Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 2 (10 lettori)

[giub]

Motivo in più di riflessione sui tempi delle modifiche dei trattati ...

era quello che volevo sottendere

 

[tommy271]

GRECIA: PAPADEMOS, ENORMI PROBLEMI; L'EURO E' UNA GARANZIA



(AGI) - Atene, 10 nov. - "E' un grande onore e una grande responsabilita'" ha detto Papademos parlando fuori del Palazzo presidenziale e sollecitando tutti a "unita' comprensione e saggezza per riuscire ad affrontare i problemi nella migliore maniera possibile". Non sono un politico - ha aggiunto l'ex banchiere centrale 64enne - ma ho dedicato gran parte della mia carriera al Paese". Papademos, che giurera' domani alle 13 ora italiana, ha anche precisato di non aver ricevuto "nessuna condizione" dai partiti politici per la formazione del nuovo governo. Per quanto riguarda le elezioni del 19 febbraio, il premier designato ha confermato che si trattera' di un governo di transizione fino alle elezioni la cui "data di riferimento" e' al momento quella del 19 febbraio.

 

[GlobalMacro]

ok, non serve fare dietrologia quando si sapeva che c'era un piano.
Lo sappiamo che il piano B l'hanno studiato, nessuno pensa che stiano lì ad aspettare la piena del fiume...
Il discorso è che, ripeto, non puoi chiamare trattato una cosa che tu unilateralmente applichi. Non dico che non lo faranno, ma certamente la Grecia, la Spagna e l'Italia non firmeranno un trattato cucito sulle esigenze franco-tedesche dopo che i tedeschi hanno, ad oggi, tratto i maggiori benefici dall'euro. certamente la Germania potrà dire "io non pago le tue bollette", ma questo non avverrà con la controfirma di quello che a causa dell'insolvenza sulla bolletta andrà fallito.

L'importante è l'effetto che si vuole ottenere, basta minacciare di farlo ed essere convincenti, l'effetto finale è di non pagare le bollette degli altri.

 

[carib]

Promemoria:
ecco quel che scriveva Papademos sul FT 20 giorni fa..


As the Greek debt crisis has escalated, so have calls to restructure the country’s public debt, in order to support debt sustainability, improve long-term growth and reduce moral hazard. In fact, though, the likely financial benefits of debt restructuring would be much smaller than is often envisaged, the process entails significant risks for Greece and the euro area.
The benefits of a sovereign debt restructuring by a eurozone country depend on the distribution of debt across creditors and their capacity to absorb such losses without government support. However, there are also funding constraints and financial interlinkages, stemming from the functioning of the European monetary union and the integration of financial markets, that can erode benefits and generate systemic risks.
In the case of Greece, the nominal value of outstanding central government debt was €366bn at the end of July 2011. Almost 30 per cent was held by Greek residents, mostly banks, pension funds and insurance companies. A substantial reduction in the nominal value of Greek debt held by these institutions would have to be largely offset by government financial support. Losses sustained by Greek households and non-financials holding public debt would hit economic activity and tax revenues.
Another large share of outstanding Greek government debt is held by official institutions. At the end of July 2011, eurozone governments, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and other official institutions held almost a third of Greek government debt. For institutional, political and legal reasons, there can be no debt restructuring resulting in losses that would burden these official debt holders.
Thus, only restructuring the debt held by foreign private investors – approximately 40 per cent of total Greek government debt – would bring net financial benefits. A 50 per cent haircut would reduce the total debt by about 20 per cent.
The adverse consequences for Greece of a “hard”, involuntary debt restructuring and a sovereign default are not limited to the costs of recapitalising domestic banks and supporting pension funds. The effects on confidence, the liquidity of the Greek banking system and the real economy are likely to be substantial, though difficult to predict and quantify. Such effects would also undermine the fiscal consolidation process, especially if debt restructuring causes a credit crunch. The ECB would not accept as collateral securities downgraded to default status. It would thus be necessary to provide “credit enhancement” to improve the quality of this collateral at a cost that would ultimately be borne by the Greek government.
Furthermore, if there is an involuntary debt restructuring and sovereign default of a eurozone country, the risk of financial contagion and spillovers on banks is likely to be significant and far-reaching. The recent sharp increases in sovereign bond yields in the eurozone have been sending loud and clear warning signals in this respect.
At the moment, the most effective and prudent way ahead is to implement the agreement of the European leaders in July, appropriately reinforced. Europe’s banks would definitely need to be recapitalised. But it would also be essential to increase the financial resources of the European financial stability facility and enhance its flexibility.
The agreement reached concerning private sector involvement in financing Greek debt should be essentially preserved. Possible modifications to improve debt sustainability by encouraging a larger haircut in the envisaged bond exchange are likely to imply a modest debt relief. Any changes in the PSI should not jeopardise its voluntary nature and should not lead to a credit event. In the case of sovereign default, the strengthening of the banks’ firewalls and the EFSF’s firepower would have to be substantially greater to protect financial stability.
There are no free lunches for debtors and no easy solutions for creditors. An involuntary restructuring of Greek sovereign debt is likely to result in modest net financial benefits and pose substantial risks that would seriously threaten the financial stability and economic performance of the eurozone as a whole. The realisation of these risks would ultimately impose a heavier burden on European taxpayers, have undesirable consequences for the stability and cohesion of the eurozone and undermine the credibility of the euro. For all these reasons, a comprehensive and convincing policy package that can help restore market and public confidence is urgently needed for the resolution of the European debt crisis.

 

[GlobalMacro]

Promemoria:
ecco quel che scriveva Papademos sul FT 20 giorni fa..


A 50 per cent haircut would reduce the total debt by about 20 per cent.
.

Sì l'ho postato un paio di volte dicendo che la cripto conseguenza era il ritorno alla dracma.

Non è solo la mia opinione, ho sentito al telegiornale di Sky che qualche politico greco velenosamente sosteneva che Papademos voleva proteggere l'Euro ... dalla Grecia, cioè grazie ai rapporti che ha vuole rendere il passaggio alla dracma meno traumatico possibile per il resto d'Europa

 

[Road Glide]

L'importante è l'effetto che si vuole ottenere, basta minacciare di farlo ed essere convincenti, l'effetto finale è di non pagare le bollette degli altri.

Questa è tutta un'altra storia: si chiama diplomazia e non necessita la modifica di nessun trattato.
Inoltre volevo porti un quesito.
Non è che l'euro a due velocità potrebbe funzionare per avvicinare i paesi membri (euro1) e i candidati membri (euro2)?

 

[GlobalMacro]

Questa è tutta un'altra storia: si chiama diplomazia e non necessita la modifica di nessun trattato.
Inoltre volevo porti un quesito.
Non è che l'euro a due velocità potrebbe funzionare per avvicinare i paesi membri (euro1) e i candidati membri (euro2)?

Mi dispiace, non posso risponderti, provo a scrivere al mio collega, comunque lo vedrò fra una settimana circa, io lavoro in una università non al MEF, lui ha questo amico in Francia ma non ha rapporti di lavoro.

A quanto mi ha detto non è una persona molto importante, è questo è ancora più preoccupante: significa che sono stati coinvolti uno o più uffici del ministero per studiare la cosa, non sono voli pindarici.

Non è diplomazia, o meglio lo è ma molto più pervasiva, nel senso che una cosa è dire se non rigate dritto vi mandiamo nell'euro2, ben altra è arrivare con una road map, magari lunga ma ben stabilita e precisa, nel secondo caso l'interlocutore è preoccupato assai e presumibilmente paga le bollette.

 

[PASTELLETTO]

Scusate la domanda, ma sono stati giorni folli e non ho seguito.
Ultime notizie sul perchè di questo andamento di CAC40 dei mercati?
Non gli va bene Monti?
O Pippademus?

 

[russiabond]

Promemoria:
ecco quel che scriveva Papademos sul FT 20 giorni fa..


As the Greek debt crisis has escalated, so have calls to restructure the country’s public debt, in order to support debt sustainability, improve long-term growth and reduce moral hazard. In fact, though, the likely financial benefits of debt restructuring would be much smaller than is often envisaged, the process entails significant risks for Greece and the euro area.
The benefits of a sovereign debt restructuring by a eurozone country depend on the distribution of debt across creditors and their capacity to absorb such losses without government support. However, there are also funding constraints and financial interlinkages, stemming from the functioning of the European monetary union and the integration of financial markets, that can erode benefits and generate systemic risks.
In the case of Greece, the nominal value of outstanding central government debt was €366bn at the end of July 2011. Almost 30 per cent was held by Greek residents, mostly banks, pension funds and insurance companies. A substantial reduction in the nominal value of Greek debt held by these institutions would have to be largely offset by government financial support. Losses sustained by Greek households and non-financials holding public debt would hit economic activity and tax revenues.
Another large share of outstanding Greek government debt is held by official institutions. At the end of July 2011, eurozone governments, the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and other official institutions held almost a third of Greek government debt. For institutional, political and legal reasons, there can be no debt restructuring resulting in losses that would burden these official debt holders.
Thus, only restructuring the debt held by foreign private investors – approximately 40 per cent of total Greek government debt – would bring net financial benefits. A 50 per cent haircut would reduce the total debt by about 20 per cent.
The adverse consequences for Greece of a “hard”, involuntary debt restructuring and a sovereign default are not limited to the costs of recapitalising domestic banks and supporting pension funds. The effects on confidence, the liquidity of the Greek banking system and the real economy are likely to be substantial, though difficult to predict and quantify. Such effects would also undermine the fiscal consolidation process, especially if debt restructuring causes a credit crunch. The ECB would not accept as collateral securities downgraded to default status. It would thus be necessary to provide “credit enhancement” to improve the quality of this collateral at a cost that would ultimately be borne by the Greek government.
Furthermore, if there is an involuntary debt restructuring and sovereign default of a eurozone country, the risk of financial contagion and spillovers on banks is likely to be significant and far-reaching. The recent sharp increases in sovereign bond yields in the eurozone have been sending loud and clear warning signals in this respect.
At the moment, the most effective and prudent way ahead is to implement the agreement of the European leaders in July, appropriately reinforced. Europe’s banks would definitely need to be recapitalised. But it would also be essential to increase the financial resources of the European financial stability facility and enhance its flexibility.
The agreement reached concerning private sector involvement in financing Greek debt should be essentially preserved. Possible modifications to improve debt sustainability by encouraging a larger haircut in the envisaged bond exchange are likely to imply a modest debt relief. Any changes in the PSI should not jeopardise its voluntary nature and should not lead to a credit event. In the case of sovereign default, the strengthening of the banks’ firewalls and the EFSF’s firepower would have to be substantially greater to protect financial stability.
There are no free lunches for debtors and no easy solutions for creditors. An involuntary restructuring of Greek sovereign debt is likely to result in modest net financial benefits and pose substantial risks that would seriously threaten the financial stability and economic performance of the eurozone as a whole. The realisation of these risks would ultimately impose a heavier burden on European taxpayers, have undesirable consequences for the stability and cohesion of the eurozone and undermine the credibility of the euro. For all these reasons, a comprehensive and convincing policy package that can help restore market and public confidence is urgently needed for the resolution of the European debt crisis.

Leggendo con la traduzione googlata ...si direbbe che anche le famose "CAC" dovrebbero essere escluse perchè probabile o possibile che determino credit event ...


quindi l'articolo parla chiaro ...si deve tentare e provare tutto prima di un credit event ....


quindi moderatamente fiduciosi ...continua la nostra navigazione ..verso il futuro ...




a questo punto penso che il termometro sia come per la 1^ volta la partecipazione "volontaria" allo swap ...più saranno e più possibilità restano a quelli che non partecipano "volontariamente" di vedere prezzi decenti ...

non nascondo e lo sapete che con prezzi decenti ...mi andrò a ficcare All IN da qualche altra parte ...parlo di prezzi sopra i 37-38 /100 sulla 2022

Avanti cosi

 

[giub]

Sì l'ho postato un paio di volte dicendo che la cripto conseguenza era il ritorno alla dracma.

scusa, ,in quale cripto riga tu decripti il ritorno alla dracma?
Io me lo sono letto tutto, ma qui ritorniamo alla dietrologia....