Zorba
Bos 4 Mod
saremo i primi a cui fa il tombino
Può succedere di tutto. Non mi sento di escludere nulla: nemmeno la call.
Obbligazioni perpetue e subordinate Tutto quello che avreste sempre voluto sapere sulle obbligazioni perpetue... - Cap. 1
- Creatore Discussione negusneg
- Data di Inizio
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- Tags
- additional tier 1 bail in basilea 3 coco bonds crd iv genussscheine grandfathering hybrid bond loss absorption lower tier 2 make whole amount matusalem bond obbligazioni irredimibili obbligazioni perpetue obbligazioni subordinate perpetual bond preference shares restricted tier 1 tier 1 upper tier 2
- Stato
Può succedere di tutto. Non mi sento di escludere nulla: nemmeno la call.
amorgos34
CHIAGNI & FOTTI SRL
Fattene una ragione preventiva, altrimenti elaborare il lutto sarà durissima.
Dedicato a chi pensa che con lo stampa-stampa si risolvano i problemi.(troppo facile)
Visto che chi riporta le quotazioni sono (siamo) sempre i soliti, invito chiunque abbia degli eseguiti a postarli. Le quotazioni BBLG (anche) oggi lasciano il tempo che trovano.
frankiemachine
Mr. Tentenna
Fattene una ragione preventiva, altrimenti elaborare il lutto sarà durissima.
Dedicato a chi pensa che con lo stampa-stampa si risolvano i problemi.(troppo facile)
Visto che chi riporta le quotazioni sono (siamo) sempre i soliti, invito chiunque abbia degli eseguiti a postarli. Le quotazioni BBLG (anche) oggi lasciano il tempo che trovano.
Epperò quelle una indicazione di un trend te la danno.
Io per esempio quasi sempre opero dopo aver letto qui le quotazioni: se ci si avvicina ad un range di prezzi che ritengo interessante allora chiamo IW altrimenti me ne sto fermo.
Quindi benvengano anche quotazioni non affidabili al 100% ma pur sempre indicative di una tendenza
Zorba
Bos 4 Mod
Fattene una ragione preventiva, altrimenti elaborare il lutto sarà durissima.
A me piace il titolo, a prescindere dalla call. Non ne ho mai fatto mistero. Detta sinceramente, a 41 sono buyer su Baca (a prescindere dalla call), non seller.
Dopo l'Irlanda, mi aspetto sempre il peggio dagli emittenti. Devo dire che questa rinnovata enfasi di UCG sulle call sta un po' sparigliando le carte. Vedremo: è divertente aprire il pc alla mattina e scoprire le news delle subordinate di UCG. Il bello è che non si perde nulla in caso di mancata call (come dice stordits, il bid è a 41)
maxolone
Forumer storico
Massimum
Forumer storico
il 28/9
Zorba
Bos 4 Mod
fidw99
100% perpetual
commento di jpm su tier1
· In our opinion a coordinated and potentially coercive recapitalisation of the European banking sector could be an effective intermediate remedy in the absence of a more definitive solution for the sovereign debt crisis. While many parallels have been drawn with the US TARP, we highlight that the relative success of this initiative was that available resources were far in excess of the capital which was eventually deployed. However, the €1.259 trillion exposure of core European banks to peripheral European geographies suggests a potential shortfall in available resources under certain tail scenarios. As a result we think that an optimal solution for a European bank recapitalization exercise would be for contingent capital instruments to be deployed, which would allow for available resources to be leveraged. Deploying high strike contingent capital instruments with conversion at 7% would, in our view, be a credible method in reinforcing solvency in a non-dilutive manner, which could then support equity valuations for the sector and provide greater flexibility for banks in terms of alternative capital raising. We note that such structures have been deployed before with relative success such as in the case of RBS which benefitted from an £8bn contingent capital commitment from the UK Government.
· While we view a recapitalization of the European banking sector to ultimately be a positive development, we note the negative impact on subordinated debt valuations given potentially more aggressive burden sharing outcomes. Our base case is for restrictions on discretionary coupon payments in line with previous EC remedies. We ascribe a much lower probability outcome to more aggressive outcomes such as in the case of Irish banks where legislative powers were deployed to force burden sharing on subordinated debt. Assuming that a European version of a ‘subordinated liabilities order’ is unlikely, we find the price action on certain instruments difficult to justify and think that there is selective value in the asset class at current levels. In particular, we highlight SOCGEN Tier I instruments which currently price in three years coupon deferral and extension to perpetuity. Additionally, we highlight BPCEGP Tier I instruments which price the most aggressive coupon deferral and extension outcomes despite being the French bank with the lowest relative degree of exposure to the periphery. While we note risks for Tier I, we expect senior debt to be supported with a recapitalization exercise.
While we highlight potential valuation opportunities in the Tier I market we think that the price evolution post-2007 has implied a significant loss of investor sponsorship and we anticipate that this, together with concerns on burden sharing, will imply that hurdle rates for the asset class are likely to remain above the levels more recently established in the market
· In our opinion a coordinated and potentially coercive recapitalisation of the European banking sector could be an effective intermediate remedy in the absence of a more definitive solution for the sovereign debt crisis. While many parallels have been drawn with the US TARP, we highlight that the relative success of this initiative was that available resources were far in excess of the capital which was eventually deployed. However, the €1.259 trillion exposure of core European banks to peripheral European geographies suggests a potential shortfall in available resources under certain tail scenarios. As a result we think that an optimal solution for a European bank recapitalization exercise would be for contingent capital instruments to be deployed, which would allow for available resources to be leveraged. Deploying high strike contingent capital instruments with conversion at 7% would, in our view, be a credible method in reinforcing solvency in a non-dilutive manner, which could then support equity valuations for the sector and provide greater flexibility for banks in terms of alternative capital raising. We note that such structures have been deployed before with relative success such as in the case of RBS which benefitted from an £8bn contingent capital commitment from the UK Government.
· While we view a recapitalization of the European banking sector to ultimately be a positive development, we note the negative impact on subordinated debt valuations given potentially more aggressive burden sharing outcomes. Our base case is for restrictions on discretionary coupon payments in line with previous EC remedies. We ascribe a much lower probability outcome to more aggressive outcomes such as in the case of Irish banks where legislative powers were deployed to force burden sharing on subordinated debt. Assuming that a European version of a ‘subordinated liabilities order’ is unlikely, we find the price action on certain instruments difficult to justify and think that there is selective value in the asset class at current levels. In particular, we highlight SOCGEN Tier I instruments which currently price in three years coupon deferral and extension to perpetuity. Additionally, we highlight BPCEGP Tier I instruments which price the most aggressive coupon deferral and extension outcomes despite being the French bank with the lowest relative degree of exposure to the periphery. While we note risks for Tier I, we expect senior debt to be supported with a recapitalization exercise.
While we highlight potential valuation opportunities in the Tier I market we think that the price evolution post-2007 has implied a significant loss of investor sponsorship and we anticipate that this, together with concerns on burden sharing, will imply that hurdle rates for the asset class are likely to remain above the levels more recently established in the market
Andre_Sant
Forumer storico
NEMMENO troppo risalto, dato che era già stato callata qualche giorno fa (annuncio bloomberg) sebbene abbia pubblicato il tutto nel suo sito web solo dopo giorni dopo..
ciao, non è così
Ubi: ha callato a luglio lt2 analoga
Mps: ha callato tutte le sue lt2 ad oggi
intesa: ha callato tutto, tier1 ed lt2
Unicredit: ha callato tutte le lt2 tranne due amortizing che erano/sono nel mot, e tutte le tier1 (forse la prima nn callata sarà baca)
Mediobanca: ha callato una lt2 solita struttura stepup, qualche giorno fa
bnl paribas: ha callato lt2, ma non ha callato la tier1 tasso fisso qualche giorno fa
banco popolare: NON ha callato le recenti lt2, ma ha fatto OPS (offerta di scambio). Ha invece callato una tier1 ad inizio anno
ciao
Io mi riferivo alle nostre perp, ubi ci ha lasciato pop bergamo, lodi, comm e industria, mps non ha callato la sua e le antonveneta, certo si dirà le regole di basilea non sono chiare, ma fatto sta che altri le perp le callano, vedi ubs, swiss re...
- Stato