stefanofabb
GAIN/Welcome
io la penso al contrario di te,ho solo 2 titoli di stato italiani uno lungo fisso e uno lungo indicizzato per l'80% e il 20 % azioni ad alto div. del FSEMIB.,buona sera
Titoli di Stato area Euro GRECIA Operativo titoli di stato - Cap. 2 (3 lettori)
- Creatore Discussione tommy271
- Data di Inizio
- Stato
ferdo
Utente Senior
ke presa per il kiu.lo ...
questi trattavano e nel frattempo riducevano l'esposizione conoscendo i termini verso cui si andava
nexvox
Forumer attivo
Non vorrei peccare di ingenuità, ma far presente a titolo preventivo (che ormai neanche sarebbe più preventivo, poiché le cose sono in fase avanzata di svolgimento) alle autorità italiane e greche che esistono dei cittadini, raccolti a formare un numero significativo, i quali vedranno i propri risparmi e i propri interessi attaccati da un atto unilaterale per il quale non sono stati consultati, al contrario degli altri partecipanti allo scambio, ecc. ecc. Ma non sarebbe meglio che far nulla nell'attesa e nella speranza che il filo sottile che ci tiene in piedi non venga troncato? Non comprendo questo stare immobili, nel caso di Boi spesso citato solo quelli che hanno fatto un casino incredibile su uno specifico bond non sono stati spazzati via, agli altri non è rimasto che lamentarsi e postare faccine come questasui forum.. in Germania, dove saranno testoni ma non fessi: SdK Schutzgemeinschaft der Kapitalanleger e.V.
caro discipline innanzitutto un plauso per l'iniziativa di raccogliere dati sulla nostra esposizione in titoli greci
ritengo che la tua proposta di far sentire già oggi la nostra voce non sia peregrina, è evidente che il tempo gioca a nostro sfavore...
dovremmo formare un comitato o qualcosa del genere per poi andare avanti sia nei confronti delle istituzioni che SOPRATTUTTO in termini giudiziari (nel caso in cui venissimo trattati come subordinati a BCE e compagnia bella).
io ci sto
ferdo
Utente Senior
se attivano la CAC ma non c'è trigger dei CDS, è vera mafia:
ricordo che i titoli originariamente non avevano CAC; l'avessero già avute le clausole, ok, ma sono state introdotte successivamente
... cmq vedremo di por.cate ormai ne hanno fatte tante, complice pure BCE
Andre_Sant
Forumer storico
esatto... e nel frattempo compravano anche obbligazioni europee e azioni vendute per paura.. e i tds grecia brevi...
facile vincere sapendo le cose a priori..
la grecia è stato un totale insider trading realizzato da parte delle grosse banche a danno degli altri investitori..
ciao
Andrea
ferdo
Utente Senior
in quel 4% potrebbero aver tenuto in conto le aziende farmaceutiche, o i bond CH e Japan
Zorba
Bos 4 Mod
Qui c'è un articolo interesante di Felix Salmon.
How all CDS are at risk of not paying out | Felix Salmon
Secondo Salmon, in caso di default veloce, in cui i vecchi bond venissero swappati velocemente (prima dell'asta CDS), scatterebbero sì i CDS, ma di fatto sarebbero inattivabili.
Traslando il discorso sulla Grecia, con la CAC scatterebbero i CDS, ma chi li ha acquistati incasserebbe cmq poco nulla in quanto non riuscirebbero a fare l'asta prima di lunedì. Probabilmente questo ha indotto i detentori dei bond GR a swappare, per cui non è esclusa un'adesione massiccia.
Discorso diverso per i bond non caccabili. Se scattassero i CDS, in quel caso probabilmente verrebbero incassati.
How all CDS are at risk of not paying out | Felix Salmon
Secondo Salmon, in caso di default veloce, in cui i vecchi bond venissero swappati velocemente (prima dell'asta CDS), scatterebbero sì i CDS, ma di fatto sarebbero inattivabili.
Traslando il discorso sulla Grecia, con la CAC scatterebbero i CDS, ma chi li ha acquistati incasserebbe cmq poco nulla in quanto non riuscirebbero a fare l'asta prima di lunedì. Probabilmente questo ha indotto i detentori dei bond GR a swappare, per cui non è esclusa un'adesione massiccia.
Discorso diverso per i bond non caccabili. Se scattassero i CDS, in quel caso probabilmente verrebbero incassati.
Concordo. Se tu o qualcuno ha il tempo di portare avanti la cosa lo appoggio e aderisco.Non vorrei peccare di ingenuità, ma far presente a titolo preventivo (che ormai neanche sarebbe più preventivo, poiché le cose sono in fase avanzata di svolgimento) alle autorità italiane e greche che esistono dei cittadini, raccolti a formare un numero significativo, i quali vedranno i propri risparmi e i propri interessi attaccati da un atto unilaterale per il quale non sono stati consultati, al contrario degli altri partecipanti allo scambio, ecc. ecc. Ma non sarebbe meglio che far nulla nell'attesa e nella speranza che il filo sottile che ci tiene in piedi non venga troncato? Non comprendo questo stare immobili, nel caso di Boi spesso citato solo quelli che hanno fatto un casino incredibile su uno specifico bond non sono stati spazzati via, agli altri non è rimasto che lamentarsi e postare faccine come questa
GiveMeLeverage
& I will remove the world
I feel more screwed then lucky, but anyway:
Greece’s Private Creditors Are the Lucky Ones
Published: Wednesday, 7 Mar 2012 | 7:02 PM ET
By: Nouriel Roubini
A myth is developing that private creditors have accepted significant losses in the restructuring of Greece’s debt; while the official sector gets off scot free. International Monetary Fund claims have traditional seniority, but bonds held by the European Central Bank and other eurozone central banks are also escaping a haircut, as are loans from the eurozone’s rescue funds with the same legal status as private claims. So, the argument runs, private claims have been “subordinated” to official ones in a breach of accepted legal practice.
The reality is that private creditors got a very sweet deal while most actual and future losses have been transferred to the official creditors.
Even after private sector involvement, Greece’s public debt will be unsustainable at close to 140 percent of gross domestic product: at best, it will fall to 120 percent by 2020 and could rise as high as 160 percent of GDP. Why? A “haircut” of €110 billion on privately held bonds is matched by an increase of €130 billion in the debt Greece owes to official creditors. A significant part of this increase in Greece’s official debt goes to bail out private creditors: €30bn for upfront cash sweeteners on the new bonds that effectively guarantee much of their face value. Any future further haircuts to make Greek debt sustainable will therefore fall disproportionately on the growing claims of the official sector. Loans of at least €25 billion from the European Financial Stability Facility to the Greek government will go towards recapitalising banks in a scheme that will keep those banks in private hands and allow shareholders to buy back any public capital injection with sweetly priced warrants.
The new bonds will also be subject to English law, where the old bonds fell under Greek jurisdiction. So if Greece were to leave the eurozone, it could no longer pass legislation to convert euro-denominated debt into new drachma debt. This is an amazing sweetener for creditors.
Moreover, the official sector began restructuring its claims (both the IMF ones and those with equal status to private ones) well before private sector creditors. Maturities were lengthened – effectively a debt restructuring – and the interest rate on those loans reduced, repeatedly.
This was despite the fact that all official loans should have been senior to the private ones, as they were all extended after the crisis struck; an attempt to resolve it rather than its cause. Historically, bilateral official (Paris Club) claims are treated as equivalent to private ones (London Club) only because such debt builds up for decades as governments lend money to former colonies or allies for political reasons. But all official lending in the eurozone began after the crisis and should have been senior to private claims. Any senior creditor that extends new financing to a distressed debtor should be given seniority; this is the principle of “debtor in possession” financing in corporate debt restructuring.
Moreover, until PSI occurred, for the last two years official loans by the Troika allowed Greece’s private creditors to exit their maturing claims on time and in full (or with a modest discount for the bonds purchased at high prices by the ECB). PSI came too little, too late.
Also, while the Eurosystem will receive, in the debt exchange, new Greek bonds valued at par, all the accounting profits from this scheme (plus the coupon on the bonds) will be transferred to governments, who have the option of passing these gains to Greece. The result is a haircut of about 30 per cent on these official sector claims. And if the ECB’s Greek bonds are passed – with no loss – to the EFSF, the latter will end up taking the losses for the difference between the bonds’ current low market price and the price at which the ECB bought them.
In conclusion, the idea that Greece’s debt restructuring is all PSI and haircuts, with no official sector involvement, is a myth. OSI started well before PSI; the PSI deal has substantial sweeteners; and with three quarters of Greek debt in the hands of official creditors by 2014, Greece’s public debt will be almost entirely socialised. Official creditors will be left to suffer most of the huge additional losses that remain likely on Greece’s still unsustainable debt in future. Moreover, the second official sector rescue of Greece will not be the last. Greece will not regain market access for at least another decade; so its fiscal and current account deficits will have to be financed with additional official resources for the foreseeable future.
So, Greece’s private creditors should stop complaining and accept the deal offered to them this week. They will take some losses, but those losses are limited and, on a mark-to-market basis, the debt exchange offers them a potential capital gain. Indeed, the fact that the new bonds are expected to be worth more than the old bonds suggests that this PSI exercise has further transferred losses to Greece’s official creditors.
The reality is that most of the gains in good times – and until the PSI – were privatized while most of the losses have been now socialized. Taxpayers of Greece’s official creditors, not private bondholders, will end up paying for most of the losses deriving from Greece’s past, current and future insolvency.
The writer is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor at the Stern School of Business, NYU
Greece’s Private Creditors Are the Lucky Ones
Published: Wednesday, 7 Mar 2012 | 7:02 PM ET
By: Nouriel Roubini
A myth is developing that private creditors have accepted significant losses in the restructuring of Greece’s debt; while the official sector gets off scot free. International Monetary Fund claims have traditional seniority, but bonds held by the European Central Bank and other eurozone central banks are also escaping a haircut, as are loans from the eurozone’s rescue funds with the same legal status as private claims. So, the argument runs, private claims have been “subordinated” to official ones in a breach of accepted legal practice.
The reality is that private creditors got a very sweet deal while most actual and future losses have been transferred to the official creditors.
Even after private sector involvement, Greece’s public debt will be unsustainable at close to 140 percent of gross domestic product: at best, it will fall to 120 percent by 2020 and could rise as high as 160 percent of GDP. Why? A “haircut” of €110 billion on privately held bonds is matched by an increase of €130 billion in the debt Greece owes to official creditors. A significant part of this increase in Greece’s official debt goes to bail out private creditors: €30bn for upfront cash sweeteners on the new bonds that effectively guarantee much of their face value. Any future further haircuts to make Greek debt sustainable will therefore fall disproportionately on the growing claims of the official sector. Loans of at least €25 billion from the European Financial Stability Facility to the Greek government will go towards recapitalising banks in a scheme that will keep those banks in private hands and allow shareholders to buy back any public capital injection with sweetly priced warrants.
The new bonds will also be subject to English law, where the old bonds fell under Greek jurisdiction. So if Greece were to leave the eurozone, it could no longer pass legislation to convert euro-denominated debt into new drachma debt. This is an amazing sweetener for creditors.
Moreover, the official sector began restructuring its claims (both the IMF ones and those with equal status to private ones) well before private sector creditors. Maturities were lengthened – effectively a debt restructuring – and the interest rate on those loans reduced, repeatedly.
This was despite the fact that all official loans should have been senior to the private ones, as they were all extended after the crisis struck; an attempt to resolve it rather than its cause. Historically, bilateral official (Paris Club) claims are treated as equivalent to private ones (London Club) only because such debt builds up for decades as governments lend money to former colonies or allies for political reasons. But all official lending in the eurozone began after the crisis and should have been senior to private claims. Any senior creditor that extends new financing to a distressed debtor should be given seniority; this is the principle of “debtor in possession” financing in corporate debt restructuring.
Moreover, until PSI occurred, for the last two years official loans by the Troika allowed Greece’s private creditors to exit their maturing claims on time and in full (or with a modest discount for the bonds purchased at high prices by the ECB). PSI came too little, too late.
Also, while the Eurosystem will receive, in the debt exchange, new Greek bonds valued at par, all the accounting profits from this scheme (plus the coupon on the bonds) will be transferred to governments, who have the option of passing these gains to Greece. The result is a haircut of about 30 per cent on these official sector claims. And if the ECB’s Greek bonds are passed – with no loss – to the EFSF, the latter will end up taking the losses for the difference between the bonds’ current low market price and the price at which the ECB bought them.
In conclusion, the idea that Greece’s debt restructuring is all PSI and haircuts, with no official sector involvement, is a myth. OSI started well before PSI; the PSI deal has substantial sweeteners; and with three quarters of Greek debt in the hands of official creditors by 2014, Greece’s public debt will be almost entirely socialised. Official creditors will be left to suffer most of the huge additional losses that remain likely on Greece’s still unsustainable debt in future. Moreover, the second official sector rescue of Greece will not be the last. Greece will not regain market access for at least another decade; so its fiscal and current account deficits will have to be financed with additional official resources for the foreseeable future.
So, Greece’s private creditors should stop complaining and accept the deal offered to them this week. They will take some losses, but those losses are limited and, on a mark-to-market basis, the debt exchange offers them a potential capital gain. Indeed, the fact that the new bonds are expected to be worth more than the old bonds suggests that this PSI exercise has further transferred losses to Greece’s official creditors.
The reality is that most of the gains in good times – and until the PSI – were privatized while most of the losses have been now socialized. Taxpayers of Greece’s official creditors, not private bondholders, will end up paying for most of the losses deriving from Greece’s past, current and future insolvency.
The writer is chairman of Roubini Global Economics and professor at the Stern School of Business, NYU
Ultima modifica:
Abulico
Forumer storico
Mezzogiorno di fuoco
Secondo le informazioni da un membro superiore del governo greco ha una immagine diretta dei titolari delle obbligazioni greche: "Siamo relativamente soddisfatti del processo"
Quando è stato chiesto se avrebbero poi innescato le clausole di azione collettiva, la risposta è stata che "le decisioni definitive prese dal Venerdì dell'Eurogruppo."
In ogni caso, il libro offre stretta sera Giovedi e Venerdì mattina annuncerà l'esito del processo. A mezzogiorno teleconferenza Venerdì si terrà a ministri delle Finanze della zona euro per valutare gli effetti dello scambio di obbligazioni greche (PSI +).
Secondo le informazioni da un membro superiore del governo greco ha una immagine diretta dei titolari delle obbligazioni greche: "Siamo relativamente soddisfatti del processo"
Quando è stato chiesto se avrebbero poi innescato le clausole di azione collettiva, la risposta è stata che "le decisioni definitive prese dal Venerdì dell'Eurogruppo."
In ogni caso, il libro offre stretta sera Giovedi e Venerdì mattina annuncerà l'esito del processo. A mezzogiorno teleconferenza Venerdì si terrà a ministri delle Finanze della zona euro per valutare gli effetti dello scambio di obbligazioni greche (PSI +).
- Stato