Da BofA
         67% of respondents would oppose a default 
   Results from the Datanalisis November Omnibus survey   show that Venezuelans are strongly opposed to defaulting on the country's   external debt. 67.2% of Venezuelans believe that the country should continue   paying its external debt, as opposed to 14.3% that believe it should stop   paying. Support for paying the debt is higher among pro-government voters   (70.3%) than in the population as a whole. 55.6% of Venezuelans (62.3% of   government supporters) believe that paying external debt is ethically   justified, as opposed to 27.3% who believe it is not. When asked whether the   government had to choose between paying the debt and buying food or if it   could take decisions that could enable it to pay for both, 68.4% of   respondents (74.1% of government supporters) stated that it could take   decisions that would allow it to pay for both, as opposed to 14.2% that said   it had to choose between one or the other. Only 26.7% of respondents say that   they would view favorably a leader that proposed a default as part of a   strategy to improve the economy. The survey, which was conducted between   November 4 and 20, covered 1,294 households and had a margin of error of   2.7% 
   Greater support for adjustments than for default    
   The 14.6% of voters that say they would support a   default is lower than the 20.1% that would support increasing the process of   regulated products, the 26.6% that would support increasing gasoline prices,   and the 27.7% that would support lifting exchange controls, though higher   than the 8.8% that would support an outright devaluation. This suggests that   it may be easier for the government to drum up political support for economic   adjustments than for a default on the country's external debt. Importantly,   support for adjustment measures is higher among government backers: 26.6% of   them would support raising the price of regulated products, 41.1% would   support a gasoline price hike, 31.0% would support lifting exchange controls,   and 17.1% would support a devaluation. 
   Government seeking to shore support unlikely to   default 
   As oil prices decline,   investors should ask what their relative standing is in the order of   priorities of authorities. If there is a key defining characteristic of   economic polices during the Maduro administration, it has been the avoidance   of decisions with short-term political cost even when the government is aware   of its long-term benefits.We argued that Venezuela had at its disposal a   number of policy measures that it could take and which would generate the   needed adjustment at a limited political cost. The fact that these measures   are less unpopular than default, combined with the limited cash-flow gains   from default due to the threat of attachment of assets and oil receivables,   supports our contention that authorities will likely choose to make key   policy adjustments rather than default on the country's external debt. 
             Opposition leads strongly in   parliamentary elections 
   The survey also shows that   pro-opposition candidates would garner a large majority of the popular vote   in the upcoming 2015 parliamentary elections. 38.9% of voters would support   opposition candidates as opposed to 21.0% that would vote for pro-government   candidates and 12.9% that would support independent candidates. The   presidential approval rating, usually a good predictor of the share of the   vote obtained by the pro-government party, fell 5.7 ppt to 24.5%, and 71.1%   of respondents believe that the president should leave office before the end   of his term. This suggests that unless the government is able to generate a   significant improvement in economic conditions during the coming year, it   could lose its parliamentary majority and face a recall referendum in early   2016. 
   Strong incentives   for adjustment remain in place 
   We continue to believe that the evolution of public opinion creates   strong incentives for the government to adopt policy adjustments over the   course of the coming year. We argue that given the current level of   distortions, these adjustments are unlikely to have the standard   contractionary effects but will rather likely lead to a rapid economic   recovery. It is by now clear that the government's economic strategy has not   allowed it to maintain a sufficiently high level of approval so as to survive   an electoral challenge next year. Therefore, the government seems to have   little to gain - and a lot to lose - electorally from maintaining the current   policy status quo. Nevertheless, current signals from policymakers -   confirmed by president Maduro's statement in a TV interview yesterday that he   would not immediately raise gasoline prices - suggests that the authorities   have yet to take the decision to undertake the full-fledged price adjustment.   We thus maintain our call that for a large FX and relative price adjustment   to occur late in 1H15, with macroeconomic instability continuing until then.