Obbligazioni societarie Monitor bond Utilities Europa III (gennaio - dicembre 2010)
- Creatore Discussione Alobar
- Data di Inizio
Alobar
So di non sapere...
Aggiornamento monitor bond Utilities (gruppo di lavoro: Alobar, Imark)
Dopo la pausa estiva, a distanza di 8 settimane, torniamo con l'aggiornamento del monitor.
AVVERTENZE
E' sempre grazie a Massimo S. che si rendono disponibili, per i bond illiquidi, i prezzi realizzati sui mercati professionali.
Fra quelli in tabella, sono infatti di fonte Xtrakter (ex ICMA) i prezzi dei seguenti titoli:EDF 2018 e 2024; EWE 2019; GDF Suez 2015; Iberdrola 02/2013; Hera 2016; Dong perpetual; Fortum 2016;
Sono invece di fonte BBML i titoli: EDF 2016 e 2020; EnBW 2025 e 2039; RWE 2033; Vattenfall 2018 e 2024; Nat Grid 2020; Veolia 2020, 2022 e 2033; GDF Suez 2012, 2018 e 2023; Iberdrola 2015 e 2018; Ned gasunie 2021;
I prezzi Xtrakter e Bloomberg risalgono a venerdì.
Trovate il file allegato al primo messaggio del thread;
La tabella dei prezzi, divisa in tre parti. Parte prima:
Dopo la pausa estiva, a distanza di 8 settimane, torniamo con l'aggiornamento del monitor.
AVVERTENZE
E' sempre grazie a Massimo S. che si rendono disponibili, per i bond illiquidi, i prezzi realizzati sui mercati professionali.
Fra quelli in tabella, sono infatti di fonte Xtrakter (ex ICMA) i prezzi dei seguenti titoli:EDF 2018 e 2024; EWE 2019; GDF Suez 2015; Iberdrola 02/2013; Hera 2016; Dong perpetual; Fortum 2016;
Sono invece di fonte BBML i titoli: EDF 2016 e 2020; EnBW 2025 e 2039; RWE 2033; Vattenfall 2018 e 2024; Nat Grid 2020; Veolia 2020, 2022 e 2033; GDF Suez 2012, 2018 e 2023; Iberdrola 2015 e 2018; Ned gasunie 2021;
I prezzi Xtrakter e Bloomberg risalgono a venerdì.
Trovate il file allegato al primo messaggio del thread;
La tabella dei prezzi, divisa in tre parti. Parte prima:
Imark
Forumer storico
C'è del materiale arretrato in termini di rating actions su emittenti del comparto, risalente in parte a luglio (poca roba, dato che durante le vacanze ho cercato di allentare la presa anche sull'attività delle agenzie, e soprattutto in quel mese, mi è spesso capitato di saltare i miei turni di guardia nella raccolta dei dispacci con cui le agenzie illustrano le valutazioni espresse), in parte ad agosto.
E comincerei con GDF Suez, per la quale rettificheremo il rating nel prossimo monitor in quanto S&P ne ha dapprima ridotto l'outlook, portandolo da positivo a stabile, e di lì a poche settimane, sempre nello scorso mese di luglio, ha posto l'emittente sotto osservazione per una possibile riduzione del rating.
La prima azione è discesa da una valutazione negativa, da parte dell'agenzia, circa la possibilità che GDF Suez fosse in grado di conseguire una metrica finanziaria in linea con il rating superiore rispetto a quello corrente.
Secondo S&P, l'onerosità del programma di investimenti nonché della remunerazione decisa a favore degli azionisti pregiudicava un possibile upgrade, in un contesto in cui l'andamento dei prezzi del gas impattava negativamente una delle principali attività del gruppo.
Successivamente, intorno alla terza settimana di luglio, il creditwatch negativo scattava alla notizia di una possibile acquisizione della maggioranza nella società inglese International Power, una società a rating speculativo (BB) di generazione energetica che ha attività nel trading energetico ed una importante esposizione in paesi in via di sviluppo.
Tale notizie è vista come potenzialmente rischiosa per il rating sia sotto l'aspetto del business profile (con la nuova acquisizione che indebolirebbe quello originario di GDF Suez, che oggi si giova della valutazione più elevata da parte di S&P, "excellent", laddove per IP il business profile è valutato "fair"), sia sotto l'aspetto del financial profile, per il quale S&P, alla luce delle prime notizie a sua disposizione, riteneva che la conservazione da parte di GDF Suez del rating attuale, "A", avrebbe presumibilmente richiesto la dismissione di alcuni asset, con i rischi di esecuzione legati ad eventuale cessione.
S&P attende dunque l'evolversi degli eventi per verificare se ridurre il rating alla luce sia della comninazione del business profile risultante dall'acquisizione, sia delle misure che verranno adottate o meno per conservare il profilo di rischio finanziario all'interno del rating attuale.
E comincerei con GDF Suez, per la quale rettificheremo il rating nel prossimo monitor in quanto S&P ne ha dapprima ridotto l'outlook, portandolo da positivo a stabile, e di lì a poche settimane, sempre nello scorso mese di luglio, ha posto l'emittente sotto osservazione per una possibile riduzione del rating.
La prima azione è discesa da una valutazione negativa, da parte dell'agenzia, circa la possibilità che GDF Suez fosse in grado di conseguire una metrica finanziaria in linea con il rating superiore rispetto a quello corrente.
Secondo S&P, l'onerosità del programma di investimenti nonché della remunerazione decisa a favore degli azionisti pregiudicava un possibile upgrade, in un contesto in cui l'andamento dei prezzi del gas impattava negativamente una delle principali attività del gruppo.
Successivamente, intorno alla terza settimana di luglio, il creditwatch negativo scattava alla notizia di una possibile acquisizione della maggioranza nella società inglese International Power, una società a rating speculativo (BB) di generazione energetica che ha attività nel trading energetico ed una importante esposizione in paesi in via di sviluppo.
Tale notizie è vista come potenzialmente rischiosa per il rating sia sotto l'aspetto del business profile (con la nuova acquisizione che indebolirebbe quello originario di GDF Suez, che oggi si giova della valutazione più elevata da parte di S&P, "excellent", laddove per IP il business profile è valutato "fair"), sia sotto l'aspetto del financial profile, per il quale S&P, alla luce delle prime notizie a sua disposizione, riteneva che la conservazione da parte di GDF Suez del rating attuale, "A", avrebbe presumibilmente richiesto la dismissione di alcuni asset, con i rischi di esecuzione legati ad eventuale cessione.
S&P attende dunque l'evolversi degli eventi per verificare se ridurre il rating alla luce sia della comninazione del business profile risultante dall'acquisizione, sia delle misure che verranno adottate o meno per conservare il profilo di rischio finanziario all'interno del rating attuale.
Imark
Forumer storico
Un interessante articolo del WSJ online di oggi in cui il CEO di GDF Suez spiega il senso di questa mega operazione, che porta la società francese ad essere il primo operatore europeo per dimensioni di fatturato.
Il senso dell'operazione, da quanto si intende, starebbe principalmente nell'integrazione verticale fra le attività che GDF Suez detiene nel settore del gas (principalmente apportate da Gaz De France alla fusione GDF-Suez) e le attività di generazione energetica che rappresentano il core business di IP, e che sono in larga misura rappresentate da centrali alimentate a gas.
L'articolo è da leggere con molta attenzione anche perché dà conto in sintesi dell'attuale fenomeno del decoupling del prezzo del gas da quello del petrolio, con l'oil in tenuta ed il gas caduto rapidamente nelle ultime settimane.
Una riduzione di cui tuttavia non beneficiano i grandi importatori e distributori europei, fra cui GDF-SUEZ, spesso vincolati a contratti di fornitura molto lunghi, anche ventennali, che linkano il prezzo del gas a quello dell'oil, a prescindere dai prezzi spot sul mercato gasiero.
By CARL MORTISHED
Gérard Mestrallet has just created a colossus: the world's biggest utility by revenue. Last month's agreement to buy a majority stake in International Power PLC will put him at the helm of a greatly enlarged GDF-Suez SA, with its army of power stations, charging ahead of rivals such as E.ON AG, the German utility, or domestic competitor Électricité de France SA.
Being top dog in a quarreling pack of European mega-utilities is no doubt gratifying, but what really interests GDF-Suez chief executive Mr. Mestrallet isn't revenue rankings or even the 88 gigawatts of power that will soon be under his control.
Instead, he talks about "flexibility." What matters, he reckons, isn't wires but pipes.
The key to the IP deal is, he says, the natural gas that powers turbines and supplies the expanding global trade in gas over which the French company is extending its influence. More than half of IP's power output is generated by burning natural gas, he explains.
"Thanks to the IP deal, we become the number one in volumes of gas handled in Europe–1,300 terawatt hours. In second place will be E.ON Ruhrgas."
This means purchasing power, and the point won't be lost on important people with gas to sell. In 2008, Mr. Mestrallet completed a merger of Suez, a company with a fast-growing trading business in liquefied natural gas, with France's monopoly supplier, Gaz de France, a marriage that caused a bell to ring in a distant capital. Last year, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin summoned Mr. Mestrallet to Moscow.
"I'd never met him before," says the GDF-Suez chief. "His message was very clear, 'You are much bigger after the merger. We are the largest gas producer. You know the markets in Europe… You are the largest importer of liquefied natural gas into the U.S. We have projects in the long term to penetrate the U.S. market. We would be pleased to cooperate more with GDF-Suez."
The first deal followed quickly—the French company took a 9% shareholding in Nordstream, a Russian pipeline stretching the length of the Baltic Sea, linking Siberian gas fields with the German coast. The IP deal brings with it a portfolio of U.S. power stations, another bauble to dangle in front of Russian state-controlled gas company OAO Gazprom.
The point about gas is you can turn it on and off, Mr. Mestrallet explains. "Flexibility is key to our business model. It is a key instruction I give to our people, flexibility to be able to adapt in the short term and medium term."
Markets are volatile; demand for power collapsed in the recession and the U.S. natural gas price is below $4 per million British thermal units, less than half its price before the financial downturn.
"If you have nuclear plants, they are not flexible at all. They are working 24 hours a day. Hydropower and [combined-cycle gas turbines] represent the best way to store electricity, because it cannot be stored except as water in a reservoir or as gas."
Fickle wind turbines are the least flexible, he says. For every megawatt of wind, you need a gas turbine to back it up. "If you have no wind, you switch on the gas and if the wind is blowing at maximum you switch it off."
This is where GDF-Suez wants to be, switching the gas on and off around the world, using its flexible portfolio of fuels and power stations to have more power to sell as demand peaks.
The recent collapse in spot gas prices has brought simmering buyer-seller tension to a boil as European governments rage over the long-term contracts that control the price of imported gas from Russia, Norway and North Africa. These contracts, which can last for two decades, link the gas price to the price of crude oil and, as a result, consumers haven't benefited from the collapse in demand for gas. Spot gas is about half the price of crude oil and the big utilities have been wrangling with exporters, such as Gazprom, Norway's Statoil ASA and Sonatrach of Algeria.
Mr. Mestrallet says he has done a deal with Gazprom over the oil-price linkage. While he won't say what it was, he hints that it was less about price than market share.
"We have tried to get more flexibility in the volumes," he says. He defends the long-term contracts, arguing that security of supply is better than short-term price gain.
French gas consumers were never cut off in the Russia-Ukraine dispute in January 2009, he says. "There is a strong link between long-term contracts and security of supply. If you trade on spot markets you are totally exposed to the risk of lack of volumes in winter."
And long-term contracts suit Mr. Mestrallet's business plan, which is all about positioning GDF-Suez to win, not in the price battle next winter but in the war for market share over many winters to come. The gas bubble will subside, he argues, some time between 2012 and 2013 because of a hiatus in investment spending by producer countries.
"Many investments have been delayed. The Qataris have decided to reduce the speed of investment. The Russians have delayed Shtokman [a huge gas project in the Arctic]. When the gas price was close to $10 it was said that the cost of [extracting] shale gas was [$7 to $8]; now the gas price is $4."
Mr. Mestrallet is no follower of energy fashion. He seems happy to watch from the sidelines as the French government wrangles over the future of its nuclear champions, EDF and nuclear-engineering company Areva SA. "We are out. There is a nuclear team with two players. We are not concerned," he says.
GDF-Suez has seven reactors in Belgium and plans to build a reactor in Romania, and one in the U.K. with Iberdrola SA and Scottish and Southern Energy PLC. But he isn't wedded to using the Areva-designed European pressurized reactor model, following concerns about the cost overruns in Finland and at Flamanville in Normandy, where Areva is building EPRs. "The Roussely report [into the French nuclear industry] said we must draw the lessons of Finland and Flamanville before launching a new EPR. That is a wise decision," Mr. Mestrallet says.
There is no doubt that one of IP's attractions for GDF-Suez is that it is one step removed from the company's government shareholder. "The government shareholder is at the upper stage. For them [IP] it is better; I manage the relationship with the state and I protect them. Their job is to produce electricity."
Having ruled himself out of the French nuclear-industry jockeying, Mr. Mestrallet is looking further afield, to Brazil. There, GDF-Suez is building Jirau, the biggest dam in the world, a $5 billion investment that will generate 3,500 megawatts of hydroelectric power—more than twice the amount of power generated by an EPR. It will be part of IP's portfolio, and if it is built on time and to specifications, Mr. Mestrallet forecasts it will generate $500 million of Ebitda profit every year for IP for 35 years, thanks to a concession from the Brazilian government and offtake agreements for 70% of the output.
"It is green power," Mr. Mestrallet says. "The desire to make electricity green is a reality here in Europe, but in many countries the first need is capacity. You have no economic growth without electricity."
Il senso dell'operazione, da quanto si intende, starebbe principalmente nell'integrazione verticale fra le attività che GDF Suez detiene nel settore del gas (principalmente apportate da Gaz De France alla fusione GDF-Suez) e le attività di generazione energetica che rappresentano il core business di IP, e che sono in larga misura rappresentate da centrali alimentate a gas.
L'articolo è da leggere con molta attenzione anche perché dà conto in sintesi dell'attuale fenomeno del decoupling del prezzo del gas da quello del petrolio, con l'oil in tenuta ed il gas caduto rapidamente nelle ultime settimane.
Una riduzione di cui tuttavia non beneficiano i grandi importatori e distributori europei, fra cui GDF-SUEZ, spesso vincolati a contratti di fornitura molto lunghi, anche ventennali, che linkano il prezzo del gas a quello dell'oil, a prescindere dai prezzi spot sul mercato gasiero.
- SEPTEMBER 5, 2010, 10:08 A.M. ET
By CARL MORTISHED
Gérard Mestrallet has just created a colossus: the world's biggest utility by revenue. Last month's agreement to buy a majority stake in International Power PLC will put him at the helm of a greatly enlarged GDF-Suez SA, with its army of power stations, charging ahead of rivals such as E.ON AG, the German utility, or domestic competitor Électricité de France SA.
Being top dog in a quarreling pack of European mega-utilities is no doubt gratifying, but what really interests GDF-Suez chief executive Mr. Mestrallet isn't revenue rankings or even the 88 gigawatts of power that will soon be under his control.
Instead, he talks about "flexibility." What matters, he reckons, isn't wires but pipes.
The key to the IP deal is, he says, the natural gas that powers turbines and supplies the expanding global trade in gas over which the French company is extending its influence. More than half of IP's power output is generated by burning natural gas, he explains.
"Thanks to the IP deal, we become the number one in volumes of gas handled in Europe–1,300 terawatt hours. In second place will be E.ON Ruhrgas."
This means purchasing power, and the point won't be lost on important people with gas to sell. In 2008, Mr. Mestrallet completed a merger of Suez, a company with a fast-growing trading business in liquefied natural gas, with France's monopoly supplier, Gaz de France, a marriage that caused a bell to ring in a distant capital. Last year, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin summoned Mr. Mestrallet to Moscow.
"I'd never met him before," says the GDF-Suez chief. "His message was very clear, 'You are much bigger after the merger. We are the largest gas producer. You know the markets in Europe… You are the largest importer of liquefied natural gas into the U.S. We have projects in the long term to penetrate the U.S. market. We would be pleased to cooperate more with GDF-Suez."
The first deal followed quickly—the French company took a 9% shareholding in Nordstream, a Russian pipeline stretching the length of the Baltic Sea, linking Siberian gas fields with the German coast. The IP deal brings with it a portfolio of U.S. power stations, another bauble to dangle in front of Russian state-controlled gas company OAO Gazprom.
The point about gas is you can turn it on and off, Mr. Mestrallet explains. "Flexibility is key to our business model. It is a key instruction I give to our people, flexibility to be able to adapt in the short term and medium term."
Markets are volatile; demand for power collapsed in the recession and the U.S. natural gas price is below $4 per million British thermal units, less than half its price before the financial downturn.
"If you have nuclear plants, they are not flexible at all. They are working 24 hours a day. Hydropower and [combined-cycle gas turbines] represent the best way to store electricity, because it cannot be stored except as water in a reservoir or as gas."
Fickle wind turbines are the least flexible, he says. For every megawatt of wind, you need a gas turbine to back it up. "If you have no wind, you switch on the gas and if the wind is blowing at maximum you switch it off."
This is where GDF-Suez wants to be, switching the gas on and off around the world, using its flexible portfolio of fuels and power stations to have more power to sell as demand peaks.
The recent collapse in spot gas prices has brought simmering buyer-seller tension to a boil as European governments rage over the long-term contracts that control the price of imported gas from Russia, Norway and North Africa. These contracts, which can last for two decades, link the gas price to the price of crude oil and, as a result, consumers haven't benefited from the collapse in demand for gas. Spot gas is about half the price of crude oil and the big utilities have been wrangling with exporters, such as Gazprom, Norway's Statoil ASA and Sonatrach of Algeria.
Mr. Mestrallet says he has done a deal with Gazprom over the oil-price linkage. While he won't say what it was, he hints that it was less about price than market share.
"We have tried to get more flexibility in the volumes," he says. He defends the long-term contracts, arguing that security of supply is better than short-term price gain.
French gas consumers were never cut off in the Russia-Ukraine dispute in January 2009, he says. "There is a strong link between long-term contracts and security of supply. If you trade on spot markets you are totally exposed to the risk of lack of volumes in winter."
And long-term contracts suit Mr. Mestrallet's business plan, which is all about positioning GDF-Suez to win, not in the price battle next winter but in the war for market share over many winters to come. The gas bubble will subside, he argues, some time between 2012 and 2013 because of a hiatus in investment spending by producer countries.
"Many investments have been delayed. The Qataris have decided to reduce the speed of investment. The Russians have delayed Shtokman [a huge gas project in the Arctic]. When the gas price was close to $10 it was said that the cost of [extracting] shale gas was [$7 to $8]; now the gas price is $4."
Mr. Mestrallet is no follower of energy fashion. He seems happy to watch from the sidelines as the French government wrangles over the future of its nuclear champions, EDF and nuclear-engineering company Areva SA. "We are out. There is a nuclear team with two players. We are not concerned," he says.
GDF-Suez has seven reactors in Belgium and plans to build a reactor in Romania, and one in the U.K. with Iberdrola SA and Scottish and Southern Energy PLC. But he isn't wedded to using the Areva-designed European pressurized reactor model, following concerns about the cost overruns in Finland and at Flamanville in Normandy, where Areva is building EPRs. "The Roussely report [into the French nuclear industry] said we must draw the lessons of Finland and Flamanville before launching a new EPR. That is a wise decision," Mr. Mestrallet says.
There is no doubt that one of IP's attractions for GDF-Suez is that it is one step removed from the company's government shareholder. "The government shareholder is at the upper stage. For them [IP] it is better; I manage the relationship with the state and I protect them. Their job is to produce electricity."
Having ruled himself out of the French nuclear-industry jockeying, Mr. Mestrallet is looking further afield, to Brazil. There, GDF-Suez is building Jirau, the biggest dam in the world, a $5 billion investment that will generate 3,500 megawatts of hydroelectric power—more than twice the amount of power generated by an EPR. It will be part of IP's portfolio, and if it is built on time and to specifications, Mr. Mestrallet forecasts it will generate $500 million of Ebitda profit every year for IP for 35 years, thanks to a concession from the Brazilian government and offtake agreements for 70% of the output.
"It is green power," Mr. Mestrallet says. "The desire to make electricity green is a reality here in Europe, but in many countries the first need is capacity. You have no economic growth without electricity."
