maxinblack
Forumer storico
Max la Credit Agricole 6% fisso l'hai già in Carniere?
No perche' me lo suggerisci? se detto da te ci faccio un pensierino ISIN?
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 1 (2 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione negusneg
- Data di Inizio
-
- Tags
- additional tier 1 bail in basilea 3 coco bonds crd iv genussscheine grandfathering hybrid bond loss absorption lower tier 2 make whole amount matusalem bond obbligazioni irredimibili obbligazioni perpetue obbligazioni subordinate perpetual bond preference shares restricted tier 1 tier 1 upper tier 2
- Stato
No perche' me lo suggerisci? se detto da te ci faccio un pensierino ISIN?
maxinblack
Forumer storico
maxinblack
Forumer storico
Purtroppo non ho Bloomberg e vado sui portali tedeschi, ma anche se il postcall e' misero viene indicata nel report come una raccomandata a call probabile
......Mi sembra
Vet
Forumer storico
zeta59
Forumer storico
Boerse-stuttgard per la SNS 523 mi da 100,8 / 102 , vi risulta abbia perso 70 cent sul denaro da stamattina ?
Topgun1976
Guest
Stà intorno all'86% 6 fixed perenne Credit Agricole,insomma come dice Vet roba buona,niente a che vedere con le ciofeche di cui si parla spesso
Rottweiler
Forumer storico
Da FTAlphaville, con dei passaggi ripresi da BNP Paribas:
Armageddon Bank
Posted by Tracy Alloway on Feb 17 08:20.
Amagerbanken is a small bank in Denmark — but its failure could end up having big consequences for investors in bank debt. It might end up being a relatively rare instance of a bank’s senior unsecured investors (and depositors) taking a hit.
Here’s Ivan Zubo and Olivia Frieser at BNP Paribas with the background:
At a Friday night Board meeting on 4 February, the Directors of the bank determined that the additional writedowns in Q4 2010 of DKK3.14bn implied the equity capital of the bank as of 1 January 2011 would be proforma negative DKK0.7bn. The bank subsequently informed the Danish FSA that it did not meet the solvency requirements. The FSA responded with an order for the solvency requirements to be met by 7pm on 6 February. As no acquirer or investor could be found in such a short period of time (i.e. over the weekend), the supervisory board of the bank elected for the bank to be wound down under the new Danish legislation approved in June 2010 and in force since 1 October 2010. Hence, all the assets and some liabilities have been transferred to a new company, Amagerbanken af 2011 A/S, which is wholly owned by Financial Stabilitet A/S (‘Financial Stability’), the government’s bank resolution fund. Equity and subordinated debt are to stay at the bankrupt entity and hence most likely be wiped out. The process/treatment of the liabilities to senior unsecured creditors is not clear to us at present although we discuss our current interpretation in the following paragraph.
Amagerbanken holds about DKK15.2bn worth of assets — or 59 per cent of its senior unsecured liabilities — which means those bondholders are looking at a 41 per cent haircut based on those current values. Those are, however, subject to change as there’ll now be a three-month audit period where the haircut is fine-tuned.
Anyway, here are some potential read-throughs according to BNP:
Will this be the butterfly that starts a hurricane?
The Amagerbanken case is no doubt closely watched by the regulators across Europe, especially in those jurisdictions with now well publicized distressed banks sagas such as in Ireland (Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide), Spain (the Cajas and perhaps even some second tier banks) and Germany (some Landesbanks). Given the recent comments from the Irish politicians prior to the election on 25 February, burden sharing for Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide appears increasingly likely. In Germany, questions about whether WestLB could become the first bank where the new bank resolution legislation could be put to use abound … We therefore remain negative on the debt of these financial institutions across the subordination structure.
Unsurprisingly, we hear that Amagerbanken has been nicknamed ‘Armageddon Bank’ in some of the more hyperbolic circles of the bank debt investment community.
Armageddon Bank
Posted by Tracy Alloway on Feb 17 08:20.
Amagerbanken is a small bank in Denmark — but its failure could end up having big consequences for investors in bank debt. It might end up being a relatively rare instance of a bank’s senior unsecured investors (and depositors) taking a hit.
Here’s Ivan Zubo and Olivia Frieser at BNP Paribas with the background:
At a Friday night Board meeting on 4 February, the Directors of the bank determined that the additional writedowns in Q4 2010 of DKK3.14bn implied the equity capital of the bank as of 1 January 2011 would be proforma negative DKK0.7bn. The bank subsequently informed the Danish FSA that it did not meet the solvency requirements. The FSA responded with an order for the solvency requirements to be met by 7pm on 6 February. As no acquirer or investor could be found in such a short period of time (i.e. over the weekend), the supervisory board of the bank elected for the bank to be wound down under the new Danish legislation approved in June 2010 and in force since 1 October 2010. Hence, all the assets and some liabilities have been transferred to a new company, Amagerbanken af 2011 A/S, which is wholly owned by Financial Stabilitet A/S (‘Financial Stability’), the government’s bank resolution fund. Equity and subordinated debt are to stay at the bankrupt entity and hence most likely be wiped out. The process/treatment of the liabilities to senior unsecured creditors is not clear to us at present although we discuss our current interpretation in the following paragraph.
Amagerbanken holds about DKK15.2bn worth of assets — or 59 per cent of its senior unsecured liabilities — which means those bondholders are looking at a 41 per cent haircut based on those current values. Those are, however, subject to change as there’ll now be a three-month audit period where the haircut is fine-tuned.
Anyway, here are some potential read-throughs according to BNP:
Will this be the butterfly that starts a hurricane?
The Amagerbanken case is no doubt closely watched by the regulators across Europe, especially in those jurisdictions with now well publicized distressed banks sagas such as in Ireland (Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide), Spain (the Cajas and perhaps even some second tier banks) and Germany (some Landesbanks). Given the recent comments from the Irish politicians prior to the election on 25 February, burden sharing for Anglo Irish and Irish Nationwide appears increasingly likely. In Germany, questions about whether WestLB could become the first bank where the new bank resolution legislation could be put to use abound … We therefore remain negative on the debt of these financial institutions across the subordination structure.
Unsurprisingly, we hear that Amagerbanken has been nicknamed ‘Armageddon Bank’ in some of the more hyperbolic circles of the bank debt investment community.
Rottweiler
Forumer storico
Sempre da FTAlphaville, sul diverso approccio delle banche, a distanza di qualche anno, sulla redemption dei Tier 1:
Another bank non-call, an entirely new reaction
Posted by Tracy Alloway on Feb 17 12:15.
Cast your minds back to the (heady) final days of 2008 — when Deutsche Bank rattled the bond market by opting not to call one of its Tier 1 subordinated bonds.
The decision spooked bank debt investors. These kinds of callable bonds had usually always been called at par, at the first available date. Deutsche said it didn’t want to call because it would be more economic not to. Investors accused the German bank of “narrow financial logic” and threatened never to invest in their bonds again.
We bring it up because the spectre of ‘non-calls’ seems to be out haunting the European market yet again. Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Sienna chose not call two of its Tier 1 bonds, or €430m worth, that were callable in February and March.
This time, however, investors seem much more resigned to these kind of non-call events. Rather than accusing Monte of “storming … one of the last bastions of presumed behaviour in the credit markets” (an accusation that was lobbed at Deutsche back in 2008) we’re seeing some accolades for the bank’s reasoning.
The below from Illiquidx:
Weakness in bank capitalisation has put a focus on a new development in bank Tier 1 paper: the call feature. Traditionally, it was market-wide convention that a bank would always call its Tier 1 at the expected call date, no matter whether economic conditions would suggest differently. The widely believed reason for a Tier 1 bond to be called, no matter what, was that if the bank did not, it would not be able to come back to market issuing Tier 1 or other callable capital ever again. When not called, a Tier 1 bond becomes perpetual, at the closest level to equity, and the last real difference between the two is a regular (and higher than previously) coupon versus an uncertain dividend. This traditional view of the certainty of a Tier 1 being called was supported by the fact that there were only very few occurrences of non-call (e.g. a European bank in the early 1990s, where the non-call situation was rectified in a matter of hours, and eventually the bond was called).
The view is set to change [with the Monte dei Paschi non-call] This occurrence is testimony to a new, more logical trend: economically rational decisions should prevail over relying on intangible or difficult to value features. Investors should expect that not all their Tier 1s would be called, given the regulatory uncertainties and generally difficulties and cost of refinancing on the wholesale markets. It is unlikely that investors would ‘enjoy’ the higher yield, given that the bank increases its interest servicing cost by having the bond outstanding and in a weak economic environment this could be a downward spiral. But leaving the existing Tier 1 outstanding could also be a rational trade-off to issuing a new one on the market at higher levels, and affording more decision-making time.
The currently high financing cost of new subordinated debt for banks and heavy regulatory pressures on bank capitalisation, specifically what proportion of capital can be accounted for by Tier 1 and what instruments will be eligible as Tier 1 under the latest Basel III rules, would increase the volatility and uncertainty of the Tier 1 asset class. This remains a hard time for banks, and preserving their reputation would be aided precisely by taking those economically rational decisions including a non-call and designing an optimal and sustainable capital structure.
Quite a step-change from the Deutsche reaction just over two years ago, then!
Below are some more ‘Tier 1 axes of interest’ to watch out for, from Illiquidx:
DB 5.33 49 (09/19/13) 90.25 – 90.50
BACR 4.875 49 (12/15/14) 84.75 – 85.00
UBS 4.28 49 (04/15/15) 88.50 – 89.00
UCGIM 4.028 49 (10/27/15) 77.00 – 77.50
ISPIM 9.5 49 (06/01/16) 97.00 – 97.50
RZB 5.169 49 (05/16/16) 77.00 – 78.00
DANBNK 4.878 49 (05/15/17) 92.50 – 93.00
ISPIM 8.047 49 (06/20/18) 95.25 – 95.75
ISPIM 8.375 49 (10/14/19) 97.25 – 97.50
BACR 4.75 49 (03/15/20) 69.00 – 69.00
Another bank non-call, an entirely new reaction
Posted by Tracy Alloway on Feb 17 12:15.
Cast your minds back to the (heady) final days of 2008 — when Deutsche Bank rattled the bond market by opting not to call one of its Tier 1 subordinated bonds.
The decision spooked bank debt investors. These kinds of callable bonds had usually always been called at par, at the first available date. Deutsche said it didn’t want to call because it would be more economic not to. Investors accused the German bank of “narrow financial logic” and threatened never to invest in their bonds again.
We bring it up because the spectre of ‘non-calls’ seems to be out haunting the European market yet again. Italian bank Monte dei Paschi di Sienna chose not call two of its Tier 1 bonds, or €430m worth, that were callable in February and March.
This time, however, investors seem much more resigned to these kind of non-call events. Rather than accusing Monte of “storming … one of the last bastions of presumed behaviour in the credit markets” (an accusation that was lobbed at Deutsche back in 2008) we’re seeing some accolades for the bank’s reasoning.
The below from Illiquidx:
Weakness in bank capitalisation has put a focus on a new development in bank Tier 1 paper: the call feature. Traditionally, it was market-wide convention that a bank would always call its Tier 1 at the expected call date, no matter whether economic conditions would suggest differently. The widely believed reason for a Tier 1 bond to be called, no matter what, was that if the bank did not, it would not be able to come back to market issuing Tier 1 or other callable capital ever again. When not called, a Tier 1 bond becomes perpetual, at the closest level to equity, and the last real difference between the two is a regular (and higher than previously) coupon versus an uncertain dividend. This traditional view of the certainty of a Tier 1 being called was supported by the fact that there were only very few occurrences of non-call (e.g. a European bank in the early 1990s, where the non-call situation was rectified in a matter of hours, and eventually the bond was called).
The view is set to change [with the Monte dei Paschi non-call] This occurrence is testimony to a new, more logical trend: economically rational decisions should prevail over relying on intangible or difficult to value features. Investors should expect that not all their Tier 1s would be called, given the regulatory uncertainties and generally difficulties and cost of refinancing on the wholesale markets. It is unlikely that investors would ‘enjoy’ the higher yield, given that the bank increases its interest servicing cost by having the bond outstanding and in a weak economic environment this could be a downward spiral. But leaving the existing Tier 1 outstanding could also be a rational trade-off to issuing a new one on the market at higher levels, and affording more decision-making time.
The currently high financing cost of new subordinated debt for banks and heavy regulatory pressures on bank capitalisation, specifically what proportion of capital can be accounted for by Tier 1 and what instruments will be eligible as Tier 1 under the latest Basel III rules, would increase the volatility and uncertainty of the Tier 1 asset class. This remains a hard time for banks, and preserving their reputation would be aided precisely by taking those economically rational decisions including a non-call and designing an optimal and sustainable capital structure.
Quite a step-change from the Deutsche reaction just over two years ago, then!
Below are some more ‘Tier 1 axes of interest’ to watch out for, from Illiquidx:
DB 5.33 49 (09/19/13) 90.25 – 90.50
BACR 4.875 49 (12/15/14) 84.75 – 85.00
UBS 4.28 49 (04/15/15) 88.50 – 89.00
UCGIM 4.028 49 (10/27/15) 77.00 – 77.50
ISPIM 9.5 49 (06/01/16) 97.00 – 97.50
RZB 5.169 49 (05/16/16) 77.00 – 78.00
DANBNK 4.878 49 (05/15/17) 92.50 – 93.00
ISPIM 8.047 49 (06/20/18) 95.25 – 95.75
ISPIM 8.375 49 (10/14/19) 97.25 – 97.50
BACR 4.75 49 (03/15/20) 69.00 – 69.00
Cat XL
Shizuka Minamoto
Il brutto di questa (che ho anche io) e' che ha gia' skippato parecchie call e non verra' chiamata, secondo me, se non dopo il 2013. Detto questo e' un solido emettitore anche se non a livello di BNP Paribas
- Stato