fabriziof
Forumer storico
xs0083585595
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 1 (4 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione negusneg
- Data di Inizio
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- Tags
- additional tier 1 bail in basilea 3 coco bonds crd iv genussscheine grandfathering hybrid bond loss absorption lower tier 2 make whole amount matusalem bond obbligazioni irredimibili obbligazioni perpetue obbligazioni subordinate perpetual bond preference shares restricted tier 1 tier 1 upper tier 2
- Stato
Zorba
Bos 4 Mod
Ciao Russia:
c'è un passaggio per tenel discorso appena pronunciato da Warren Buffet, mentre rendiconta dei successi
della sua Berkshire:
"Buffett also devoted part of his message to educating investors on key business principles. Buffett said the financial crisis of 2008 confirmed the dangers of investing with borrowed money because even a short absence of credit can ruin a company.
"When leverage works, it magnifies your gains. Your spouse thinks you're clever, and your neighbors get envious. But leverage is addictive," Buffett said. "Once having profited from its wonders, very few people retreat to more conservative practices."
That's part of why Berkshire always keeps at least $20 billion cash on hand for unforeseen events or investment opportunities, he said. At the end of 2010, its cash reserve totaled $38 billion."
Secondo me, in una certa misura anche l'attuale rendimento elevato della vecchia generazione delle P (no loss, cum o must pay coupon) è un'addiction. Sarà tragico quando ce le avranno callate tutte... dovremo imparare a disintossicarci...
fabbro
Forumer storico
Ciao Mitico Fabbro,
puoi postare per favore il post call di questa?
Grazie
Emissione con godimento 16/6/2006 per istituzionali di 700 milioni di sterline e TAGLIO 50.000 GBP.Ora sta pagando facciale annuo 6,214%ogni 16 giugno.Post call pagherebbe LIBOR 3 +2,08%.
A Francoforte anno 2010 minimo e massimo 78(21/5/10) e 90,50(18/1/10)e MINIMO STORICO 31(16 MARZO 2009) e MASSIMO STORICO 101,15(9/11/2006).
Zorba
Bos 4 Mod
Forse Bos ha fatto propria la frase di Amorgos
Non puoi andare sempre con il piede a tavoletta… prima o poi la benzina finirà. Carlito Brigante
bosmeld
Forumer storico
Forse Bos ha fatto propria la frase di Amorgos
Non puoi andare sempre con il piede a tavoletta… prima o poi la benzina finirà. Carlito Brigante
zorba mi legge nel pensiero
é bello correre, ma bisogna stare attenti a non spettinarsi
cmq sono riflessioni fatte cosí, non penso a un crollo terribile. ultimamente ho aumentato un po la liquiditá.
e su questi prezzi salvo casi particolare non mi sembra il caso di entrare sui distressed.
quindi non vedendo grosse opportunitá sui distressed (le cose che mi sembrano interessanti giá le ho)
mi sto rivolgendo a titoli cosí detti migliori, che potrebbero ancora regalarci qualche cosa.
peraltro devo dire in tutta onestá che mentre a novembre era piuttosto sicuro di una discesa.
adesso non so dove si andrá. sono sinceramente in bilico. si potrebbe andare su ancora di molto, o giú.
sinceramente al momento non riesco a capirlo. ogni giorno cambia lo scenario.
quindi non sapendo che pesci pigliare l'idea é di prendere posizione su titoli con storie particolari, o su titoli cmq molto solidi e abbastanza immuni a possibili scossoni.
vediamo un po come andrá.
alla fine la h15 ha un anno di tasso fisso e quindi cedola piú alta.
se c'é una differenza inferiore ai 2 punti conviene la h15 altrimenti vai di h23
io le ho entrambe
amorgos34
CHIAGNI & FOTTI SRL
Forse Bos ha fatto propria la frase di Amorgos
Non puoi andare sempre con il piede a tavoletta… prima o poi la benzina finirà. Carlito Brigante
Gli anni passano per tutti
(o è l'aria della Perfida Albione o sa qualcosa che noi umani...)
Zorba
Bos 4 Mod
Burn the rhetoric, by all means, but not the bondholders
“Burden sharing” with senior bondholders runs contrary to the national interest, writes DONAL O’MAHONY
LAST FRIDAY, an angry Irish electorate took to the polls, intent on imposing the biggest ever “haircut” on the parliamentary representation of an historically dominant Fianna Fáil party. This was probably inevitable, given the political fallout from Ireland’s seismic economic and financial upheavals. However, it was the deep unpopularity of policy stabilisation efforts, particularly in the banking arena, that ignited the rhetorical wrath of all and sundry during the recent hustings.
“Burn the bondholders” has become the defining refrain of the entire debate, this borne out of a pervasive sense of injustice regarding the dearth of “burden sharing” in the current crisis. The conviction has steadily grown that the State’s contingent banking liabilities are now impossible to bear, such that a certain reneging of these liabilities is a sine qua non for debt sustainability. Initial calls for the imposition of “haircuts” on subordinated bank debt have now given way to more aggressive demands for burden sharing among the senior bondholders.
The incessant vox pop on this issue has been ill-served by a crass misrepresentation of the senior bank debt investor. Far from being the reckless high risk/high reward speculators characterised in various dispatches, senior bondholders are the most risk-averse of species. They are placed alongside rank and file depositors at the very top of the creditor pecking order, where return of capital rather than return on capital is the absolute byword. Senior debt provides term financing for bank credit creation that stretches well beyond the limits of ordinary deposit maturities. Continuous repayment of this debt, alongside that of the pari passu depositor, is the confidence glue which sustains the “maturity transformation” process of modern commercial banking.
Senior bank debt, like deposits, is not risk capital, and does not share in the profits (or losses) of banking operations. Risk capital resides further down the balance sheet in the form of subordinated debt, preference shares and common equity. It bears reminding that such capital has already played a substantial role in the burden sharing of Ireland’s bubble burst. Destruction of shareholder value (and loss of capital reserves) across the banking system amounts to circa €55 billion, while a near €10 billion haircut has already been applied to subordinated bondholdings following numerous liability management exercises.
These numbers need to be placed alongside the cost to Irish taxpayers of the banking stabilisation efforts to date. The €34 billion of promissory note/ cash injections into the failed entities (Anglo/INBS) represent the true dead-weight loss of the banking debacle. Additional injections into the viable institutions (BKIR/AIB/EBS) are financial transactions by the NPRF, with legitimate expectations of longer-term return.
Any taxpayer burden sticks in the craw in current circumstances. However, the moral justification for State burden sharing (over and above financial stability issues) lies in the acute failings of domestic regulators (Central Bank, FR). It is the implicit acceptance of across-the-board regulatory failure during the credit bubble that has now focused the attention of euroland authorities on “bail-in” considerations for future (post-2013) bond contracts only.
Ireland, for its part, remains more focused on the present, and those incessant demands for burning bondholders are being voiced with scant regard for the legal obstacles involved (the current Anglo US investor challenge being a case in point), not to mention the adverse cost/benefits of any such action. Note Moody’s recently junked the senior unsecured debt ratings of the Irish banks, while also placing deposit ratings under review for downgrade. Their decision reflects the understandable perception of reduced systemic support for this particular debt category.
It was a similar perception of systemic support loss for senior subordinated paper in early October that contributed to a vicious contagion of junked credit ratings, surging bond yields, seized-up funding markets and dramatic deposit flight, all of which culminating in the EU/IMF interventions of late-November. Then, as now, the amount of relevant debt outstanding was relatively small, particularly in relation to the two failed entities most at risk of a coercive burden sharing arrangement. Then, as now, the risk/reward associated with such withdrawal of systemic support may have seemed attractive politically; however, it was to prove financially disastrous first time around, and this remains the threat today.
The reality of Ireland’s situation is that, notwithstanding painful efforts to improve the solvency of both sovereign (fiscal consolidation) and banks (over-capitalisation), expected improvements in funding costs have failed to materialise. Irish default risk premia (per market pricing) remain highly elevated, and this increasingly reflects as much investor concern over Ireland’s “willingness” to pay as “ability” to pay. Worse, by continuing to undermine creditor confidence at the very summit of the Irish banks’ capital structure, a much-needed stabilisation of deposit balances is being further imperilled, leaving Ireland susceptible to more prolonged emergency funding assistance than need otherwise be the case.
When the government forms, the rhetoric stops, and negotiations with our European partners will resume. Fine Gael’s election manifesto aspires to extending coercive burden sharing to the senior bank debt of failed institutions “as part of a European wide framework”. But although bank resolution schemes are emerging across Europe, there is no appetite to impose losses on senior creditors on the grounds of contagion risk. Such fears are valid in the context of a still fragile eurosystem, wherein any coercive action against senior bondholders could ripple through to other vulnerable financials in the euroland periphery, threatening renewed deposit outflows and increased funding reliance at the ECB window. With less than €4 billion of senior unsecured debt outstanding at Anglo/INBS, the resolve of our EU paymasters will hardly soften on cost/benefit grounds.
Not that our new government has nothing to negotiate over. Clearly, some concession on the non-IMF portion of Ireland’s bailout interest cost may soon materialise, albeit more likely in the generalised context of an EFSF revamp for the system as a whole. However, a much more important concession may await during the requisite downsizing of the Irish banking system. Any further asset sales at firesale prices will only further imburden the sovereign via stepped-up recapitalisation injections. On the other hand, a second asset transfer scheme, this time conducted at current bank marks, and with attractive long-term funding provided by Europe, could represent a defining moment for Ireland’s financial recuperation.
The optimal path to debt sustainability stems from economically viable funding costs for both sovereign and banks. If the EU/ECB facilitates lower funding costs, a recovering Irish sovereign and banking system can dismiss all talk of default.
Burn the rhetoric, by all means, but not the bondholders - The Irish Times - Mon, Feb 28, 2011
“Burden sharing” with senior bondholders runs contrary to the national interest, writes DONAL O’MAHONY
LAST FRIDAY, an angry Irish electorate took to the polls, intent on imposing the biggest ever “haircut” on the parliamentary representation of an historically dominant Fianna Fáil party. This was probably inevitable, given the political fallout from Ireland’s seismic economic and financial upheavals. However, it was the deep unpopularity of policy stabilisation efforts, particularly in the banking arena, that ignited the rhetorical wrath of all and sundry during the recent hustings.
“Burn the bondholders” has become the defining refrain of the entire debate, this borne out of a pervasive sense of injustice regarding the dearth of “burden sharing” in the current crisis. The conviction has steadily grown that the State’s contingent banking liabilities are now impossible to bear, such that a certain reneging of these liabilities is a sine qua non for debt sustainability. Initial calls for the imposition of “haircuts” on subordinated bank debt have now given way to more aggressive demands for burden sharing among the senior bondholders.
The incessant vox pop on this issue has been ill-served by a crass misrepresentation of the senior bank debt investor. Far from being the reckless high risk/high reward speculators characterised in various dispatches, senior bondholders are the most risk-averse of species. They are placed alongside rank and file depositors at the very top of the creditor pecking order, where return of capital rather than return on capital is the absolute byword. Senior debt provides term financing for bank credit creation that stretches well beyond the limits of ordinary deposit maturities. Continuous repayment of this debt, alongside that of the pari passu depositor, is the confidence glue which sustains the “maturity transformation” process of modern commercial banking.
Senior bank debt, like deposits, is not risk capital, and does not share in the profits (or losses) of banking operations. Risk capital resides further down the balance sheet in the form of subordinated debt, preference shares and common equity. It bears reminding that such capital has already played a substantial role in the burden sharing of Ireland’s bubble burst. Destruction of shareholder value (and loss of capital reserves) across the banking system amounts to circa €55 billion, while a near €10 billion haircut has already been applied to subordinated bondholdings following numerous liability management exercises.
These numbers need to be placed alongside the cost to Irish taxpayers of the banking stabilisation efforts to date. The €34 billion of promissory note/ cash injections into the failed entities (Anglo/INBS) represent the true dead-weight loss of the banking debacle. Additional injections into the viable institutions (BKIR/AIB/EBS) are financial transactions by the NPRF, with legitimate expectations of longer-term return.
Any taxpayer burden sticks in the craw in current circumstances. However, the moral justification for State burden sharing (over and above financial stability issues) lies in the acute failings of domestic regulators (Central Bank, FR). It is the implicit acceptance of across-the-board regulatory failure during the credit bubble that has now focused the attention of euroland authorities on “bail-in” considerations for future (post-2013) bond contracts only.
Ireland, for its part, remains more focused on the present, and those incessant demands for burning bondholders are being voiced with scant regard for the legal obstacles involved (the current Anglo US investor challenge being a case in point), not to mention the adverse cost/benefits of any such action. Note Moody’s recently junked the senior unsecured debt ratings of the Irish banks, while also placing deposit ratings under review for downgrade. Their decision reflects the understandable perception of reduced systemic support for this particular debt category.
It was a similar perception of systemic support loss for senior subordinated paper in early October that contributed to a vicious contagion of junked credit ratings, surging bond yields, seized-up funding markets and dramatic deposit flight, all of which culminating in the EU/IMF interventions of late-November. Then, as now, the amount of relevant debt outstanding was relatively small, particularly in relation to the two failed entities most at risk of a coercive burden sharing arrangement. Then, as now, the risk/reward associated with such withdrawal of systemic support may have seemed attractive politically; however, it was to prove financially disastrous first time around, and this remains the threat today.
The reality of Ireland’s situation is that, notwithstanding painful efforts to improve the solvency of both sovereign (fiscal consolidation) and banks (over-capitalisation), expected improvements in funding costs have failed to materialise. Irish default risk premia (per market pricing) remain highly elevated, and this increasingly reflects as much investor concern over Ireland’s “willingness” to pay as “ability” to pay. Worse, by continuing to undermine creditor confidence at the very summit of the Irish banks’ capital structure, a much-needed stabilisation of deposit balances is being further imperilled, leaving Ireland susceptible to more prolonged emergency funding assistance than need otherwise be the case.
When the government forms, the rhetoric stops, and negotiations with our European partners will resume. Fine Gael’s election manifesto aspires to extending coercive burden sharing to the senior bank debt of failed institutions “as part of a European wide framework”. But although bank resolution schemes are emerging across Europe, there is no appetite to impose losses on senior creditors on the grounds of contagion risk. Such fears are valid in the context of a still fragile eurosystem, wherein any coercive action against senior bondholders could ripple through to other vulnerable financials in the euroland periphery, threatening renewed deposit outflows and increased funding reliance at the ECB window. With less than €4 billion of senior unsecured debt outstanding at Anglo/INBS, the resolve of our EU paymasters will hardly soften on cost/benefit grounds.
Not that our new government has nothing to negotiate over. Clearly, some concession on the non-IMF portion of Ireland’s bailout interest cost may soon materialise, albeit more likely in the generalised context of an EFSF revamp for the system as a whole. However, a much more important concession may await during the requisite downsizing of the Irish banking system. Any further asset sales at firesale prices will only further imburden the sovereign via stepped-up recapitalisation injections. On the other hand, a second asset transfer scheme, this time conducted at current bank marks, and with attractive long-term funding provided by Europe, could represent a defining moment for Ireland’s financial recuperation.
The optimal path to debt sustainability stems from economically viable funding costs for both sovereign and banks. If the EU/ECB facilitates lower funding costs, a recovering Irish sovereign and banking system can dismiss all talk of default.
Burn the rhetoric, by all means, but not the bondholders - The Irish Times - Mon, Feb 28, 2011
angy2008
Forumer storico
le banche italiane avrebbero risolto il problema Basilea
Banche, occhi sull'oro di Bankitalia su Advisor Online newsmagazine della consulenza finanziaria
essendo le azioniste di Bankitalia basta rivalutare la quota di partecipazione in base al valore delle riserve auree e come per magia tutti i ratios sono esemplari, almeno nella media del pollo.
Il discorso sembra plausibile, quello che invece non mi sembra corretto è che le banche private abbiano una partecipazione in Bankitalia, al massimo sarebbe logico il contrario. L'avranno mai pagate le loro quote? e a che valore?
Banche, occhi sull'oro di Bankitalia su Advisor Online newsmagazine della consulenza finanziaria
essendo le azioniste di Bankitalia basta rivalutare la quota di partecipazione in base al valore delle riserve auree e come per magia tutti i ratios sono esemplari, almeno nella media del pollo.
Il discorso sembra plausibile, quello che invece non mi sembra corretto è che le banche private abbiano una partecipazione in Bankitalia, al massimo sarebbe logico il contrario. L'avranno mai pagate le loro quote? e a che valore?
negusneg
New Member
No
Posso dirti che LT2 ne ho da prima della crisi, e non le ho mai vendute, anzi, ho incrementato. Ci sono parecchie emissioni, tutte molto simili, ma probabilmente poco appetibili per la maggioranza, roba da euribor + 2-3%, se non esercitano la call.
LT1 ne ho da pochissimo, anzi, devo ringraziare la segnalazione di un amico del forum
. Comunque anche di queste ce ne sono diverse, nella lista ne trovi almeno una dozzina. Fino a pochi mesi fa non le avrei neanche prese in considerazione. Ma qualcosa sta cambiando, fra un po' io e bos ci potremo scambiare il portafoglio Sulle decisioni legislative prima o poi farò un commento, comincia a darmi abbastanza fastidio questo voler cambiare le regole del gioco senza tener nella minima considerazione gli interessi dei risparmiatori (che sono quelli senza i quali non esisterebbe mercato
). Ma di questo mi sa che ne parleremo diffusamente al prossimo meeting nel Monferrato (o nelle Langhe?).A proposito, voi venite? Sono ancora aperte le iscrizioni:
http://www.investireoggi.it/forum/v...nisti-di-io-passaggio-nord-ovest-vt61392.html
ari
Forumer attivo
No
Posso dirti che LT2 ne ho da prima della crisi, e non le ho mai vendute, anzi, ho incrementato. Ci sono parecchie emissioni, tutte molto simili, ma probabilmente poco appetibili per la maggioranza, roba da euribor + 2-3%, se non esercitano la call.
LT1 ne ho da pochissimo, anzi, devo ringraziare la segnalazione di un amico del forum
Sulle decisioni legislative prima o poi farò un commento, comincia a darmi abbastanza fastidio questo voler cambiare le regole del gioco senza tener nella minima considerazione gli interessi dei risparmiatori (che sono quelli senza i quali non esisterebbe mercato
A proposito, voi venite? Sono ancora aperte le iscrizioni:
http://www.investireoggi.it/forum/v...nisti-di-io-passaggio-nord-ovest-vt61392.html
Mi posso permettere di chiedere il tuo pf di perpetue? Grandissimo Negus
Siccome qualche pagina indietro, proprio dopo una tua osservazione sulle "ciofeche" molti hanno postato il proprio pf; sarebbe veramente un ulteriore imparare, capire le tue predilette
- Stato