certain that Venezuela will renege on
its obligations in the next five years.
Creditors would have a hard time convincing U.S. courts
that Citgo Petroleum Corp., the Houston-based unit owned by
Venezuela’s state oil company, is legally an “alter ego” of
the government and responsible for its obligations, according to
law firms Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP and Buchanan
Ingersoll & Rooney. For almost two decades, bondholders have
assumed the ability to seize Citgo assets would deter Venezuela
from stopping debt payments, which has propelled gains of 834
percent, according to Carl Ross, a senior sovereign analyst at
Grantham Mayo Van Otterloo & Co.
Bondholders’ ability to get their hands on Citgo is
“practically nil,” David Fernandez, an attorney at Buchanan,
said in a telephone interview from New York. “Citgo is not
assuming any liability or responsibility for any of Venezuela’s
debts or obligations.”
Officials with Venezuela’s Information Ministry and state
oil company Petroleos de Venezuela didn’t respond to e-mails
seeking comment. Fernando Garay, Citgo’s public affairs manager,
declined to comment.

Bonds Plummet

The nation’s benchmark bonds due 2027 sank 8.3 percent to a
16-year low of 37.825 cents on the dollar after President
Nicolas Maduro wouldn’t rule out the possibility of default in
televised speeches over the weekend.
“There is no possibility of default, unless we would
decide to not pay anymore as part of an economic strategy for
development,” he said Dec. 13. “And that’s not the strategy
that has been constructed in these years of economic thought
laid out by Hugo Chavez.”
Maduro, who succeeded his late predecessor Chavez in 2013,
also said he had no plans to curb gasoline subsidies and that he
will keep a 6.3 bolivar-per-dollar fixed exchange rate for
priority imports. Analysts including Eurasia Group’s Risa Grais-
Targow and Bank of America Corp.’s Francisco Rodriguez say a
devaluation would help ease a scarcity of dollars in a country
plagued by shortages of everything from toilet paper to
toothpaste.
The comments pushed the upfront cost to protect Venezuelan
debt for five years with credit-default swaps to 64.21 percent,
implying a 97 percent probability of non-payment, according to
CMA data.

Panel Discussion

Deepening concern Venezuela will default led some 150
investors, lawyers and analysts to attend a panel discussion on
potential scenarios organized by Cleary Gottlieb on Dec. 1 in
New York, according to interviews with six attendees who asked
not to be identified because the meeting was private.
Speakers at the event included partners Lee Buchheit, who
has represented countries from Iceland to Greece in debt
negotiations, and Carmine Boccuzzi, an attorney for Argentina in
its decade-long battles with creditors, according to a copy of
the agenda.
One of the topics discussed was whether Citgo oil stations
could be seized as collateral, they said. If Venezuela
defaulted, it would be difficult for the nation’s bondholders to
prove that they could confiscate Citgo’s assets, they said.
Citgo is owned by PDVSA through PDV Holding Inc. and its
subsidiary PDV America Inc., which are incorporated in Delaware.
While the board members are appointed by Venezuela’s president,
the government is not liable for the obligations of PDVSA or the
obligations of its subsidiaries, according Citgo’s bond
prospectus.

‘Very Difficult’

If Citgo is “not directly run and administered by the
Venezuelan government, there are layers of bureaucracy in the
corporation itself that make it very difficult to attach any
assets,” said Buchanan’s Fernandez. “It’s not like licking a
stamp and putting it on an envelope.”
Citgo is capable of refining 749,000 barrels of oil a day
at facilities in Texas, Illinois and Louisiana, and operates
5,900 Citgo-branded gasoline stations. Venezuela said in October
that it had scrapped a plan to sell Citgo in deals with price
tags estimated from $7 billion to $15 billion, according to
court papers.
Still, Citgo’s representatives approached potential buyers
as recently as November, said people familiar with the sales
campaign who asked not to be identified because the talks are
private.
Bondholders wouldn’t be the only ones looking to Citgo to
recoup their money.

Scare Off

ConocoPhillips claims PDVSA is trying to sell Citgo as part
of a plan to avoid paying compensation for assets that were
nationalized by Chavez in 2007. Chavez, who died last year, had
vowed to never pay foreigners a dime for assets he confiscated.
Reagan Simpson, a lawyer for Citgo, said at a hearing in
state court in Houston on Dec. 15 that ConocoPhillips’s request
for a court order to probe Venezuela’s effort to sell Citgo may
scare off any potential investors.
The increasing need to sell Citgo comes as the price for
Venezuela’s oil, which accounts for 95 percent of the country’s
exports, has tumbled 51 percent since March 2012 to a five-year
low of $57.5 a barrel, and the economy heads for the biggest
contraction since 2009. While Venezuela had $21.4 billion in
international reserves on Dec. 11, the government and PDVSA have
about $21 billion of debt to pay by the end of 2016.
Venezuela’s bonds are still a buy to Barclays Plc, which
reiterated its recommendation on Dec. 15 and said the country
has the wherewithal to keep making payments.

‘Strong Incentives’

“Venezuela has the capacity and strong incentives to avoid
a default/debt restructuring,” strategists including Donato
Guarino said in the report.
If Venezuela repudiates its debt, everything from oil tanks
to oil receivables could be equally difficult for investors to
get their hands on, Buchanan’s Fernandez said. The tanks are
probably leased, with an independent financing contract assigned
to each one, while oil revenue receivables may be already
collateralized against other debt, he said.
“Litigation can be difficult to achieve,” Michael Ganske,
who oversees $8 billion including Venezuela bonds as the head of
emerging markets at Rogge Global Partners Plc, said by telephone
on Dec. 12. “Investors are questioning their assumptions. It’s
not a straightforward case.”