Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 2 (3 lettori)

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tommy271

Forumer storico
Se i nostri ragionamenti sono fondati credo quindi con molta probabilità che il prossimo governo greco, chiunque esso sia, con qualche modifica, confermerà il memorandum e quindi l'appartenenza della Grecia all'euro.

Syriza, forse, sarà il primo partito con relativo premio di maggioranza.
Ma non potrà governare da solo ...

Comunque vediamo ... i sondaggi precedenti li hanno sbagliati... forse questi potrebbero essere "dubitabili".
Se Syriza si muove, gli altri non stanno certamente con le mani in mano.
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
Ue, Commissione deve diventare governo Ue - Schaeuble

mercoledì 16 maggio 2012 16:22




AQUISGRANA, Germania, 16 maggio (Reuters) - Il ministro delle Finanze tedesco, Wolfgang Schaeuble, ha proposto una riorganizzazione della macchina istituzionale dell'Unione Europea, affermando che la Commissione dovrebbe diventare un organo di governo.

In seguito alla crisi, da diverse parti sono tornate le richieste per una maggiore integrazione, anche fiscale.

"Sarei a favore di un ulteriore sviluppo della Commissione Europea in un governo e per l'elezione di un presidente europeo", ha detto Schaeuble in un intervento ad Aquisgrana.
 

belindo

Guest
Ue, Commissione deve diventare governo Ue - Schaeuble

mercoledì 16 maggio 2012 16:22




AQUISGRANA, Germania, 16 maggio (Reuters) - Il ministro delle Finanze tedesco, Wolfgang Schaeuble, ha proposto una riorganizzazione della macchina istituzionale dell'Unione Europea, affermando che la Commissione dovrebbe diventare un organo di governo.

In seguito alla crisi, da diverse parti sono tornate le richieste per una maggiore integrazione, anche fiscale.

"Sarei a favore di un ulteriore sviluppo della Commissione Europea in un governo e per l'elezione di un presidente europeo", ha detto Schaeuble in un intervento ad Aquisgrana.

Ma allora avevi ragione! :eek:
E' un europeista convinto.......................ma non sono ancora sicuro ;)
 

Max11

Forumer attivo
Te l'ho detto ... è giovane, poca esperienza ... e gioca a poker ...

Speriamo tu abbia ragione; per adesso ha messo sotto scacco l'Europa intera.
In fondo, ammettiamolo, è l'unico ad aver detto chiaramente che cos'è oggi la UE: un feudo germanico, dove gli unici che ci guadagnano sono i tedeschi, affamando metà Europa.
Tutti gli altri leader (si fa per dire) europei si sono dimostrati degli emeriti para...li.
 

Baro

Umile contadino
Speriamo tu abbia ragione; per adesso ha messo sotto scacco l'Europa intera.
In fondo, ammettiamolo, è l'unico ad aver detto chiaramente che cos'è oggi la UE: un feudo germanico, dove gli unici che ci guadagnano sono i tedeschi, affamando metà Europa.
Tutti gli altri leader (si fa per dire) europei si sono dimostrati degli emeriti para...li.
L'ha detto anche Junker che era stufo di prendere ordini dalla Germania e si è dimesso.
 

ficodindia

Forumer storico
La ricetta per salvare l'euro: aumentare consumi ed investimenti.

Secondo l'economista statunitense Mark Weisbrot
"If the European authorities (the European Commission, the European Central Bank, and the IMF) continue to block the eurozone's economic recovery with senseless austerity measures, individual countries will want to consider more rational alternatives in order to restore full employment. The people of Greece, Spain, Portugal, Ireland, and other countries are told every day that they must swallow this bitter medicine, and that there is no alternative to the prolonged suffering and high unemployment that they are going through. But the Argentine experience – in reality rather than in mythical portrayals – indicates that this is not true. "
Argentina and the magic soybean: the commodity export boom that wasn't | Mark Weisbrot | Comment is free | guardian.co.uk

Nello stesso articolo Mark Weisbrot prende come modello l'economia Argentina, che grazie ad una politica economica espansiva, promuovendo consumi ed investimenti, ha potuto superare la grave crisi del 2001.
 
Ultima modifica:

Baro

Umile contadino
Monetary Policy in unconventional times

Introductory remarks by Mario Draghi, President of the ECB,
at the ECB colloquium held in honour of José Manuel González-Páramo,
Frankfurt am Main, 16 May 2012


Ladies and Gentlemen, Dear José Manuel,
It is my pleasure to welcome you here today on the occasion of this colloquium on “Monetary Policy in unconventional times”. It is held in the honour of José Manuel González-Páramo to mark the end of his eight-year term as Member of the ECB’s Executive Board.
The topics of today’s colloquium are not only of great relevance, but I believe also very close to your heart, José Manuel, as they reflect two of the main areas which you have dealt with during much of your career:
The first topic concerns the experiences gained with the ECB’s non-standard measures and monetary policy during crisis times. José Manuel was closely involved in shaping these measures during his time at the ECB, having been in charge of monetary policy operations for several years, also prior to the financial crisis.
José Manuel joined the ECB in times that seemed very different from today. Financial markets seemed to work rather efficiently in an environment of low volatility and seemingly little risk. Liquidity was distributed by stable and efficient interbank markets at (almost) uniform prices throughout the euro area. The operational framework served well its purpose of transmitting the decisions by the Governing Council on policy rates to market rates. Monetary policy relied on standard monetary policy operations. Money market rates were quite stable and close to the ECB’s main refinancing rate, with fluctuations in money market rates being within a few basis points.
How times have changed! Over the past few years, a number of standard and non-standard measures have been implemented as the Eurosystem’s response to the dysfunctions in money markets caused by the financial and sovereign debt crises. You have been involved in the design and the implementation of these measures in all phases of the recent crisis: in the early phases, the ECB mainly responded to the crisis by adjusting the timing of its liquidity provision and the lengthening of the maturity of its open market operations, which helped to stabilise short term rates in an environment of high volatility and extreme distrust.
Later on, we dealt with the design and the launch of longer-term refinancing operations, the adjustment of the collateral framework, and the various purchasing programmes that were necessary to maintain an efficient transmission mechanism of monetary policy throughout the euro area.
At the same time, for several years you were overseeing the ECB’s research department, which contributed with in-depth analyses on related topics, such as the effects of non-standard measures, or monetary policy around the zero lower bound. All this was achieved with the input, great effort and expertise of you and your staff.
I hope that the interventions in the first half of today’s colloquium will provide us with some important insights on the effects of these measures and relationship with standard monetary policy.
The second topic of today’s colloquium will look at the interaction of private and public debt, deficits and monetary policy. As Professor of Economics from the Universidad Complutense in Madrid, José Manuel had of course already dedicated a lot of thought and work to these issues prior to the start of his career as a central banker. In fact, José Manuel headed the Public Finance Department of the Universidad Complutense for many years and has published numerous important academic articles in this area and a reference university textbook on the economics of the public sector. He has also played a leading role in many of the most prestigious academic journals on economics and public policy in Spain. He also helped lead the work of the prestigious Centre for Monetary and Financial Studies in Spain better known as the CEMFI Foundation of which he was an Executive Board Member.
José Manuel was able to combine his depth of academic knowledge and experience with a brilliant career as a central banker in Banco de España. This background and wealth of experience proved to be an invaluable asset after he joined the Executive Board and Governing Council of the ECB in June 2004.
One can say that José Manuel had foreseen some of the pressing problems of the euro area today: the need for tax reforms and fiscal consolidation, the issue of sustainability of fiscal reforms and economic growth, to name a few. You have asked the question how to achieve permanent reductions in public deficits in order to achieve fiscal reform, pointing to the reduction of structural public expenditure. You have also asked the question on regional divergences in the euro area, pointing to the need for structural reforms.
Some of these topics are now at the forefront of the questions that European policy makers are confronted with, how to reduce fiscal and macroeconomic imbalances, how to achieve growth, and how to combine these goals with the necessary fiscal discipline that serves to balance the interests among the present and future generations.
Important steps have been taken on the European level as regards the implementation of fiscal rules and consolidation measures. The euro area general government deficit has declined significantly; public debt should stop rising next year and decline thereafter.
The extent of the progress on this front is insufficiently acknowledged and worth noting. Everywhere governments have undertaken significant and difficult reforms and continue to do so. Although more work is certainly needed, we should appreciate how quickly things improve when serious action is taken.
To foster employment and growth policy makers have to address macroeconomic imbalances in the euro area. While monetary policy will continue to ensure price stability in the euro area as a whole and cannot address inflation rates in individual countries, relative competitiveness adjustments can and need to occur at the country level. These adjustments need to be driven by national policies. The countries that experienced unit costs systematically above the euro area average and lost competitiveness will have to regain competitiveness. This can be achieved through a combination of cost moderation – including in some specific cases of past excesses, decisive adjustments – productivity gains and technological change.
In this process, they should experience unit costs below the euro area average – possibly for a sustained period in case of large earlier competitiveness losses. The ECB’s focus on price stability in the medium term for the euro area will contribute to an anchoring of longer-term inflation expectations in all countries.
Before concluding, let me comment briefly on the difficult situation in Greece. Since the Treaty does not foresee anything on exit, this is not a matter for the ECB to decide. While the ECB will continue to comply with the mandate of keeping price stability over the medium term in line with Treaty provisions and preserving the integrity of our balance sheet, I want to state that our strong preference is that Greece will continue to stay in the euro area.
Dear José Manuel, you joined the Executive Board of the European Central Bank 8 years ago, in 2004. Since 2006, we were both members of the Governing Council, and I still recall extensive meetings in which José Manuel presented to the Governing Council one item after another on a very wide variety of subjects – ranging from the implementation of monetary policy to the new series of banknotes or to complicated statistical and risk-management issues – with the same degree of commitment and full command of the most technical details.
And of course we became even closer colleagues last fall when I moved to Frankfurt to join the Executive Board. It is with warmth and admiration of your professional skills and congenial nature that I look at our common experiences.
Having now nearly completed your full term as ECB Executive Board member, you have witnessed the financial and sovereign debt crises from the start. Even though we will welcome a new highly experienced member to this team in a few weeks’ time, we will greatly miss your personal experience and judgement.
Ladies and Gentlemen, let me close by wishing you a very interesting colloquium. We have highly distinguished speakers from Europe and overseas, and I look forward to some interesting discussions.
Thank you.
European Central Bank
Directorate Communications
Press and Information Division
Kaiserstrasse 29, D-60311 Frankfurt am Main
Tel.: +49 69 1344 7455, Fax: +49 69 1344 7404
Internet: ECB: European Central Bank home page
 

tommy271

Forumer storico
BCE: la sospensione temporanea dei finanziamenti per le banche greche







La notizia della sospensione temporanea di alcune accesso greca le banche al meccanismo di base del rifinanziamento BCE conferma l'autorità monetaria centrale. I "rubinetti" di indebitamento riaprirà dopo la ricapitalizzazione delle banche, e sarà finanziato dal meccanismo tra il consiglio superiore (ELA).

Si noti che questa mossa si basa sullo statuto della BCE.

L'Eurosistema continua a sostenere le banche greche, ha detto il portavoce della BCE.

In precedenza, Reuters ha riferito che la BCE operazioni di rifinanziamento sono interrotti per le banche greche hanno sostegno sufficiente ai loro fondi.
Vi era tuttavia chiaro quanti le banche sono interessate.

Fonte anonima, adiacente al caso, ha detto che il capitale delle quattro banche era così carente che essi operino con patrimonio netto negativo, secondo la Reuters. Il regolamento della BCE, permette di fornire liquidità alle banche che si trovano in questa situazione.

Le voci sono state avviate dal quotidiano olandese Financieele Dagblad , citando che "le fonti a Bruxelles", ha detto la Banca centrale europea si rifiuta crescenti esigenze di liquidità delle banche greche, che li rende dipendenti dalla Banca centrale greca per chiedere aiuto.

In risposta al post, in rappresentanza della Banca centrale europea ha detto che la banca continuerà a sostenere le banche greche.

Si trasmette il Dow Jones Newswires, il portavoce ha rifiutato di dire quanto la BCE dovrebbe cambiare la sua politica, se continuo deflusso di depositi dalle banche greche.

Alla fine di gennaio, le banche greche hanno 73 miliardi a sostegno della liquidità da parte della BCE, ma tale importo è sceso più del 50%, secondo il giornale. La BCE ha tagliato il suo sostegno come la Grecia non è ancora progredita fino a ricapitalizzare il sistema bancario, nonostante il fatto che abbia ricevuto 25 miliardi di dollari per questo scopo, ha detto il giornale.


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tommy271

Forumer storico
BCE: Sosteniamo le banche greche







La BCE e l'Eurosistema continua a sostenere le banche greche, secondo le dichiarazioni ufficiali della BCE.

Attivato fino alla ricapitalizzazione delle banche sono sottocapitalizzate, come risultato di PSI, alcune delle banche tipici greci si sono spostati per fornire liquidità d'emergenza ELA meccanismo. Una volta che la ricapitalizzazione, e si prevede che accadrà presto, le banche recuperino il loro finanziamento dell'Eurosistema.

La BCE osserva che le banche della zona euro hanno due modi per aumentare la liquidità da parte dell'Eurosistema.

Se per qualche motivo le operazioni di rifinanziamento principali non sono disponibili, le banche possono ottenere, in determinate circostanze, supportano la fornitura di meccanismo di emergenza di liquidità (ELA), che fornisce loro la banca centrale.


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