Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 1

[Zorba]

su quest'onda :
IKB sub lt2 4,50% 09/07/2013 = 79,50/81

non so quanto attendibile, ma leggevo sui siti tedeschi che IKB sia un possibile candidato per la nuova legge sulle ristrutturazioni (quella che prevede la compartecipazione dei subordinati alle perdite).

Credo che dovremmo cercare materiale sul tema...

 

[Zorba]

Eurohypo prevede l'utile nel 2011... mah...

Google Traduttore

 

[pier_pat]

acquistato
BPVN 290 a 74,50
BNP 319 A 87,10

@ 74,50 è già un bel comprare, complimenti! L'ultima volta l'avevo comprata a 73, questo giro speravo di fare meglio... che dite, troppo sbruffone?

 

[nik.sala]

Grande Top !

Una mezza idea me la sono fatta, ma sarei curiosissimo di sapere ad oggi che pct , per fare un esempio, dell'Intesa 506 NON è in mano ad istituzionali(a cominciare da Assicurazioni, Fondi previdenziali...).



Per quanto riguarda invece le BPVN 290 il Fondo NIK Sala ne ha una più che discreta quantità.

la 506 è il mio prox obiettivo, è l'intesa migliore in assoluto.
Devo fare qualche switch "congruo" ma con questi su e giù è un pò duretta...
...beh si, diciamo che di bpvn 290 sto incrementando secondo il metodo "buy accumulate", anche se sto concentrandomi un pò troppo sul singolo emittente... tutti a VR il 11/12

 

[nik.sala]

Berlin to make debtholders carry greater burden​

By Jennifer Hughes in London and James Wilson in Frankfurt
Published: November 24 2010 19:40 | Last updated: November 24 2010 19:40​

While the attention of bond investors has been focused on Ireland’s efforts to bail out its ailing banks, Germany has been quietly forging ahead with plans that could have far wider consequences for the industry.
The Bundesrat, the German parliament’s upper house, is expected on Friday to pass radical bank restructuring laws that will include one of the first examples of a so-called “bail-in”, a scheme to ensure that creditors take losses when a bank is failing, rather than the state.
The new rules would mean bondholders, even those ranked at the top of a bank’s capital structure, could be forced to swap some of their investment for equity and potentially suffer big losses to help rescue a bank before taxpayers are called upon.
The controversial idea has become increasingly popular among European policymakers doubtful about the ability of cross-border mechanisms to deal swiftly with ailing banks. They expect countries to remain largely responsible for their own rescues.
Banks fear the proposals could push up funding costs. But some regulators and central bankers hope it will lead to more market discipline when it comes to pricing risk. As one financial lawyer puts it: “Part of the game of being a central banker is to try to convince people that there is moral hazard. You need to be able to say credibly ‘I can fix this bank and you’ll be stuffed. So please price and assess credit accordingly’.”
Germany’s new law, which includes setting up a rescue fund by levying an annual charge on banks, envisages several stages of bank intervention.
The first level of restructuring would be instituted by a bank itself. It would involve the bank being reorganised under the supervision of an administrator, similar to what happens under the US Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedure. New capital could be injected and its providers would outrank existing debtholders.​

More radical action could involve debt-to-equity swaps and special resolution powers. This would allow Germany’s financial regulator, BaFin, to move assets to a new ”good bank” that can then be sold, leaving bondholders’ claims with the “bad bank”.
When that is wound up, bondholders would receive whatever is left.
“It remains to be seen how much the first restructuring mechanism will be used,” says Dennis Heuer, a partner at White & Case in Frankfurt. “Probably troubled banks that qualify go straight to the higher level of intervention that will allow debt-to-equity swaps and the like.”
But, as support for bail-ins has been gaining among regulators, so investor unease has been mounting. Bankers in the debt capital markets are also privately voicing concerns about the impact that the threat of bail-ins would have on the funding ability and costs of banks based in countries with these powers.
“If you leave it to regulators and management to decide on a bail-in, then they’re always going to do it too early,” says Hugh Savill, acting director of investment affairs at the Association of British Insurers. “From a manager’s point of view it is cheap equity, and from a regulator’s, they’ll do anything to prevent failure.”
In essence, bail-ins are a back-to-front form of the carrot-and-stick talks with bondholders that are typical for any distressed company.
Usually a company negotiates with its investors. Ireland, for example, in its efforts to recapitalise Anglo Irish Bank, has been negotiating to try to force losses on the bank’s junior bondholders, who are fighting the plans. Under bail-ins, those losses would be imposed immediately by the regulator.
In Germany, this would be done through creditor groups, who need to approve any bail-in measures. If necessary, a court could impose a solution so long as it leaves creditors no worse off than they would be without a restructuring.
“The big stick is the banking act and authorities’ power to involuntarily transfer assets and liabilities. The carrot is that if creditors agree to a voluntary restructuring, the transfer won’t happen,” says Kai Schaffelhuber, a partner in Allen & Overy’s German practice.
The biggest attraction of a bail-in is that it could, in theory, be triggered over a weekend, leaving a bank ready to open the following Monday, albeit with liquidity provided by a central bank.
The Association for the Financial Markets in Europe, an industry group which has supported the idea of the bail-in, has published details of an example based on Lehman Brothers [see graphic] that would have left the US bank with capital far in excess of its peers’.
This would have involved wiping out shareholders and converting subordinated bonds and preferred shares into new equity.
Senior bondholders, the largest group, would have seen only up to 15 per cent of their holdings converted.
Those wary of bail-ins question whether any system could work so cleanly given the speed of banking collapses and the dependence of banks on the financial markets’ confidence in them to operate.
“It’s almost certainly impossible to fully analyse even a medium-sized bank over a weekend,” says Simon Gleeson, partner at Clifford Chance.
“That leaves you with two options. Either the government undertakes to compensate if it gets it wrong and short-changes a group of creditors, or it decides it cannot do anything until it has completed its analysis,” he says. “And, in the aftermath of Lehman, we all know what time delays do to the markets.” ​

Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.​

Se passa Questa roba voglio vedere Commerz,Euroypo,Hsh,tutte le Landesbank a quanto si rifinanzierannoX me è un'autogol assurdo,sopratutto se in altri stati tipo Italia Francia Olanda non permetteranno tale scempio

non so quanto attendibile, ma leggevo sui siti tedeschi che IKB sia un possibile candidato per la nuova legge sulle ristrutturazioni (quella che prevede la compartecipazione dei subordinati alle perdite).

Credo che dovremmo cercare materiale sul tema...

azz zorba,
non puoi affondare questo colpo basso a quest'ora
di ikb 219 ne ho un bel pò, proprio contando sul fatto che le lt2, cmq, senza default emittente, DEVONO rimborsare a 100.
Questo prima di ANGLO, e dopo il forse legge "tagliasub" della Merkel.
La notizia di cui accenni sarebbe quella sopra ??? A parte che sembra che verrà usata solo in caso di ulteriore aggravamento dell'economia(per capirci se tornassimo a marzo 2009)...dove hai letto il nominativo ikb ed in quale notizia ???
Perchè io condivido la view di top, se tagliano la faccia a milioni di finanziatori voglio vedere poi quali $$$ vedono ancora...

 

[bosmeld]

Spagna: previsto balzo delle vendite di case pignorate

Finanzaonline.com - 25.11.10/19:38

Le vendite di case pignorate nel 2011 potrebbero triplicare. È quanto si legge in un report della Pisos Embargados de Bancos, che si occupa di collocare gli immobili pignorati. In questo momento sul mercato, continua il rapporto, ci sono 100 mila immobili pignorati ma il numero è destinato a crescere in maniera decisamente sostenuta perchè i nuovi requisiti prevedono una rendicontazione più rapida dei cali delle quotazioni degli immobili, incoraggiando così le banche a disfarsi delle proprietà. Gli istituti spagnoli hanno impegnato 181 mld di euro in prestiti "problematici" al settore immobiliare ed a quello delle costruzioni.






p.s una casetta sul mare in spagna, non mi sembra malaccio...

 

[mago gambamerlo]

Tradotto in parola povere = Tax Payers finanziano la banca buona e lasciano le birciole a bond holders e &. ? Interessante ! Tutto questo per punire quei selvaggi / cinici / speculatori che danno in prestito i propri fondi a quelle smodate percentuali del 2.5 % to max 6 % .....

Berlin to make debtholders carry greater burden

By Jennifer Hughes in London and James Wilson in Frankfurt
Published: November 24 2010 19:40 | Last updated: November 24 2010 19:40

While the attention of bond investors has been focused on Ireland’s efforts to bail out its ailing banks, Germany has been quietly forging ahead with plans that could have far wider consequences for the industry.
The Bundesrat, the German parliament’s upper house, is expected on Friday to pass radical bank restructuring laws that will include one of the first examples of a so-called “bail-in”, a scheme to ensure that creditors take losses when a bank is failing, rather than the state.
The new rules would mean bondholders, even those ranked at the top of a bank’s capital structure, could be forced to swap some of their investment for equity and potentially suffer big losses to help rescue a bank before taxpayers are called upon.
The controversial idea has become increasingly popular among European policymakers doubtful about the ability of cross-border mechanisms to deal swiftly with ailing banks. They expect countries to remain largely responsible for their own rescues.
Banks fear the proposals could push up funding costs. But some regulators and central bankers hope it will lead to more market discipline when it comes to pricing risk. As one financial lawyer puts it: “Part of the game of being a central banker is to try to convince people that there is moral hazard. You need to be able to say credibly ‘I can fix this bank and you’ll be stuffed. So please price and assess credit accordingly’.”
Germany’s new law, which includes setting up a rescue fund by levying an annual charge on banks, envisages several stages of bank intervention.
The first level of restructuring would be instituted by a bank itself. It would involve the bank being reorganised under the supervision of an administrator, similar to what happens under the US Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedure. New capital could be injected and its providers would outrank existing debtholders.

More radical action could involve debt-to-equity swaps and special resolution powers. This would allow Germany’s financial regulator, BaFin, to move assets to a new ”good bank” that can then be sold, leaving bondholders’ claims with the “bad bank”.
When that is wound up, bondholders would receive whatever is left.
“It remains to be seen how much the first restructuring mechanism will be used,” says Dennis Heuer, a partner at White & Case in Frankfurt. “Probably troubled banks that qualify go straight to the higher level of intervention that will allow debt-to-equity swaps and the like.”
But, as support for bail-ins has been gaining among regulators, so investor unease has been mounting. Bankers in the debt capital markets are also privately voicing concerns about the impact that the threat of bail-ins would have on the funding ability and costs of banks based in countries with these powers.
“If you leave it to regulators and management to decide on a bail-in, then they’re always going to do it too early,” says Hugh Savill, acting director of investment affairs at the Association of British Insurers. “From a manager’s point of view it is cheap equity, and from a regulator’s, they’ll do anything to prevent failure.”
In essence, bail-ins are a back-to-front form of the carrot-and-stick talks with bondholders that are typical for any distressed company.
Usually a company negotiates with its investors. Ireland, for example, in its efforts to recapitalise Anglo Irish Bank, has been negotiating to try to force losses on the bank’s junior bondholders, who are fighting the plans. Under bail-ins, those losses would be imposed immediately by the regulator.
In Germany, this would be done through creditor groups, who need to approve any bail-in measures. If necessary, a court could impose a solution so long as it leaves creditors no worse off than they would be without a restructuring.
“The big stick is the banking act and authorities’ power to involuntarily transfer assets and liabilities. The carrot is that if creditors agree to a voluntary restructuring, the transfer won’t happen,” says Kai Schaffelhuber, a partner in Allen & Overy’s German practice.
The biggest attraction of a bail-in is that it could, in theory, be triggered over a weekend, leaving a bank ready to open the following Monday, albeit with liquidity provided by a central bank.
The Association for the Financial Markets in Europe, an industry group which has supported the idea of the bail-in, has published details of an example based on Lehman Brothers [see graphic] that would have left the US bank with capital far in excess of its peers’.
This would have involved wiping out shareholders and converting subordinated bonds and preferred shares into new equity.
Senior bondholders, the largest group, would have seen only up to 15 per cent of their holdings converted.
Those wary of bail-ins question whether any system could work so cleanly given the speed of banking collapses and the dependence of banks on the financial markets’ confidence in them to operate.
“It’s almost certainly impossible to fully analyse even a medium-sized bank over a weekend,” says Simon Gleeson, partner at Clifford Chance.
“That leaves you with two options. Either the government undertakes to compensate if it gets it wrong and short-changes a group of creditors, or it decides it cannot do anything until it has completed its analysis,” he says. “And, in the aftermath of Lehman, we all know what time delays do to the markets.”


Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.
​

 

[amorgos34]

Fresche fresche

Intesa 663 97.25-97.75
Intesa 506 98.5-99
SG 19 105.5-106
BPCE 269 98.5-99.5

 

[Doc82]

venduto lottomatica XS0254095663 a 97,75
se a qualcuno interessa la lettera è 98,75.
Ieri hanno annunciato il nuovo bond senior a 5 anni quotato in lussemburgo dal 2 dicembre, presto arriverà l'ibrido tasso 8,75.
Ci sono possibilità di ulteriori deprezzamenti credo, quindi ho tirato lo sciacquone e mi sposto sulla bei turca 2015 in collocamento adesso.
Un po' di qualità nel portafoglio

 

[bulogna]

Fresche fresche

Intesa 663 97.25-97.75
Intesa 506 98.5-99
SG 19 105.5-106
BPCE 269 98.5-99.5

grazie