Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 1 (2 lettori)
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bia06
Listen other's viewpoint avoid conflicts & wars.
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Ciao,
ti risulta cumulativa e step up?
Ti ringrazio, buona serata
Ciao,
ti risulta cumulativa e step up?
Ti ringrazio, buona serata
Zorba
Bos 4 Mod
Okkio alla Germania: diventa pericolosa per i distressed
Berlin to make debtholders carry greater burden
By Jennifer Hughes in London and James Wilson in Frankfurt
Published: November 24 2010 19:40 | Last updated: November 24 2010 19:40
While the attention of bond investors has been focused on Ireland’s efforts to bail out its ailing banks, Germany has been quietly forging ahead with plans that could have far wider consequences for the industry.
The Bundesrat, the German parliament’s upper house, is expected on Friday to pass radical bank restructuring laws that will include one of the first examples of a so-called “bail-in”, a scheme to ensure that creditors take losses when a bank is failing, rather than the state.
The new rules would mean bondholders, even those ranked at the top of a bank’s capital structure, could be forced to swap some of their investment for equity and potentially suffer big losses to help rescue a bank before taxpayers are called upon.
The controversial idea has become increasingly popular among European policymakers doubtful about the ability of cross-border mechanisms to deal swiftly with ailing banks. They expect countries to remain largely responsible for their own rescues.
Banks fear the proposals could push up funding costs. But some regulators and central bankers hope it will lead to more market discipline when it comes to pricing risk. As one financial lawyer puts it: “Part of the game of being a central banker is to try to convince people that there is moral hazard. You need to be able to say credibly ‘I can fix this bank and you’ll be stuffed. So please price and assess credit accordingly’.”
Germany’s new law, which includes setting up a rescue fund by levying an annual charge on banks, envisages several stages of bank intervention.
The first level of restructuring would be instituted by a bank itself. It would involve the bank being reorganised under the supervision of an administrator, similar to what happens under the US Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedure. New capital could be injected and its providers would outrank existing debtholders.
More radical action could involve debt-to-equity swaps and special resolution powers. This would allow Germany’s financial regulator, BaFin, to move assets to a new ”good bank” that can then be sold, leaving bondholders’ claims with the “bad bank”.
When that is wound up, bondholders would receive whatever is left.
“It remains to be seen how much the first restructuring mechanism will be used,” says Dennis Heuer, a partner at White & Case in Frankfurt. “Probably troubled banks that qualify go straight to the higher level of intervention that will allow debt-to-equity swaps and the like.”
But, as support for bail-ins has been gaining among regulators, so investor unease has been mounting. Bankers in the debt capital markets are also privately voicing concerns about the impact that the threat of bail-ins would have on the funding ability and costs of banks based in countries with these powers.
“If you leave it to regulators and management to decide on a bail-in, then they’re always going to do it too early,” says Hugh Savill, acting director of investment affairs at the Association of British Insurers. “From a manager’s point of view it is cheap equity, and from a regulator’s, they’ll do anything to prevent failure.”
In essence, bail-ins are a back-to-front form of the carrot-and-stick talks with bondholders that are typical for any distressed company.
Usually a company negotiates with its investors. Ireland, for example, in its efforts to recapitalise Anglo Irish Bank, has been negotiating to try to force losses on the bank’s junior bondholders, who are fighting the plans. Under bail-ins, those losses would be imposed immediately by the regulator.
In Germany, this would be done through creditor groups, who need to approve any bail-in measures. If necessary, a court could impose a solution so long as it leaves creditors no worse off than they would be without a restructuring.
“The big stick is the banking act and authorities’ power to involuntarily transfer assets and liabilities. The carrot is that if creditors agree to a voluntary restructuring, the transfer won’t happen,” says Kai Schaffelhuber, a partner in Allen & Overy’s German practice.
The biggest attraction of a bail-in is that it could, in theory, be triggered over a weekend, leaving a bank ready to open the following Monday, albeit with liquidity provided by a central bank.
The Association for the Financial Markets in Europe, an industry group which has supported the idea of the bail-in, has published details of an example based on Lehman Brothers [see graphic] that would have left the US bank with capital far in excess of its peers’.
This would have involved wiping out shareholders and converting subordinated bonds and preferred shares into new equity.
Senior bondholders, the largest group, would have seen only up to 15 per cent of their holdings converted.
Those wary of bail-ins question whether any system could work so cleanly given the speed of banking collapses and the dependence of banks on the financial markets’ confidence in them to operate.
“It’s almost certainly impossible to fully analyse even a medium-sized bank over a weekend,” says Simon Gleeson, partner at Clifford Chance.
“That leaves you with two options. Either the government undertakes to compensate if it gets it wrong and short-changes a group of creditors, or it decides it cannot do anything until it has completed its analysis,” he says. “And, in the aftermath of Lehman, we all know what time delays do to the markets.”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.
By Jennifer Hughes in London and James Wilson in Frankfurt
Published: November 24 2010 19:40 | Last updated: November 24 2010 19:40
While the attention of bond investors has been focused on Ireland’s efforts to bail out its ailing banks, Germany has been quietly forging ahead with plans that could have far wider consequences for the industry.
The Bundesrat, the German parliament’s upper house, is expected on Friday to pass radical bank restructuring laws that will include one of the first examples of a so-called “bail-in”, a scheme to ensure that creditors take losses when a bank is failing, rather than the state.
The new rules would mean bondholders, even those ranked at the top of a bank’s capital structure, could be forced to swap some of their investment for equity and potentially suffer big losses to help rescue a bank before taxpayers are called upon.
The controversial idea has become increasingly popular among European policymakers doubtful about the ability of cross-border mechanisms to deal swiftly with ailing banks. They expect countries to remain largely responsible for their own rescues.
Banks fear the proposals could push up funding costs. But some regulators and central bankers hope it will lead to more market discipline when it comes to pricing risk. As one financial lawyer puts it: “Part of the game of being a central banker is to try to convince people that there is moral hazard. You need to be able to say credibly ‘I can fix this bank and you’ll be stuffed. So please price and assess credit accordingly’.”
Germany’s new law, which includes setting up a rescue fund by levying an annual charge on banks, envisages several stages of bank intervention.
The first level of restructuring would be instituted by a bank itself. It would involve the bank being reorganised under the supervision of an administrator, similar to what happens under the US Chapter 11 bankruptcy procedure. New capital could be injected and its providers would outrank existing debtholders.
More radical action could involve debt-to-equity swaps and special resolution powers. This would allow Germany’s financial regulator, BaFin, to move assets to a new ”good bank” that can then be sold, leaving bondholders’ claims with the “bad bank”.
When that is wound up, bondholders would receive whatever is left.
“It remains to be seen how much the first restructuring mechanism will be used,” says Dennis Heuer, a partner at White & Case in Frankfurt. “Probably troubled banks that qualify go straight to the higher level of intervention that will allow debt-to-equity swaps and the like.”
But, as support for bail-ins has been gaining among regulators, so investor unease has been mounting. Bankers in the debt capital markets are also privately voicing concerns about the impact that the threat of bail-ins would have on the funding ability and costs of banks based in countries with these powers.
“If you leave it to regulators and management to decide on a bail-in, then they’re always going to do it too early,” says Hugh Savill, acting director of investment affairs at the Association of British Insurers. “From a manager’s point of view it is cheap equity, and from a regulator’s, they’ll do anything to prevent failure.”
In essence, bail-ins are a back-to-front form of the carrot-and-stick talks with bondholders that are typical for any distressed company.
Usually a company negotiates with its investors. Ireland, for example, in its efforts to recapitalise Anglo Irish Bank, has been negotiating to try to force losses on the bank’s junior bondholders, who are fighting the plans. Under bail-ins, those losses would be imposed immediately by the regulator.
In Germany, this would be done through creditor groups, who need to approve any bail-in measures. If necessary, a court could impose a solution so long as it leaves creditors no worse off than they would be without a restructuring.
“The big stick is the banking act and authorities’ power to involuntarily transfer assets and liabilities. The carrot is that if creditors agree to a voluntary restructuring, the transfer won’t happen,” says Kai Schaffelhuber, a partner in Allen & Overy’s German practice.
The biggest attraction of a bail-in is that it could, in theory, be triggered over a weekend, leaving a bank ready to open the following Monday, albeit with liquidity provided by a central bank.
The Association for the Financial Markets in Europe, an industry group which has supported the idea of the bail-in, has published details of an example based on Lehman Brothers [see graphic] that would have left the US bank with capital far in excess of its peers’.
This would have involved wiping out shareholders and converting subordinated bonds and preferred shares into new equity.
Senior bondholders, the largest group, would have seen only up to 15 per cent of their holdings converted.
Those wary of bail-ins question whether any system could work so cleanly given the speed of banking collapses and the dependence of banks on the financial markets’ confidence in them to operate.
“It’s almost certainly impossible to fully analyse even a medium-sized bank over a weekend,” says Simon Gleeson, partner at Clifford Chance.
“That leaves you with two options. Either the government undertakes to compensate if it gets it wrong and short-changes a group of creditors, or it decides it cannot do anything until it has completed its analysis,” he says. “And, in the aftermath of Lehman, we all know what time delays do to the markets.”
Copyright The Financial Times Limited 2010. You may share using our article tools. Please don't cut articles from FT.com and redistribute by email or post to the web.
no perpetual no party
Forumer storico
cedola fissa 4,875%, cedola annuale al 17/10, call al 17/10/2011.
Rating emittente : AA
Rating tier 1 : A
il rimborso dovrbbe avvenire l'anno prox...io la calcolo come YTC, dalle notizie che mi sono arrivate all'orecchio da desk esteri...altrimenti non l'avrei presa
io do la call al 95%
ciao Nik!
ottima la 290 a 74,5
colpaccio! (è scesa veramente di brutto....)quasi quasi faccio lo switch con groupama414..
i siti tetteski mi danno ancora 80 come prezzo.....
invece su Bnp... mah... è vero che non callare è un brutto segno, ma è anche stragiustificato da nuove regolamentazioni, crisi, ecc... insomma tutte le fregnacce che hanno tirato fuori fino ad adesso... il rating è statosferico per la media dei nostri titoli
e penso che proprio l'emittente sia il motivo principale per cui speri nella call... che dicono i desk?ono
Nuovo forumer
Titoli retail
Appena sopra qualcuno ha detto che i titoli retail con taglio da 1000 non sono stati richiamati alla prima call, lasciando intendere che quelli da 50/100.000 hanno piu facilitá di essere richiamati.
Questo ragionamento é basato su qualche regola, prassi o altro ??
Qui in Spagna (lasciamo da parte la notevole crisi in cui si trova il paese)
alcuni desk ragionano in modo inverso, cioe ritengono piu probabile una call
sulle obbligazioni collocate al retail;
in quanto sono state collocate moltissime subordinate al retail.
Questo non vuol dire che vengono richiamate, infatti alcune obbligazioni sono gia oltre la date del primo call.
Sarei interessato alla vostra opinione in merito.
Grazie.
Appena sopra qualcuno ha detto che i titoli retail con taglio da 1000 non sono stati richiamati alla prima call, lasciando intendere che quelli da 50/100.000 hanno piu facilitá di essere richiamati.
Questo ragionamento é basato su qualche regola, prassi o altro ??
Qui in Spagna (lasciamo da parte la notevole crisi in cui si trova il paese)
alcuni desk ragionano in modo inverso, cioe ritengono piu probabile una call
sulle obbligazioni collocate al retail;
in quanto sono state collocate moltissime subordinate al retail.
Questo non vuol dire che vengono richiamate, infatti alcune obbligazioni sono gia oltre la date del primo call.
Sarei interessato alla vostra opinione in merito.
Grazie.
Topgun1976
Guest
Se passa Questa roba voglio vedere Commerz,Euroypo,Hsh,tutte le Landesbank a quanto si rifinanzieranno
X me è un'autogol assurdo,sopratutto se in altri stati tipo Italia Francia Olanda non permetteranno tale scempioTopgun1976
Guest
Qui in Italia (unicredit su tutte) hanno molte + possibilità di richiamo le 50k,proprio perchè collocate a istituzionali.Mesi fà una sub Unicredit non venne callata proprio perchè in mano ai retail
amorgos34
CHIAGNI & FOTTI SRL
Grande Top !
Una mezza idea me la sono fatta, ma sarei curiosissimo di sapere ad oggi che pct , per fare un esempio, dell'Intesa 506 NON è in mano ad istituzionali(a cominciare da Assicurazioni, Fondi previdenziali...).
Per quanto riguarda invece le BPVN 290 il Fondo NIK Sala ne ha una più che discreta quantità.
fabbro
Forumer storico
...ed inoltre sempre Unicredito invece richiamò la IT0003748313 che avrebbe avuto in post call euribor 6 mesi +un ridicolo 0,20% di spread che però era anche per il retail . E mi ricordo anche io che la UC (unica credo) non richiamata era solo per il retail .
pier_pat
Mountaineering
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